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I
Title: A Grounded Agent Model of the Consumer Technology Adoption Process

Adoption is one of the most important concepts in the diffusion of innovations
(DOI) literature, yet certain aspects of it are poorly understood. In particular, causal
adoption process theory (CAPT) has been stagnant for decades and seldom subjected
to critical scrutiny. In consequence, DOI research is unstable - different studies
identify different factors as important.
This dissertation introduces grounded agent modeling, a hybrid methodology
drawing on existing software engineering and social science techniques to construct a
step-by-step explanation of how consumers make technology adoption decisions.
Inductive case studies, grounded theory, and sequence analysis are used to investigate
transportation mode adoption and build a theoretical framework that is sufficiently
precise to guide its implementation in Unified Modeling Language (UML).
What emerges is the Motive-Technology-Belief (MTB) framework, a theory
that conceptualizes adoption in terms of motives (inner mental reasons), technologies
(tools that pertain to motives) and beliefs (associations between motives and/or
technologies.) Motives and technologies are self-similar and exhibit fractal structure.

The atomic unit of adoption is the temor, a belief that associates a technology with a
particular motive.
Three conscious processes govern the behavior of these structures. "Selecting"
chooses a tool to satisfy an immediate need. "Evaluating" constructs beliefs about a
tool. Selecting and evaluating are complementary ceteris paribus processes that
i

operate in tandem. "Maintaining" determines the functional status of a tool. Five
unconscious

auxiliary

processes

-

"perceiving,"

"framing,"

"focusing,"

"categorizing," and "acting" - govern motivation.
This study makes important contributions to several fields by cracking open
two black boxes - one theoretical, the other methodological. The theoretical
contribution is a coherent and empirically grounded framework that exposes the inner
mental processes of adoption. The methodological contribution is to combine
qualitative field research with UML to make consumer agent modeling more
systematic, clear, and insightful. The substantive contribution is a grounded agent
model that is well-suited to guide the construction of simulated consumer agents.
Aggregations of calibrated consumer agents may be able to identify new markets
before they exist and model DOI with greater accuracy. Consequently, this dissertation
lays the foundation for a totally new approach to research on DOI and the formation of
markets.
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organizational processes involve opposing forces, nonlinear
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point raised by these theorists, however, is that the interaction of a
relatively small number of simple deterministic elements may generate
complexity, if they take into account such phenomena. With this, there
is hope that relatively parsimonious theoretical formulations may be
able to make sense of the complexity observed in process data."
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epistemological implications of its own work. Eventually someone will
come and explain what lessons the experience of software construction
holds for the intellectual world at large. No doubt abstract data types
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CHAPTER 1. PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES, AND OVERVIEW
1.1. The Need for New Adoption Theory
Adoption is the process of finding the right tool for the job. It is one of the
oldest and most important concepts in the diffusion of innovations literature (Eveland,
1979) and has been the focus of a mammoth body of research (Choudrie & Dwivedi,
2005; Venkatesh, 2006). To convey some idea of the size of this literature, one
popular questionnaire for measuring organizational adoption, the Technology
Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989), has well over a
thousand citations; even more widely cited is the Transtheoretical Model (Prochaska
& DiClemente, 1984), a questionnaire used to measure the adoption of health-related
innovations by individuals. The literature is so large that one might conclude that there
could be no remaining gaps which could justify undertaking yet another adoption
study.
And yet, despite this abundant literature, there is still much about adoption that
is poorly understood. To be sure, certain aspects are quite mature, such as the
identification of factors influencing adoption rates or outcomes for various
innovations. However, causal adoption process theory (CAPT) has been stagnant for
decades and has seldom been subjected to much critical examination or scrutiny
(Eveland, 1979; Mohr, 1982; Gatignon & Robertson, 1985; Venkatesh, 2006). A
CAPT is a step-by-step explanation of how events or life experiences cause beliefs
about a technology to change over time.
(1)

Everett Rogers argues that past adoption studies have been theoretically
shallow, displaying "a kind of sameness, as they pursue a small number of research
issues with somewhat stereotyped approaches" (Rogers, 2003, pg. 40). Historically,
consumer adoption studies have tended to rely almost exclusively on surveys, while
organizational adoption studies have nearly always utilized case studies (Choudrie &
Dwivedi, 2005). For Elihu Kfetz (1999, pg. 145), the stagnation of CAPT is
attributable in part to the multidisciplinary nature of adoption: "Almost nobody admits
to owning the problem, and the state of the theory shows it." The result has been
'miles of studies - inches of theory.' Rogers adds that "students of diffusion have been
working where the ground is soft...The challenge for future research is to expand the
area of digging and to search for different objectives than those of the past. Perhaps
there is a need to dig deeper, in directions that theory suggests." (Rogers, 2003, pg.
101)
One may be tempted to ask: "So what if adoption studies are theoretically
shallow? Doesn't this vast body of literature imply that CAPT isn't essential to
adoption practice?" The answer is that theory is important, for several reasons: it
provides a framework for identifying empirical patterns and resolving inconsistencies
across studies; it helps recommend directions for future research; it generates
hypotheses by which generalizable conclusions may be tested; it locates research
within the broader context of knowledge claims; and it serves as a mechanism for
integrating knowledge from related fields (Steinfield & Fulk, 1990).

(2)

The stagnation of CAPT also has practical consequences, for it contributes to
the instability of diffusion research. Downs and Mohr define instability as a tendency
for one study to identify factors which are considered important to diffusion, only to
have these same factors found to be less important, unimportant, or inversely
important by other diffusion studies (Downs & Mohr, 1976, pg. 700). This instability
is caused in part by variation1 in how adoption is conceptualized, measured, and
compared:
"For example, a positive relation between the social status of the
potential adopter and earliness of adoption is supported in 275 studies
(68 percent) and not supported in 127 others. Why is that? [...] The
world is complex; it is not surprising that sometimes older managers
are the first to innovate and sometimes younger ones. What one cannot
do is make any theoretical sense out of such a record. Moreover, it
cannot be productive, at this point, to add either the 276th supporting
study or the 128th nonsupporting study to the running tally on social
status and innovation." (Mohr, 1982, pg. 8)
As a purely practical matter, then, the stagnation of CAPT makes it difficult to
identify which aspects of adoption are significant and stable enough to measure.
1.2. The Management Question
CAPT does not merely study tool use; its focus is the broader mental and
social process of sensemaking about tools within the context of one's life. CAPT does
not seek to explain adoption in technology-centric terms such as the number of units
sold or the frequency of use; neither does it seek to explain adoption by treating
collective entities (e.g., groups, teams, coalitions, business units, departments,

organizations, or industries) as if they were discrete causal actors (Whitehead,
1929/1978; Sandelands & Stablein, 1987; Drazin & Sandelands, 1992; Anderson,
(3)

1999). CAPT identifies individuals as the agents who cause adoption outcomes to
circulate, reproduce, and persist over time within collective entities (Schank, 2001).
However, management of technology (MOT) is primarily concerned with
collective social phenomena such as diffusion, organizational learning and strategy,
innovation dynamics, technology markets, and so forth. How could a CAPT of
individual consumer adoption rielp MOT practitioners to extract useful information
from organizations, technology markets or innovations, or predict their future
behavior? The answer is: by harnessing agent-based social simulation as a new tool for
market research.

1.3. Artificial Markets
A CAPT may be built, tested, and validated with empirical field research, but
its full potential can only be unleashed through computer simulation. Over the past
decade it has become possible to construct agent-based simulations of actual cities,
regions, and even whole countries that are geographically and demographically
accurate to a spatial resolution of a few meters. By adding agents to simulate the
actions and interactions of individual consumers, a new and extremely powerful form
of simulation may be constructed with the power to revolutionize MOT research: an
artificial market (AM).
Consumer agents are the "sim-citizens" of an AM. Agents are programmed to
simulate the behavior and communication of real consumers, in proportions which
reflect the demographics and preferences of actual markets. Agents of various types
may be combined within the same AM, such as firms pursuing various strategies (e.g.,
(4)

invention, innovation, imitation, reaction) to increase market share among the
simulated consumers.

"The resulting society will - unavoidably -

couple

demography, economics, cultural change, conflict, and public health. All these spheres
of social life will emerge - and merge - naturally and without top-down specification,
from the purely local interactions of the individual agents." (Epstein & Axtell, 1996,
pg. 158)

>

Together with their cousins, artificial organizations (Prietula, Carley, &
Gasser, 1998), AMs could facilitate understanding and insight and make possible new
practical applications such as generating and evaluating new business models for
disruptive markets, profiling products and services that markets are poised to accept,
exploring innovation dynamics, forecasting technology diffusion, and much more.
Consumer agent modeling is embryonic, but a need has already emerged for a
CAPT of consumer adoption that is 1) solidly grounded in empirical observations of
consumer behavior and 2) sufficiently precise and formal to guide the construction of
simulated consumer agents (Kottonau, Burse, & Pahl-Wostl, 2000; Ben Said, Drogoul,
& Bouron, 2002; Kliiver, Stoica, & Schmidt, 2003; Zhang & Zhang, 2007).
Computers are unforgiving of ambiguity, and unfortunately most extant behavioral
theories are too imprecise and informal to serve as a reliable guide for consumer agent
construction (Goldspink, 2002).
1.4. Dissertation Objectives
To summarize, the stagnation of CAPT contributes to instability in diffusion
research and hinders the development of AMs as a new venue for MOT research.
(5)

CAPT is needed that is solidly grounded in empirical observations of consumer
behavior and sufficiently precise and formal to guide the construction of simulated
consumer agents.
The objective of this study is to build a CAPT to explain how certain events or
life experiences change a consumer's beliefs about technologies over time. Two sets
of research questions are posed:''
RQ-1. How do consumers make adoption decisions? What are the
characteristic states and events of the process? Which transition
patterns are observed to occur? How do consumers limit the time and
effort they expend on the process? How do they respond to
interruptions? How is the adoption process bounded in time?
RQ-2. How might a grounded agent model (GAM) be constructed from
empirical evidence? How might its structure and behavior be derived
from in situ observations?
To address these questions, theory-building methods from the social sciences
(inductive case studies, grounded theory, and sequence analysis) are applied in
conjunction with software engineering modeling techniques to construct a theoretical
framework for adoption that is sufficiently precise and formal to be expressed as a
GAM in Unified Modeling Language (UML). The aim of this study is to construct a
'simulation-ready' theory of adoption (as opposed to an actual working simulation.)
The substantive topic is the psychological process by which transportation
consumers adopt single occupancy vehicles alternatives such as transit, bicycles, and
(6)

car sharing. Two cases are examined. The first is a retrospective study of
transportation mode adoption among participants in Portland State University's
Passport Plus program, an annual pass which entitles the bearer to the use of light rail,
bus, car sharing, and reduced rate campus parking in any desired combination. The
objective of the first case is to unpack the properties and dimensions of adoption by
investigating how participants irf this program make choices and tradeoffs from among
the available options. The second case is a longitudinal cohort study of novice winter
bicycle commuters; its objective is to trace the progression of the adoption process
over time and identify its characteristic states, events, and transition sequences.
This study should be understood as the first project in a long-term research
program. After completion of this study, the next phase will be to use the GAM as a
measurement model for a questionnaire to classify the adoption status of consumers.
After validating the questionnaire (and, by extension, the GAM), the final phase will
integrate the GAM as a component of an agent-based AM simulation.
1.5. Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized into ten chapters. The second chapter reviews the
theoretical and methodological literature on technology adoption; it concludes that
adoption is a reified concept which is in need of fresh theoretical perspectives. Chapter
three examines the potential of "Artificial Markets as a New Venue for Innovation
Research" and finds that new methodologies are needed that can synthesize social
science field research and software engineering modeling techniques to produce
grounded agent models of consumer behavior. Chapter four introduces a methodology
(7)

for constructing behavioral agents from qualitative field research; this chapter presents
an overview of the research approach and discusses steps taken during the data
collection process. The nature of the grounded theory discovery is such that greater
clarity may be attained by discussing methodology and data collection in the same
chapter.
Chapters five through eight are devoted to data analysis. Chapter five presents
an overview of the theoretical framework, followed by detailed analysis of the
"Structural Foundations" in chapter six, "Conscious Behavioral Processes" in chapter
seven, and "Unconscious Auxiliary Processes" in chapter eight.
The ninth chapter discusses steps taken to ensure the "Validity and
Generalizability" of the framework. The tenth and final chapter, "Conclusions"
reviews the findings of the study, discusses its contributions and limitations, and
recommends directions for future research.

(8)

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. The Adoption Concept
Adoption is one of the oldest and most important concepts in the diffusion of
innovations (DOI) literature (Eveland, 1979). Although it is central to DOI research,
the concept is slippery and elusive. 'Adoption' and 'innovation' are often used
interchangeably in DOI research, especially in the organizational context (e.g., Downs
& Mohr, 1976; Rogers, 2003, Chapter 10). A certain conceptual overlap exists among
'adoption', 'learning', 'problem solving', 'decision making', and 'innovation'.
Adoption can refer to a process, an event, or a state of being - sometimes all at once.
Adoption is laden with positive value and implied finality; adopters are those who
adopt, as opposed to rejectors who decide not to adopt, or nonadopters who have yet to
begin the process of becoming adopters.
Eveland (1979) argues that DOI researchers have tended to reify adoption,
legitimizing the concept through frequent repetition without pausing to critically
consider its deeper implications. He recommended that DOI researchers observe a
moratorium on the use of 'adoption' until the concept could be more clearly defined,
but his advice was unheeded. Adoption has served as the main dependent variable for
a large number of DOI studies and has provided the main basis for the generalizability
claims of most DOI research (Eveland, 1979; Tornatzky & Klein, 1982). It has also
served as an important criterion for measuring the effectiveness of prescriptive
diffusion campaigns (e.g., Vaughan & Rogers, 2000; Polacsek et al., 2001). By
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contrast, adoption's antithesis rejection has been the stepchild of DOI research,
receiving relatively scant attention and funding.
Rogers (2003, pg. 21) defines adoption as the decision to make full use of an
innovation as the best course of action available. He distinguishes among three types
of adoption decisions:
•

An optional adoption decision is made by a single individual (e.g.,
most consumer decisions).

•

A collective adoption decision is arrived at through group consensus.

•

An authority adoption decision is imposed by a relatively few
individuals who occupy positions of power, status, or technical
expertise in a group.

Most MOT research on diffusion has investigated collective or authority
adoption decisions in organizational settings. This study focuses on optional adoption
decisions, which are 'optional' in the sense that the final decision to implement or
reject is made by a single individual. However, 'optional' does not imply that the
individual acts as a free agent, since family, friends, salespersons, and advertising can
still apply social pressure to adopt or not to adopt (Katz, 1962). Adoption is an
inherently social process.
2.2. Adoption Process Models
The technology adoption decision process (TADP) is a dynamic sequence of
actions and interactions by which an individual evaluates a technological innovation
(10)

and decides whether to incorporate it into ongoing practice. The dominant assumption
of most TADP models is the phase theorem (Witte, 1972), which states that decision
making occurs in sequential phases or stages - presumably because the cognitive
aspects of adoption are easier to manage if the process is broken into more
manageable subtasks.
The most frequently cited adoption model in the DOI literature is the Rogers
model (Figure 5) whose five stages have served as the dependent variable for a sizable
number of studies (Ettlie, 1980).
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Figure 5. The Rogers Model of the TADP (Rogers, 2003)

Several other staged TADP models have appeared over the years. Some have
addressed innovation adoption decisions made by individuals (Lavidge & Steiner,
1961; Rogers, 1962; Klongan & Coward, 1970; Robertson, 1971; Rogers &
Shoemaker, 1971; Zaltman & Brooker, 1971). Others have explored the TADP in
organizational or collective settings (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Eveland, Rogers, & Klepper, 1977; Nutt, 1984; Meyer
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& Goes, 1988; Langley & Truax, 1994), for specific classes of innovations (e.g.,
Wildemuth, 1992), or by substage (e.g., Pounds, 1969; Alexander, 1979; Lyles &
Mitroff, 1980; Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983; Smith, 1989).
Staged models are also common in the consumer psychology literature, where
they have been used to describe behavior change by individuals (e.g., Janis & Mann,
1977, pg. 171-200; Montgomery, 1983; Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992;
Beach & Mitchell, 1996; McGuire, 2001) as well as problem-solving by individuals
(e.g., Polya, 1957; Simon, 1960; Brim, Glass, Lavin, & Goodman, 1962; Newell &
Simon, 1963; Maier, 1964; Pounds, 1969; Newell & Simon, 1972; Kast &
Rosenzweig, 1979; Bransford & Stein, 1984).
In the marketing literature the most widely-cited TADP model is probably the
Engel-Blackwell-Miniard model (1982), shown in Figure 6.
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2.3. Criticisms of Adoption Process Models
The empirical validity of staged models remains in doubt. Only a handful of
studies have tested the validity of staged TADP models (Ettlie, 1980; Lipshitz & BarIlan, 1996; Rogers, 2003, pp. 197-198). In a study of the adoption of 34 transportation
innovations from six firms, Ettlie (1980) found that the Rogers model adequately
described the decision making sequence about 60% of the time. Several researchers
report evidence of overlap between stages, difficulty in clearly distinguishing between
stages, skipped stages, and out-of-order stages (e.g., Beal & Rogers, 1960; Francis &
Rogers, 1960; Mason, 1962; Sabherwal & Robey, 1993; Langley & Truax, 1994;
Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995; Tucker, 1999; Rosen,
2000). Other studies report truncated search procedures (Cyert & March, 1963),
interruptions and disjointed progress (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Mintzberg et al.,
1976), and coincidental confluence of problems, solutions, decision makers and choice
opportunities (March & Olsen, 1976).
Most staged models offer little in the way of theoretical justification (Ettlie,
1980; Gatignon & Robertson, 1991; Lipshitz & Bar-Han, 1996; Rogers, 2003, pp. 197198). The theoretical basis of the Rogers model is the tendency of individuals to seek
information from different communication channels during different stages of the
adoption process (Beal, Rogers, & Bohlen, 1957). However, this is a weak basis for
differentiating stages, since individuals may use the same information channels in
each stage (Bach, 1989; Rogers, 2003, pg. 197) and non-stage processes may be
responsible for the differences (Weinstein, Rothman, & Sutton, 1998). Furthermore,
(13)

this criterion is inherently biased since interview questions about information sources
and communication channels tend to be framed in terms of an implicit stage model
(Mason, 1962; Poole & Roth, 1989). In some cases these stages may derive more from
the researcher's logic than empirical observations of events over time (Sabherwal &
Robey, 1993). In other cases stage models may be constructed on the basis of
retrospective interviews, which* tends to bias the models because informants may
selectively recall details which make the decision process seem more sequential and
logical than it appeared at the time (Coughenour, 1965; Schwenk, 1985). Nutt
concludes that "the sequence of problem definition, alternative generation, refinement,
and selection, called for by nearly every theorist, seems rooted in rational arguments,
not behavior." (Nutt, 1984, pg. 446)
Staged decision making models share a certain degree of conceptual overlap
and privilege the stages of the process over events or turning points. Most depict
transition paths as simple linear sequences with little consideration of branching,
exceptions, interrupts, parallelism, or iteration; or, these features may be discussed in
general terms while the exact circumstances of their occurrence is left unspecified.
Almost without exception, staged models grossly simplify adoption behavior and are
too informal to permit the formulation of testable propositions and falsifiable
hypotheses. Since the reliability of most staged models is problematic, it is difficult to
assess their validity.
In summary, the TADP occupies a pivotal role in DOI research (Eveland,
1979; Rogers, 2003, pp. 196-197). Many staged TADP models have been proposed,
(14)

but they tend to privilege the stages of the process over other aspects such as critical
events or transition paths. Stages are often

emphasized

when

facilitating

communication is the goal. The first models of the TADP were developed as teaching
tools (Hassinger, 1959) with lasting consequences for how the TADP has been
approached in the literature. Staged models are most applicable to preprogrammed
decisions, arrived at by individual decision makers, acting with deliberate intent to
consider the adoption of innovations embodied by fixed-form physical products. They
are least applicable to non-routine strategic decisions, arrived at by organizational or
collective decision making units, with regard to loosely-structured innovations, about
which no clearly agreed-upon goal or consensus exists (Meyer & Goes, 1988, pg. 902;
Abbott, 1990).
2.4. Bias in Adoption Process Research
The DOI literature is heavily tilted toward prescriptive research, giving rise to
systematic shortcomings which limit what is understood about the TADP (Gatignon &
Robertson, 1985; Rogers, 2003). Pro-innovation bias is the assumption that an
innovation should be adopted as widely as possible without deviating from endorsed
patterns of use (Rogers, 2003, pg. 106). This form of bias has caused certain aspects of
the TADP to be under-researched, such as the rejection and discontinuance of
innovations, user modification of innovations, and user motivations for adoption (von
Hippel, 1976, 2005). "If diffusion scholars could more adequately see an innovation
through the eyes of their respondents, including why the innovation was adopted or
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rejected, diffusion research would be in a better position to shed the pro-innovation
bias of the past." (Rogers, 2003, pg. 116).
A second form of shortcoming is source bias, which Rogers (pg. 118) defines

"...a tendency for diffusion research to side with the change agencies
that promote innovations rather than with the individuals who are
potential adopters. This source bias is perhaps suggested by the words
that we use to describe this field of research: 'diffusion' research might
have been called something like 'problem solving,' 'innovation
seeking,' or 'evaluation of innovations' had the audience originally
been a stronger influence on the research...The source sponsorship of
early diffusion studies may have given these investigations not only a
pro-innovation bias but also structured the nature of diffusion research
in other important ways."
In many DOI studies adoption is defined as the purchase or acquisition of
whichever innovation is centrally valued by the research sponsor (Eveland, 1979).
Researchers who take this stance tend to frame adoption as a question of whether to
accept a proffered innovation rather than which of several competing options to
choose.
Rogers also argues that DOI scholars sometimes overlook the ethical issues
raised by their research. He advocates taking an "empirical-critical" stance which
explicitly considers the ethical considerations of research while at the same time
affirms the value of empirical scientific inquiry (Rogers, 1987).
In summary, there is a prescriptive flavor to most DOI literature on adoption.
Descriptive research is needed to stimulate the development of new diffusion theory,
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investigate the TADP from the decision maker's perspective, and avoid the source bias
and pro-innovation bias which pervades DOI research.
2.5. Consumer Adoption
Consumer research is a multidisciplinary area whose main contributions have
come from psychology, marketing, and economics. It overlaps the DOI literature to
some extent and shares several key contributors (e.g., Everett M. Rogers, Gerald
Zaltman, Thomas Robertson, Hubert Gatignon, Richard Bagozzi, R.H. Thaler). The
roots of consumer behavioral research are in marketing, and many self-identified
consumer psychologists now work in marketing departments (Olander, 1993). An
economics thread weaves its way through this literature, although consumer
psychologists far outnumber economic psychologists (Lea & Belk, 1994).
Consumers have been a traditional focus for basic behavioral research. In an
analysis of studies published in the Journal of Consumer Research, Lutz (1991) found
that the majority of consumer research designs begin in the conceptual domain to
identify a theory of interest, then move to the methodological domain to devise a test
of that theory, and finally proceed to the substantive domain to identify phenomena
which fit the theoretical boundary conditions. Lutz argues that such 'concept-driven'
research designs are unlikely to provide insight into the substantive phenomenon
which is the ostensible target of the study. Olander (1993) agrees and adds that most
academic consumer psychology studies have the character of basic research, which
seeks to explain theoretical and behavioral concepts, rather than applied research
which contributes to knowledge about substantive phenomena. In concept-driven
(17)

research designs the choice of a substantive topic area is determined by the choices
made in the theoretical and methodological domains.
Social marketing uses marketing strategy to encourage the adoption of
nonprofit products and services (e.g., mass transit, recycling, conservation.) These
situations are fertile grounds for basic behavioral research:
"It can be hypothesized that social marketing situations are of such high
involvement that models which are difficult to test in traditional
marketing settings will reveal themselves in the more highly charged
social marketing contexts. In social marketing, one is asking parents to
begin to regulate family size or a rural mother to regularly weigh her
child and expose the fact that her family has little food. This is a much
more serious issue for the target audience than asking them to buy a
Toyota or new furniture. As a consequence, when behavior change
does take place, one would expect it to be driven by very powerful,
relatively easily discernable forces. Underlying linkages between
attitudes, personality, lifestyle, memory, external influences, and
behavioral intentions ought to be relatively stronger and more stable
than is the case in the less involving choices where chance influences
and/or basic structural instabilities can effectively mask the underlying
true relationships." (Andreasen, 1991, pg. 487)
2.6. Philosophical and Theoretical Frameworks for TADP Research
Deciding whether to adopt or reject a new innovation is a dynamic social
process. Mapping the structure of the adoption process requires a different research
approach than identifying factors which influence adoption. Mohr (1982) defined
process research as a collection of methods for investigating how social organization
evolves over time. Process research focuses on the structure of a social process rather
than independent variables which might influence that process or dependent variables
which might be influenced by that process. Process research is often defined in terms
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of events, or discrete, measurable occurrences in time. Events provide the means by
which a process may be measured, studied, modeled, and sometimes managed.
By contrast, variance research seeks to identify correlations or covariances
among variables rather than their time order. Mohr and Rogers argue that the static
nature of variance research is ill-suited to the investigation of dynamic patterns such as
the movement over time from state A to state B:
In order to explore the nature of a process, one needs a dynamic
perspective to explain the causes and sequences of a series of events
over time. Data-gathering methods for process research are less
structured and might entail using in-depth personal interviews. The data
are typically more qualitative in nature than in variance research.
Seldom are statistical methods used to analyze the data in process
research. Diffusion scholars have frequently failed to recognize the
important distinction between variance and process research in the past
(Mohr, 1978). Research on a topic such as the [TADP] should be quite
different from the variance research that has predominated in the
diffusion field. The scarcity of process research on the [TADP] is a
basic reason why we lack definitive understanding of the degree to
which stages exist. (Rogers, 2003, pp. 196-7)
One of the most important works in the TADP literature is Mohr's Explaining
Organizational Behavior (1982). In this book Mohr called for increased use of process
research as an alternative to variance research to remedy the instability of DOI
research as well as to overcome obstacles to explanatory theory. Explaining
Organizational Behavior has been widely influential and is cited by many of the
studies discussed in this section.
'Process' is an overloaded term which is applicable to a wide range of
phenomena. Van de Ven (1992) recommends that process researchers clarify what
they mean by 'process' to establish a firm conceptual foundation, to help guide
(19)

research design choices, and to locate their research within the context of the
literature.
A major theme in the DOI literature has been to understand how the TADP
unfolds in organizational settings. Organizational decision making is seldom rational
(Nutt, 1984, pg. 446; Meyer & Goes, 1988; Wildemuth, 1992, pg. 222). Sometimes it
exhibits a clear structure, while" at other times it more closely resembles a chaotic
muddle. Loosely speaking, organizational decision making studies tend to cluster
along a continuum between two opposing theoretical poles (Pinfield, 1986; Langley et
al., 1995). Anchoring one pole is the structured perspective, which conceives of the
organizational decision making as a structured sequence of events gradually
converging toward a resolution (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1976). At the other pole is the
anarchic perspective, which conceives of the TADP as the dynamic interaction of
problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities (e.g., Cohen, March, &
Olsen, 1972; Pettigrew, 1990b).

2.6.1. The Structured Perspective
The exemplar for the structured perspective is Mintzberg, Raisinghani and
Theorem's classic 1976 case study of 25 'unstructured' decision processes (Figure 7).
Mintzberg and his colleagues developed a general model of the organizational
decision process in enough detail to be represented in flow chart form. It is more
complete than many staged models, featuring path cycles, time delays, and interrupts.
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Figure 7. The Mintzberg-Raisinghani-Th6oret Model of Decision Making (Mintzberg et al., 1976)

Early structured perspective research defined the TADP as a 'pattern in a
stream of decisions' (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979). However, when theorists
attempted to backtrace the evolution of any particular decision, they found it difficult
to pin down exactly when decisions were made in organizations (e.g., Meyer, 1991;
Langley & Truax, 1994). Scholars have disagreed as to why 'the decision' is so
elusive. Some have framed the issue in operational terms: most strategic decisions
leave few measurable traces. Others have cited the bounded perspective of individual
informants (Meyer, 1991) and known problems with the reliability of retrospective
interviewing techniques (Coughenour, 1965; Schwenk, 1985). Some have questioned
whether 'the decision' is a meaningful construct in an organizational setting
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990b; Langley & Truax, 1994; Langley et al,
1995). As one GM executive remarked,
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"It is often difficult to say who decided something and when - or even
who originated a decision.. .1 frequently don't know when a decision is
made in General Motors. I don't remember being in a committee
meeting when things came to a vote. Usually someone will simply
summarize a developing position. Everyone else either nods or states
his particular terms of consensus." (Quoted in Quinn, 1980, pg. 134)
2.6.2. The Anarchic Perspective
At the opposing pole is the anarchic perspective, exemplified by Cohen,
March and Olsen's 'garbage can' model of decision making in universities. Cohen and
colleagues (Cohen et al, 1972, pg. 16) describe the garbage can as
"a model of decision making in organized anarchies, that is, in
situations which do not meet the conditions for more classical models
of decision making in some or all of three important ways: preferences
are problematic, technology is unclear, or participation is fluid. The
garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions, and
participants move from one choice opportunity to another in such a way
that the nature of the choice, the time it takes, and the problems it
solves all depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing of elements.
These include the mix of choices available at any one time, the mix of
problems that have access to the organization, the mix of solutions
looking for problems, and the outside demands of the decision makers."
Scholars sharing the anarchic perspective insist on "explicit recognition that
change is multifaceted; involving political, cultural, incremental, environmental, and
structural, as well as rational dimensions. Power, chance, opportunism, accident are as
influential in shaping outcomes as are design, negotiated agreements and masterplans" (Pettigrew, 1990a, pg. 268). A major contribution of this perspective is that it
shuns the notion of 'decisions' as artificial, post facto constructs imposed by
researchers and onlookers in their attempt to make sense of an inherently dynamic,
fluid social process. Another contribution is that it explicitly acknowledges the key
element of social interaction in the decision making process.
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A strong 'anti-pattern' thread weaves its way through anarchic perspective
research, perhaps in reaction to the presumed rationality and top-down design implicit
in structured perspective research. Langley and her colleagues (1995) along with
Pinfield (1986) believe that the anarchic perspective exaggerates the extent of disorder
in organizational decision making, since hierarchies very often do provide sufficient
constraint on goals, actions, and^participants for structured patterns of decision making
to emerge.
The anarchic perspective has made only limited theoretical contributions to
organizational research. In part, this may be so because the anarchic perspective does
not easily lend itself to follow up by instrumental research; any unexplained variance
in organization strategy formation can always be dumped into the "garbage can of
organizational chaos" (Pinfield, 1986). The anarchic perspective seeks to develop rich
historical narratives which preserve the context and antecedents of organizational
change; for practical reasons, this usually limits data collection to a single case,
making it difficult to generalize or make theoretical sense of the findings. The
anarchic perspective remains a minority view among organizational theorists (Langley
et al., 1995, pg. 262) but it has been relatively more influential among sociologists
(Carley, 1995, pg. 7). Pinfield (1986, pg. 367) compares and contrasts the structured
and anarchic perspectives (Table 1).

(23)

Time

Contextual
dependence

Participation

Goals and
technology

Decision
definition

1. Different moments in time can be
considered functionally equivalent.
2. Identification, development, and selection
occur in rough sequence.

Structured (e.g.. Mintzbera et al.. 1976)
1. The decision process is defined
retrospectively beginning with a
commitment to action.
2. Decision processes have clear endings and
implicitly clear beginnings.
3. Sequences of activities are interpreted in
terms of their functional contribution to the
resolution of a problem.
1. Participants agree on goals,
2. Participants disagree about how best to
accomplish those goals
No explicit consideration of participant
makeup.
No explicit consideration of the decision
making context.

1. Participation is fluid.
2. Participants are important as carriers of problems and solutions.
1. Patterns of decisions are influenced by concurrent problems,
alternative choice opportunities, and participant attention.
2. Random, exogenous events influence problem definition and
evaluation criteria.
1. The past cannot be repeated. Passage of time permits problem and
contextual evolution and influences evaluation criteria.
2. There is no necessary sequence to problems, choices, and actions.

1. Participants disagree about goals.
2. Participants disagree about the best way to accomplish those goals.

Anarchic (Cohen et al.. 19'
1. "Decisions" are a post-factum constructs produced by participants or
onlookers.
2. The origins and terminations of decision processes are problematic.
3. Problems can be addressed without any explicit consideration of
whether a choice is being made. Choices can be made without any
explicit consideration of whether a problem is being solved.

TABLE 1. THE STRUCTURED AND ANARCHIC PERSPECTIVES (PINFIELD, 1986)

2.6.3. Alternative Perspectives
Langley, Mintzberg, and colleagues (1995) argue that the literature on
organizational decision making is stuck along a continuum between the opposing
poles of the structured and anarchic perspectives, inhibiting further theoretical
progress. They attribute this stagnation to three fundamental factors:
i

•

'The decision' is a reified construct which assumes that there is a single
moment of 'choice', reflecting a bias towards centralized thinking
about organizations as concrete, mechanistic structures.

•

Organizational theorists have largely ignored the role of the individual
as the creator, carrier, and primary causal agent in collective decision
episodes.

•

Organizational research has tended to study decision episodes in
isolation from one another as well as from their surrounding
organizational context.

The structured perspective applies when there is agreement about goals; the
anarchic perspective applies when goals are ambiguous, participation is fluid, and
actions are diffuse (Daft, 1983; Pinfield, 1986). The structured and anarchic
perspectives have staked out the macro and micro endpoints, but new perspectives are
needed to bridge the gap between individual and organizational behavior by exploring
complex, nonlinear meso-level phenomena.
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The binary opposition of the anarchic and structured perspectives is not limited
to organizational research, for it replicates a fault line which runs throughout the social
sciences. Silverstein (1988) characterizes this fault line as a tension between the
particular (the uniqueness of individual cases) and the universal (generic patterns
transcending individual cases). Structural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss argued
that human classification system^ are constrained to move in one of two directions: in
a 'downwards' direction towards the analytic pole when the goal is to explore a rich
lexicon of meaning; and in an 'upwards' direction towards the synthetic pole when the
goal is to identify common patterns, construct abstractions, and develop general
theories (Wiseman & Groves, 2000). Thus, the tension between the anarchic and
structured perspectives does not stem from a gap in the literature; it is the product of a
fundamental ontological divide.

2.7. Causal Adoption Theory
All process theories are explanatory, but not all explanatory theories are
process-oriented. Even if we cannot explain the TADP itself, we would at least like to
explain how the inputs influence the outcomes. Following Mohr's distinction, it is
useful to divide causal adoption theories into two groups, as shown in Figure 8: causal
adoption variance theories (CAVT) and causal adoption process theories (CAPT).
CAPTs explain causality in terms of the internal structure and behavior of the TADP,
but they do not predict how the inputs influence the outputs. CAVTs explain causality
between inputs and outcomes, but treat the process itself as a black box whose internal
details are neither observed nor explained.
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Causal Adoption Process Theories (CAPT)

Causal Adoption Variance Theories (CAVT)

Technology Adoption Decision Process (TADP)
Figure 8. CAPT and CAVT in Relation to the TADP

One popular and useful CAVT technique is LISREL (Joreskog, 1970), a
multivariate modeling method in which the researcher treats the process as a
construct: an approximation of a concept that can be defined, but not directly
measured (e.g., motivations, feelings, and attitudes.) On the basis of these constructs,
the modeler specifies a set of causal relationships by which one or more input
variables are hypothesized to cause or create outcomes represented by at least one
other variable. CAVT defines causation in variance terms: a sufficient degree of
correlation must exist between the variables; one variable must occur before the other;
and no other reasonable cause may explain the outcome. LISREL models consist of
two parts. The first part is the measurement model, a set of indicators for each
construct together with an assessment of their reliability. The second part is the
structural model, a set of dependency relationships that link the constructs. LISREL
was used to develop two widely-cited CAVTs: the Theory of Planned Behavior
(Ajzen, 1985) and the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989).
(27)

LISREL is an extremely useful (if rather complicated) technique that is widely
used in the social and behavioral sciences. However, CAVTs are only as good as their
constructs. A structural model can be shown to have an acceptable fit, but there is no
guarantee that another model would not fit at least as well. Since the constructs are
almost completely specified by the researcher, it is essential for them to have some
basis in CAPT to help guide the* estimation process - especially when modifying the
structural model. LISREL is a confirmatory method that is guided more by theory than
empirical data. The structural model is very flexible, creating a significant risk that the
researcher may overfit the model to the observed data or create a model with little
generalizability (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Thus, CAVT and CAPT
are complementary partners. Since it is impossible to have a good CAVT without a
good CAPT, the stagnation of CAPT is a serious problem for DOI research.

2.8. Methods of TADP Research
Beyond the common theme of developing

explanatory theories of

organizational change, scholars of the TADP have been unable to agree on a common
method of inquiry. This is because they hold different views about the meaning and
theory of process. They ask different questions, use different methods, and make
different contributions (Van de Ven, 1992). For Van de Ven and Huber (1990), the
crux of the disagreement centers on the advantages and disadvantages of:
•

Identifying structural patterns vs. capturing rich historical narratives;

•

Case-based vs. theory-based generalizations;
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•

Inductive vs. deductive theory building;

•

Theory-first vs. theory-later methods of inquiry;

•

Quantitative analysis of variables (CAVT) vs. qualitative exploration of
events (CAPT); and

•

Real-time, retrospective, or longitudinal methods of data collection.

Several traditions of inquiry were evaluated for this literature review. This
discussion focuses on three: grounded theory, case studies, and sequence analysis.
2.8.1. Grounded Theory
Grounded theory (GT) is an inductive modeling method which originated in
sociology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and subsequently became popular with
management theorists (Martin & Turner, 1986; Locke, 1996, 2001; Easterby-Smith,
Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002). It is best suited to the initial exploration of processes which
have not previously been the subject of much systematic inquiry, or when fresh
perspectives are sought.
GT occurs within a systematic and highly structured inductive framework.
Data collection and analysis are closely intertwined and proceed in rounds. Data
collection typically takes the form of interactive personal interviews during which the
interviewer probes the informant for nuances, variations, and connections within the
phenomena of interest. After each interview, open coding, microanalysis, and
theoretical memos are used to break the data into discrete parts ("categories") for
analysis and incorporation within a database. At this point axial coding is used to
(29)

uncover the attributes ^properties")

of categories, together with the range of

variability displayed by those properties Q'dimensions"). Axial coding seeks to
identify the conditions, actions/interactions, and consequences that make up the
process. As new theoretical insights occur, they suggest fresh areas for inquiry and
trigger additional cycles of theoretically-motivated sampling, data collection and
analysis. These cycles complete^ when new categories cease to emerge from the data
("saturation"). During the final step, a central category is chosen to provide a
framework for integration and refinement. Selective coding is then used to develop a
story line, diagram, or other formalism to integrate and refine the categories in the
axial coding model. Conditional propositions or hypotheses are typically formed at
this time.
GT results in substantive-level theory, a low-level theory limited to a particular
situation or context (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pg. 174). Substantive-level theory stands
in contrast to theories of greater abstraction and applicability termed midlevel theories,
grand theories, or formal theories (Creswell, 1998, pg. 242-243). It can be problematic
to generalize from a GT, although to a certain extent this drawback is common to all
qualitative methods, and should be seen in the context of the tradeoff between process
research and variance research. The price of using inductive theory-building
techniques is that the principle of equifinality applies: multiple models may be equally
valid in describing the behavior in question, depending on one's theoretical
perspective (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990, pg. 214; Van de Ven, 1992, pg. 178).
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GT is well-suited for developing process models. In the specialized language
of GT, & process is a category with two or more stages (Glaser, 1978) or "a series of
evolving sequences of action/interaction that occur over time and space, changing or
sometimes remaining the same in response to the situation and context" (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998, pg. 165).
GT needs a fairly large* number of comparable incidents that are all richly
described. Data collection and analysis can be time consuming and result in a large
volume of interview transcripts. Several thousand pages are not uncommon. This
technique focuses attention at such a low level of detail that it risks missing broad
overall patterns operating over longer time frames. Since GT is closely bound to the
interview data, is it dependent on the ability of observers and participants to recognize
key events (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990, pg. 216). A GT can only be as complete as
the informant's bounded knowledge, perception, and cognition allows.
2.8.1.1. Grounded Theory and the TADP.
Several authors have used the GT technique to study processes of technology
adoption and organizational change. Isabella's GT analysis of shifts in the cognition of
managers during episodes of organizational change received a Best Paper award from
the Academy of Management Journal (Isabella, 1990).
Alan Meyer and colleagues used GT as part of a series of studies conducted for
the National Science Foundation to model the adoption of medical equipment in
community hospitals (Greer, Greer, & Meyer, 1983; Greer, 1984; Meyer, 1984;
Meyer, 1985; Greer, 1986; Meyer & Goes, 1988). Over a six year period their team
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conducted 355 interviews at 25 community hospitals to develop a nine stage model of
the TADP, together with an associated set of measurement scales. Wildemuth (1992)
used GT to construct a five-stage linear model of the TADP for end user computing
applications in publishing, insurance, and health care organizations.
2.8.1.2. The Straussian and Glaserian Schools.
GT originated with the publication of The Discovery of Grounded Theory
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), a highly influential work which is still extensively cited.
However, the collaboration between Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss ended when
Glaser published his Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis (1992) as a sharply critical
rebuttal to Strauss and Corbin's (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research. The split
between the two founders led to the emergence of different schools of GT.
The Straussian school locates agency for theory development with human
researchers. The researcher plays a very active, even provocative, role to interrogate
the data and develop conceptual theories. This school allows for the potential of prior
theory, non-technical literature, and personal as well as professional experiences to
help researchers to gain insight into the data.
The Glaserian school locates agency for theory development in neutral
methods and data. Glaser argues that active provocation of the data is not only
unnecessary, it actually contaminates the GT. He argues that researchers must
maintain distance and independence from the phenomena under investigation and
insists that the analytic techniques offered by Strauss and Corbin will preempt and
obstruct understanding of the phenomena under study. Glaser believes that categories
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emerge naturally from the data, and should not be forced by active provocation by the
researcher. He insists that Straussian methods will result in 'forced conceptual
descriptions' rather than 'grounded theories'. Glaser objects to the potential use of
prior theory, non-technical literature, and personal as well as professional experiences
to help researchers gain insight into the data. In his view, only the world under study
should shape theorizing.
Locke notes that the primary difference between these schools concern the
assumptions they make about the relationship of the researcher to the evidence (Locke,
1996, pg. 241). Locke is critical of Glaser's position that the researcher should not
bring a priori knowledge to the research endeavor. She argues that this is a significant
revision of the flexible orientation originally promoted by The Discovery of Grounded
Theory, in which the authors suggested that it was possible for researchers to cultivate
fruitful insights from many sources - provided that these were worked out in relation
to the data. Locke believes that Glaser's verificationist views stem from his training at
Columbia, where the natural world was seen as an objective reality to be discovered
through objective methods ("a one-way mirror through which the natural world might
be revealed", Locke, 1996, pg. 241). For Glaser, the natural world will embed itself in
theory when appropriate methods are executed with discipline and restraint.
"Categories emerge upon comparison and properties emerge upon more comparison.
And, that is all there is to it." (Glaser, 1992, pg. 43)
Locke notes that many management scholars employing GT have simply
ignored this dispute and may be unaware of its existence. She asserts that management
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scholars have not kept up with developments since The Discovery of Grounded
Theory and continue to cite the 1967 work without reference to any subsequent
publications by either author. While these scholars claim to have followed the methods
of GT, they do not provide any operational indicators and may even use procedures
which run counter to the specifications of GT. Locke concludes that The Discovery of
Grounded Theory is invoked by%ome as a kind of "methodological touchstone" which
adds legitimacy to an "anything goes" approach to inductive inquiry.
2.8.1.3. The Critical Incident Technique
The critical incident technique (CIT, Flanagan, 1954) is an elicitation method
used to investigate key events, incidents, processes or issues which the respondent
considers to be significant. The technique is akin to GT, except that CIT allows for the
existence of prior theories or conceptual frameworks to be tested or extended in the
field (Chell, 1998).
CIT begins with the selection of a central category and an initial coding frame.
Interviews elicit the strategy which the respondent followed to achieve a desired
outcome along with the key events which took place during that process, the
properties of these events, and the dimensions of the properties.
Chell describes a CIT elicitation technique in which the informant is presented
with a card containing a double-headed arrow running centrally along its length. The
interviewer explains that this arrowed line represents the entire period of the decision
episode and its aftermath. The informant is invited to mark the significant events of
the episode on the card in order of occurrence. Each event is labeled on the card, then
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used as a visual reference point for reconstructing a chronology of what took place
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, pg. 96-97). Thus, the decision episode as a whole is
explored with a task-related 'grand tour' question, and the individual events are
explored with 'mini-grand tour' questions (Spradley, 1979).
CIT is well-suited for the refinement of inductive process theories which are
defined in terms of critical eveiits or turning points. Miles and Huberman (1994, pg.
115) cite an example of the critical incident technique being used in conjunction with
the Concerns-Based Adoption Model (CBAM, Hall, Loucks, Rutherford, & Newlove,
1975).
2.8.2. Case Studies
'Process' spans a diverse range of phenomena whose dimensions may be
difficult to capture with a single case (Langley et al, 1995). Case studies examine
process from multiple perspectives to gain different interpretations of decision
episodes. The case study method has a long history spanning many social science
disciplines including management, psychology, law, medicine, political science,
anthropology, sociology and education. These disciplines employ case studies for
different purposes; there is no single accepted method for conducting case study
research.
A 'case' may refer to a target for inquiry (e.g., individuals, organizations,
communities, decisions, projects) or a methodology for examining those targets (Miles
& Huberman, 1994, pg. 25; Creswell, 1998, pg. 61). However a case is defined, there
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is broad agreement that it occurs within a bounded context, and that it is a method for
detailed, in-depth analysis of data collected from multiple sources.
In management research the most frequently cited methodologists are Yin
(1981; 2003) and Eisenhardt (1989). Yin's approach to case studies emphasizes a
quasi-experimental data collection and sampling method ('replication logic').
However, his treatment of analytical issues is relatively sparse. Eisenhardt's approach
emphasizes theory building; she describes an integrative methodology which
combines Yin's replication logic, Strauss and Corbin's constant comparison
interviewing methods, and Miles and Huberman's analytical techniques. Her
framework will be described in detail later in the chapter. Other contributors to case
study research include Stake (1995), who approaches the method from the perspective
of action research; Hamel and colleagues (Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993) who adopt
a historical, problem-centered approach to sociological case studies; and Merriam
(1988) who discusses qualitative case studies in an educational context.
The chief drawbacks with case studies involve generalizability and analysis. It
is usually impractical to investigate more than a couple of dozen cases. It may be
difficult to generalize from small samples, and cross-case perspectives may prove
difficult to integrate; each case becomes relevant by itself, but is insufficient for
understanding the outcome. Without some analytical means for integrating the
perspectives, the results may be difficult to apply (Langley, 1999).
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2.8.3. Sequence Analysis
Miles and Huberman agree with Mohr (1982) that the construction of
explanatory process theory is a particular forte of qualitative research. Matrices may
be used to develop explanatory or causal models by identifying predictor variables on
the basis of similarities and patterns in chunks of coded data. Once identified, these
variables may be used to make causal predictions and test emerging theoretical
frameworks.
Sequence analysis maps the occurrence of critical incidents over time to
identify process patterns and the interaction of process variables; it may be thought of
as the analytical counterpart to the critical incident technique.
Miles and Huberman describe a suite of analytical tools for conducting
sequence analysis:
•

Context charts may be used to identify the context surrounding a
decision episode (pg. 102-105).

•

Event-state networks may be used to decompose a decision episode into
a set of states and events (pg. 115-117).

•

Within-case causal network analysis may be used to identify
relationships among the set of states and events (pg. 151-165).

•

Composite sequence analysis can be used to identify the transition
sequences which link the set of states and events (pg. 204-206).
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•

Causal models may be used to generate hypotheses about the causal
network (pg. 222-228).

•

Cross-case causal network analysis may be used to devise tests of the
hypotheses (pg. 228-233).
2.9. Visual Displays in TADP Research

Many qualitative TADP studies have used visual displays as a convenient way
of packing a lot of information into a small space, as an analytical tool to develop and
verify theoretical ideas, and as a vehicle for triangulating between case-based and
variable-based analysis (Werner & Schoepfle, 1987; Tsoukas, 1989; Meyer, 1991;
Langley & Truax, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Langley, 1999). Several types of
visual displays have been used for this purpose. For example, Werner and Schoepfle
(1987) used activity records to show the structure of hierarchical activities (Figure 9).

ENTER

Change Tire

get sparfe

Figure 9. Example of an Activity Record (Werner & Schoepfle, 1987)
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Meyer and Goes (1988) used decision models to describe the TADP for
medical equipment in community hospitals (Figure 10).

Equipment purchased
according to priority

Figure 10. Example of a Decision Model (Meyer, 1991)

Langley and Truax (1994) used sequence analysis to construct an event-state
network of the TADP in small manufacturing firms, as shown in Figure 11.
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- April 1987 •

Period 1: Rivalry between projects,
management turnover, priority on COM

Contract
obtained with
^major client

• May 1988 -

August 1388

Jan 1989

May 1989 Period 3: Development of a major investment
project stimulated by the firm's principal client

Figure 11. Example of an Event-State Network (Langley & Truax, 1994)

Period 2: Strike, financial
difficulties. CAD

These visual displays hint at important software engineering principles. For
example, event-state networks incorporate elements commonly found in finite state
automata; activity records embody the principles of modularity and hierarchical
decomposition; decision models use flowcharts to capture and express control
sequences.
However, as a guide t6 implementing the TADP in computer simulations,
informal visual displays share a number of limitations: (Harel, 1988)
•

A linear increase in the number of events will tend to trigger an
exponential increase in the number of states, a tendency known as the
state explosion problem (Kozen, 1997). Miles and Huberman allude to
it in this passage: "A variable with too many arrows leading to it
becomes a nuisance, because it multiplies the possible number of
streams." (pg. 237)

•

Methods such as flow charts (e.g., Figure 10) are fundamentally
sequential and can deal with concurrency only in a superficial fashion.
Other visual displays can depict concurrency (e.g., Figure 11) but
typically without specifying the coordination mechanisms.

•

Many visual displays provide for iteration (e.g., Figure 7 on page 21)
but typically without specifying the consequences of reentering a state.
For example, is the prior history discarded when a state is reentered, or
is it fully or partly retained and used as a basis for further processing?
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•

Visual displays often frequently lack a means for denoting contingent
transitions. Consider the flowchart shown in Figure 10. Do these
transitions happen at any time the conditions are true, or do they occur
only when the conditions change from false to true? Are conditions
evaluated instantaneously, or are they sensitive to the order of
evaluation?

•

Visual displays can become unwieldy and unreadable when expressing
hierarchy, decomposition, recursion, and modularity (e.g., Figure 9).

•

Relatively few visual displays attempt to express the preemption of
low-level processes by high-level interrupts. Consider the activity
record shown in Figure 9. At any point in the process of changing a tire
the driver might need to pause to allow traffic to pass. Such a highlevel interrupt would clutter the diagram with many low-level
transitions.

Harel argued that more precise semantic notations were needed to overcome
these limitations, and during the past two decades many improvements have been
proposed. Many of these improvements were originally motivated by the need to
model reactive systems, which must continuously interact with their environment,
respond to changes at unpredictable times, gracefully manage high-priority
preemption, handle multiple concurrent tasks, and display considerable operational
flexibility - all of which are characteristic of human decision making.
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In an influential pair of papers, Osterweil (1987; 1997) raised the intriguing
possibility that formalisms originally developed to model computer software could be
adapted to model other kinds of processes:
"In examining the hypothesis that software [engineering] processes are
software, there seems to be nothing particularly special about software
processes. This suggests a hypothesis that processes in general are also
software. Confirmation of that hypothesis would be of particular
interest as it would suggest that application software technology can
also help support the development and evolution of all kinds of
processes. In particular it suggests that software engineers might have
something of particular value to offer to those who engineer
manufacturing systems, management systems, classical engineering
systems, and so forth." (Osterweil, 1997, pg. 551)
For Osterweil, process is software. He implies that fundamental software
principles have direct application to process theory, and particularly the TADP.
Forging an explicit connection between process theory and computer software may
help advance experimental research on meso-level social phenomena like the diffusion
of innovations. Such a role would be consistent with AxtelPs view (2003) that
computer science and social science are developing a revolutionary relationship.
Visual formalism are not a panacea, of course. Visual formalisms are firmly
aligned with the structured perspective; they have a 'mechanical' feel which is more
suitable for capturing structural patterns and relationships (Osterweil, 1997; Langley,
1999) than relating rich historical narratives. However, obtaining a 'thick description'
is not always the most appropriate goal, particularly when the intention of a study is to
develop a simulation model. Simplicity, precision, and parsimony are important
considerations in computational modeling, for it is neither possible nor desirable for
simulations to reproduce all aspects of target behavior (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 1999). A
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major objective of simulation-oriented process research is predicting which variations
are most likely to occur and capturing complex structural and behavioral patterns such
as concurrency, iteration, recursion, coordination, and preemption.
2.9.1. The Unified Modeling Language
In software engineeering, the best-known and most successful visual
formalism has been the Unified Modeling Language (UML, Booch, Rumbaugh, &
Jacobson, 1999), which can precisely specify the interrelationships among a set of
concepts independent of any particular software implementation (for an introduction
to UML for nonprogrammers, see Appendix I). The conceptual alignment between GT
and UML is surprisingly close, given their very different origins and intended purpose.
This alignment is not immediately apparent, since GT and UML are each defined in
terms of their own specialized language. Once this alignment is made explicit (see
Table 2) it becomes apparent that UML is well-suited as a partner for theory-building
in combination with GT or sequence analysis.
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TABLE 2. GROUNDED THEORY AND UML TERMINOLOGY
C.T
Term
Phenomenon
Category

Subcategory

GT Definition
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998)
Central ideas in the data,
represented as concepts
A concept that stands for a
phenomenon.

UML
Term
Object

A concept that pertains to a
category.

Subclass

Class

f

(There is no counterpart in GT to a UML
"property")
A characteristic of a category.
Property

Attribute

Dimension

Type

Axial code

Process

Structure
Central
Category
The
Paradigm

Property

The range of variation of properties
in a category.
A relationship between a category
and its subcategories, or a link
between categories at the level of
properties and dimensions.
A sequence of evolving
action/interaction which can be
traced to changes in structural
conditions.
The conditional context in which a
category is situated.
A conceptual idea within which all
other categories can be subsumed.
The integration of structure with
process.

Association

Operation

UML Definition
(Alhir, 1998)
An abstract representation of a
concrete or conceptual entity.
An archetype for objects which
have common attributes,
operations, relationships, and
semantics.
A specialized class which inherits
the characteristics of its parent,
but which may add or redefine
certain attributes and operations.
An attribute or operation.
A characteristic shared by all
objects in a class.
The range of values that an
attribute may have.
A relationship between a class
and its subclasses (generalization)
or between classes (aggregation
or composition)
A dynamic behavioral process
shared by all objects of a given
class.

Structure

A static configuration of objects.

Base Class

The root class of a generalization
hierarchy.
A self-contained collection of
structural and behavioral elements
that provides a basis for
integrated modeling.

The Object
Oriented
Paradigm

2.9.2. Structure and Behavior
UML observes a fundamental distinction between structure and behavior
(Alhir, 1998; Douglass, 2004). Structure refers to static organization; behavior refers
to dynamic relationships. UML defines three distinct types of behavior (Douglass,
2004, pg. 140-144). The most common is simple behavior, in which a specified set of
tasks is performed upon request. An object which exhibits simple behavior will always
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do the same thing in response to a given input or stimuli, regardless of past history; it
is memoryless. The second type is discrete or reactive behavior, which occurs in
objects possessing a finite number of discrete, mutually exclusive states. Discrete
behavior is the act of transitioning from one state to another in response to an external
event. The third type is continuous behavior, which is found in objects which are
capable of a potentially infinite number of states; this type of behavior is highly
contingent on past behavior and inputs. All software processes can be modeled as
some combination of these three types of behavior. Thus, if Osterweil's hypothesis
holds, then all processes - regardless of their domain - can be modelled as variations
on these basic behavioral patterns. These types of behavior will be as applicable to
psychological and social processes as they are to software processes.
2.10. Chapter Summary
Eveland (1979) argues that adoption has become a reified concept: "A single
act (or a limited set of acts) serves as the criterion for judging the outcomes of the
process, and the process itself is usually unexplored." Many staged models of the
TADP have been proposed, but most are only weakly supported by empirical
evidence, privilege the stages of the process over key events and transition sequences,
tend to discount the process of screening alternatives, and ignore important
nonlinearities such as interrupts and timing thresholds (Rogers, 2003, pg. 202).
In the DOI literature adoption studies have typically privileged the perspective
of research sponsors and change agencies; seldom has the TADP been explored from
the perspective of the individual consumer, and decision theoretic perspectives have
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been overlooked (Gatignon & Robertson, 1991; Kottonau et al., 2000). As Rogers
notes, "diffusion scholars would do well to remember that individual's own
perceptions count in determining their innovation behavior" (2003, pg. 116).
Qualitative process research is now well-established as a method for
researching the TADP, and the value and understandability of these methods are
considerably enhanced by visual displays (Werner & Schoepfle, 1987; Meyer, 1991;
Langley & Truax, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Langley, 1999). Unfortunately,
informal visual displays tend to be inadequate for expressing complex notions such as
concurrency, iteration, recursion and preemption. More precise notations are needed to
overcome these limitations (Harel, 1988). Osterweil proposes that computational
formalisms such as UML could be adapted to model processes in general, including
human behavior and communication.
Langley, Mintzberg, and colleagues argue that "decision making must be
studied in toto and in vivo, at the individual level to include insight and inspiration,
emotion and memory, and at the collective level to include history, culture, and
context in the vast network of decision making that makes up every organization"
(1995, pg. 261). They offer five suggestions for opening up process research:
•

Focus on a new unit of analysis - the issue - which is to be traced
forward in time, rather than attempting to trace backward in time to
discover the source of a decision.
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•

Use alternative perspectives: zoom inward to more fully explore
individual behavior and decision processes; zoom outward to uncover
long-term trends and behavioral patterns.

•

Supplement retrospective data with longitudinal and real-time data.

•

Broaden the scope of research to include personality differences and
participant interaction.

•

Effect a descriptive stance, and avoid bias toward specific outcomes.

However, the seemingly intractable divide between the structured and anarchic
perspectives poses a formidable barrier to further theoretical progress in meso-level
domains like DOI. Agent-based social simulation shows great promise as a means of
bridging the gap, but it is hampered by the imprecision and incompleteness of
previous staged TADP models. To better understand macro-level phenomena like
technological innovation, explanatory models of the TADP are needed which
characterize the micro-level actions and interactions of consumers in formal
computational terms. A new methodological synthesis is needed which adapts existing
process research methods to meet the specialized requirements of agent-based social
simulation. In the next chapter we shall examine the potential applications of agentbased social simulation to MOT.
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CHAPTER 3. ARTIFICIAL MARKETS AS
A NEW VENUE FOR INNOVATION RESEARCH
3.1. Agent-Based Social Simulation
In recent years there has been a surge of interest in computer simulation as a
means of studying complex social and organizational phenomena which cannot be
investigated using more traditional methods (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 1999; Goldspink,
2002). Agent-based social simulation (ABSS) is an emerging form of interdisciplinary
computational modeling which began emerging during the early 1990's from research
strands in distributed artificial intelligence and automata theory (Troitzsch, 1997). A
recent survey of 196 self-identified ABSS researchers identified two domains of
interest to management and marketing scholars (David, Marietta, Sichman, & Coelho,
2004).
Socio-concrete models use direct observation and statistical data to simulate
the behavior of real social systems and organizations. An exemplar of this type is the
Artificial Anasazi Project, whose aim was to model the mysterious decline of the
Anasazi civilization during the era from 800 C.E. through 1350 C.E. (Dean et al.,
1999). This simulation was constructed through the assistance of a wealth of historical
data covering environmental conditions, demographic trends, and settlement sites.
Prototyping models are multi-agent systems designed to simulate real
environments for strategic planning purposes. An example is TRANSIMS, a massive
traffic simulation used to study urban areas such Albuquerque, Dallas/Fort Worth, and
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Portland. The TRANSIMS model permits traffic engineers, urban planners, public
officials and other interested parties to conduct 'what-if experiments to see how
proposed road construction projects might affect traffic patterns (Beckman, 2001).
TRANSIMS was later adapted into the EpiSims model, which evaluates possible
responses by public health officials to contain epidemics such as smallpox (Eubank,
Kumar, Marathe, Srinivasan, & Wang, 2004).
Four common themes characterize ABSS research: a focus on individual
behavior and communication; a preference for bottom-up modeling; an appreciation of
the importance of the spatial dimension; and a focus on the micro-to-macro gap. The
following sections examine each of these themes in turn.
3.1.1. Individual Behavior and Communication
The primary aim of ABSS is to represent situations whereby global social
structures emerge from the behavior and interactions of diverse agents (Drogoul &
Ferber, 1994, pg. 130). Agents are autonomous computational processes capable of
performing local actions in response to various stimuli and communications with other
agents (Drogoul & Ferber, 1994). A range of agent types are possible, from reactive
agents which behave according to simple stimulus-response rules to cognitive agents
which are driven by internally-generated intentions. Shank (2001) argues that
individuals hold a special place in social systems since they act as the unit of
propagation of social structures, are intractable to further reductionistic expansion, and
act as important causal links through their interactions with other individuals.
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3.1.2. Bottom-Up Modeling
Natural phenomena such as ant colonies, birds in flight, slime molds, traffic
jams, and forest fires are emergent macroscopic patterns produced by the local
interactions of autonomous individuals (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, pg. 33). Emergence is
self-organizing in the sense that these macroscopic patterns arise, naturally and
without a priori specification, from the structure and behavior of constituent actors
(Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Holland, 1998).
Bottom-up modeling is a different way of seeing the world. It takes an active
mental shift for us to perceive the world in terms of decentralized actors and complex
multilevel feedback loops, and even then it may be difficult for us to find the right
language to describe what we see. Simulation provides a kind of language which is
more precise than natural language for reasoning about decentralized social
phenomena; Ostrom (1988) described simulation as a third symbol system for inquiry
in the social sciences, along with natural language and mathematics.
3.1.3. Spatial Phenomena
In addition to its value in studying the interactions of heterogeneous agent
populations, ABSS is also useful for studying spatial phenomena (Epstein, 1999, pg.
42-49; Jager & Janssen, 2003, pg. 11-15). Equation-based models can become
intractable if the spatial dimension is included, for it is usually impossible to derive an
analytical solution to a nonlinear, multidimensional equation. Simulation is often the
only practical option for studying such systems.
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The usefulness of ABSS is not limited to physical space; it is also useful for
investigating discrete or network space (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Brassel, Mohring,
Schumacher, & Troitzsch, 1997, pg. 58). Physical topography is the most familiar
meaning of "space", and it has long been known to be an important factor in the
diffusion of innovations (e.g., Hagerstrand, 1967). Ant colonies, termite mounds, and
traffic jams are all examples bf phenomena where physical space is important.
Discrete topography represents space in abstract terms, like a chessboard or hexagonal
grid; cellular automata models like Sugarscape exemplify this approach (Epstein &
Axtell, 1996). Network topography represents social space in graph form, making it
possible to endogenously represent important DOI concepts such as opinion
leadership, boundary spanning, and network ties (Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1966;
Granovetter, 1973, 1978; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981; Valente, 1995). Network
topography also links ABSS to important recent advances in 'small world' network
theory (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).

3.1.4. The Micro-to-Macro Gap
A deep chasm of complex behavior separates the particular and the universal.
Bridging the micro-to-macro gap has long been an important goal of social science
research (Alexander, Giesen, Munch, & Smelser, 1987; Smith, 1997; Goldspink &
Kay, 2004). It may be understood in terms of three levels of perspective. The micro
perspective focuses on the individual; theories at this level often seek to control or
minimize the influence of social forces on the individual (Prietula et al., 1998). The
macro perspective focuses on large-scale behavior. Individuals are treated in an
(52)

aggregate manner, and the complexities of individual behavior are ignored.
Mathematical modeling is commonly used at this level (Drogoul & Ferber, 1994;
Prietula et al, 1998). The meso perspective seeks to explain and predict how macrolevel behavior emerges from the micro-level behavior and interactions of cognitivelylimited agents. Complex feedback loops between micro- and macro-level processes
intersect at this level (Schank, 2001).
It is at the meso-level that ABSS seems likely to make its greatest
contributions. ABSS attempts to close the micro-to-macro gap by examining how the
actions and interactions of micro-level agents emerge as macro-level forms and
patterns. By oscillating between the micro- and macro-poles, it attains the desired
synthesis (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 1999). ABSS offers the potential to explore
organizational forms which would otherwise remain unobservable. In many cases,
ABSS may be the only feasible way to conduct experimental research on social
systems. When used as a partner to theory-building, ABSS can help flush out
inconsistencies in a theoretical framework and shed light on previously overlooked
phenomena (Langley, 1999).
3.2. A Comparison Case: Lotka-Volterra
All of the themes explored in this section - individual-based modeling,
bottom-up modeling, the spatial dimension, and the micro-to-macro gap - can be
illustrated by the famous Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model (LV, Lotka, 1925;
Volterra, 1926). The Lotka-Volterra model has been used for technology forecasting
purposes (e.g., Modis, 1999) and is available in both ABSS form and system dynamics
(53)

form, thus providing a simple and relevant basis for comparing these two forms of
social simulation.
The system dynamics version of Lotka-Volterra

(LVSD)

is implemented as a

coupled system of differential equations given by:
dFjt)
=
dt

dR(t)
dt

F(bR-a)

R(c-dF)

Where F(t) is the predator population, R(t) is the prey population, a is the
predator death rate, b is the predator birth rate, c is the prey death rate, and d is the
prey birth rate; a, b, c, and d are positive constants. The dynamic behavior of LVSD is
shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. The Lotka-Volterra Model: Dynamic Behavior.

The ABSS version of Lotka-Volterra

(LVABSS)

is implemented in terms of

individual prey and predator agents who wander a 2-dimensional spatial environment

in search of food. The endogenous representation of space leads to some important
differences in the behavior of these models:
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•

LVSD

treats predator and prey populations as aggregate quantities.

LVABSS treats

•

LVSD

predator and prey as individual organisms.

ignores the spatial dimension.

LVABSS explicitly

takes space into

account, leading to the finding that a critical food density is necessary
for the predator and prey populations to stabilize.
t

•

In LVSD extinction is impossible for either predator or prey as long as
their initial populations are nonzero. In LVABSS it is possible for the
predator to become extinct if the food density drops below a critical
threshold.

•

In LVSD tipping behavior is deterministic once the equations and their
initial values are specified. In LVABSS tipping is probabilistic, since it is
not possible to completely characterize the state-space of the system.

Edwards, Huet, Goreaud & Deffuant (2003) compared an individual-based
model of innovation diffusion with its aggregate equivalent. They found that the two
approaches sometimes arrived at the same conclusions, but at other times they did not.
The distinguishing factor is the degree of behavioral complexity exhibited at the
individual level. When individual behavior is simple, the results are more likely to
converge; when individual behavior is complex, the results are more likely to diverge.
Aggregate measures frequently conceal as much interesting behavior as they reveal
(Roberts, Hulin, & Rousseau, 1978). For a more detailed comparison of ABSS, system
dynamics, discrete system simulation, and cellular automata, see Brassel, Mohring,
Schumacher, and Troitzsch (1997).
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3.3. Artificial Consumer Markets
Artificial markets (AMs) are a form of agent-based social simulation in which
individual consumers, organizations, or industries interact under realistic market
conditions. AMs are a recent development, most having been published within the past
five years. Agents of various types may be combined within the same AM, such as
simulated firms pursuing various strategies to increase their market share among
simulated consumers. Some AMs are simple and abstract (e.g., Izquierdo & Izquierdo,
2007), while others are geographically and demographically realistic models of actual
metropolitan areas (e.g., Heppenstall, Evans, & Birkin, 2006); there is broad variation
in how AMs represent time, space, social interaction, population demographics, agent
heterogeneity, cognitive complexity, randomness, and coordination (Richiardi,
Leombruni, Saam, & Sonnessa, 2006). Table 3 summarizes some key traits of AMs.
TABLE 3. KEY TRAITS OF ARTIFICIAL MARKETS
Key idea
Typical units
of analysis
Typical areas
of variability
Typical
parameters
Strengths

Opportunities

Weaknesses
Threats

Artificial markets: agent-based simulations of consumer behavior
Agents mimicing consumers and/or firms acting and interacting according to local
behavioral rules ("agent specifications")
Abstraction vs. realism (environmental, demographic, behavioral); agent interaction
mechanisms; agent heterogeneity; role of randomness; temporal and spatial scope;
cognitive complexity of agents
Geographic: population density; home, work, and shopping locations; etc.
Demographic: age; gender; income level; etc.
Agent: social connectedness; imitativeness; initial adoption status; etc.
Simultaneous expression of multiple variables of demand-side markets (e.g.
consumer psychology, social networks, product characteristics, competitive
environment, distribution channels, marketing strategies); controlled 'what if
experiments on complex market behaviors
Diffusion forecasting; exploring innovation dynamics; education and insight; policy
foresight; massively parallel market analysis; profiling new products and services;
assessing business models in volatile new markets
Currently unsolved problems in the areas of specification, calibration, analysis,
publication, and replication
Sensitivity to initial conditions; plasticity
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In this section we review the work of a few teams who have pioneered the use
of AMs as a tool for studying the diffusion of innovations.
3.3.1. The Consumat Model
One of the earliest AMs was the Consumat Model, which Wander Jager
developed for his doctoral dissertation (Jager, 2000). Jager defines a 'consumat' as an
artificial consumer who obeys a set of behavioral rules which are derived from the
social psychology and evolutionary economics literatures (Janssen & Jager, 1999,
2002).
The Consumat Model defines two dimensions of consumer utility:
•

Need satisfaction, which includes both personal and social needs; and

•

Experienced uncertainty.

These dimensions determine which strategy the consumat uses (Figure 13.)
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Figure 14. The Consumat Model of Consumer Behavior (Jager, 2000)

Jager and Janssen have used the Consumat Model to simulate:
•

Lock-in in monopolistic environments (Janssen & Jager, 1999)

•

Lock-in as an entry barrier to green products (Janssen & Jager, 2002)

•

Gender and age demographics of consumer cohorts (Jager & Janssen,
2003)

Janssen and Jager (2002) is an illustrative study. The authors investigated the
impact of various tax policy scenarios which were designed to encourage the lock-in
of green products such as car pooling and car sharing. Their model included innovator
and imitator firms in addition to the consumats; in this way, they demonstrated the
ability to use ABSS to assess organizational strategies under different taxation and
product development scenarios.
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3.3.2. The ESP Model
The Episode-based Social Persuasion (ESP) model was created to simulate the
diffusion of car sharing programs in Switzerland and Germany (Kottonau et al., 2000).
The consumer agents in the ESP model simulate the cognitive process through which
habitual car ownership gives way to deliberation and eventual discontinuance. This
model is designed to address ''questions about diffusion dynamics, especially the
influence of adoption and rejection on word-of-mouth communication. The model is
shown in Figure 15.
The ESP model posits two dimensions of consumer utility:
•

Functional utility is what the consumer considers truly useful (e.g.,
short distance to the car sharing location); and

•

Socio-aesthetic utility is a composite of self-consistency, self-esteem,
social approval and social consistency (e.g., personal autonomy and the
importance of having a 'green' self-image)

The ESP model is sophisticated in the way that it uses the consumer
psychology literature. Confirmation bias, status quo bias, sunk costs, negativity bias,
memory, attitude formation, and attitude-behavior consistency are all endogenous to
the model. The model defines four classes of consumer decision episodes which are
similar to Svenson's (1996) four-level decision typology. However, the inclusion of so
many psychological factors made each agent so computationally intensive that the

simulation could only accommodate a social network of 12 consumers. Nevertheless,
the ESP model is an impressive demonstration of the potential of ABSS to serve as a
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vehicle for interdisciplinary synthesis of decision psychology and the diffusion of
innovations.
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Figure 15. The ESP Model of Consumer Behavior (Kottonau et al., 2000)
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3.3.3. The CUBES Model.
CUBES stands for Customer Behavior Simulator (Ben Said et al., 2002). This
model simulates competition among several brands in an AM of several thousand
consumer agents. It was developed by a team of French researchers who synthesized
theoretical concepts in psychology, economics, marketing, and sociology. The model
is very abstract and is best regarded as a proof of concept study. The model is shown
in Figure 16.
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Figure 16. The CUBES Model of Consumer Behavior (Ben Said et al., 2002)

An important assumption of the CUBES model is that it is possible to
represent consumer behavior in terms of elementary behavioral primitives which are
not specific to purchasing (e.g., imitation, opportunism, mistrust.) The automaton
shown in Figure 17 is an example of these generic behavioral elements.
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VBP > Trig_Thr

lnh_Thr INF <V BP

VBP < Trig_Thr

Figure 17. Behavioral Primitive Automaton for the CUBES Model (Ben Said et al, 2002)

The behavioral primitive determines how the consumer agent responds to
environmental stimuli. When the consumer agent receives a stimulus, the automaton
compares its intensity (VBP) to the appropriate thresholds (InhThriNF, Inh Thrsup,
Trig_Thr) for the current state (the ovals). If the threshold is exceeded, the agent
transitions to a new behavioral state; otherwise, it ignores the stimulus. Thus, the
automaton constitutes a simple stimulus-response model of the TADP.
3.3.4. The Project FAIR Model
Project FAIR models the diffusion of green agricultural innovations (Deffuant,
Huet, & Amblard, 2005). This team of French researchers later generalized their
model to simulate the diffusion of mobile phones, the Internet, contraception, organic
products, genetically modified organisms, and cloning. The Project FAIR consumer
agents are also driven by a behavioral automaton of the TADP, as shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18. Behavioral Automaton for the Project FAIR Model (Deffuant et al., 2005)

3.3.5. Recent Models
Two workshops have been held on agent-based models of market dynamics
and consumer behavior; the first in January 2006 at the University of Surrey at
Guildford, UK., and the second in August 2007 at the University of Groningen in the
Netherlands. Several new models were introduced to simulate diffusion of water
resource management innovations in the upper Danube basin (Schwartz & Ernst,
2006), shoe fashions in the Regensburg region of Germany (Schrodl, Loffler, & Rauh,
2006), transportation mode choice in Amsterdam (Dugundji & Gulyas, 2006), retail
gasoline prices in West Yorkshire, UK (Heppenstall et al., 2006), grocery shopping
patterns in the Umea region of northern Sweden (Schenk, Loffler, & Rauh, 2007), and
online shopping for bath products in Switzerland (Roach & Gilbert, 2007) to cite a few
examples. There has been a surge of AM publications during the past two years as
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more fields discover the potential of these models. Several AM studies were published
in a recent special issue of the Journal of Business Research, and a special issue of the
Journal of Product Innovation Management is currently in preparation. Papers from
the 2006 and 2007 AM workshops may be viewed at the Marketing Dynamics wiki:
http://www.essa.eu.org/simulation-wiki/MarketDvnamicsSIGWiki. A cross-section of
AM studies are listed in Table 4l
TABLE 4. CROSS-SECTION OF ARTIFICIAL MARKET STUDIES
Authors

Substantive Domain

Specification Method
1

Janssen and Jager
(2001; 2002; 2003)

Car sharing and car pooling

Ad hoc, based on social
psychology and economics

Kottonau, Burse and
Pahl-Wostl (2000)
Ben Said, Drogoul
and Bouron (2002)
Deffuant, Huet and
Amblard (2005)

Car sharing

Ad hoc, based on consumer
psychology
Ad hoc, based on consumer
psychology
Ad hoc, based on social
networking theory

Schwarz and Ernst
(2006)
SchrOdl, Loftier and
Rauh (2006)
Dugundji and Gulyas
(2006)
Heppenstall, Evans
and Birkin (2006)
Schenk, Loffler and
Rauh (2007)
Roach and Gilbert
(2007)

Cellular phones

Agriculture, mobile phones,
cloning, genetically
modified organisms,
contraception, the internet,
organic products
Water resource management Theory of Planned Behavior
Retail shoe shopping
Transportation mode choice
Retail gasoline shopping
Retail grocery shopping
Retail internet shopping

Ad hoc, based on geographic
theory
Discrete Choice Analysis

' ...
Variable
Innovation
diffusion and
lock-in
Attitude
formation
Brand
competition
Innovation
diffusion

Innovation
attributes
Retail attributes
Mode split

Geographically Weighted
Regression
Discrete Choice Analysis

Retail attributes

Ad hoc, based on consumer
behavior

Retail attributes

(64)

Retail attributes

3.4. A SWOT Analysis of Artificial Markets
In this section we assess the strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, and threats
facing AM as they relate to the MOT field.
3.4.1. Strengths
AMs belong to the causal or explanatory class of models in which the relevant
variables and linkages are endogenously specified in terms of mathematical equations
or simulation code. Models of this class are often used to forecast technology adoption
and diffusion (Martino, 1999). To appreciate the strengths of AMs it is helpful to first
understand the limitations of existing forms of causal models such as closed-form
mathematical equations.
In marketing, the most widely used diffusion forecasting method has been the
Bass model and its variants (Bass, 1969). The Bass model is a regression-based
method which forecasts the overall shape of the adoption S-curve in a population, the
goal being to forecast the adoption rate of a new product or technology. It assumes
two primary sources of influence: mass media and word-of-mouth (see Figure 19).
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Figure 19. The Bass Model of Diffusion Forecasting (Mahajan, Muller, & Bass, 1990)
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Mathematically, the Bass model is given by: (Mahajan, Muller, & Wind, 2000)
^ Q = p[m - N(t)]+^N(t)[m
dt
m

- N(t)]

Where N(t) represents the cumulative number of adopters, m is the maximum
number of adopters, and/? and q are coefficients representing the effectiveness of mass
media and interpersonal communication respectively. The original Bass model
imposed several highly restrictive assumptions: (Mahajan, Muller, & Bass, 1990)
•

Adoption is defined as the first purchase of an innovation; people either
adopt or they do not. Repeat purchases, discontinuance, and substitution
cannot be expressed within this model. The nature of an innovation does
not change over time, and its diffusion is independent of all other
innovations. Clusters or bundles of interdependent innovations are
ignored.

•

The model entirely ignores human decision variables (Bass, Krishnan, &
Jain, 1994). Adopter populations are assumed to be homogenous and
perfectly mixed, with interpersonal influence uniformly distributed
throughout a social system of fixed size. Diffusion networks and opinion
leadership are ignored.

•

The total market potential is constant. Diffusion patterns are not
influenced by the marketing mix, advertising strategies, promotional
efforts, phased product introductions, distribution channels, supply
restrictions, or any other product or market characteristics.
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Since so few innovations are capable of satisfying all of these assumptions, a
number of refinements have been published to incorporate the influence of the
marketing mix (Bass, Jain, & Krishnan, 2000), clusters of interdependent innovations
(Bayus, Kim, & Shocker, 2000), marketing strategy and competition (Charter) ee,
Eliashberg, & Rao, 2000; Kuester, Gatignon, & Robertson, 2000), stage of adoption
(Sharif & Ramanathan, 1982;*»Dekimpe, Parker, & Sarvary, 1998), non-uniform
interpersonal influence and disaggregate populations (Strang & Tuma, 1993; Parker,
1994; Roberts & Lattin, 2000), multiple markets (Dekimpe, Parker, & Sarvary, 2000),
product and market characteristics (Golder & Tellis, 1997, 1998; Rangaswamy &
Gupta, 2000), supply constraints (Ho, Savin, & Terwiesch, 2002), and repeat
purchases (Ratchford, Balasubramanian, & Kamakura, 2000). Unfortunately, there is a
shortage of practical advice on how to use these refinements, especially when applied
in combination. Most define parameters which are difficult to interpret and require
considerable data to estimate. By the time these data have been acquired it is often too
late to develop a forecast (Mahajan et al., 1990; Parker, 1994). To summarize, the
Bass model yields general information about macro-level phenomena (Brassel et al.,
1997) which is of limited usefulness to practitioners (Dockner & Jorgensen, 1988). To
progress beyond these limitations, more powerful methods are needed.
AMs are attractive when it is important to simultaneously account for multiple
factors in the same model (e.g., consumer psychology, social behavior, product
characteristics, competitive threats, distribution channel characteristics, and marketing
strategy.) A particular strength of AMs is their ability to endogenously represent
(67)

psychological variables; consumer psychology has been largely overlooked by
previous diffusion studies (Gatignon & Robertson, 1991; Kottonau et al., 2000). The
forte of AMs occurs in demand-side forecasting situations when social interaction
and/or cognitive biases are known to be important, when consumer behavior is
complex and market behavior volatile, when equation-based modeling would impose
too many restrictions, and when -controlled experimentation is desirable yet infeasible.
These conditions are typical of innovation diffusion (Garcia, 2005).
3.4.2. Opportunities
AMs show great promise for advancing technology futures research
(Technology Futures Analysis Methods Working Group, 2004). Linstone (1999)
suggests that these models could aid in exploring the dynamics of technological
evolution, mapping domains of market stability, developing strategies to stimulate or
delay phase changes, and gaining insight into the impact of technology on society. In
this section we identify and explore several promising AM applications in the MOT
field.
Market forecasting. It has already been noted that AMs are finding practical
applications in the area of innovation diffusion when alternatives such as the Bass
model are infeasible. AMs are also attractive in situations when social interaction or
consumer cognition are known to be important (e.g., viral marketing) or when
controlled experimentation is desirable, but currently unfeasible (e.g., evaluating

alternative marketing strategies, product characteristics, or product launch campaigns.)
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Exploring market dynamics. AMs could be used to explore domains of stability
and instability in market behavior, such as factors leading to the establishment of
monopoly and monopsony behavior (e.g., Jager, 2000), technology lock-in,
substitution, coevolution, or revolution (e.g., Janssen & Jager, 2003), social
networking phenomena such as opinion leadership and the s-curve 'chasm' (Moore,
2002), and the emergence of niche markets.
Education and learning, AMs could be used as 'flight simulators' to teach
management and marketing students how markets might respond under various
conditions and explore 'what if scenarios.
Policy foresight. AMs could be used in conjunction with scenario analysis to
envision desirable future states of nature, develop public policies for achieving these
states, evaluate the relative effectiveness of these policy options, and highlight
possible unintended or undesirable consequences.
Massively parallel market analysis. AMs could prove useful in retrieving,
filtering, and integrating real-world market data, generating useful information from
massive databases.
Innovation mining. A particularly novel and intriguing application would apply
AMs in conjunction with search algorithms, scenario analysis, and traditional
marketing data to develop profiles of products and services which do not yet exist, but
which markets are poised and ready to accept. In this hypothetical 'innovation mining'
application, an AM could be constructed of a target city or region to reflect the
demographics, social networks, adoption status, and preferences of the target
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consumer population. After validation testing, a search algorithm could be applied to
'mine' the AM for profiles of innovations that satisfy latent or unmet consumer needs
while at the same time exhibit easy adoption paths. Scenario analysis could be used to
interpret these innovation profiles and develop descriptions of proposed products and
services. Scenario analysis could also be used to interpret future market states
predicted by the AM and nominate leading indicators of these states for validation and
tracking purposes. The relative probabilities of these states could be estimated with
additional simulation runs, after which the results could be fed into normative decision
support models. Finally, the viability of the proposed products or services could be
tested by means of traditional market acceptability research.
Innovation mining could provide early alerts of innovations whose market
window has arrived. As such, it would be a form of technology foresight - a method
for identifying future trends and opportunities, then devising strategies to make the
most of them. While this application is rather speculative at this stage and a proof of
concept demonstration far in the future, our analysis suggests that innovation mining is
possible in principle. Regardless of whether it proves to be viable, research on this
topic could likely result in theoretical and methodological 'spillovers' that benefit
other MOT areas like innovation dynamics.
Gaming business strategy. AMs could generate and assess alternative business
models to exploit or defend against disruptive technologies. In this application an AM
could be constructed as a volatile market mix of stable and disruptive technologies.
Organizational agents representing established and entrepreneurial firms could be
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programmed to pursue random business models; the AM would then run until certain
conditions had been satisfied (e.g., the surviving number of organizations drops below
a certain threshold, indicating a market shakeout.) By replicating the experiment many
times, the AM would identify the most promising business models and identify areas
of sensitivity. In essence, the AM would permit a market selection experiment to be
conducted in silico.
3.4.3. Weaknesses
AMs face several currently unsolved problems. In this section we discuss five
areas of weakness: specification, calibration, analysis, publication, and replication.
3.4.3.1. Weaknesses: Specification
Specification refers to the task of constructing the simulated consumer agents.
Human behavior is complex, and agents are difficult and time-consuming to construct.
A good model should "separate the essential from the incidental, cutting through what
is deemed irrelevant detail to get at the heart of a problem." (Byrne, 1997, para. 4.1). It
should be simple, clear, bias-free, and manageable; simplicity is useful as a starting
point, but there is a tradeoff between simplicity and fidelity (Casti, 1997; Gross &
Strand, 2000). The challenge is how to specify consumer behavior rules which are
realistic and accurate without burdening the model with excessive complexity (Jager,
2007). This tradeoff must be resolved based on the model purpose.
Three styles of agent specification appear in the AM literature which it is
useful to call the ad hoc, theory-first, and theory-later approaches. The ad hoc
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approach is often used to explore market behavior at a high level of abstraction, as
was the case in Epstein and AxtelPs Sugarscape model (1996). The usual goals which
motivate this approach are learning, exploration, and insight, and these are best
achieved with simple agent behavioral rules. Highly abstract AMs may define
arbitrary rules: "The main constraint we impose on ourselves in constructing such
rules...is to make them as simple as possible...practically, we want to be able to state
a particular rule in just a few lines of code" (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, pg. 22). More
typically, rules are synthesized from multiple theories in a particular field such as
consumer behavior or social psychology; the macroscopic market behavior which
emerges from these rules is then compared to the target phenomena to validate the
findings. It is characteristic of the ad hoc approach that validation occurs at the macrolevel; little or no effort is made to validate the micro-level behavioral rules against the
actual behavior of consumers in those markets. Nor is any significant effort devoted to
testing the correspondence between the rules and the theories from which they have
been derived; since the rules are typically a synthesis of several different theories,
such correspondence is difficult to test. Changing the micro-level consumer behavior
usually changes the macro-level market behavior (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, pg. 86;
Durlauf, 1997) so only limited conclusions may be drawn with this approach.
The theory-first approach derives the agent rules from a specific behavioral
framework. For example, Dugundji and Gulyas (2006) used discrete choice analysis to
construct an AM of transportation mode adoption in Amsterdam, while Schwarz and
Ernst (2006) used the theory of planned behavior to simulate diffusion of water
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resource management innovations in the upper Danube basin. Explicitly linking the
agent behavior to extant theory makes the theory-to-model correspondence easier to
establish and strengthens the validity of the simulation. There is much to be said for
the theory-first approach in terms of its overall efficiency, validity, and ease of
incorporating empirical data into the AM, and it is overtaking the ad hoc method as
the dominant approach to consumer agent specification.
That said, there are few behavioral frameworks which are precise, formal, and
complete enough to support the theory-first approach (McKelvey, 1999; Goldspink,
2002). To the extent that a theory is imprecise, informal, or incomplete, it increases
the difficulty of deriving a set of behavioral rules from that theory, blurs the
distinction between ad hoc and theory-first modeling, and limits the conclusions which
may be drawn from the AM.
Consider the TADP, a key behavioral process for AMs. The Consumat, ESP,
CUBES, and Project FAIR models all assume that it is possible to express adoption in
terms of behavioral primitives for imitation, repetition, trust, opportunism, etc. and all
define behavioral automata analogous the one shown in Figure 18 on page 63.
Figure 18 was developed by means of the ad hoc approach; let us suppose we
instead wished to derive it using the theory-first approach. Chapter 2 revealed that at
least 34 staged models of adoption, consumer purchasing, decision making, and
problem solving have appeared over the years. Most of these depict the TADP as a
linear progression of stages, with branching, exceptions, interrupts, parallelism, and
iteration either glossed over or ignored entirely. This poses an immediate problem,
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since these phenomena are all important when specifying a behavioral automaton.
Turning to studies which have used 'stage of adoption' as an independent variable, in
Chapter 2 it was also found that the empirical support for staged TADP models is
rather weak, with evidence of overlapping stages, difficulty in clearly distinguishing
between stages, skipped stages, out-of-order stages, truncated search procedures,
interruptions and disjointed progress, and coincidental confluence of problems,
solutions, decision makers and choice opportunities. Most staged TADP models
require liberal interpretation before they can be translated into agent specifications,
which increases the risk of introducing unintended behavioral artifacts (Axtell,
Axelrod, Epstein, & Cohen, 1996; Casti, 1997). The present state of agent modeling
practice does not adequately safeguard against this risk (Drogoul, Vanbergue, &
Meurisse, 2002; Midgley, Marks, & Kunchamwar, 2007).
AM would greatly benefit from new CAPT of greater precision and formality
than has been typical of past staged models (Kottonau et al, 2000; Ben Said et al.,
2002; Goldspink, 2002; Kliiver et al, 2003; Zhang & Zhang, 2007). Despite the vast
size of the adoption literature, there is a shortage of the kind of research that could
help guide the theory-first specification of behavioral primitives like Figure 18.
When extant theory is inadequate or new perspectives are desired, the theorylater approach may be attractive. In this approach agent modeling is combined with
qualitative techniques such as case studies, grounded theory, or sequence analysis to
construct theories that are grounded in a deep engagement with the consumer
experience, and yet possess the degree of precision and formality needed to support
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consumer agent construction. An example of this approach is Andrews, Baptista and
Patton (2005), who used grounded theory to construct an agent-based simulation
model of worker behavior in a small plastics manufacturing firm. The theory-later
approach recognizes that prior theory may run at cross-purposes with the need to
observe consumers in situ for subtle but important behavioral cues (Agar, 2003,2005).
Listening to the customer is ah important aspect of management and marketing
(Zaltman, 1997) and much the same may be said of consumer agent modeling.
The theory-later approach has its own drawbacks. Methodologies guiding its
application are virtually nonexistent. Furthermore, it is a time-consuming and
analytically demanding approach which requires intense interaction among simulation
modelers, consumer field researchers, and subject matter experts; a diverse team is
needed. Theory-later is a decidedly minority approach at present, but it may yet
increase in popularity as qualitative research methods gain acceptance in mainstream
management and marketing research (Locke, 2001; Arnould & Epp, 2006).
3.4.3.2. Weaknesses: Calibration
Calibration is the task of initializing the AM so that its parameters and
variables accurately reflect the characteristics of the real-world target system.
Calibration and specification are distinct activities; an AM can be entirely probabilistic
(e.g. by basing behavioral rules on discrete choice analysis) and still incorporate
empirical data to calibrate the various geographic, demographic, and agent parameters.
It is entirely possible to use empirical data to calibrate an AM but not to specify it, and
vice versa.
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Calibration is a challenging task (Drogoul et al., 2002; Fung & Vemuri, 2003;
Fehler, Klugl, & Puppe, 2004; Boero & Squazzoni, 2005; Moss & Edmonds, 2005;
Garcia, Rummel, & Hauser, 2007; Midgley et al., 2007). Data may be difficult to
acquire or measure directly, and in their absence the model parameters may only be
estimated (Goldspink, 2002). Even when data are available, they may not be clean or
captured in a useful form. The calibration problem is particularly acute in AMs
because of the need to realistically generate large populations of agents from relatively
small samples (Drogoul et al., 2002; Jager & Janssen, 2002; Fehler et al., 2004). The
challenge here is how to generate a synthetic agent population which is statistically
indistinguishable from a target population. Demographic data (e.g. age, income, sex,
and household composition) may be obtained from public sources and incorporated
into the AM by means of statistical techniques such as iterative proportional fitting.
However, data on cultural norms, attitudes, social connectivity, and personality factors
may be more difficult to come by. Traditional marketing tools such as surveys and
conjoint analysis may be useful in this regard (Garcia et al., 2007), especially when
applied in combination with theory-later specification.
Piana (2004) argues that it should always be possible to convert the behavioral
rules of consumer agents into questions for real consumers in questionnaires. This is
important to achieve empirical feedback, calibration, and validation of the AM, as well
as to help ensure that the agent specifications do not become so contrived that they
defy description in ordinary terms. At present, few methodologies exist to help link
consumer questionnaires to agent behavioral rules; more research is needed.
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3.4.3.3. Weaknesses: Analysis
AM simulations can be quite complex, and great care is needed to avoid
simply substituting one difficult-to-understand system for another. Lack of validation
is a major reason for the rejection of agent-based simulation models (Leombruni &
Richiardi, 2005). New techniques are needed to support model verification and
validation, sensitivity analysis' output analysis, system comparison, and visual
representation of results. In particular, research needed on how to validate findings
generated by AMs (Chattoe, Saam, & Mohring, 2000; Moss & Edmonds, 2003;
Richiardi et al, 2006; Marks, 2007; Midgley et al, 2007).
3.4.3.4. Weaknesses: Publication
Even simple agents can produce quite complex emergent behavior which can
be difficult to summarize. It is no easy matter to condense AM findings into the
limited space of a journal article. The challenge here is how to communicate the
essential features of the model and convey understanding and insight without
overwhelming the reader with detail.
Some authors (e.g., Axelrod, 1997; Goldspink, 2002) have argued that the
publication problem could be addressed by relying on online journals, which are not
bound by space limitations, or by posting simulation source code to the web. These
measures are unlikely to prove satisfactory, since the publication problem is common
to all large software systems, and is not unique to AMs. Source code cannot be made
self-documenting, no matter how carefully it is written (McConnell, 1993). Neither is
it practical to publish ever-longer specifications, since experience suggests that these
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will simply gather dust on the shelf. The current trend being pursued throughout much
of the software industry is to break large, monolithic software systems into modular
components for independent validation and publication (e.g., Cheesman & Daniels,
2001; Heineman & Councill, 2001), and this approach could be profitably applied to
AMs as well.
Component-based approaches are sometimes used to build cognitive agents.
Cognitive modeling is a daunting task, and researchers must sometimes reduce its
scope by developing partial models of human behavior and communication (Pew &
Mavor, 1998; Zachary, Campbell, Laughery, & Floyd, 1998, pg. 10). These partial
models then crucially depend on their software architecture to provide an integrative
framework within which to compose a viable cognitive agent (Sun, 2006). Modular
architectures are needed for consumer agent modeling.
3.4.3.5. Weaknesses: Replication
After publishing a simulation it is important for independent teams of
researchers to replicate the results, for many types of errors can go undetected
(Goldspink, 2002). Simulation is prone to a wide variety of errors including
conceptual mistakes in the model, ambiguities when rendering the model into a
specification, programming errors in the specification, and errors in analyzing the
simulation output. Edmonds and Hales go so far as to state that "an unreplicated
simulation is an untrustworthy simulation - do not rely on their results, they are
almost certainly wrong...in the sense that, at least in some detail or other, the
implementation differs from what was intended or assumed by the modeler." (2003,
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para. 12.2, emphasis original). Unfortunately, replication is seldom performed in
practice, and many things can go wrong even when it is attempted (Axelrod, 1997;
Bruderer & Maiers, 1997).
3.4.4. Threats
AMs also face limitations which stem from fundamental threats rather than
mere weaknesses in current understanding or practice. In this section we will examine
two of these threats and suggest strategies to mitigate and offset their impact.
3.4.4.1. Threats: Sensitivity to Initial Conditions
Sociotechnical systems are notoriously difficult to forecast; predictions are
usually qualitative and very often inaccurate (Ascher, 1978; Porter et al., 1991).
Forecasting problems arise in part because sociotechnical systems exhibit sensitivity
to initial conditions which limits the usefulness of historical data (Linstone, 1999). For
example, at least 112 distinct typewriter designs were produced during the period from
1714 to the 1860s (Shermer, 1995). Who could have predicted in advance that the
Remington model in particular would emerge as the standard design?
Some have argued that sensitivity to initial conditions effectively rules out
prediction, at least for complex nonlinear systems involving deterministic chaos (e.g.,
Seror, 1994). However, sensitivity to initial conditions is a function of the system
structure. Complex nonlinear systems may be extremely sensitive to certain types of
change, while highly stable in regard to others (Goldspink, 2002). Basins of stability
frequently exist within complex nonlinear systems, and these may provide some basis
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for at least qualitative prediction. Thus, while it may have been futile to predict when a
stable typewriter design would emerge, or what form it would eventually take, the fact
that 112 designs were produced over a span of 150 years suggests that the need for the
typewriter was quite stable, even as the rest of the world changed almost beyond
recognition.
3.4.4.2. Threats: Plasticity
Nobel laureate Herbert Simon established that people use only limited
information when making decisions, and settle on acceptable outcomes after only a
moderate search - even though these outcomes may not be ideal or optimal (Simon,
1956; Newell & Simon, 1972). Human decision making is sensitive to context. Which
factors are considered - and the order in which they are considered - determine the
decision outcome (Pious, 1993). This sensitivity to context is called plasticity.
Certain AM applications such as innovation mining require data on latent
consumer needs. This poses a major problem, since consumers are by definition
unaware of these needs. However, identification of latent needs is not a new problem
in marketing research (Levy, 2001) and various projective techniques have been
developed to elicit such data (Spiggle, 1994; Mariampolski, 2001; Smith & Fletcher,
2004; Arnould & Epp, 2006). These could prove useful, especially if applied in
conjunction with theory-later specification.
While careful research can minimize the effects of plasticity, it can never be
entirely eliminated. Plasticity will always constitute a limitation on results obtained
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solely by AMs. Therefore, triangulation of methods and sensitivity analysis may be
necessary when pursuing AMs in MOT research.
3.5. Chapter Summary
In this chapter we reviewed the AM literature and identified the strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing AMs as they pertain to MOT research.
AMs are especially strong for the study of technology diffusion, where complex social
interactions limit the usefulness of equation-based forecasting techniques like the Bass
model; they also show great promise for exploring innovation dynamics, policy
foresight, education and training, analysis of massive market data, generation and
evaluation of business strategies in volatile markets, and the profiling of new products
and services. Before AMs can deliver on this promise, however, they must overcome
several weaknesses and threats in the areas of agent specification, calibration, analysis,
publication, replication, sensitivity, and plasticity. We offer seven recommendations
when using AMs for MOT research.
1. Strive to balance simplicity with fidelity. To ensure credible results,
consumer agents should be behaviorally realistic (Jager & Janssen, 2002; Pahl-Wostl
& Ebenhoh, 2004) without overloading the model with extraneous detail (Midgley et
al., 2007). Simple models are useful for learning and insight, but the limit the kinds of
conclusions which may be drawn. Realistic models may be more convincing, but are
difficult to validate. This tradeoff must be resolved on the basis of the model purpose
(Casti, 1997; Gross & Strand, 2000).
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2. Reexamine important but reified concepts. Concepts like 'adoption',
'decision', 'technology', 'innovation', 'market' and 'environment' are sometimes
reified - applied without much critical examination. CAPTs of these phenomena are
needed that are grounded in empirical data and stated in more formal and precise
terms than has been typical of past theories. Computational formalisms like UML
could be helpful in sorting out Some of the conceptual questions which lurk beneath
the surface of these reified concepts.
3. Incorporate the voice of the customer in consumer agent models. When it is
important to capture consumer behavior with all of its biases, heuristics, and shortcuts,
the theory-later approach could be useful as a means of grounding agents in
"differences that make a difference" to real human beings in actual market settings
(Agar, 2005) especially if combined with existing qualitative consumer research
techniques. Methodologies for theory-later agent specification are in short supply;
more research is needed in this area.
4. Ensure that agent decision rules can be converted into questions for
consumers. When consumer questionnaires which are linked to the agent
specifications it is easier to incorporate empirical feedback, thus easing the calibration
and validation problems (Piana, 2004). Few methodologies exist for constructing
consumer questionnaires from agent behavioral rules; more research is needed.
5. Look beyond closed consumer agent architectures. Monolithic, selfcontained simulation models typically make no provision for the reuse of their
constituent parts by other models (Axtell et al., 1996; Burton, 1998; Edmonds &
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Hales, 2003; Hales, Rouchier, & Edmonds, 2003). Opaque models are difficult to
validate, publish, replicate or reuse. By contrast, a component-based approach would
help open up the 'black box' of consumer agent specification, reducing the scope of
the task while at the same time creating additional opportunities for piecewise
validation, publication, replication, and reuse. In the long run it would also reduce the
time and expense needed to develop AM models. There is much to be said for modular
simulation architectures in terms of validity, generality, parsimony, clarity,
practicality, and computational efficiency.
6. Look for basins of stability. When using AMs to study volatile market
behavior, it may be product to identify which aspects of the environment are less
likely to change over the time scale of the study. These could provide a stable
foundation for qualitative prediction.
7. Triangulate AMs with complementary methods. To mitigate the impact of
plasticity and sensitivity to initial conditions, AMs should be triangulated with
methods which are less susceptible to these threats.
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
This chapter introduces grounded agent modeling, a method for constructing
behavioral agents from qualitative field research. This approach decouples the agent
microspecification from the simulation model for independent validation, thus offering
certain advantages over theory-first agent specification methods.
Grounded agent modeling is a hybrid methodology which draws on existing
software engineering and social science techniques. Inductive case studies, grounded
theory, and sequence analysis are used to investigate transportation mode adoption and
construct a theoretical framework of sufficient precision and formality to guide its
implementation in UML. The objective is not to construct a working simulation, but
rather to construct a theoretical framework which, after further validation and testing,
could be integrated as a component in an agent-based simulation. The long-term
research goal is to construct a component-based model which is grounded in empirical
data, supplies its own calibration instrument, and is suitable for implementation and
reuse across a wide range of agent simulation platforms.
The substantive topic for the study is the psychological process by which
transportation consumers adopt alternatives to single occupancy vehicles such as
transit, bicycles, and car sharing. This topic was chosen because commuting decisions
are driven by powerful, readily discernable forces which facilitate qualitative inquiry
by bringing the underlying linkages and processes to the surface (Andreasen, 1991).
Two sets of exploratory research questions are posed:
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RQ-1. How do consumers make adoption decisions? What are the
characteristic states and events of the process? Which transition
patterns are observed to occur? How do consumers limit the time and
effort they expend on the process? How do they respond to
interruptions? How is the adoption process bounded in time?
RQ-2. How might a grounded agent model be constructed from empirical
evidence? How might its structure and behavior be derived from in situ
observations?
4.1. Methodological Choices
Four major methodological choices were made in pursuit of these questions: 1)
to cultivate a theory-later stance on agent modeling in preference to a theory-first
stance; 2) to structure the field study around case-oriented process research; 3) to
pursue theory-building in parallel with model-building, and 4) to capture data on both
the structural and behavioral aspects of adoption.
4.1.1. Theory-Later Stance
Outsiders and insiders may disagree as to what really makes a difference in a
given social setting. In the social sciences there has been longstanding disagreement as
to the advantages and drawbacks of outsider versus insider perspectives. In the
outsider or theory-first stance, development is deductive: the researcher proposes
certain constructs, develops hypotheses, and tests them against the target phenomenon.
This approach is exemplified by Dugundji and Gulyas (2006), who used discrete
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choice modeling theory to construct an agent-based simulation of transportation mode
adoption in Amsterdam.
In the insider or theory-later stance, development is inductive: the phenomenon
of interest is first observed to identify which units of analysis are relevant to the
participants in a given social setting; once these have been determined, a theory is
developed and validated according to criteria that are germane to that particular
setting. This approach is exemplified by Andrews, Baptista and Patton (2005), who
used grounded theory to construct an agent-based simulation model of worker
behavior in a small plastics manufacturing firm. While each approach has its merits
and drawbacks, this study will adopt the theory-later stance.
4.1.2. Case-Oriented Process Research
Process research seeks to discover causal relationships and patterns in the
sequence of events over time. Mohr contrasted it with 'variance' research, which seeks
to determine the covariance and correlation among variables, independent of their time
order. The aim of process research is to construct theories explaining the time order of
events; it does not concern itself with variables which might influence the rate or
outcome of these events (Mohr, 1982). Process research is less structured and more
qualitative than variance research; typical methods include case studies, grounded
theory, and sequence analysis (Langley, 1999). Sometimes these methods are applied
in combination (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1990).
Case studies are descriptions of past or present phenomena which are
developed from multiple sources of evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). A
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defining feature of case studies is the utilization of multiple sources of evidence (e.g.,
interviews; direct observation; participant observation; archival or source documents.)
Grounded theory is a method for building theories through the systematic
comparison of data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). It produces a theory which is suitable
for insight and understanding into one particular phenomenon. Grounded theory does
not test hypotheses; instead, it relies on constant comparison and an active search for
disconfirming information to construct a theory which is an accurate description of the
phenomenon of interest.
Sequence analysis is a suite of analytical tools for developing explanatory
process models. It uses event predictor variables to identify similarities and patterns in
chunks of coded data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). These variables may eventually be
used to make predictions and test the emerging theoretical framework.
4.1.3. Parallel Theory-Building and Model-Building
When developing a CAPT which is specifically intended for implementation as
a simulated human agent it can be useful to pursue theory-building and modelbuilding in parallel. A theoretical framework is a natural-language causal explanation
of a target phenomenon; a grounded agent model (GAM) is the formal, modelinglanguage counterpart to that framework. To apply a software engineering analogy, the
theoretical framework corresponds to the system requirements, while the GAM
corresponds to the system design.
The GAM is an integral part of data analysis which emerges iteratively and in
parallel with the theoretical framework. It is not merely an addendum to the theory,
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because it helps keep inquiry focused along lines which were likely to be productive,
thereby improving the efficiency of data collection. The GAM also helps to identify
where ambiguities exist in the theory that need to be worked out in relation to the
evidence. This symbiotic relationship is illustrated in Figure 20.
Case Studies
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Theoretical
Framework

Traceability
Matrix
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Grounded
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Figure 20. The Theory-GAM-Target Relationship

Construction of the theoretical framework proceeded per Eisenhardt's (1989)
strategy for building theories from inductive case studies and Dubin's (1978)
principles for constructing explanatory theories. Construction of the GAM was guided
by the principles of object-oriented software analysis (Meyer, 1997; Douglass, 2004).
4.1.4. Structure and Behavior
In process research it is often useful to distinguish between structure and
behavior. Structure refers to the key concepts and static relationships of a process.
Behavior refers to patterns in a series of events over time. Structure and behavior are
thus complementary views of a process. In UML, structure is expressed with class and
object diagrams, while behavior is expressed using sequence, collaboration, statechart,

and activity diagrams.
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To build the GAM it was desirable to collect structural and behavioral
evidence. To unpack the structure of the adoption process a range of outcomes needed
to be sampled (i.e. maximum variation sampling.) This meant relying on retrospective
data, since the outcomes needed to be known in advance. To study behavior, it was
important to observe the process as it unfolded; this meant collecting longitudinal or
real-time data where the outconies could not be known in advance. These conflicting
needs presented a challenge: how can structural and behavioral evidence be collected
within the context of a single research design without posing thorny data collection
and analysis problems?
This conflict was resolved by employing a two-case complementary assistance
research design. Complementary assistance is a triangulation technique which is useful
when two different methods are needed in pursuit of the same research objective
(Morse, 1991; Morgan, 1998). It requires explicit consideration of the relative priority
and sequence of the two methods (see Figure 21.) During the first case, higher priority
was given to structural analysis and retrospective data collection was used (following
Morse's notation, STRUCTURE+behavior.) During the second case behavioral
analysis
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and

(structure+BEHAVIOR.)
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4.2. Case Design
Case selection was guided by Yin's (2003) replication logic strategy. The
primary case selection variable was the degree of user commitment, per Svenson's
(1996) typology of decisions:
Type I

Unconscious, quick, and largely automatic decisions.

Type II

Conscious decisions made on the basis of a few attributes or
immediate emotional reactions.

Type III

Conscious resolution of tradeoffs between conflicting goals.

Type IV

Active search and construction of alternatives.

It was not feasible to investigate all four of Svenson's decision types within the
context of a single study due to inherent conflicts in the time horizons of these
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decisions. A decision was made to focus on Types III and IV at the exclusion of Types
I and II; thus, the study findings are only generalizable with respect to Type III and IV
decisions.
4.2.1. The Retrospective Case: Passport Plus (PP+)
The retrospective case investigated transportation mode adoption among
i

participants in Portland State University's Passport Plus program, an annual pass
which entitles the bearer to the use of light rail, bus, the Flexcar car sharing service,
and reduced rate campus parking in any desired combination. The objective of this
case was to unpack the properties and dimensions of adoption by investigating how
participants in this program made choices and tradeoffs from among the available
options. This case was selected as a sample of a Type III decision.
Recruiting posters (Appendix A) were posted around the PSU campus at
TriMet bus and streetcar stops, Flexcar locations, campus parking garages, and
departmental bulletin boards. Telephone prescreening (Appendix B) was used to
amass a pool of PSU faculty or staff informants who were at least 21, had currently
owned or operated a car during the previous year, and were either current members of
the program, were currently considering participation, or had participated within the
past two years.
The purpose of the study and confidentiality safeguards were discussed with
each informant during telephone prescreening and again at the beginning of the
interview. Signed informed consent forms (Appendix D) were collected prior to the
interviews. Primary informants were assigned identification numbers, and names were
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not used in any of the transcripts or other data. A few secondary informants who were
interviewed in an official capacity were given a special consent form granting explicit
permission to quote them by name.
Maximum variation sampling was used to solicit informants for a range of
personal innovativeness, adoption status, 'greenness', and potential for contributing to
the emerging theoretical framework. Innovativeness was assessed by asking
informants to self-rate their willingness to try new technologies on a five-point scale,
with one indicating the least willingness and five indicating the most willingness.
Adoption status was assessed by administering the Concerns Based Adoption Model
(CBAM) to all informants during the telephone prescreening (Appendix B.) Assessing
'greenness' was more problematic, since this concept is invested with positive value.
Some informants were recruited whose first use of transit did not occur until after the
age of 18 in order to avoid oversampling lifelong transit users. All informants were
asked to complete a short questionnaire intended to classify their attitudes toward car
use; this instrument was adapted from the Transtheoretical Model (Prochaska &
DiClemente, 1984) and is listed in Appendix F. These questionnaires were collected at
the outset of interviews, then set aside and not tabulated after until the bulk of the
analysis was completed to facilitate comparisons with a rival adoption framework.
During the interviews no informant cited environmentalism as a leading factor in their
decision making, suggesting that the case did not oversample 'green' informants and
that a wide range of environmental attitudes were naturally present. The informant
sampling results are listed in Table 5.
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TABLE 5. PP+ CASE INFORMANT SAMPLING
Innovativeness
1:« = 0
2:« = 2
3:« = 3
4:« = 3
5:« = 2

CBAM Classification
0 (Nonuse):
«=1
I (Orientation):
«=2
II (Preparation):
n=\
III (Situational Use): n=\
IV (Routine Use):
n=l
V (Integration):
n=\
VI (Renewal):
«=4
Unclassifiable:
«=4

1 ransit History
First use before age 18: « = 7

First use after age 18:

«=3

To help ensure complete coverage of CBAM states, classification scores were
computed for more than one technology (e.g., TriMet and Flexcar.) Thus, the total
number of CBAM classifications exceeds the total number of informants for the case.
Multiple forms of evidence were collected including interviews, shadowing of
first-time Flexcar users, participant observation journals, and source documents (see
Table 6.)
TABLE 6. PP+ CASE EVIDENCE
Primary:
n = 10
Secondary: n =

Documents
« = 31

Direct Observation
Flexcar user shadowing

Participant Observation
TriMet and Flexcar journals

Semi-structured interviews (Appendix E) were conducted with primary
informants in accordance with the critical incident technique (Chell, 1998). These
interviews lasted an hour and elicited information about turning points leading up to
the adoption or discontinuance of transit, car sharing, and bicycle transportation
modes. Interviews with primary informants were audio recorded, transcribed, and
imported into the Atlas-ti software package for analysis. Contact summary sheets
(Appendix H) were written immediately after each interview to preserve initial
impressions. A limited number of interviews were also conducted with secondary
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informants to obtain background information on the PP+ program. These interviews
were audio recorded, but not transcribed or analyzed.
Data collection and analysis were concurrent and conducted in rounds of two
or three informants each. As each round of interviews was transcribed and analyzed,
new questions emerged which identified new areas for inquiry, prompting another
round of data collection and analysis. The first round focused on two transit users. The
second round included three former PP+ users. The third round consisted of two
potential Flexcar users. The fourth round included three reduced-rate parking users.
By the fourth round new categories had ceased to appear from the analysis, indicating
that saturation had occurred and that the case was complete. The outcomes are
summarized in Table 6.
Direct observation was utilized to shadow two new Flexcar users as they
signed up and used the service for the first time. The author also engaged in
participant observation by relinquishing car ownership throughout the course of the
study, keeping journals on the experience of relying exclusively on transit, bicycle,
and Flexcar.
Source documents for the case included mode split data from the PSU
Department of Parking and Transportation, newspaper articles, TriMet route maps,
and listings of Portland Flexcar locations. Primary informants were asked to complete
a short questionnaire (Appendix F) to classify their adoption status according to the
Transtheoretical Model. Critical event sheets (Appendix C) were collected during
primary informant interviews.
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TABLE 7. PP+ PRIMARY INFORMANT OUTCOMES
Round
1

ID
Summary
Transit
Adopted
1 Adjunct faculty for several
years before becoming
full-time; regularly visits
elderly mother in an area
Transit
not well-served by transit
Adopters
Adopted
3 Pursued a variety of
modes over several years
in hope of reducing the
stress of auto commuting
2
4 Bus user who discontinued Reduced use
PP+ in favor of bicycles
Discontinued
5 Light rail user who
Annual
discontinued PP+ in favor
Pass
of bicycles
Rejectors
10 Pursued a variety of
Adopted
modes over several years
in hope of reducing the
expense of auto
commuting
3
6 Lifelong transit user
Adopted
Potential
Flexcar
8 Working mother in oneAdopted
Adopters
car suburban family
4
14 Auto commuted for years
Adopted
before discontinuing in
Reduced
favor of transit
Rate
17 Suburban worker whose
Adopted
Parking
job was transferred
Adopters
downtown
Discontinued
18 Pursued a variety of
modes over several years
in hope of reducing the
stress of bus commuting

Car Sharing
Adopted

Bicycle

Adopted

Annual Pass
Adopted

Adopted

Discontinued

Adopted

Discontinued

Rejected
before 1st use

Adopted

Discontinued

Adopted

Discontinued

Rejected
Rejected
before 1st use before 1st use
Adopted

Adopted
Adopted

Adopted

Rejected

Adopted

Decision
pending

Discontinued

Adopted

Discontinued

Rejected
before 1st use

Adopted

4.2.2. The Longitudinal Case: Winter Bikes (WB)
The second case was a cohort study of novice winter bicycle commuters. The
objective of this case was to trace the progression of the adoption process over time
and identify its characteristic states, events, and transition sequences. It was chosen to
sample a Svenson Type IV decision requiring active search and construction of
alternatives.
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Recruiting posters (Appendix A) were posted in bicycle shops, bike-oriented
websites, and summer biking events in the Portland area. Telephone prescreening
(Appendix B) was used to build a pool of adult informants who were not employed by
Portland State University, had made a previous personal commitment to bike to work
during the upcoming winter of 2006/2007, had not previously biked to work during
the winter, and were relatively inexperienced at riding under rainy, dark, or cold
conditions.
Maximum variation sampling was used to solicit informants for a range of
personal innovativeness, adoption status, employer size, and geographical distribution
throughout the Portland metropolitan area. Innovativeness and adoption status were
assessed in the same manner as in the PP+ case. Some informants were recruited from
small employers to avoid a potential large-employer sampling bias (many large
employers in the Portland area provide some form of transit subsidy.) Finally, since
PDOT data reveals that bicycle ridership is lower in hilly Northwest and Southwest
Portland than in the flatter North, Northeast, or Southeast parts of the city, informants
were sampled to ensure geographic dispersal throughout the Portland metropolitan
area. The informant sampling results are listed in Table 8.
TABLE 8. WB CASE INFORMANT SAMPLING
Innovativeness
1:« = 0
2:rc = 3
3:«=1
4:« = 5
5:« = 2

CBAIV1 Classification
0 (Nonuse):
n=2
I (Orientation):
n=2
II (Preparation):
ra = 0
III (Situational Use):
n=\
IV (Routine Use):
n=3
V (Integration):
n=2
VI (Renewal):
n=5
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Employer Size
Size < 50: n = 3

Size > 50:

Home Address
K=4
SE:
N/NE:

w=4

NW/SW:

»=3

n=8

To help ensure complete coverage of CBAM states, classification scores were
computed for more than one technology (e.g., bicycle and Flexcar.) Thus, the total
number of CBAM classifications exceeds the total number of informants for the case.
Multiple forms of evidence were collected for the WB case including
interviews, direct observation, participant observation journals, and source documents
(see Table 9.)

Data collection protocols for the WB case were generally similar to the
previous case except for the primary informant interviews, which were time-critical. In
Portland the winters are cool, dark, and rainy; the rain begins to fall around October
15 and continues almost daily until late spring, offering ideal conditions for a natural
experiment (see Figure 21.) Interviewing occurred in two rounds during which all of
the informants were interviewed. The pre-treatment round was held in late September
2006 during a two week window just prior to the onset of the rainy season; the
protocol for these interviews was substantially similar to the previous case. The posttreatment interviews were held in late February 2007 towards the end of the rainy
season, just prior to the return of Daylight Savings Time; the protocol for these
interviews was more structured, and the critical event technique was not used (see
Appendix E). An interim status check was conducted in early November, and 8
members of the cohort responded by e-mail.
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Since the WB case was a cohort study, the outcomes were not known in
advance. To help ensure that the data would include examples of discontinuance as
well as adoption the informants were told they were under no obligation to keep
biking all winter and could continue to participate in the study regardless of their
decision. The outcomes for the WB case are summarized in Table 10.
TABLE 10. WB PRIMARY INFORMANT OUTCOMES
Transit
Adopted

Bicycle (Pre)
Adopted

Reduced use

Adopted

Discontinued

Adopted

Adopted

Adopted

Reduced use
Discontinued

Adopted
Adopted

Discontinued

Adopted

Adopted
Discontinued

Adopted
Adopted

36 Took up bike commuting to gain exercise

Reduced use

Adopted

41 Took up bike commuting to economize

Discontinued

Adopted

20
21
22
23
25
26
27

31
33

Summary
Empty-nester who resumed biking after a
pause of many years
Took up bike commuting after recovering
from major surgery
Former transit driver who discontinued bus
commuting in favor of bicycles
Empty-nester who resumed biking after a
pause of many years
Took up bike commuting to economize
Took up bike commuting for health reasons;
struck by car during the treatment period
Took up bike commuting for political
reasons; struck by car during the treatment
period
Took up bike commuting for political reasons
Took up bike commuting to lose weight

Bicycle (Post)
Suspended
until spring
Continuous use
Suspended
until spring
Reduced use
Continuous use
Suspended
until spring
Suspended
until spring
Reduced use
Suspended
until spring
Suspended
until spring
Discontinued

4.3. Analytical Approach
As previously noted, data analysis produced two outputs: a theoretical
framework and a GAM (see Figure 22.) The theoretical framework was comprised of
a grounded theory and a set of sequence diagrams; the GAM was comprised of a
structural and behavioral specification.
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Figure 22. Analytical Approach

4.3.1. Structural Analysis
Grounded theory is a systematic process for induction which produces an
emergent theory of a phenomenon in one particular research setting (Strauss & Corbin,
1998). The task of the researcher is to uncover what is going on in that setting by
constantly comparing one piece of evidence to another. Data collection began with
personal interviews during which the investigator probed for nuances, variations, and
connections in the commuting experience.
Open coding was used to break the interview data into discrete chunks to
facilitate analysis. The initial template of 77 codes expanded to 97 codes after coding
the first interview, and ultimately stabilized at 124 codes in six general groups (see
Appendix K for a full listing):
-

Commuting issues (e.g., time utilization, cost, accessibility);

-

Transportation modes (e.g., rail, bus, car);

-

Social interactions (e.g., community building, conflict, socializing);
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-

Psychological issues (e.g., self-image, regret, behavioral traps);

-

Process tags (e.g., candidates, needs, limits...);

-

Miscellaneous (e.g., queries, in vivo quotes).

Theoretical memos were produced in parallel with open coding. These were
written to explore emergent themes and structured as 'mini-journals' in which each
entry was time-stamped to trace the evolution of these themes over time. The two
cases yielded a combined total of 160 memos running several hundred pages in length
(Appendix M).
As thematic 'categories' began to emerge, they were compared with freshly
collected data for refinement

into subcategories

called

'properties'

whose

'dimensions' or ranges of variability could be determined. Grounded theory uses
specific and rather idiosyncratic language; Table 2 on page 45 translates grounded
theory terms into their UML counterparts.
Axial coding was used to explore the linkage within the categories in the form
of conditions, actions/interactions, and consequences. In object-oriented terms, axial
coding corresponds to the process of establishing associations and links among the
classes. The Atlas-ti qualitative data analysis package was used to conduct axial
coding, which produced a series of network diagrams (Appendix N.) Atlas-ti greatly
simplified the task of managing and analyzing the large volume of data generated for
this study.
A progressive literature search was conducted in parallel with data analysis to
serve as a source for making comparisons, enhance sensitivity to nuances in the data,
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simulate analytical questions, identify areas for additional theoretical sampling, and
compare the emerging framework with prior theory. Late in the analysis a central
category was chosen to serve as a vehicle for integration and refinement. Selective
coding and illustrative diagrams were then used to communicate the theory. In its final
form, the grounded theory consisted of a theoretical framework for adoption whose
conceptual elements are presented in Chapter 5.
4.3.2. Behavioral Analysis
Analysis of the behavioral aspects of adoption followed Miles and Huberman's
(1994) strategy for sequence analysis, a collection of visual displays which are useful
for identifying the causal relationships among a series of events. There were several
steps in this analysis.
For each informant:
1. Conduct an interview.
2. Create a chronology of the critical issues (e.g., Table 11.)
3. Convert the chronology into a decision diagram (e.g., Figure 23.)
Then, for each process family:
1. Develop a set of sequence codes (Appendix K and Appendix O.)
2. Code each decision diagram to produce a dataset of sequences.
3. Plot the dataset to create a sequence diagram.
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4.3.3. Analysis of Individual Informants
Informant analysis began with the interview. For the PP+ case complete
transcripts were produced; transcription for the WB was limited to key in vivo
passages, since sequence analysis does not require transcripts. Contextual information
from each interview was extracted by constructing an issue chronology. This was a
two-pass process: during the first pass the audio recording or transcript was reviewed
and the issues listed in their order of appearance. A note was made of the approximate
time period when the issue was active as well as information identifying the source of
the data. During the second pass issues were sorted in chronological order and similar
issues consolidated. Table 11 shows a partial chronology for one informant.
TABLE 11. PARTIAL ISSUE CHRONOLOGY FOR INFORMANT #3
Jan 2005 Job interview - found out about PP+/Flexcar link
March 05 Hired at PSU
Spring 05 Dissatisfaction with nonproductive commute
time
Spring 05 Feelings of guilt about environmental impact of
driving
Spring 05 Concern about potential parking cost
Spring 05 Concern about potential parking hassles
March 05 Decides to participate in PP+
April 05 Office trip - first use of Flexcar
2nd Vi 05 Flexcar billing problems
2nd V4 05 Forgot to leave keys in Flexcar; got called by
service
2nd Vi 05 Frustration and stress over Flexcar scheduling
issues
nd
2 !/2 05 Limits Flexcar use to essential situations only
2nd V2 05 Stable pattern of frequent Flexcar use for work
errands
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Next, the chronology was converted into a decision diagram (DD), a visual
display of interactions among streams of issues as a series of decisions unfold over
time (Langley, 1999). The purpose of the DD was to depict the time order of events,
thus converting nominal data into ordinal data. Figure 23 shows a partial DD for one
informant based on the chronology in Table 11. The DD notation is shown in Figure
24. This step yielded a total of 90 pages of DDs: 31 pages from the PP+ case and 59
pages from the WB case. Appendix P contains a complete listing of all DDs.
The bulleted box in Figure 23 is a selection set, a stable period during which
the informant routinely chose from among a regular set of options anytime the need
for transportation arose. Selection sets were especially interesting since their formation
and dissolution marked the temporal boundaries of decision episodes, the main unit of
behavioral analysis.
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At this point member checks were conducted as a validation step (Maxwell,
1996). For the initial PP+ case feedback was solicited from informants whose
interviews had raised particularly interesting issues. The DD was used to walk the
informants through an account of their decision episodes to uncover errors of fact,
interpretation, omission, emphasis, accuracy, or importance. This procedure resulted
in only minor corrections to theiDDs and was not felt to be entirely satisfactory, since
the informants appeared intimidated by the 'formal' appearance of the DDs and may
have found them difficult to understand. Furthermore, it was desirable to catch errors
at an earlier stage of the process, before effort had been expended to produce the DDs.
During the subsequent WB case the procedure was revised to solicit feedback from all
informants at the beginning of the second round interview. Instead of the DD, the
issue chronology was used to give a verbal synopsis of the decision episodes and
solicit informant feedback. This revised procedure proved much more satisfactory and
generated better quality feedback at an earlier stage; it also had the added benefit of
refreshing the informant's memories at the outset of the second round interviews,
thereby eliciting a richer discussion than might have otherwise been the case.
4.3.4. Analysis of Process Families
After completing analysis of individual informants the focus next shifted to
analysis of the process families. The first task here was to develop a set of sequence
codes for classifying the decision episodes depicted in the DDs. Generating these
codes was the most challenging task in the behavioral analysis, since they could not be
determined simply through inspection of the DDs; code generation required synthesis
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of the chronologies, the DDs, the grounded theory, the progressive literature search,
and the GAM. Due to the critical nature of this step the procedure will be described in
some detail.
After producing the DDs for the PP+ case a review was made of the grounded
theory memos and relevant consumer psychology studies to identify potential process
families and sequence codes. A s'eries of three use case diagrams were produced in the
StarUML software package: a need-driven adoption path (see Figure 97 in Appendix
K), an opportunity-driven adoption path (Figure 98), and a problem-solving adoption
path (Figure 99). Use cases are a type of diagram commonly produced at an early
stage of object-oriented analysis, when it is important to identify the key actors and
functions of a system. The use cases were used to draw up a provisional set of
sequence codes; the use cases were then set aside and played no further role in
modeling or analysis.
At this point the sequence codes were regarded as initial templates which still
needed to be worked out in relation to the data (King, 1998). A few interesting,
unusual, or detailed decision episodes were used as test cases. During test coding it
was important that resulting sequences did not feel 'forced', which was taken as an
indication that the codes had failed to capture some essential feature of the episode.
After several iterations the list finally stabilized at 48 codes in three families: 17
evaluation codes, 19 selection codes, 10 maintenance codes, and 2 special interrupt
codes (see Appendix O.)

(106)

The sequence codes were then used to code all of the DDs. As an illustration of
sequence coding, Figure 25 zooms in on an episode from Figure 23 when this
informant used Flexcar for the first time.

0>

I

Flexcar tradeoff

J

-*•

Q.

Apr 2005

Feb 2006

Figure 25. First Selection of Flexcar by Informant #3

Too much detail can clutter a DD and make it unreadable, so during sequence
coding it can be helpful to go back and review the original data. From the transcript:
"My coworkers mentioned that we'd have to leave half an hour early
for a meeting right across the river. That prompted me to say 'Oh,
maybe there's another way. We could almost walk that fast.' One of
them had a car, but she hadn't driven that day. They were talking about
riding the bus and how long it would take us to get there, and I said,
"Well, I've got the Flexcar, we can just drive over and back." [#3]
This is a typical selection episode. The sequence is:
EVTS FSN AR RCL (Bus) AON SCO RCL (Friend's
car) AON SCO RCL (Walk) CLO NO SEN QUITX RSM
RCL (Flexcar) AON SCO CLO 00 CMT ACT (Flexcar)
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To translate: a selection event occurred (EVTS) that resulted in a situation
(FSN) needing immediate action (AR). Three options were considered: the bus, a
friend's car, and walking. As each option was recalled (RCL), they assessed what
would be needed (AON) if they used that option (SCR). Three candidates were all they
could come up with (CLO), none of which were entirely satisfactory (NO). Next time
they would have to think of something better (SEN), but just now they needed to get to
their meeting (QUITX). They were about to resign themselves to a 30 minute bus ride
just to cross the river (RSM) when the informant suddenly remembered Flexcar (RCL).
This option was quickly assessed (AON SCO) and found to be their best bet (CLO
00). They reserved the Flexcar and drove it to the meeting (CMT ACT).
This first Flexcar use also resulted in an evaluation episode, which was
sequenced independently according to the evaluation process codes.
The end product of selection coding was a dataset of 283 sequences in three
major families (Appendix O). The final step in behavioral analysis was to diagram and
interpret the dataset; the results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MTB FRAMEWORK
5.1. Introduction
Chapters 5 through 8 present the motive-technology-belief (MTB) framework,
a grounded theory of the TADP derived from a structural and behavioral analysis of
the Passport Plus and Winter Bikes evidence. In the MTB framework (Figure 26) the
TADP is modeled as a set of structural elements whose interactions are governed by
certain conscious and unconscious behavioral processes.

Motives,
representations of inner mental reasons

Auxiliary Processes
(perceiving, categorizing,
focusing, framing, acting)
change motives

Selecting
uses beliefs
Technologies,
tools pertaining to motives

Beliefs,
judgements about cause and effect

Maintaining
changes technologies

Evaluating
changes beliefs

Figure 26. The Motive-Technology-Belief (MTB) Framework

The structural elements are the foundation of the framework; they are analyzed
in Chapter 6 using Straussian GT. Structural elements are indicated with nouns:
-

A motive is a representation of an inner mental reason.

-

A technology is a tool which pertains to a motive.

-

A belief is a judgment or attribution about perceived cause and effect.
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Behavioral processes operate on the structural elements and are indicated with
verbs. Behavioral processes are divided into two groups, conscious and unconscious.
In Chapter 7 sequence analysis is used to analyze the conscious behavioral processes:
-

Selecting is the process of choosing a technology to satisfy a motive.

-

Evaluating is the process of judging how well a technology satisfies a
motive.

-

Maintaining is the process of ascertaining a technology's functional status.

In Chapter 8 GT is used to analyze the unconscious behavioral processes:
-

Perceiving is the process of constructing a situational context for an event,
assessing its valence (goodness or badness), and attributing its cause.

-

Focusing is the process of selectively directing attention to certain motives.

-

Framing is the process of recalling certain motives to memory.

-

Categorizing is the process of consolidating related motives into summary
categories, or differentiating categories into more finely-grained motives.

-

Acting is the process of implementing a plan.

The MTB framework is a work in progress. Additional validation testing is
planned for future research and will doubtless lead to many changes and refinements.
Every effort has been made to ensure that the framework is extensible and flexible
enough to accommodate change and growth.
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5.2. A Comment on UML Notation
Throughout this discussion UML is used to illustrate key relationships; readers
are advised to review the short UML tutorial in Appendix I before proceeding. GT and
UML terms are considered interchangeable within the context of this discussion and
may be substituted without altering the meaning of the framework; Table 2 on page 45
maps GT terms to their UML equivalents. By convention, UML terms are used
throughout this discussion to reduce the potential for ambiguity and confusion.
5.3. Analytical Background
This section describes how the MTB framework evolved over the course of the
study. My earliest work on the framework began four years prior to the study, when I
first began sketching out some ad hoc UML models of the adoption process. I began
with the prototype automaton shown in Figure 112 on page 481. The problem I had
with this automaton is that I couldn't see any obvious way of validating it; since it
sprang from my own imagination and personal insight and was unsupported by any
empirical evidence or basis in theory. It was no better than any other staged model.
Moreover, it seemed unclear to me what the automaton was a model of, in other
words, what precisely was the object or unit of analysis whose state changes were
being depicted in Figure 112? What were its operational linkages to other processes?
What interesting behavior might it be concealing or glossing over? What was
happening inside states like "experimentation" and "adoption"? What were the
relevant variables and parameters? I wanted to know.
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I decided to set the automaton aside and try a different tack. Rather than
attempt a deductive validation of an a priori model, I would use inductive inquiry to
grounded theory of adoption from empirical case studies. I formulated some guiding
propositions to serve as an initial framework; these are listed in Appendix Q. During
the course of the inquiry I discarded or substantially altered many of these guiding
propositions, with three notable exceptions. First, throughout the study I have
maintained a broad definition of technology as a tool for extracting power from nature.
Second, I have consistently conceived of adoption as a process of forming associations
between needs and technologies. Originally I called these associations 'temes' which
was suggestive of 'memes'. As the study progressed, however, I concluded that
memetics was unworkable as a causal framework, so I changed the name from 'temes'
to 'temors'. By the time I formulated the guiding propositions I had realized that
Figure 112 was a diagram of state changes in a teme (temor). Third, I have
consistently conceived of innovations as structures which emerge from the interactions
of needs and technologies. As I see it, innovations have no fixed form, but are
historically situated and socially constructed - a stance which is consistent with the
tenets of Whitehead's process philosophy (Whitehead, 1929/1978; Rescher, 2000).
The reason why innovations are stable over time is because they are generated by
universal mental processes - even though the inputs and outputs of these processes
vary from observer to observer. I wanted to map out the contours of these processes
and capture them in UML form.
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As I engaged in field work I allowed the theory to emerge from the evidence,
consistent with the Straussian approach to grounded theory. Five themes emerged
early on and led to the lines of inquiry traced in Figure 27:
1. Why is thinking hard?
2. Why doesn't everybody adopt?
3. What is a'perk'?
4. Why do people procrastinate?
5. Why do some technologies have cults?
Several works from decision psychology influenced my thinking, especially
Beach and Mitchell's Image Theory (1996), Montgomery and Svenson's contributions
to Dominance Structuring (Montgomery, 1983; Montgomery & Svenson, 1983),
Svenson and Benthorn's theory of Differentiation and Consolidation (Svenson &
Benthorn, 1992) and Irvine's extensions to the Humean theory of motivation (Hume,
1739/1981; Irvine, 2006). Other influences include Regret Theory (Loomes & Sugden,
1982; Dunning & Parpal, 1989), Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the
halo effect (Thorndike, 1920; Asch, 1946), Attribution Theory (Kanouse & Hanson,
1972; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove, 1973; Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley,
1975; Miller, 1976; Taylor & Fiske, 1978), Reason-Based Choice (Shafir, Simonson,
& Tversky, 1993), the Conflict Model of Decision Making (Janis & Mann, 1977),
Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981),
behavioral traps (Pious, 1993), and Simon's work on bounded rationality, satisficing,
and nearly-decomposable systems (Simon, 1956, 1996). These works were extremely
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Figure 27. Major Lines of Inquiry

The Halo Effect

Usage Categories

Capabilities and
Requirements

helpful in understanding particular phenomena and achieving a synthesis between the
evidence and prior theory.
5.3.1. Why is Thinking Hard?
This is a deceptively simple question. As I see it, most people regard thinking
as hard work and will avoid it if they can. This is not meant to be a cynical or
perjorative comment; it is offered as an honest assessment of the human condition.
Most adoption models treat cognition as a free good, but I disagree: cognition is not
free. Our brains consume a large percentage of the calories we take in, and large brains
impose other serious drawbacks such as making childbirth more difficult and
dangerous and increasing the time needed for a child to reach maturity. It seemed to
me that, from an evolutionary standpoint, our cognitive abilities must have been
purchased at great cost, and it would be only natural if our brains were wired with
various shortcuts to conserve cognitive resources (Gigerenzer, 2000). In particular,
people prefer to eliminate uncertainty rather than reduce it (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Pious, 1993). Assuming that this tendency arose from the need to reduce
cognitive effort, what are the implications for adoption?
A couple of conclusions follow from the observation that people do not like to
hold decisions open indefinitely. First, it implies a 'need for closure' (Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996) which we experience as an urge to 'get on with it' or 'turn the page'
on decisions by reducing complex details into summary categories. Consolidation
implies the existence of its obverse, differentiation - learning to recognize nuance and
tease fine distinctions from simple initial notions. Inquiry into differentiation led to
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examination of what qualitative changes happened as novices gained experience with
a new technology.
Another line of inquiry investigated how and under what circumstances
collapsing occurs, and how positive and negative information were reconciled to
arrive at a summary judgment. This line of questioning explored the phenomena of
regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and its opposite, dominance structuring
(Montgomery, 1983) better known as 'patting yourself on the back.' Another line of
inquiry explored the nature of framing and epiphanies. While examining the need for
closure, I realized that the greater weight we accord to negative information sets up the
status quo to function as a dynamic equilibrium; an input of energy or 'shock to the
system' is required before we will relinquish the old status quo and transition to a new
state of affairs. In the data, adoption was always preceded with disenchantment over a
rival solution due to a persistent pattern of unmet needs which left the decision maker
feeling dissatisfied, exposed, or vulnerable.
5. 3.2. Why Doesn 't Everybody Adopt?
Most adoption studies have sought to identify factors which encourage
adoption and/or reduce the time to adoption. Rogers argues that this has resulted in a
systematic 'source bias' in which researchers overidentify with the needs of funding
agencies and sponsoring organizations (Rogers, 1987, 2003). Since nonadopters are
usually given short shrift by diffusion scholars, the opposite tendency seemed like a
fertile area to me: if a technology is so advantageous, then why doesn't everybody
adopt?
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This line of inquiry led to two insights. The first was that an innovation cannot
be used unless it is obtainable, available, and operable when needed; past adoption
research has tended to ignore maintenance considerations. Second, bundles of
complementary technologies (e.g. walking + transit, or bike + car sharing) are often
needed to make up a complete solution, and that from the user's perspective these
bundles function as coherent wholes. This led to deeper insights into the basic nature
of technologies, including how they provide capabilities and impose additional
requirements of their own.
5.3.3. What is a Perk?
I find it curious that I can recognize that an attribute is a perk, and yet I have
no idea how I know this (or when an attribute is a 'show-stopper', a drawback, a
'clincher', or a 'killer application' for that matter.) How are such 'folk utility'
determinations made and used in practice? It seemed to me that these informal idioms
were hinting at something important about how decisions are made, and if I
understood how they worked I would know a good deal more about adoption. This
line of inquiry led to an exploration of needs: what they are, how they manifest
themselves in usage situations, from whence they arise, and how they interact. Folk
utility is discussed in Appendix R.

5.3.4. Why Do People Procrastinate ?
I imagine that I know myself pretty well. Many times when I have decided on
a certain course of action - such as removing the tree that is damaging the foundation
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of the garage - 1 can clearly acknowledge to myself that it is the right and proper thing
to do and fully resolve to put my plan into action - only to let it languish on my to-do
list for weeks, months, or even years. Why do people procrastinate? It seemed to me
that this question was saying something important about motivation. A progressive
literature search revealed that comparatively little attention had been paid to
procrastination except for wayfe to overcome it. I could locate no studies which
explored procrastination as an interesting phenomenon in its own right. During the
study I explored the various forms that procrastination takes and the deliberate
behavioral traps that informants would set for themselves to overcome its effects (e.g.,
"New Year's Resolutions"). This line of inquiry improved my understanding of the
role that emotions and willpower play in adoption.

5.3.5. Why Do Some Technologies Have Cults?
I find technology cults quite interesting - and, given the central role that wordof-mouth communication plays in technology diffusion,

quite an important

phenomenon. I was especially curious as to why some technologies like bicycles
seemed to encourage vibrant user cultures, whereas others like buses did not.
Engaging with informants, I identified several characteristics associated with the
growth of user communities, or the lack thereof. This led me to explore how personal
and social identities could be constructed around certain technologies (e.g. 'chopper'
bikes, tall bikes, 'Zoobombing' and so forth) which in turn increased my appreciation
of the role that self-image plays in adoption. Eventually I recognized that evaluating
and selecting were distinct mental processes with their own information requirements.
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I also explored 'technovangelism' (both pro and con) and the role it plays in
reconciling and consolidating conflicting attitudes about technologies.
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CHAPTER 6. STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS
6.1. Motives
Motives are representations of inner mental reasons. They drive technology
use, regardless of whether we are consciously aware of them, deny them, or are able to
articulate them - for adoption is; not necessarily a rational or consciously planned act:
(Levy, 2001)
"At the time I got the bus pass I didn't have all my transportation issues
sorted out. I really didn't even have my PSU schedule sorted out yet. I
knew when I would have to be there to teach, but I didn't know when I
would be on campus." [#1]
"I think initially my feeling was, 'Well, I'll ride my bike and see how
things go.' I hadn't planned long-term." [#5]
Needs and desires are two subclasses of motives which emerged from the
analysis (Figure 28.)
Motive

Desire

il

Need

Figure 28. Motives, Needs, and Desires

6.1.1. Needs
Needs are motives which are pursued for the sake of something else, such as
when we need A to get B:
"I thought about Flexcar in terms of having to make a quick getaway
from downtown to back home, because public transportation might not
be fast enough for emergency situations, because something came up
where I needed to be at the house fairly quickly." [#6]
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"Parking is a huge issue here; and the cost as well. I think probably the
cost was more significant to me than the parking issues, but the cost
was going up and up and up. And when the Flexpass was offered at, I
think it was first offered at about $17 a month, as opposed to a parking
pass which was $70 a month, that seemed completely worth it
financially to me." [#14]
Two subclasses of needs which emerged from the data are plans and images.
Need

Plan

f t

Image

Figure 29. Plans and Images

Apian is a short-term, pragmatic need which is conscious in nature:
"I actively made decisions about jobs to take, and what jobs not to take
when offered to me, and which jobs to apply for, based on how bad I
thought the commute would be. I actually turned down a job south of
Wilsonville because it would be too bad a commute. As I said, it also
dictated which jobs I was willing to apply for. There were some jobs I
felt like I was qualified for and could have gotten, but didn't apply for
because I didn't want to travel to those locations." [#3]
"I enjoyed the idea of biking and commuting, and it had been a goal of
mine to have the dual purpose of getting exercise while biking, getting
to exercise while commuting, like killing two birds with one stone,
while working full time." [#10]
An image is long-term need that expresses unconscious values of right and
wrong, visions of the ideal future, and the trajectory of one's life. Their importance is
illustrated by the case of Informant #18, a person with anxieties about riding the bus:
"This whole process [of riding the bus] for me is very personal. The
decisions I make about transportation are very different than what
another person might make because of specific factors about myself.
Such as...my physical size makes it difficult for me. [#18 is a large
person] So, when I say I want alone time, literally there is some
anxiety. I mean, I'm a Chihuahua anyway. But there is some anxiety
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about riding the bus. Although I want to...I'm sorry, I'm getting teary.
[#18 is experiencing some strong emotion] I've had a hard day.
Although I want to ride the bus, you've got to understand that it's very
tied up with all kinds of other stuff, like... this is probably so weird for
you. This comes on the end of a conversation of, 'I just turned 28, I'm
trying to get my whole life together, I can't...you know, I'm just
learning how to get my garbage out on the right day...' and all this kind
of stuff- because I'm kind of a young 28. There is this planning thing
with the bus, because the bus requires you to be on time, and I've never
been good at that. So it's all very tenuous, my relationship with the bus
because it really rubs up^against something I'm not very good at. So I
can be late in a car, and not feel as bad as if I'm late on the bus.
Because I can't make [the bus] go faster, it freaks me out. Or also, I
will be on the bus, and it's the #15 and it's really heavily populated,
and there's nowhere to sit. Or literally, sitting on the bus is sometimes
awkward because there's not a lot of space, or like there's this weird
subtle like, 'Don't sit next to me,' or 'God, there's only one seat left
and it's her,' and I'm always wanting to share, but sometimes people
don't want to sit next to me..." [#18]
As we shall see in Chapter 8, unconscious images are a major driving force for
adoption. As Beach and Mitchell argue, "principles cannot be clearly articulated, but
they are powerful influences on reasons...potential goals must not contradict them, or
those goals and actions will be deemed unacceptable. Moreover, the utility of decision
outcomes derives from the degree to which they conform to and enhance the decision
maker's values." (Beach & Mitchell, 1996, pg. 3)
6.1.2. Situational and Optional Needs
In the MTB framework, an episode is a period of time during which a
consumer engages in mental activities relating to technology use. A situation is the set
of motives which originally prompts or triggers an episode; a decision frame is the set
of all motives which are active during that episode. Initially, the decision frame and
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the situation are identical. Later, motives will be added to or subtracted from the
decision frame, causing it to digress from the original situation.
Technologies are never used for their own sake, but are always employed as a
means to an end. Thus, the motives in the situation are always needs, and it is useful to
refer to them as situational needs. Situational needs are the reasons why technologies
get used in the first place. For example, we may want to go shopping...
"The place I lived was unbelievably gorgeous! In the woods! They had
redone this place, had this beautiful huge apartment that they had added
skylights to in every room. And everywhere I looked, trees and quiet! It
was heaven! I was six or seven minutes from Northwest Portland. It
was the place that you dream about living, because I was right next to
town up there, and...it was damned. [Laughs] You couldn't do
anything. To get a cup of coffee, or see anyone, I had to get in my car."
[#10]
.. .or attend a meeting...
"I've been teaching at 4 in the afternoon out in Hillsboro. Sometimes I
have a meeting someplace else, or I may need to be here at lunchtime
for a faculty meeting or a talk or something." [#5]
.. .or visit friends or family:
"I drive to campus maybe once a week, usually if I'm carrying a lot of
stuff or if the trip to campus is in conjunction with something else. For
instance, I drove to campus yesterday, because when I was through
with what I needed to do here on campus I went over to southeast
Portland to make dinner for my mom." [#1]
One reason why motives are added to or subtracted from the decision frame is
that technology options impose requirements of their own; these are the optional
needs. For example, we might need to rinse off after biking to work:
"[Laughs] Physique-wise, I'm not one of the folks who can commute in
their work clothes and be presentable at the end of their bike ride. I run
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about 10 degrees warmer than everyone else, so I need to clean up
when I get where I'm going." [#4]
Some optional needs are not immediately evident, but emerge over time:
"The car commute from Hillsboro to Wilsonville was a huge negative
that I really had to work through. I have upper back problems that got
worse when I was driving more. It took a lot of my time that couldn't
be used for anything else such as reading or anything. Certainly, there
was the wear and tear on the car. And I think I put my life at a good
deal more risk. There were a number of close calls, and I could see it
was just a matter of time before it was going to be not a near miss, but a
hit." [#3]
Situational and optional needs are distinguished by the time and manner in
which they enter the decision frame. They are not different kinds of needs, like plans
or images; they simply enter the decision frame at different times and for different
reasons.
6.1.3. Desires
Desires are motives which are pursued for their own sake; they are their own
justification and do not depend on other considerations. Two subclasses of desires
which emerged from the data are hedonic desires and volitional desires.
Desire

Hedonic Desire

Volitional Desire

Figure 30. Hedonic and Volitional Desires
Hedonic desires are about seeking rewards and avoiding punishment. They are
affective in character and spring from the emotions. For example, fun is its own
reward:
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"I just like riding my bike. Not all the time. [Laughs] There are days
when I [laughs] come in, you know, you get a bit like a drowned rat,
and it's really cold, and you think 'Ah, that wasn't very nice.' But
mostly I just enjoy riding my bike. And yesterday, for example, instead
of riding my old heavy commuting bike I brought a light racing bike,
and I just...it was just a great day. You know, the sun was out, and it
just made me feel good about life. So that's why I do it." [#5]
Curiosity is also its own reward:
"I'm now into month four of being really interested and really into
bikes. Being able to get that bike together got me interested in history,
and maintenance, and compatibility between different parts, and getting
different things together. My obsession for the last few months has
been learning more about bikes and getting into cycling more." [#25]
Volitional desires are motives which arise from the will, 'just because'; they
are cognitive rather than affective. Volitional desires are not as powerful as hedonic
desires and by themselves are not strong enough to motivate adoption:
"I don't think I would try Flexcar just on a fluke, but I think I would do
it if I had a utilitarian reason. I don't imagine I would just go downtown
and say, 'Oh, I think I'll just grab one of those Flexcars and buzz
around for a while.'" [#1]
Volitional desires are strong enough to tip the balance between opposing
hedonic desires, as when we experience a sudden surge of willpower to 'just do it'...
"The first or second day here at Portland State I noticed that there were
a bunch of bikes around, and a couple of people I work with's bikes
were there. One of them (at least) lives right down the street from me in
North Portland, and I took the emotional leap of just doing it. In the
back of my mind it was like 'You could bike that. You can definitely
bike that.' But I had this emotional...I just didn't want to think about it,
didn't want to deal with it in my own mind. There's the whole, 'Is it
going to be safe? It's going to be cold, it's going to be wet. Is your bike
good enough? You're going to get hit by a car.' And then, just like the
second day I worked here, I was in this moment of change in my life, I
was starting a new job. And I just put on my bike clothes, and I biked
to work. I just did it." [#10]
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Volitional desires can also manifest themselves as determination to see through
prior commitments:
"[Winter bike commuting falls within] the general category of people
who do things that they don't necessarily have to, things that are
difficult and a challenge. It was impressive [to my coworkers] because
somebody has taken a conscious choice to do something that's more
difficult than some other alternative." [#25]
Of course, such commitments are not easy to maintain over an extended
period:
"It's kind of like, 'Am I lazy, or am I not?' One of the main
discouraging things is, 'Do I really want to ride home in the dark and
rain tomorrow night? I don't know." [#25]
'Why not?' and 'Just do it!' are not rational arguments, they are reasonable
ones. Rationality implies suspension of emotion. Reasonability implies the integration
of emotion with decision making as an indispensable aspect of wisdom and good
judgment. Without our emotions we would lose access to the hedonic desires which
comprise the greater part of our motivation and resolve. Noted neuroscientist Antonio
Damasio argues that emotions are integral to decision making, a proposal known as
the somatic marker hypothesis. He relates the case of Mr. Elliot, a brain-damaged
patient who lost access to his emotions and became hyperrational. Mr. Elliot was
unable to exercise judgment, form goals, or make tradeoffs, and fell victim to 'analysis
paralysis':
"He needed prompting to get started in the morning and prepare to go
to work. Once at work he was unable to manage his time properly; he

could not be trusted with a schedule. When the job called for
interrupting an activity and turning to another, he might persist
nonetheless, seemingly losing sight of his main goal...One might say
that Elliot had become irrational concerning the larger frame of
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behavior, which pertained to his main priority, while within the smaller
frames of behavior, which pertained to his subsidiary tasks, his actions
were unnecessarily detailed.. .The tragedy of this otherwise healthy and
intelligent man was that he was neither stupid nor ignorant, and yet he
acted often as if he were. The machinery for his decision making was
so flawed that he could no longer be an effective social being. In spite
of being confronted with the disastrous results of his decisions, he did
not learn from his mistakes." (Damasio, 1994, pg. 36)
6.1.4. Summary
Motives are representations of inner mental reasons: needs are pursued for the
sake of something else, whereas desires are pursued for their own sake. Hedonic
desires are affective motivations to seek rewards and avoid punishment, while
volitional desires are cognitive motivations which arise from the will. Volitional
desires are weaker than hedonic desires and not strong enough to drive adoption by
themselves; however, they can tip the balance between opposing hedonic desires.
Emotions are the driving force behind all technology use.
An episode is a period of time during which a consumer engages in mental
activities relating to technology use. Motives that prompt an episode are called
situational needs, and motives imposed on the decision frame by technology options
are called optional needs. Situational and optional needs enter the decision frame at
different times and for different reasons, but they are not different subclasses of needs
like plans and images are. Plans are short-term pragmatic needs for achieving
particular outcomes. Images are long-term needs which represent fundamental
principles of right and wrong, visions of the ideal future, and life trajectories.
The classes of motives discussed in this section form an inheritance hierarchy
(Figure 31): a desire is a kind of motive, a hedonic desire is a form of desire, etc.
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Figure 31. Inheritance Hierarchy for Motives

6.2. Technologies
Technologies are tools that pertain to motives. A technology is simply the
name of a category of tool, together with personal knowledge of its properties.
Technologies are mental and social constructs which vary from person to person; they
are only relevant to adoption to the extent that they help or hinder human purposes.
6.2.1. Capabilities and Requirements
When we speak of using technology A to achieve need B, what we really mean
is that we are using some capability of A to satisfy some requirement of B. For
example, a car provides the capability for me to move my self, passengers, and cargo:
(Figure 33)
Car: Technoloqy

ooo-i

Move Carqo: Capability

Move Mvself: Capability

Move Passenqers: Capability

Figure 32. Capabilities

(128)

If I need to get to work, I may take advantage of the capability to move myself
without necessarily needing to use these other capabilities: (Figure 33)
Car: Technoloqy

: Decision Frame

Get to Work : Situation
Move Myself: Situational 1
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Move Carqo: Capability

Move Mvself: Capability

Move Passengers: Capability

Figure 33. Capabilities and Situational Needs

Technologies impose requirements such as secure storage in the case of a
bicycle, fare in the case of transit, and fuel, parking, and a driver in the case of a car:
(Figure 34)
Car: Technology
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Move Carqo: Capability

Move Myself: Capability

Move Passengers: Capability

Driver: Requirement

Fuel: Requirement

Parking: Requirement

Figure 34. Requirements

Requirements must be satisfied. Using a car imposes optional needs: (Figure
35)
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Move Myself: Capability

Move Passengers: Capability

Driver: Requirement

Fuel: Requirement

Parking: Requirement

Figure 35. Requirements and Optional Needs

Capabilities and requirements are constructed as technologies and motives are
evaluated; thereafter, they are embedded in technologies and motives like raisins in
bread dough.
6.2.2. Bundling
Complementary technologies can be combined, such as when a bicycle is
bundled with transit to support a car-free lifestyle. For example, informant #21
routinely rides her bicycle to work. Periodically she must travel to her company's
headquarters 17 miles northwest of her office in downtown Portland. On these
occasions she rides light rail to the station nearest to the headquarters, then bikes the
rest of the way. Her "light rail + bike" bundle constitutes a complete solution which
acts like a technology in its own right.
Any technology which is capable of being decomposed into potentially useful
parts can be thought of as a bundle. Bundles are recursive: if a bundle's parts contain
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useful subparts then they too may be unbundled, and so forth. For example, a car is a
bundle of many different technologies. Its dashboard may contain an analog clock,
which is itself a bundle of clock parts. One of these parts is a gear, which may be
useful as a spare part, a conversation piece, or hunk of scrap metal:
There's a couple of chopper bike organizations in the U.S. where folks
build tall bikes or chopper bikes. They'll go down to the bins and get a
bunch of frames, take them back, cut them up, weld them into new
grotesque bike frames, and just ride them around for carnival sorts of
things. You'd get on these tall bikes, you know, two frames welded on
top, or you'd have a chopper with a 10 foot fork that goes way out in
front. They're just goofy machines to ride around on. For different
events they'd bring them out and they'd do sort of a show with them.
It's called "Chunkathalon." All the tall bikes and chopper bikes get
together and compete in different events that involve pretty ridiculous
things. So, yeah, there's an ethic of some sort.. .a cultural aspect." [#4]
Since a gear fragment is not useful as an entity in its own right, a gear is a
primitive: it cannot be unbundled, and thus halts the recursion.
6.2.3. The Origin of Capabilities and Requirements
Technologies can sometimes inherit the capabilities and requirements of their
bundled subtechnologies. To illustrate, consider the case1 of a customer shopping for a
book online. The customer needs to be able to browse, place and purchase an order,
track the order, and ensure the security of his personal information. These situational
needs may be satisfied by the technology bundle known as an online bookstore (Figure
36.)

1

This online shopping example is offered to illustrate the internal dependencies and inheritance
mechanisms of capabilities and requirements. It is not meant to be taken as a literal description of ecommerce technology.
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Purchase: Situational Need

Purchase: Capability

Figure 36. Online Bookstore: Situational Needs and Capabilities
An online bookstore

inherits

several

capabilities

from

its bundled

subtechnologies, as shown in Figure 37. For example, the order tracking capability is
inherited from hyperlink technology, and the purchasing capability is inherited from
credit card technology.
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Figure 37. Online Bookstore: Bundling and Internal Dependencies
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Computer: Technology

Figure 37 reveals many internal dependencies; for example, the e-mail
confirmation capability requires the hyperlink technology. Because this dependency is
satisfied internally, it is transparent and seamless to the user. Because requirements
must be satisfied, any internal requirement which is not matched by an internal
capability will result in a capability deficit, leading to three possible outcomes:
a. One or more of the bundle's external capabilities will be lost, a condition
familiarly known as a 'show-stopper'.
b. The deficit will be imposed as an external requirement on the customer,
adding one or more optional needs to the decision frame. This condition is
informally known as a 'drawback.'
c. The deficit will be imposed as an external requirement on some exogenous
technology, resulting in a new bundle. Over time, technologies within a
bundle may become optimized to each other's presence, which tightens the
bundle's internal constraints to such an extent that the subtechnologies are
no longer capable of functioning independently. They have become
primitives.
In online shopping the browser, mailer, internet, and computer are not
provided; they are imposed as external requirements on the customer, and thus add
new optional needs to the decision frame (Figure 38.)
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Figure 38. Online Bookstore: Requirements and Optional Needs

In the MTB framework technologies do not exist 'out there' - they are mental
and social constructs which reside in the mind of the user, consistent with the tenets of
Whitehead's process philosophy (1929/1978). It follows that capabilities and
requirements do not exist 'out there' any more than technologies do: as we shall see in
the next chapter, they are constructed during the evaluating process, used during the
selecting process, and changed during the maintaining process.
6.2.4. Summary
Technologies are tools which pertain to motives. A technology is the name of a
category, together with the knowledge of its properties. Knowledge about technologies
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is mentally and socially constructed; it varies from person to person and culture to
culture.
Technologies have capabilities and requirements. Capabilities satisfy needs or
requirements, whereas requirements impose conditions which must be satisfied.
Capabilities and requirements are constructed as technologies and motives are
evaluated.
Technologies encapsulate various subtechnologies through recursive bundling;
a technology may be unbundled as long as at least one of its subtechnologies is
capable of satisfying a need on its own. Technologies which cannot be unbundled are
said to be primitives.
6.3. Beliefs
Beliefs are judgments or attributions about perceived cause and effect which
we construct as we evaluate technologies and motives; beliefs do not have
independent existence. Beliefs are not reflexive; just because I believe that A satisfies
B does not imply I believe that B satisfies A. This property is called valence:
-

Positive valence: A is effective at satisfying B.

-

Negative valence: A is ineffective at satisfying B.

-

Mixed valence: A partly satisfies B.

-

Unknown valence: It has not yet been determined whether A satisfies B.

Every belief has two endpoints: a requirement or "effective" end in which
something is wanted, and a capability or "causal" end in which something is provided.
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A belief, then, is comprised of a requirement end, a capability end, and a valence
property. We can express this structure in UML form (Figure 39.)
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Figure 39. The Internal Structure of a Belief

Requirements and capabilities act like 'sockets' and 'pegs' to join motives,
technologies, and beliefs; they are the internal interfaces of the MTB framework.
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Figure 40. Capabilities and Requirements in the MTB Framework

It is hypothesized that the process of evaluating a technology differs from the
process of evaluating a motive. Identical processes would imply that there is no
difference between abstract and concrete thought, and that ideas and innovations are
fully equivalent. Studies from developmental psychology contradict this implication.
In a series of experiments, Piaget demonstrated that children develop cognitive

abilities in stages, and that their ability to manipulate concrete objects precedes their
ability to grasp abstract ideas (Benson, 1998). While far from conclusive, such
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evidence suggests that beliefs have physiological counterparts in the brain which
develop at different rates, and that beliefs about physical objects differ from beliefs
about abstract ideas in ways that are yet to be determined. If true, this hypothesis
implies the existence of two subclasses of belief, which it is useful to call temors and
momors (Figure 41.)
Belief

Temor

t

\
Momor

Figure 41. Inheritance Hierarchy for Beliefs

6.3.1. Temors
A temor (for 'technology-motive relation') is a belief which relates a motive to
a technology; it serves as a home for the properties of a single dimension of
technology use. Figure 42 gives an example of a temor. Temors are discussed in
Chapter 7.
Getting to Work: Situation
Move Myself: Need

Car: Technology

Temor

KM

Move Myself: Capability

Figure 42. Temors

6.3.2. Momors
A momor (for 'motive-motive relation') is a belief which relates one motive to
another; it serves as a home for the properties of that association. Figure 43 gives an
example of a momor. Momors are discussed in Chapter 8.
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Figure 43. Momors and Motive Chains

6.4. Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced motives, technologies, and beliefs, the structural
foundations of the MTB framework. It defined two subclasses of motives (needs and
desires), two subclasses of desires (hedonic and volitional), and two subclasses of
needs (plans and images.) Situational and optional needs differ by the time and
manner in which they enter the decision frame, but they are not different types of
needs.
Technologies are tools that pertain to motives. They are mental and social
constructs, so their precise definition will vary from person to person and culture to
culture. Technologies have various capabilities and requirements which they can
inherit from their bundled subtechnologies.
Beliefs are attributions of perceived cause and effect. Two subclasses of beliefs
are temors (relations between motives and technologies) and momors (relations
between motives.)
Table 12 traces these structures back to their origins in the analytical memos
and network diagrams, and from there they may be traced back to the empirical
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evidence. The full text of all theoretically significant memos is contained in Appendix
M; the network diagrams are shown in Appendix N.
TABLE 12. TRACEABILITY MATRIX FOR CHAPTER 6
Memo
(Appendix M)
Motives
Needs
Situational and optional
needs
Desires
Hedonic desires
Volitional desires
Technologies
Bundling
Capabilities and
Requirements
Beliefs
Temors and Momors

Network Diagram
(Appendix IN)

M.45
M.45
M.45,M.50,M.51

N.ll
N.ll
N.l,N.3,N.2,N.ll

M.20, M.45
M.10,M.32, M.45
M.10, M.43, M.45, M.54, M.70,
M.68
M.18
M.46
M.45,M.50,M.51

N.6.N.11
N.l,N.2,N.8,N.9,N.10,N.ll
N.l, N.2, N.3, N.6, N.7, N.9, N.10,
N.12
N.4, N.5
N.12
N.l, N.3, N.2, N.ll

M.33, M.39, M.45, M.52
M.45, M.56, M.62

N.2, N.7, N.8,N.10, N.ll
N.ll,N.12
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CHAPTER 7. CONSCIOUS BEHAVIORAL PROCESSES
This chapter discusses the conscious behavioral aspects of the MTB
framework. Sequence analysis was used to identify and map the behavior of three
processes: selecting, evaluating, and maintaining.
7.1. Selecting
Selecting is the process of choosing a technology to satisfy an immediate need.
Of the 283 identified behavioral sequences, 75 (27%) involved selecting. These are
plotted in Figure 44.
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Figure 44. Sequence Plot for the Selecting Process (n = 75)
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Selecting unfolds in three stages: framing, screening, and choice (c.f. Beach &
Mitchell, 1996). Stages are sequences of conceptually related tasks. They are
characteristic of simple behavior in which a series of tasks is performed until the series
is completed or the tasks are interrupted by an external stimulus (Douglass, 2004).
Simple behaviors are not reentrant, so if they are interrupted they cannot be resumed;
they must be restarted at the beginning.
7.1.1. The Framing Stage
During the framing stage the decision maker assesses the situation to determine
whether action is warranted. This stage makes use of an unconscious auxiliary process
of the same name which is discussed in the next chapter.
Every selecting sequence was initiated by a prompting motive of some sort.
Most involved the need to commute to work, but a few were prompted by other needs
such as socializing with friends and family, shopping, child care, and family
emergencies. The exit criteria for this stage is whether the situation is considered
pressing enough to merit attention at present; this determination involves an
unconscious process called focusing which is discussed in the next chapter. Figure 45
depicts the framing stage in the form of a UML activity diagram.
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Figure 45. The Framing Stage of the Selecting Process

7.1.2. The Screening Stage
During the screening stage the decision maker assembles a short list of viable
options that might satisfy the needs of the situation. If the situation is a familiar habit,
the list could be as short as a single option. As each option is recalled, its capabilities
and requirements are screened for compatibility with the situational needs. Screening
concludes when the decision maker judges that enough effort has been spent
reviewing the options and that it is time to make a choice. This determination is called
closure, part of the acting process discussed in the next chapter. Figure 46 depicts the
screening stage in UML form.
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Figure 46. The Screening Stage of the Selecting Process

7.1.3. The Choice Stage
During the choice stage the decision maker picks a finalist from the short list
of screened options. There are three potential paths through this stage depending on
how many options there are in the short list. If there is more than one option, the
decision maker must expend cognitive effort to make a tradeoff:
I was thinking, 'How am I going to get to PSU?' My daughter was also
working downtown, and she's always complaining about how she had
to commute, and how bad the traffic is, and there's nowhere to park,
and it's so expensive. So the solution to me was clear: I'll ride my bike,
most of the time, because that's how I commuted to my last job. But
that was only three miles from home; this is twelve miles from home,
and it's over the top of the hill. This was okay for the first few trips in
September, when the weather's good, and I haven't got a tight schedule
to meet. When we did the employee orientation, and the realities of
coming in everyday and having to be in on time to teach classes and so
forth came along, I thought 'Well, the TriMet pass looks like a good
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option. I can ride my bike to the Sunset Transit Center. I can get on the
train which takes me right to Goose Hollow, and then it's only
something like another five minute's ride from there to here, this seems
like a good way to get to work.' So I signed up for the TriMet pass.
[#5]
If it was just car versus MAX, there would have been no question about
it, but there's the solid third option for me, the bike. Because I also get
exercise. I mean, the recorder can't see this, but I have a few extra
pounds on me, and I sit at a desk for a third to half of my day. I have
the long-term intention of getting more exercise, and biking is good,
low-impact, get-fresh-air exercise. [#10]
We actually bought a new car in August of '04, to replace the old
vehicle. We sat down and did the math beforehand, and thought about
the cost of using rental cars, the cost of using Flexcar. At the same
time, unfortunately, my wife moved to a new work location that's not
served by transit very well. So, it made sense to buy. [#4]
There is a considerable body of literature on tradeoff heuristics; for reviews,
see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1992) and Gigerenzer (2000).
If there are no options in the short list the prompting motive becomes
sensitized, an aspect of focusing discussed in Chapter 8. As indicated by Figure 44 on
page 140, the decision maker can either give up at this point or settle for less by
reframing the situation:
Public transportation takes effort in the sense of being willing to spend
more time, being willing to wait; being willing to accept the
compromise of 'Oh, other people have to get out on this stop!'
Sometimes when I ride the #19 out I regret the decision, because it
stops and it starts... 'Why do these people have to get out here? Go
straight ahead!' I like the idea of an express bus. I always use to say
with the #12, 'Why the hell don't they have an express line for the #12
line?' There's a certain inconvenience, and with a bus you're lurching
around a bit, too. I guess the universe does not revolve around me, and
I guess public transportation - it's fairly obvious that you're making
some compromises. [#6]
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There are two paths forward from reframing. The first is to cancel or
deemphasize some of the needs in the decision frame (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Montgomery, 1983) in such a way as to qualify at least one option for the short list;
flow then returns to the choice stage for a resolution. The second path is to 'think
outside the box' or have an epiphany by recalling an infrequently used or untried
option. Flow then proceeds to the screening stage where the viability of the option is
checked.
Assuming that the decision maker does not quit, the choice stage concludes
when exactly one option remains and the consumer commits to a course of action.
However, commitment does not guarantee implementation, for the decision maker
may still procrastinate; this process is discussed in Chapter 8. Figure 47 depicts the
choice stage as a UML activity diagram.
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Figure 47. The Choice Stage of the Selecting Process
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7.1.4. Help and Information Events
Thus far we have not considered what happens when selecting is interrupted.
Two interrupt events were observed in the behavioral data: gaining help from other
persons and gaining new information. We do not distinguish whether such events were
initiated by the decision maker or by someone else. Help and information events are
asynchronous and may interrupt the selecting process at any time; in so doing, they
provide an operational link to the evaluating process as we shall see in the next
section.
The behavioral data indicate that novice users are more likely to acquire new
information during the screening stage as they assess the optional needs of a new
technology. They are more likely to acquire help during the choice stage, just after
committing to an untried technology but prior to implementation. No regularities were
observed in the help or information events of experienced users. Figure 47 depicts
these events as UML interrupt handlers.
Get
Help

Information

^~~^LInformation
Event

Help
Event

Figure 48. Interrupt Handlers for the Selecting Process

7.1.5. Discussion and Summary
Selecting is the process of choosing a technology to satisfy an immediate need.
Its main input is a prompting motive, and its main output is technology option.
Selecting is an operation of the need class.
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The hypothesis that selecting is a simple behavior is supported by two lines of
evidence. First, if selecting were a simple behavior we would expect it to unfold in
stages. The sequence data revealed three of these - framing, screening, and choice which are congruent with other staged adoption models, especially Beach and Mitchell
(1996). Second, if selecting were a simple behavior then we would expect that
decision makers would respond Ho interruptions by starting the process over from the
beginning. This hypothesis is supported by an experimental study by Potter and Beach
(1994) which asked subjects to screen a list of apartments. After the subjects had
produced a short list they were informed that all of their options had been rented and
were no longer available. Subjects were then given the option of screening an entirely
new set of options or rescreening their previously rejected options. Potter and Beach
found that nearly 90% of the subjects preferred starting over with a new list of rooms,
consistent with the hypothesis that selecting is a simple behavior.
In summary, selecting is a simple behavior which requires the decision maker
to maintain a train of thought. While selecting is a conscious process2, the cycles in
Figure 44 indicate that it is not a simple linear progression of stages. Selecting is
'reasonable' in the sense that it is involved in constructing defensible 'reasons' or
narrative justifications for decisions. However, selecting is supported by a number of
unconscious auxiliary processes, which belies the notion that it is entirely rational.
Figure 49 summarizes the entire process in UML form.
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For Svenson Type III and IV decisions, at any rate.
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Optional Need

7.2. Evaluating
Evaluating is the process of assessing how well a technology satisfies a motive.
It accounts for 151 of the 283 sequences (53%); these are plotted in Figure 50.
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Figure 50. Sequence Plot for the Evaluating Process (n = 151)

Evaluating is an operation of the temor class. Each temor preserves the state of
a single motive-technology pair, and evaluating is the main process by which that state
changes. Each temor is judged on its own merits: a technology that is unsatisfactory
for one motive may be quite satisfactory for another. However, the temors of a motive
are not truly independent. They are only 'nearly decomposable' (Simon, 1996) in that
they can influence each other to change states by means of the unconscious 'halo
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effect' discussed in Chapter 8. Thus, evaluating is not the only way for temors to
change states.
Evaluating is an event-driven behavior characterized by fault lines or axes
which bifurcate the temor state-space into mutually exclusive substates. For each axis
there exists a characteristic event that induces a transition from one state to the next.
The axes for the evaluating process are:
Relevance:

Is this technology relevant to this motive?

Familiarity: Have I ever before used this technology to satisfy this motive?
Valence:

Is this technology of positive, negative, mixed, or unknown
worth in terms of satisfying this motive?

A state is a period of time during which a condition is satisfied or an event is
pending; states differ from stages in certain ways. For example, a light switch has
states: at any given time it is either on or off, and the transition from one state to
another is discrete and instantaneous. By contrast, stages flow from one to the next in
a steady progression. A party is thrown in stages: planning the guest list; sending
invitations; making preparations; greeting the guests; partying; and cleaning up.
Information flows between stages, but it does not flow between states.
7.2.1. The Relevance Axis
Before an event can be evaluated it must first be recognized as relevant. Every
evaluating sequence began with a prompting event of some kind, such as an
interesting news item, a surprising experience, a chance opportunity, a sale or special
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offer, or an otherwise noteworthy incident. While all of these events involved
technologies, their cause was not always attributed to these technologies. In many
cases cause was attributed to human actors or chance circumstances:
"I saw a bus pass by, but it didn't occur to me that that was a mode of
transportation. That's what surprised me when I got on the bus in
Eugene - the internal experience of 'Oh, this is a mode of
transportation. This is a real mode, it's not a theoretical mode of
transportation. It's almdst like a train.' I've only taken a train in
Europe, maybe once in the States. It was an incredibly pleasant
experience. But I don't think of it as transportation; it's almost like a
little holiday, like scuba diving or something." [#10]
Attribution is an aspect of perceiving, an unconscious auxiliary process which
always precedes evaluating. Perceiving constructs a situational context for an event,
assesses its valence (goodness or badness), and attributes its cause. Events which are
attributed to technological causes are routed to the appropriate temor(s) for evaluating;
otherwise they are routed to destinations outside the scope of the framework.
Perceiving is discussed in Chapter 8.
Relevance (Figure 51) is an axis which divides the temor state-space into the
irrelevant and relevant substates. When a temor is in the irrelevant state it means that
the technology has no bearing on the motive (e.g., canning is irrelevant to
commuting.) A temor in the irrelevant state will ignore any event except recognition
that the technology is relevant to the motive.
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Figure 51. The Relevance Axis

7.2.2. The Familiarity Axis
The first occasion of use is a watershed event:
"I very distinctly remember [the first time I rode MAX to work.] The
level of stress and driving was just completely removed. I remember
thinking, 'I can't believe I drove on the Banfield for 25 years!' Because
I've been at PSU, it will be 29 years in August. And every day I drove.
I just remember, just the level of... [exhales] ah! just relaxation, sitting
on the MAX, instead of sitting in traffic gripping the steering wheel.
And I had no idea, the level of stress I had sitting on the freeway, until I
sat on the MAX. And that first week I so clearly remember how less
stressed I was when I got to work. So, that was pretty significant for
me." [#14]
First use divides the adoption experience into before and after, novice and
experienced, unfamiliar and familiar. A recent experimental study found significant
differences in the perception of product capability and usability between novice and
experienced users; these same differences were not observed among amateur and
expert subjects (Thompson, Hamilton, & Rust, 2005). The first tacit experience with a
product changes evaluation in a way that explicit expertise does not.
Familiarity (Figure 52) is the second axis of evaluating. This axis is only
defined while the temor is in the relevant state. The first use event bifurcates the
relevant state into two substates: unfamiliar and familiar.
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7.2.3. The Valence Axis
Valence is the third axis of evaluating; it refers to the worth of a technology in
satisfying a need. Like the other axes, valence is dichotomous: a technology either
satisfies a need or it does not, there are no 'in-between' values. What we think of as
'in-between' value is actually caused by enhanced perception of need. As we gain
experience in using a tool, we often find that our needs are more complicated than we
originally thought. We develop a more refined and nuanced understanding of our
needs in parallel with a finer appreciation of which tools are right for the job: for
ordinary household maintenance I can make do with a hammer and a screwdriver, but
a professional carpenter cannot. Thus, mixed valence does not indicate an intermediate
value between positive and negative valence; it indicates that a need is complex and
must be unpacked before it is possible to say whether or not an option is satisfactory.
Is a hammer satisfactory for building a cabinet? The answer will depend on which task
is being performed. A temor with mixed valence can always be unpacked or
differentiated into a more refined set of temors with dichotomous positive or negative
valence. The differentiating process is discussed in Chapter 8.
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We begin to develop beliefs about the worth of an option even before we have
tried it. When discussing the valence axis it is important to distinguish between its
effects in the unfamiliar and familiar states.
7.2.4. Valence in the Unfamiliar State
The valence axis (Figure 53) divides the unfamiliar state into the passive
interest, active interest, and disinterest substates.
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Figure 53. The Valence Axis in the Unfamiliar State

7.2.4.1. Passive Interest
Passive interest is a condition in which consumers attend to information which
comes their way, but do not actively seek it out. At first, passive interest may consist
of nothing more than a vague sense that a technology might be useful somehow:
"I got a little e-mail on my Odin account about the Flexcar...I tend to
keep my e-mails a long time anyway, just in case I want to look at them
again. And I kept that one, just thinking 'Maybe I should see what this
is all about.' I didn't click on the link for a long time. I just read it and
thought 'Oh, I don't think that would work for me.' But I just kept it. I
must have been thinking about it on some level, because I didn't delete
it." [#1]
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As consumers monitor information they begin to discover the capabilities and
requirements of the option. Each such discovery creates a new temor; in this way,
evaluation constructs knowledge about technologies.
7.2.4.2. Active Interest
During active interest consumers will proactively seek out information rather
than passively waiting for it to come their way. It is hypothesized that a temor
transitions to this state when a capability is discovered that relates to a sensitive
motive. Informant #1 signed up for Flexcar about a month after she received an initial
e-mail offer from PSU's Office of Parking and Transportation Services:
"To tell you the truth, I didn't see where [Flexcar] would work for me,
but I looked into it. I decided to get it because I thought, well you
know, conceivably I could take the #12 from the Barbur transit center
to downtown, get one of those Flexcars, and go see my mother in
southeast Portland. Take her to lunch, take her grocery shopping, and
get her back home and get back downtown in four hours. Because you
have four hours, and then I wouldn't be using my gas. That's kind of
what I thought, 'well, this might be a good thing because it will save
me gas.' Even though it wouldn't save me time, because I'd have to
drive or take the bus downtown. I thought, you know, the way the gas
prices are this would be something good to have. And it might be
something fun to do just to drive another car sometime, just for kicks."
[#1]
7.2.4.3. Disinterest
Nothing is inevitable about adoption, and interest has a short shelf life.
Disinterest is a state in which an option has been recognized as relevant to a need but
has not generated enough excitement to motivate initial use. It may be that the need is
not sensitive, or that current options are satisfactory, or that the need does not engage
the emotions strongly enough to sustain interest. Disinterest is distinct from
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irrelevance or rejection; irrelevance is a failure to recognize that an option is related to
a need, and rejection only occurs after an option has been tried and judged
unsatisfactory. Several informants became disinterested in Flexcar after they were
unable to find a useful application for the service:
"The four hour Flexcar limit really doesn't meet my present needs.
When I drive to campus, I'm usually there less than four hours, so I just
find a meter. I usually taice the bus. Then I can get a nap and not have
to hunt to park when I arrive." [#1]
Four months after signing up for Flexcar, Informant #1 gave up trying to find a
use for it. Although she had registered as a member, she had never actually used the
service.
7.2.5. Valence in the Familiar State
The decision to initiate first use occurs during the selecting process when an
untried but promising option stacks up favorably in comparison to its rivals during an
actual usage situation. First use can only occur if the new option's capabilities have
positive valence to at least one sensitive motive, for otherwise it will never make the
short list.
The valence axis (Figure 53) divides the familiar state into six substates: initial
use, dominance structuring, positive evangelism, regret, negative evangelism, and
differentiation.
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7.2.5.1. Initial Use
By default, when a temor enters the familiar state it starts out in the initial use
state. It is hypothesized that valence acquired prior to first use is only used to
determine whether first use is warranted. After first use, consumers will tend to
bracket or set aside prior valence and place greater weight on information which has
been acquired first-hand. During initial use, 'the jury is out.'
7.2.5.2. Dominance Structuring
Dominance structuring is a condition in which a consumer attempts to
construct a set of beliefs about the technology such that it dominates its rivals on every
sensitive motive (Montgomery, 1983; Montgomery & Svenson, 1983; Svenson &
Benthorn, 1990). Dominance structuring is familiarly known as "patting yourself on
the back." Informant #10 decided to bike to campus for a year instead of buying the
annual PP+ transit pass. After returning the pass for a refund he engaged in a bit of
dominance structuring:
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"So I was like, 'Well, I've done due diligence. If I end up spending an
extra hundred bucks that I would have saved, that hundred bucks is a
cheap long-term mental psychological payment to know that I'm...I
mean, it would be a beautiful thing if in September it turns out that I
had lost a hundred bucks. Because then, for the next 20 years (if I work
here for 20 years) I'm going to be solidly, completely grounded in the
idea that riding the MAX is by far a fantastic decision to make. So I
can't lose. If I saved money, I saved money. If I lost money, it's a
cheap lesson to learn for the rest of the time I work here." [#10]
In the dominance stractiiring, regret, and evangelism substates temors undergo
an unconscious 'consensus building' phenomenon known as the halo effect. Informant
#14

formed

a positive

opinion

of

Flexcar

and

became

an

enthusiastic

'technovangelist'; observe how she plays down any negative aspects of the service:
"I was a little scared. It's kind of like driving someone else's car. I'm
so used to my own car, and I was a little.. .apprehensive. But once I got
in it, and figured out the car, and did it, at the end it was 'That was
great! That was great!! I'm gonna do this!' For one thing, the parking.
There was always going to be a parking space, most of the time.
[Laughs] And just being able to use it, and then put it back in the same
place; having it right there, not having to worry about.. .if I have to, you
know, get somewhere on the bus, which is sometimes what I would do,
the availability of it...just the ease of using it. It's easy. And I think it's
also that there's a lot of options; it's not just that car. I say, 'Oh, I can
do that! I can go pick that up.' And I go see that car is busy. Okay, well
then I go to the Pizzacato car. Well, that one is busy. One time I had to
go up to the gas station, that far, to get a car. But still, it was five
blocks. So I think 'ease', meaning lots of options. It's not just one car,
one place, one time." [#14]
It is hypothesized that temors with positive or negative valence will try to
induce other temors to revise their valence in the same direction (Janis & Mann, 1977;
Montgomery & Svenson, 1983). The halo effect is discussed in more detail in Chapter
8.
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7.2.5.3. Positive Evangelism
If the temors for an option can establish a consensus positive (or
'metapositive') valence, then en masse they will transition to the positive evangelism
substate and the consumer will begin giving unsolicited testimonials to anyone within
earshot. This is how Informant #14 became a Flexcar 'technovangelist':
"Oh yeah, yes. I've been on my whole office about it! [Laughs] My
first person who was [Informant #18]...she's now joined, and that's
why I have the credit. Another person in our office takes the bus. And I
haven't convinced her about the Flexcar yet, I'm not sure why. She
just... 'I don't need i t ' Yeah, or when I...just around campus, and
somebody said 'Well, can you go here or there?' I say, 'I can get a
Flexcar!' 'Oh!' So I talk to people about it, yeah. Because it really
works for me." [#14]
Technovangelism goes well beyond ordinary word-of-mouth communication:
"To hear his friends tell it, Matt Smith is an easygoing guy. A recently
engaged business consultant from Charlotte, N.C., Mr. Smith, 31, is a
casual fan of golf, Nascar, and Wake Forest basketball. But there is one
subject his friends are loath to bring up around him, for fear it will
provoke one of his prolonged sermons on its myriad virtues: the
television gadget TiVo. 'I'd say he brings it up every time we're
together,' said Fran Radano, a college pal who has resisted Mr. Smith's
efforts to convert him to TiVo. 'There's usually someone in the group
who's new to his preaching. It's highly annoying.' [...Mr. Smith]
estimates he has talked 15 people into buying a TiVo - so far. 'If I'm at
a cocktail party and I've had more than two drinks,' he said, 'I'm going
to try to sell you a TiVo.'" (St. John, 2003)
It is hypothesized that persons receiving help or information events from a
technovangelist are more likely to attribute these events to personal causes rather than
technological causes. This accounts for why the events are given less weight: instead
of being routed to temors for evaluating they are routed elsewhere.
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7.2.5.4. Regret
A mirror set of states characterize the effect of negative valence. In the regret
state people compare the quality of their decision outcomes to what they might have
gotten if they'd made a difference choice (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Dunning &
Parpal, 1989). Regret is familiarly known as "buyer's remorse." Four months after
purchasing Passport Plus, informant #5 felt he wasn't getting his money's worth:
"Just around about Christmastime 2004 I called up the transit people at
PSU, who administer the pass and asked them if I could turn it in and
get a refund. And they said 'yes, and you go down to Neuberger, and
turn it in, and you'll get a credit.' And when I went actually down to try
and do that I was told I couldn't. [Laughs] Because the annual pass had
actually been paid for to TriMet, and they couldn't get their money
back, so I couldn't get my money back. So I kept the pass, but I
probably used it maybe half a dozen times through the rest of the year."
[#5]
Informant #10 was luckier. He purchased PP+ in October, two months into the
annual service period. Since TriMet does not prorate PP+ passes, he still had to pay
full price despite receiving only 10 months of service. After a few days he experienced
buyer's remorse and returned the pass for a refund:
"I took it back. I sat down and...there were a couple of factors. The
factors were that I was behind by two months when the pass started. So
basically I had to pay for two months just to catch me up. They don't
prorate it." [#10]
7.2.5.5. Negative Evangelism
If the temors for an option can establish a consensus negative (or
'metanegative') valence, then en masse they will transition to the negative evangelism
substate and the consumer will begin actively dissuading people from using the
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technology. Informant #41 had a very upsetting encounter which soured her on riding
the bus:
"I rode the bus up to an interview at OHSU. There was this woman on
it, and the bus driver asked her to stand up. She was in labor, and he
didn't know, and she started to cry. And this other woman was
like...old and...the bus driver was being mean to her, and she ran off
the bus at OHSU. I felt sorry for her, and felt sorry for the whole
system that people had to be mean to get by. I mean, I know that not
every bus ride is like that, but it tainted the day for me. It just made me
think I'd be better off riding my bike from now on. The bus in general
is not something I want to take. I really wish there were another option.
I don't know what that would be.. .The bus smells bad; it's expensive; I
don't like to meet the people I see on it." [#41]
When interviewed again six months later, she was still volunteering negative
opinions about the bus:
"I do remember a statistic I read, which I find appalling: when you
stand behind a bus, you inhale more toxic chemicals in one breath than
a person in the Middle Ages inhaled in their entire lifetime. So, you
know what? Screw buses! [Laughs] Honestly, I don't want them on the
road with me. I know they're good for transportation for people who
don't have cars, but they need to be all electric or something. That's
how I feel about buses." [#41]
7.2.5.6. Differentiation
Differentiation occurs when a consumer splits a need into a more nuanced set
of subneeds. This happens when a technology is discovered to be good for some things
but not others. Over time informant #4 came to regard Flexcar as a mixed blessing:
"Let's say I was going to use Flexcar to come here. 'Well, Brent, how
long do you think we're going to be? Okay, it's Friday morning, I've
got to give myself 45 minutes to get there and back, all right, let's say 3
hours...okay, I'll book it for 3 hours.' Well, we get over here and we
go over, or they're doing construction on one of the routes I didn't
know about when I'm driving over, and all of the sudden... So there's a
lot of things, you either commit to that, or you overcommit and you
lose out by spending more. Or, you go past your allowance for that day
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with PSU and you pay for that. So, that's the challenge: you've gotta
nail it on the head, 'cause if you underdo it and there's somebody after
you, Flexcar calls them a cab and they get to have a chauffeured ride
for their reservation! You pay for it! So, you know... [Nervous laugh]"
[#4]
When a need differentiates, its temors will also split; the temor of the original
parent need will take on mixed valence and transition to the differentiation substate,
while its child temors will take on dichotomous positive or negative valence. The
differentiating process is discussed in Chapter 8.
Consolidating is the reverse process: it collapses a set of needs into a single
summative need. Political pollsters tap into this phenomenon when they ask
respondents to sum up whether they think the country is "headed in the right
direction." The consolidating process is discussed in Chapter 8.
7.2.6. Discussion and Summary
Evaluating is the process of judging how well a technology satisfies a motive;
it is an operation of the temor class. Thus, adoption can be thought of as the process of
constructing and using temors.
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Evaluating is event-driven behavior that may be interrupted any number of
times without disruption. It does not require the decision maker to maintain
concentration or a continuous train of thought, and it typically unfolds over a longer
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period of time than selecting. Between events the consumer's attitude with respect to
the technology is "nearly" preserved, within certain limits.
Evaluating is characterized by three dichotomous axes, as shown in Figure 55:
Relevance:

Is this technology relevant to this motive?

Familiarity: Have I ever before used this technology to satisfy this motive?
Is this technology of positive, negative, mixed, or unknown

Valence:

worth in terms of satisfying this motive?

Irrelevant
Recognition

Relevant
Unfamiliar
Passive
Interest
Negative
or Mixed

Positive
Positive

Disinterest

Active
Interest

Negative or Mixed

First Use
Familiar
Initial Use
Negative

Regret
MetaNegative ty

Positive

Mixed
Positive

Negative
Mixed or Positive

Differentiation

Mixed or Negative

f Positive
or Mixed

Negative
Evangelism

Dominance
Structuring

Negative ^
or Mixed
MetaNegative

MetaPositive

Figure 55. The Evaluating Process (Temor Class)
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Positive
Evangelism

Selecting and evaluating are the yin and yang of adoption. Selecting chooses a
technology to satisfy an immediate need; evaluating assesses a technology's
capabilities and requirements independent of its rivals. Both may be understood as
exercises in ceteris paribus: selecting holds the motives constant while vaiying the
options, whereas evaluating holds the options constant while varying the motives.

However, the independence of temors is not absolute. Through the
unconscious halo effect they can influence each other to arrive at a summary judgment
or 'metavalence'.
The split between the unfamiliar and familiar states has implications for
survey-based adoption research. First use is driven by motives that are sensitive from
the perspective of novice users, whereas discontinuance is driven by motives which
are sensitive from the perspective of experienced users. Thus it is hypothesized that a
factor analysis of novice and experienced respondents will reveal distinct populations
which load on different factors.
7.3. Maintaining
Maintaining is the process of determining the functional status of a technology.
It accounts for 57 of the 283 sequences (20%), and these are plotted in Figure 56.
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Figure 56. Sequence Plot for the Maintaining Process (« = 57)

Maintaining is an event-driven behavior of the technology class which is
characterized by three dichotomous axes:
Obtainability:

Can I get the technology?

Accessibility:

Do I have the technology?

Operability:

Does the technology function?

It is possible to satisfy one condition without satisfying the other. For example,
my wine cellar may contain several bottles of a certain rare vintage which is no longer
available: this vintage is accessible but unobtainable. I also have last year's vintage,
which is accessible and obtainable. I could purchase another vintage from the wine
shop down the street, but since I do not own any bottles of this vintage at present it is
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inaccessible but obtainable. Obtainability acts as a guard condition on the transition
from the inaccessible state to the accessible state. If I drink the last bottle of the rare
vintage, it will become inaccessible; and because it is also unobtainable, I will be
unable to regain access. The relationships between obtainability, accessibility, and
operability are illustrated in Figure 57.
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Figure 57. The Maintaining Process (Technology Class)

7.3.1. The Obtainability Axis
The obtainability axis measures whether there is an opportunity to obtain the
technology, either now or in the future. Opportunity can be gained in many ways such
as product offerings, service contracts, or exchanging social favors. It can be curtailed
or eliminated via obsolescence, usage restrictions, and the like. I asked Informant #14,
the Flexcar technovangelist, whether she used the service during the evenings or
weekends:
"I don't, because there aren't any in Gresham! I wish there were,
because I have a $40 credit because I referred someone who joined.
And the credit's sitting there." [#14]
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Several informants living in the suburbs commented that they would use light
rail to commute to the PSU campus except that the Gateway and Sunset transit center
parking garages fill up too quickly on weekdays. Thus, parking is obtainable in
principle but it requires 'good parking karma.' A technology is obtainable if the
decision maker knows of some way to get it, even if that way is difficult and success is
not guaranteed.
7.3.2. The Accessibility Axis
The accessibility axis measures whether a technology is at hand in the moment
of need. As shown in Figure 57, it operates independently and in parallel with the
obtainability axis. Access can be gained by purchasing a product, subscribing to a
service, borrowing an item from a friend, etc. It can be lost by selling or discarding a
product, canceling a service, allowing it to expire, returning a borrowed item, and so
forth.
7.3.3. The Operability Axis
The operability axis measures whether a technology is functional. As shown in
Figure 57, operability is only defined while the technology is in the accessible state.
Operability can be lost if the technology breaks or its supplies are consumed; it can be
gained by repairing the technology or replenishing its supplies.
Operability is related to accessibility and obtainability. I have an old typewriter
in the back of my closet which is accessible in case I should ever need to use it.
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Unfortunately, the ribbon has long since played out, so the typewriter is currently
inoperable. A replacement ribbon is unobtainable for this model, so I am out of luck.
7.3.4. Discussion and Summary
Maintaining is the process of determining the functional status of a technology.
It is an event-driven operation of the technology class which is characterized by three
dichotomous axes: obtainability, accessibility, and operability. These axes bifurcate
the state-space of the technology class as shown in Figure 57. Maintaining interacts
with the evaluating and selecting processes by causing technological capabilities and
requirements to come and go.
7.4. Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced selecting, evaluating, and maintaining. Selecting is the
process of choosing a technology to satisfy an immediate need. Selecting is a simple
behavior of the need class which is organized into framing, screening, and choice
stages. Situational needs are determined in the framing stage; a short list of options is
developed in the screening stage; and a finalist option is selected in the choice stage. If
no options survive screening, the situation becomes sensitized. Since selecting only
applies to immediate needs, it implicitly defines a seventh and final axis: timing,
whether action is needed immediately or in the future.
Evaluating is the process of assessing how well a technology satisfies a motive.
It is an event-driven behavior of the temor class which is characterized by three axes:
relevance, familiarity, and valence.
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Maintaining is the process of determining the functional status of a technology.
It is an event-driven behavior of the technology class which is characterized by three
axes: obtainability, accessibility, and operability.
Selecting and evaluating interact through sensitivity and beliefs. They also
interact through help and information events, which interrupt selecting and give the
evaluating process an opportunity to update beliefs. Maintaining interacts with
selecting and evaluating through capabilities and requirements, which can come or go
depending on the technology's current functional status.
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CHAPTER 8. UNCONSCIOUS AUXILIARY PROCESSES
This chapter examines the unconscious processes that influence evaluating and
selecting. These processes operate on motives and are all considered operations of the
motive class. They are called 'auxiliaries' because they solve general problems that
are not specific to adoption. They play a supporting role, but are nevertheless
necessary for a full understanding of the adoption process.
Since informants are generally unaware of these processes, they are like 'black
boxes' whose internal organization can only be inferred by observing their external
effects. The present research design is not ideal for mapping their internal
organization, so we will not attempt to describe these processes in detail; we will only
characterize their external interfaces. A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the
present study.
The unconscious auxiliary processes are:
-

Perceiving, which places an event in context;

-

Framing, which recalls certain motives to memory;

-

Focusing, which selectively directs attention to certain motives;

-

Categorizing, which consolidates related motives into summary metamotives and differentiates summary motives into finer-grained submotives;
and

-

Acting, which implement a plan.
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8.1. Perceiving
Perceiving is the process of placing an event in context. Just because an event
occurs while a technology is being used does not mean that the decision maker will
attribute the cause of that event to the technology; it could be attributed to other
factors such as human agency, other facets of the situation, or chance circumstances
(Miller et al, 1973; Orvis et al./1975). Attribution is context-dependent. Consider the
case of three biking informants involved in car accidents, two of which occurred
during the Winter Bikes cohort. Informant #26 attributed his accident to chance:
"I understand that I'm just simply part of the percentage, and
intellectually I understand that I was just in the wrong place, wrong
time. Whatever, no hard feelings." [#26]
Informant #27 blamed himself:
"I didn't have a headlight, so / assumed it was my fault because I didn't
give him a way to be able to see me." [#27]
Informant #10 attributed the cause to biking itself:
"Biking had become something that I stopped doing in Memphis
because it was just dangerous." [#10]
Perceiving is a kind of routing function that forwards events to particular
beliefs for evaluation. Perceiving is to evaluating what delivering the mail is to
reading it; they are different processes performed by different actors, yet one always
precedes and enables the other.
It is hypothesized that perceiving is a three-stage linear process, as shown in
Figure 50 on page 149. During the first stage the decision maker constructs a
situational context by determining which motives are involved; this utilizes framing,
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an auxiliary process discussed in the following section. During the second stage the
decision maker assesses whether the valence of the event is positive, negative, or
mixed. During the third stage the decision maker attributes the cause of the event. If
the cause is attributed to a technology, the event is routed to the appropriate temor(s)
for evaluating; otherwise it is routed to a momor, passing beyond the scope of this
thesis.
A number of experimental studies support this hypothesis. It is well established
that valence is judged relative to context (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Miller, 1986) so situational context must be framed
before valence is assessed. Furthermore, multiple studies have concluded that valence
strongly influences causal attribution. For example, people tend to attribute positive
behaviors to dispositional factors and negative behaviors to situational factors (Taylor
& Koivumaki, 1976) especially in the context of racial prejudice (Regan, Straus, &
Fazio, 1974; Pettigrew, 1979). People are also more likely to accept responsibility for
successes than failures (Miller, 1976; Schlenker & Miller, 1977; Mullen & Riordan,
1988). Logically, valence must be assessed before cause is attributed. To summarize:
we assess valence before we attribute cause, and we frame the situation before we
assess valence - thus supporting the hypothesis that perceiving is a three-stage linear
sequence.
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8.2. Framing
Framing is the process of recalling certain motives to memory. It is a highly
complex, context-sensitive process which has eluded efforts at a comprehensive theory
(Beach & Mitchell, 1996). Only a general description will be attempted here.
8.2.1. Chains of Reasoning
Framing constructs chains of reasoning, networks of motives and technologies
that are believed to cause particular outcomes or conclusions. Event A reminds us that
to accomplish motive B we need technology C:
"It just hadn't occurred to me that I should get a bus pass. [My niece]
was getting one, and I'm helping her with her tuition. She asked me if I
would buy her a bus pass, and that's what got me to thinking maybe I
should get myself one." [#1]
When these chains conflict they must be reconciled. Informant #8 describes
what it was like to juggle the transportation needs of her one-car suburban family:
"Both kids are in elementary school, and I signed up to do the art
literacy classes. Apparently there's no art anymore in school, so I
signed up to do that. When I first signed up I thought, 'Well, I'll just do
it in the morning, and I'll go to work a little late.' But they have a set
curriculum in the morning; and my son was in afternoon kindergarten
anyway. I typically can't take the bus to the school in the middle of the
day, so that's when I started thinking about Flexcar a little bit. My
husband just hated having to interrupt his day because he had to drive
from Tigard to PSU and get me, then drive me to the elementary school
in Tigard. I did the art literacy class, and then he drove me back to
work." [#8]
Framing reveals fragments of the ontologies that we build and maintain
throughout our lives. Most of this knowledge base is unconscious, unrevealed, and
difficult to discover. However, over the years a number of projective techniques have
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been developed for constructing 'mental maps' of consumer needs, feelings, and
attitudes. One popular method is the Zaltman metaphor elicitation technique (Coulter
& Zaltman, 1994; Zaltman & Coulter, 1995; Coulter, Zaltman, & Coulter, 2001)
which was used to construct the mental map shown in Figure 58.

Figure 58. Partial Mental Map of a Detergent (Coulter and Zaltman, 1994)

For our purposes we are only interested in the structure of this mental map, not
its content. All of the major structural elements from Chapter 6 are present in Figure
58: "dependable" and "strong" are images; "softens clothes", "clean clothes", and
"fresh clothes" are technological capabilities; "feel comfortable", "feel refreshed", and
"no worries" are situational requirements; and "self-confidence" is a need (verging on
a desire) which stems from a deeper desire to maintain a positive self-image. The
arrows represent the beliefs that bind the structure together.
We can glean from Figure 58 that the distinction between a need and a desire is
somewhat arbitrary: is "self-confidence" a need or a desire? Fortunately, it is not
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necessary to rigidly separate needs and desires, since desires are primarily useful as a
conceptual device. As a practical matter, needs can function as if they were desires.
Figure 59 superimposes a chain of reasoning onto Figure 58: a set of conscious
means (requirements and capabilities) which achieve a set of unconscious ends
(images and desires.)
Unconscious
Images

Imags

Unconscious
Dssires

Conscious
Plans

< Momor

Capability

Temor |

Requirement

\

Mornor

Need

Momor

Dsaira

1 Dependable

Figure 59. Informant's Chain of Reasoning for a Detergent

8.2.2. The Cycle of Means-Ends Reasoning
When David Hume famously proclaimed that "Reason is, and ought only to be,
slave of the passions" (1739/1981, pg. 415) what he meant was that ends are
emotional desires that are not subject to rational inquiry. For Hume, the role of
rationality is to tell us how best to achieve our desires; rationality can only motivate
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behavior when it is coupled with a value system - an image of something worth
having. But how do we come to desire these particular images in the first place?
Clearly some kind of feedback is operating from images to desires, and from
cognition to affect. We know from experimental research that goals are more attractive
when they are feasible (Beach & Lipshitz, 1996) and that subjective probabilities and
utilities are seldom independent "(Slovic, 1966; Pious, 1993). This suggests that meansends reasoning is actually a closed feedback loop, as shown in Figure 60.
Willpower

Emotion

Figure 60. The Means-Ends Reasoning Cycle

We can see that the unconscious 'ends' are connected through intuition and the
conscious means are arrived at through bounded rationality (Simon, 1956). Emotion is
the primary driver, but it is balanced by willpower which enables us to choose among
conflicting desires and gradually reshape the images that we desire.
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8.2.3. The Self-Similarity of Motives
Needs are chains of reasoning motivated by desires. The need to do the laundry
implies the need for detergent to wash our clothes, so that we can appear presentable,
so that we can feel self-confident, so that we can maintain a positive self-image.
Chains of reasoning have a recursive or self-similar organization: every need provides
the capability to satisfy the retirements of one or more other motives, and each
capability-requirement pair is governed by its own belief (momor.) Because motives
are self-similar, they have fractal organizational structure - as do usage categories
(bundles of related motives) and technologies (bundles of subtechnologies.)
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Figure 61 expresses the recursive, self-similar structure of motives in UML
form.
Motive

/ M ..*
Momor
Capability
1
Need

Figure 61. Recursive Motives

8.3. Focusing
Much of life consists of habit, and we pay only intermittent attention to our

surroundings. Habit and sensitivity are obverse phenomena. Habituating is learning to
ignore a stimulus by treating it as part of the background; sensitizing is learning which
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stimuli to pay attention to. These phenomena enable us to focus our attention on the
most salient stimuli in a situation while relegating all others to the background:
"I do well when I have a habit. I could easily find an excuse to not ride
[my bike], if I started to think about it. 'I want to wear this today,' or 'I
don't feel like it,' 'I don't really feel that good,' 'I don't feel like I have
very much energy,' 'It's going to be too cold.' There'll be some reason.
Then, if I don't do it one time, it would be easier for me to say 'No, I'm
not going to do it again.' So, I just wouldn't even visit the question; I
would just get up and go?." [#36]
"Part of exercise or anything else you do is establishing a routine. I
think it was laziness as to why I wasn't making that leap." [#12]
"I have tried many different ways of dealing with the exercise
conundrum. There's all kinds of ways to do it: you can go to a gym;
you can run; I've done all of these things, at one point or another. What
I've found is that if there's anything in my exercise program that
involves going to a specific location, and changing and taking a shower
in that location, I'm not going to do it. I'm just not going to do it. It
feels like a piece of my day that's getting ripped away, and I really
want to use my time for other things. It seemed to me that the bike is
the easiest way to integrate that into my existence, because then it's just
part of what I do to get to work and back. That, to me, makes a lot of
sense." [#33]
Focusing is influenced by repetition, with positive stimuli encouraging habit
and negative stimuli encouraging sensitivity. Of the two, we place greater weight on
negative information (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972) because a 'shock to the system' is
needed to jolt us out of the status quo.
The case study evidence suggests that any persistent, unsolved negative
stimulus - no matter how unimportant it may seem at first - has the potential to
decrease and even discontinue use in favor of a rival option. One of the Winter Bikes
informants, #27, had a daily 30 mile round trip over the West Hills before he
suspended bike commuting in late October. What bothered him was neither the
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distance, nor the twice-daily trek over the steep hills, nor even the dangerously foggy
weather conditions. He discontinued because his hands kept getting cold, despite every
effort he made to keep them warm:
"It was wearing me down, emotionally and physically. Riding every
morning, just dreading your ride because it's going to be cold - no
matter what gloves you've tried, or what different products you've tried
to stay warm, even if they were waterproof, or whatnot. It was an
emotional strain, a little bit. Just over the course of three or four weeks,
I don't remember exactly, I just figured it wasn't worth putting myself
through." [#27]
He desired to continue, and he also desired to stop; his emotions were in
conflict. What kept him riding was willpower. For a while, his volitional desires were
able to tip the scales between his competing hedonic desires. However, the persistent
negative stimuli of cold, numb hands exacted a steady toll. He needed his hands for
work, and the cold interfered with that. Eventually, his desire for comfort became so
strong that his willpower could no longer compensate, and he put away his bike until
spring.
Another informant became sensitive to the disruptive behavior of teenagers on
the bus. At first he viewed these encounters as occasional annoyances, but as they
persisted over the course of several months they became a real problem for him:
"We caught the #75 northbound at E. Burnside. At the Glisan stop I
knew the fun was just beginning, because there was a crowd of rowdy
teenagers waiting for the bus, and two of them were having a fistfight
over a basketball. They got on, and the two pugilists in question
proceeded to sit right behind us, where they continued their verbal and
physical sparring. When one of them fell against me, we moved to the
front of the bus to get away from them - along with a couple of other
adult passengers. The bus driver didn't do anything to stop this for
several minutes, then just before we got off he made a halfhearted
effort to suggest that they sit down and be quiet. Of course, they didn't.
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We got off at NE Tillamook and 39th, just as a large crowd of
teenagers from Grant High School were boarding. Thank God we were
getting off the bus, and not boarding it." [May 31, 2006 TriMet
Journal]
The informant grew so tired of this rowdy behavior that he stopped riding the
bus in the afternoons (around the time school let out) and instead began walking home
from work every day - a distance of three miles. (He later took up bicycle
commuting.) Again we see how an unsolved, persistent negative stimuli can sensitize
a motive and eventually trigger discontinuance.
There is an operational link between sensitivity and selecting. If there are no
surviving options on screening's short list, we can either quit or settle for less. Either
way, we are likely to make a mental note that we should avoid similar uncomfortable
situations in the future; this is how motives become sensitized. If the negative stimuli
persist, they will further increase the sensitivity of the motive:
"In general I'd say we've been less than delighted with these [biking
rain gear] booties; they keep our feet dry to be sure, but the material is
extremely inelastic and has no give whatsoever. The only shoes I have
that fit my booties are my cheap sneakers. Oh well...live and learn. I'll
know better what to look for next time." [Nov. 22, 2006 Bicycle
Journal]
"It's actually why I ended up getting a car eventually, was because I
eventually came to the point where I just had this deep desire to not feel
like I was stuck without a way to get somewhere." [#10]
Sensitivity is important to quality of service. Flexcar is set up in such a way as
to catch its users on the horns of a dilemma: when they reserve a Flexcar, they must
estimate in advance how long they will need the vehicle. If through no fault of their
own they are late in returning the car, they are liable to stiff fines and obligatory cab
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fare for the (potentially angry) next person to reserve the car. If they try to avoid these
fines by overbooking the vehicle, they or their employers must pay for any unused
portion of the reservation. These policies make Flexcar inherently stressful to use:
"There have been a couple of frantic phone calls on my cellphone,
stuck on the interstate coming back to park [the Flexcar], like 'I'm late!
I'm late! I don't know if there's anybody after me...can you extend the
reservation? Can you do it?' It's always worked, but if you're on your
own dime - or if you run out of time, because PSU limits you to 4
hours a day - you don't want to overbook so that you're paying more
or go past your limit. But you don't want to underdo it so that you're
frantic. It's that balance." [#4]
"The stress of the Flexcar is every time. The lack of familiarity with the
bus is a big first time stress, and then it tails off. The Flexcar is a lower
stress, all of the time." [#3]
If these 'pet peeves' continue long enough, they can trigger diminished or
discontinued use. But how long is 'long enough'? If it takes '30 days to make a habit',
how long does it take to break one? The data hints that sensitivity behaves like some
kind of moving average, but additional research is needed on this point.
What does seem clear is that sensitivity is caused by situations that lack a
satisfactory solution. Furthermore, sensitivity is not the same as importance.
Importance gets at compatibility with images - principles of right and wrong, visions
of the ideal future, and life trajectories. The long-term focus of importance makes it
more stable than sensitivity. Sensitivity is to importance what weather is to climate.
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To illustrate this point, let us consider the experience of Informant #26, who
was struck by a car and seriously injured during the course of the Winter Bikes case.
This informant, a serious and experienced recreational biker, was proactive about
safety issues due to having been struck by a car on a previous occasion:
"It's going to be dark, I'll literally risk my life. But I've got lots of
lights on my bike, I've got a great commuter bike, I've got great
clothes...I've spent money. You can be seen, but it costs money." [#26,
September 23 rd 2006]
"I bought a DiNotte rear light ($129) which is probably the best out
there at 140 lumens. It is outstanding... brighter than most cars... but I
still fear someone will not see me. Also, I have always thought that the
importance of a headlight during urban commutes was more legal than
anything. I can see just fine with the streetlights and such. But I'm
going to invest in a much better front light to insure that I can be seen."
[#26, November 7th 2006]
On December 7, 2006, in broad daylight and good weather, an elderly woman
pulled out of a driveway directly into the path of Informant #26. She was leaving the
eye clinic where her doctor had just cleared her to drive following cataract surgery. He
struck her car broadside at approximately 25 MPH and flipped completely over her
car. He was rushed to the hospital and was lucky to escape with his life. After the
accident, safety loomed even larger as an issue:
"I'm anxious to get back out, but I'm afraid, to be quite honest...I
understand that I'm just simply part of the percentage, and
intellectually I understand that I was just in the wrong place, wrong
time. Whatever, no hard feelings. But it certainly changed my views
and behavior about riding in limited visibility, and what is and is not an
acceptable level of risk, as far as that goes. I'm sure that as time goes
on that will fade, but right now it's kind of on my mind." [#26,
February 17th 2007]
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The accident served as a powerful negative stimulus, exposing the inadequacy
of his precautions. Safety had been important to him before the accident, and
afterwards it became sensitive as well. Over the next few months, as no new incidents
occurred the sensitivity of his safety concerns gradually eased and he resumed his bike
commute. However, he did not forget the incident, and safety remained as important
as ever.
8.4. Categorizing
As we have seen, motives have self-similar organization: "doing the laundry"
involves many plans, images, and desires that are bound together by beliefs. Usage
categories are stable, socially constructed sets of motives; categorizing refers to the
dynamics of these associations. The key categorizing processes are differentiating,
consolidating, and the halo effect.
8.4.1. Usage Categories
Our tendency to pigeonhole options into conceptual categories is deeply
ingrained. Just as some people regard a bicycle as a 'thing-for' getting around...
"Even my friends would think it was idiotic to ride your bike in West
Virginia...There was no encouragement and no bike community.
Literally, nobody rode their bicycles. You just didn't. If you ever saw
somebody riding their bicycle, you knew they lost their license for DUI
and that was the only reason they were riding their bicycle!" [#23]
.. .others may regard it as a 'thing-for' economizing...
"Cyclists [in Santiago, Chile] used to be seen as blue collar workers
who'd drive their bikes to work to save bus fare. But today you see
executives, government workers, lawyers, students - everyone is
riding." [Public Radio International report, April 6, 2006]
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.. .or a 'thing-for' losing weight and getting exercise...
"The bike, to me, is really a means to an end - bringing a better
exercise regime into my life." [#36]
.. .or a 'thing-for' saving time...
"For me, I find it's far faster to cycle into work, especially with the
showers at work. I live on the #14 Hawthorne [bus] route, and in the
mornings, even coming pvery three to five minutes, that bus is packed.
You're just squished in there, and they're making stops the whole way.
It's probably about a 25 minute bus ride, which with the wait it ends up
being a half an hour. I can get downtown on my bike in 15 minutes."
[#4]
.. .or a 'thing-for' sport and recreation...
"Bicycling is like running or ice skating or skiing, it's a recreational
thing." [#5]
.. .or a 'thing-for' expressing one's political beliefs...
"I regard my choice to ride a bike as political, for sure - to not use oil."
[#31]
.. .or a 'thing-for' having fun.
"Bikes should be fun and comfortable. The whole idea of riding a bike
is not to shave off time and ounces. It's to enjoy." [#22]
A usage category is a stable, socially-constructed set of motives. Categories
help determine which motives are included as situational needs through a phenomenon
known as associative priming (Pious, 1993). Categories and situations are linked:
categories are archetypes of situations, and situations are specific instances (or
"instantiations") of categories. For example, 'shopping' is a category which is
comprised of several needs such as browsing, ordering, purchasing, tracking, and
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trusting. But a trip to Trader Joe's this afternoon would be a situation - an
instantiation of the shopping category.
Usage categories are deeply cultural:
"A couple of months ago, in the privacy of his Reston townhouse, Alan
Chien made a final break from cultural tradition, a guilt-filled decision
he has yet to share with his parents. He used his dishwasher. He knows
his parents will not understand. 'They don't believe in it,' said Chien,
35, an engineer who emigrated with his family from Taiwan when he
was a toddler. 'Just because they never used it, I never used it, so it was
just a mysterious thing to me.' In many immigrant homes, the
automatic dishwasher is the last frontier. Long after new arrivals pick
up football, learn the intricacies of the multiplex and the DMV and
develop a taste for pizza, they resist the dishwasher. Some joke that not
using the appliance is one of the truest signs of immigrant heritage,
whether they hail from Africa, Latin America, Asia or Eastern Europe.
If they have a dishwasher - and many do, because it is standard
equipment in most homes - it becomes a glorified dish rack, a
Tupperware storage cabinet or a snack-food bin. It's never turned on.
[...] Chien has a hard time explaining dishwasher guilt...'I still have
the sense that it's kind of a waste of electricity,' he said. 'It's odd. We
buy American clothes; we use the oven; we use the stove; but,
somehow that appliance...' [...] Kitchen historians speculate that the
dishwasher lies at the heart of what it means to be a family.
Dishwashers began appearing in many middle-class American
households in the late 1960s and 1970s, about the time that many
women began entering the workforce. A decade later, the microwave
came along. The family dinner hour disappeared. It's been downhill
from there." (Ly, 2005)
It is all too easy for us to presume that, if other people are using the same tools
as we, they probably attach similar meanings to these tools - such as what it means to
be a 'bike person'.
"I thought if you're a bike person, then you had to wear toeclips. I was
talking to this guy at work, and he's a bike fanatic. He was telling me
about this movement that he counts himself among that's a reaction
against the spandex-racer-lycra-toeclip-skinny-tire-racing-around-town,
because it's not very appropriate. This is one of their things, they're
kind of anti-toeclip-bike-nuts. It's not really an official group, it's just
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this movement of believers. They're into the aesthetic of older bikes,
I'm not sure it's fixed gear, necessarily. They're not anti-technology,
just appropriate technology I guess I would say. They seem to have this
aesthetic of take the good from the old and combine it with the new, but
do things that have a pleasant aesthetic to them." [#22]
A bike commuter and a weekend 'roadie' both ride bicycles, but that does not
mean they construct similar needs or images around bicycles. As these quotes suggest,
there is actually a certain degree' of friction and resentment between these groups. The
tendency to assume that other people form categories that are similar to our own has
been called 'category error' (Ryle, 1949).
"There's a lot of people I know as recreational riders who do things like
Cycle Oregon, we do weekend rides, you know, we'll ride 50 or 80 or
100 miles on a weekend. But they would never ride two miles to the
store to get their groceries. It's not on their radar. Bicycling is like
running or ice skating or skiing, it's a recreational thing. And they
just...it does not fit into their lives. Now, not everyone - 1 mean, there
are a few people who are keen commuters, clearly. But there's a lot of
people, it's just not on their radar. And they say 'Oh, it's far too
dangerous.' I mean, they ride all the time for recreation, but they
dismiss it entirely as a means of transportation. And I've had no
success in convincing them that this is irrational [laughs] or getting
them to change their minds." [#5]
8.4.2. Differentiating
As we gain experience at performing a new task - learning to bike commute,
for instance - we discover that what we originally thought was a single need is in fact
a collection of separate yet related needs:
"Flexcar is a very good thing. But in a way, it only becomes helpful or
desirable when it's a big deal, when the thing you're trying to do is a
big deal. Like when you're going to Costco and you have to move lots
of stuff; when you're trying to move your house; when you're trying to
do those big things. Otherwise, for small stuff I just don't think it's
useful." [#18]
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"I discovered a few things. One was that it wasn't actually much faster
to ride to the Sunset Transit Center, put my bike on the train sometimes waiting for the train 10, 15 minutes - and getting off at
Goose Hollow, as opposed to just riding all the way. That wasn't a
good tradeoff. Two of my students also lived out in the same direction,
so in the evenings we often commuted home together, and that was
actually a good time to connect with them. That was an opportunity I
wanted to take advantage of. So, I found I was actually not using the
transit pass more than a couple of times a month." [#5]
Differentiating is the process of disaggregating a summary need into a set of
subordinate needs. Consider the experience of Informant #4:
"My bike routes in town are sort of like fishing holes in a way. You get
to know and trust certain routes. And I spend a fair bit of time playing
with them. I've been doing more time riding Lloyd District riding from
Hawthorne, and trying to find that right path. The other guys that ride
that route, we sort of trade tips and ideas on what routes are probably
the best. Dealing with Sandy and Burnside is sort of the big pain in the
butt, figuring out where to cross Sandy and Burnside to get over." [#4]
Informant #4 has been riding his bike along NE 16th Avenue, a designated
'bike boulevard.' It makes a good route to work because it is a low traffic residential
street - except when crossing East Burnside, which at NE 16th is a major 4-lane
arterial with high-speed rush hour traffic and no signal for blocks in either direction.
This dangerous cross street poses a negative stimulus every time #4 bikes to work,
differentiating his original need to get to work and sensitizing him to safety issues
(Figure 62.)
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Get to Work: Need
Move Myself: Requirement

Bicycle: Technology
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Move Myself: Capability

Bike Route: Technology
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Arrive Safely: Requirement
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Most of Route:Technoloqy

Arrive Safely: Capability
16th & Burnslde: Technology

Figure 62. Differentiating Example

Could he solve the problem by finding a different route to work? Or by
lobbying the city for a pedestrian/bike signal at this intersection? Or by altering his
work hours to miss the rush hour traffic? If he can find a practical solution to his
problem, he may continue biking to work, or he may ignore the problem and hope for
the best. Alternatively, he may begin to question whether bike commuting is safe
enough for him.
8.4.3. Consolidating
Consolidating is the mirror image of differentiating: it aggregates several
related motives into a summary category.
"We're certainly talking about consolidating our trips. We generally do
that; we have done that. I do not like driving a mile to Gateway Fred
Meyer just to buy one thing. My wife is very practical about getting up
a list and planning trips, very good about that. As I said, she's a very
organized person; she was a medical tech on the hill. So, when the car's
ready to go out, usually there are several things to do, there are rounds
to make on the weekends." [#6]
Consolidating is closely related to habituating, since categories often form
around habitual behaviors. Consider the experience of Informant #1, an adjunct
professor at PSU and PCC who acts as caregiver for her elderly mother:
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"There was a grocery store right across the street, so sometimes on my
way home I would pick up some groceries too. That would also
maximize the use of my car, because I could then get a bag of
groceries, carry the heavy books and the groceries all home in one
trip." [#1]
She needs to make the best use of her time, so on Tuesdays she has developed
a regular routine. She first drives her car to the PSU campus and teaches a course, then
shuttles over to the PCC campW and teaches a second class. Afterwards she swings by
to check on.her mother, then on her way home she visits the grocery store. She has
repeated this sequence enough times that it has become her "Tuesday routine" (Figure
63.)
The Tuesday Routine: Need
Using My Time Effectively: Need

Shuttling Between Campuses: Need

Carrying Heavy Items: Need
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Buying Groceries: Need

Car: Technology

Carrying Heavy Items: Need

Checking in on Mom: Need

Figure 63. Consolidating Example

As far as her commute is concerned, Tuesdays are on autopilot until the current
term ends. Consolidation has freed her mind to think about more important things.
Habituating can be thought of as a strategy for conserving cognitive resources.
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8.4.4. The Halo Effect
What triggers differentiating

and consolidating? These processes are

unconscious, so we cannot conclusively identify the causal mechanisms. However, the
data suggests that differentiating and consolidating may be caused by the decision
maker's ability or inability to maintain a consensus valence or 'metavalence' among a
motive's beliefs. As long as the*metavalence is homogeneous - either all-positive or
all-negative - then there is no necessity for nuance, and the motive will remain
undifferentiated. However, metavalence need not be unanimous. Differentiation will
be triggered if the metavalence changes from unanimity to consensus (e.g. an
anomalous negative belief is formed in the midst of uniformly positive set of beliefs.)
Conversely, a summary need can be consolidated from a set of subneeds if their
individual valences can be aligned to produce a consensus metavalence. The process
by which beliefs influence each other's valence is called the halo effect (Thorndike,
1920; Asch, 1946).
We hypothesize that the halo effect is a weighted voting scheme in which
sensitive and important beliefs are accorded proportionally greater weight. A new
consensus metavalence emerges if the weighted sum passes a critical threshold (a la
neural networks.) Beliefs that are at odds with the consensus metavalence undergo
revision pressure in the direction of the consensus (e.g., if the consensus is
metapositive, then negative beliefs will undergo pressure to become mixed, and mixed
beliefs will undergo pressure to become positive.) These predicted revisions are
summarized in Table 13.
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TABLE 13. PREDICTED REVISION OF BELIEF VALENCE
Consensus IMctavalencc
Belief Valence
Metapositive
Pressure to mixed
^ I Q ^ S ^ ^ I Pressure to positive Pressure to negative
No change
| 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H Pressure to mixed

Evidence in support of this hypothesis is provided by Montgomery and
Svenson (1983), who studied attention to and evaluation of alternatives before and
after a choice was made. Montgomery and Svenson found no significant changes in
positive evaluations of the chosen alternatives and negative evaluations of the
nonchosen alternatives, exactly as predicted by Table 13. Also as predicted, they
found that negative evaluations of the chosen alternatives were positively revised after
the decision, and that positive evaluations of the nonchosen alternatives were
negatively revised after the decision. Figure 64 plots shifts in subject's evaluation
scores between the first and second halves of Montgomery and Svenson's
experimental protocol.
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As new beliefs are formed they will either conform to or conflict with the
consensus metavalence. As long as the new beliefs conform to the consensus they will
not trigger differentiating. If they conflict there are two possible outcomes. If the
consensus is strong, the new belief will be 'outvoted' and the metavalence will be
unchanged; the new belief will be treated as an exception or outlier and will undergo
revision pressure as predicted by Table 13. If the consensus is weak, the new belief
may tip the balance past a critical threshold and disrupt the old metavalence. If this
happens, a period of chaos may ensue as the individual beliefs vie to construct a new
consensus. (It is worth noting that new beliefs are likely to be sensitive and thus exert
proportionally greater influence over the consensus than older beliefs.)
If the new consensus is the reverse of the older one then changes will be
observed in the consumer's behavior at the macroscopic level. The extent of these
changes will depend on the type of belief and the state of the consumer's belief
system. If the beliefs are temors then the impact is likely to be rather limited; the
consumer may simply shift from use to nonuse of a technology, or vice versa. But if
the beliefs are momors such metavalence reversals are potentially more disruptive.
The disruption could cascade up the chain of reasoning, tipping the consensus of
higher-order metavalences. In the most extreme cases the disruption may spread to a
person's images, resulting in an altered worldview with wide-ranging consequences
(e.g., mid-life crisis, religious conversion, mental breakdown, even insanity.) The
extent of the disruption will depend upon the state of that person's belief system at the
time of the perturbation. The belief systems of most people will be quite robust even
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in the face of strong shocks. Other people may have unstable belief systems that
exhibit "self-organized criticality" and are prone to cascading disruption. More
research is needed on this topic.
8.5. Acting
Most of what has been discussed so far has involved developing plans; we
have not yet discussed acting, the process of implementing plans. Two opposing poles
of acting are closure and procrastination.
Closure is an urge to finish acting: to 'get on with it', or 'turn the page', or 'cut
to the chase.' Impatience, complacency, the reluctance to rehash a 'settled' issue,
anger, fear, anxiety, panic, and other emotions loom large over decision making. In
section 6.1.3 we discussed the case of Mr. Elliot, the brain-damaged patient who was
stuck in analysis paralysis and could not cope with relatively simple decision tasks.
When asked to schedule his next doctor's appointment, he would obsessively
overanalyze the alternatives and constantly reframe the situation, taking irrelevant
factors into account. Without his emotions to guide him, Mr. Elliot could not 'cut to
the chase' or achieve closure (Damasio, 1994). Closure is an inherently emotional act
that is dependent on a number of variables such as affect (Isen, 1997), personality type
(Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996; Vermeir, van Kenhove, & Hendrickx, 2002), time pressure
(Gigerenzer, 2000), sensitivity and habituating (Goodwin, 1977; Banister, 1978), and
probably many more.
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Procrastination is the opposing tendency: the urge to avoid acting. Four distinct
varieties of procrastination emerged from the data. The first is denial, an unconscious
strategy of avoiding action in unpleasant situations that lack easy solution (Janis &
Mann, 1977). One way that denial can manifest itself is through an inordinate
preoccupation with minor concerns. In War and Peace, Leo Tolstoy wrote of a
regiment ordered to stand and whit while under shellfire during the battle of Borodino:
"Without moving an inch or firing a shot the regiment lost another third
of its men on the spot. Ahead of them, especially over to the right, the
cannons boomed away through the never-thinning smoke... Most of the
time the men followed their orders and just sat there on the ground.
One man would take off his shako, loosen the gathers and tie them up
again; another would crumble up some dry clay to clean his bayonet;
another would adjust a buckle or tighten a strap on his shoulder-belt;
someone else would re-roll his leg bandages with infinite care and pull
his boots back on again. Some men built tiny houses out of clods of
earth, or plaited together stubble straw. They all seemed thoroughly
engrossed in what they were doing. When men got killed or wounded,
when stretchers were dragged past, when our troops started coming
back, when massed ranks of the enemy suddenly appeared through the
smoke, all these developments were completely ignored...It was as if
these morally exhausted men could find some relief in the ordinary
events of everyday life." (Tolstoy, 1869/2006, pg. 898)
A second form is vacillation, an inability to reconcile tradeoffs. Informant #8
wrestled for months with whether the hassle of juggling her family's transportation
needs was worth the cost of signing up for Flexcar, given her very tight budget:
"I think in this case, the inconvenience that we've been experiencing,
and the cost along, is enough to jolt me out of my slumbering state here
in terms of, you know, I've been thinking 'Oh, it's not that big a deal.'
But then last time... We're [driving the one car back and forth] again
next Thursday and we did it on Monday. And I think 'yeah, it hasn't
been too bad' but you know...I thought '$25 [the Flexcar signup fee]
it's kind of hard sometimes to come up [with it]' I feel guilty, like we
should be doing other things with that money. But in this case, I had
already sort of set the summer as the last [self-imposed deadline]. We
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need to make a decision, I would probably be for it. But just the, you
know, this year of...with costs going up, of gas, and making my
husband drive back and forth two times. It seems kind of unfair not to
say, we need to make a decision here. Certainly it's...I would say
probably, I hate to say, more gas prices; and then the inconvenience
issue. Also, we nearly got in an accident the other night, so you think,
'Oh! One more time out on the road with crazy people who don't know
how to signal!'" [#8]
A third form of procrastination is foot dragging, a conscious strategy of
delaying implementation of a clear but high-cost course of action in the hope that the
problem will disappear of its own accord. Foot dragging is a conscious choice, which
sets it apart from denial, and it differs from vacillation in that the course of action is
clear - it is just difficult, unpleasant, or otherwise undesirable.
"I might look into [Flexcar], but I don't feel it's high on my priority
right now. I think it's nice to know it's out there. It's a nice idea...I
know about it, I've seen it ...and the thought about it economically,
probably makes sense. But I don't...as I said before, I'm a little lazy
about it. I guess I have the sense, 'Well, that's a pretty good deal, I can
look into it [later on if it becomes an issue.]'" [#6]
Finally, true procrastination occurs when a decision maker commits to a course
of action which is seen as correct and necessary, but delays implementing that plan for
lack of adequate motivation. True procrastination is not a deliberate strategy, which
sets it apart from foot dragging. The decision maker acknowledges the necessity for
action, what is lacking is the motivation for acting. Tasks can remain on the to-do list
for days, weeks, months, or years:
"You know, we also need to roto-till our yard, it's all rocks and weeds,
pretty much. But actually going, figuring out what to do and doing it...
once you get past that hump, then it's usually quite easy." [#8]
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True procrastination seems to occur when there simply isn't enough emotional
reward or pain involved to move away from the status quo. Since willpower relies on
no justification or reason other than itself, it is entirely arbitrary and can be opposed
on equally arbitrary grounds. On some level we sense this truth about ourselves, which
is why we use little stratagems like "New Year's Resolutions" to trick ourselves into
acting:
"I feel like if I have the Passport it will be easier for me to roll out of
bed and go "Ah, I'll just get on the bus today [instead of biking to
work]. [#4]
"And I thought, 'If I [buy the PP+ pass], that will encourage me not to
want to drive." [#5]
"The idea is that [not buying the annual PP+ pass] motivates me to get
on my bike, and it definitely motivates me not to drive my car [because
campus parking costs $8/day.]" [#10]
In the end, procrastination may be best understood as an urge to stick with the
old status quo, whereas closure is an urge to hurry things along to a new status quo.
8.6. Chapter Summary
Five auxiliary processes operate on the motive class: perceiving, framing,
focusing, categorizing, and acting.
Perceiving is the process of placing an event in context. It involves a three
stage linear sequence of (1) constructing a situational context, (2) assessing the
valence of the event, and (3) attributing its cause.
Framing is the process of recalling one or more motives to memory. Chains of
reasoning are networks of motives and technologies which are believed to cause
(196)

certain outcomes or conclusions. These chains are part of closed feedback loops in
which images and desires are connected through intuition and plans are arrived at
through bounded rationality. Emotions drive the cycle, but willpower exerts an
influence as well by reshaping the images of what we desire.
Focusing is the process of selectively directing attention to certain motives. It
is influenced by repetition, with* positive stimuli encouraging habituating and negative
stimuli encouraging sensitizing. Any persistent, unsolved negative stimulus - no
matter how unimportant it may seem at first - can trigger diminished or discontinued
use.
Categorizing is the process of consolidating related motives into usage
categories and differentiating summary motives into finer-grained submotives.
Consolidating is related to habituating, and differentiating is related to sensitizing. The
halo effect is an unconscious process whereby beliefs realign themselves with the
consensus valence or 'metavalence' of the summary category.
Acting is the process of implementing a plan. Its opposing poles are closure, an
urge to hurry things along to a new status quo, and procrastination, an urge to cling to
the old status quo.
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CHAPTER 9. VALIDITY AND GENERALIZABILITY
This chapter describes the steps taken to improve the validity and
generalizability of the MTB framework. Since this is a qualitative theory-building
study, evaluation criteria such as external and internal validity, hypothesis testing, and
generalizability are defined somewhat differently than in quantitative research. In
qualitative research validity is viewed as a direction rather than a destination; the goal
is to increase confidence in the findings by addressing specific ways in which they
might be wrong. This means that specific validity threats must be identified and ruled
out after a tentative account has been developed (Maxwell, 1996). Evaluation
standards for qualitative research are discussed in section R.l 1 of Appendix R.
9.1. External Validity
In the context of this study, external validity gets at the question of whether the
theoretical framework and GAM accurately capture the relevant aspects of human
behavior (Goldspink, 2002). This is an important question because the GAM is
designed for use with agent-based artificial markets, where even relatively minor
changes could result in significant differences in simulated market behavior (Epstein
& Axtell, 1996, pg. 86; Durlauf, 1997). Table 14 lists several validity threats which
were identified and addressed during the course of the research.
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TABLE 14. EXTERNAL VALIDITY THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES
External Validity Threat
The cases might be
unrepresentative.
The informants might be
systematically biased.
The decision settings might be
artificial and unrealistic.
The researcher might influence the
informant's decision process.
The informants might selectively
recall past decisions as being more
structured than they actually were.
The researcher might arrive at
invalid or premature conclusions.
A rival theory might provide a
better explanation of the target
phenomenon.

Study Countermeasure
Use Svenson's decision typology to select cases on a quasiexperimental basis.
Establish criteria to select informants for a range of
innovativeness, adoption status, geographic dispersion, employer
size, and greenness.
Collect context-rich data in situ.
Collect retrospective data on decisions which were made in the
recent past.
Collect longitudinal data on decisions which are currently in
progress.
Solicit feedback from informants on findings; actively seek out
discrepant evidence and negative cases; collect multiple forms of
evidence; employ multiple analysis methods.
Compare the emerging theory to specific rivals:
• Transtheoretical Model (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984)
• Concerns-Based Adoption Model (Hall, Loucks,
Rutherford, & Newlove, 1975)

9.2. Internal Validity
For this study, internal validity refers to the correspondence between the MTB
framework and the GAM (Goldspink, 2002). Mainstream social science has been slow
to accept the methodological legitimacy of simulation research, in part from the
perception that almost any desired result may be attained simply by tweaking
assumptions hidden deep in the model (Waldrop, 1992, pg. 268). As noted by
Andrews et al. (2005), theory-later agent modeling requires intense interaction
between programmers and qualitative researchers as a grounded theory is formalized
into an agent model. During this interaction conceptual ambiguities are forced into the
open where they must be worked out in relation to the evidence. The present study
improves the transparency of consumer agent modeling by making it possible to trace
the parallel coevolution of the theoretical framework and GAM by means of a series
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of modeling memos (see Appendix M.) Every change in the GAM corresponds to a
change in the theoretical framework, and every change in the framework is linked to
case evidence. Table 15 details the techniques used to strengthen the internal validity
of the study.
TABLE 15. INTERNAL VALIDITY THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES
Internal Validity Threat
Data may be lost.
Traceability may be lost
between data and theoretical
framework.
Traceability may be lost
between theoretical framework
and GAM.
Data analysis may be
haphazard or unsystematic.

Study Countermeasure
Keep the data and GAM under version control and run regular
backups.
Use the Atlas-ti software to facilitate qualitative analysis and
maintain a chain of evidence linking the theoretical framework to
the data.
Use traceability matrix to maintain a chain of evidence linking the
GAM to the theoretical framework.
Maintain modeling memos to document changes to the GAM and
questions arising during analysis. Follow systematic procedures for
data collection, coding, memoing, modeling, and analysis. Use the
GAM to help guide analysis, force conceptual clarity, and direct
analysis in a systematic manner.

9.3. Hypothesis Testing
The main emphasis of this study was theory-building rather than theorytesting. A number of informal hypotheses were proposed during the course of the
study (see Table 16.) Foliowup research is needed to test these propositions and assess
the construct and predictive validity of the MTB framework.
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TABLE 16. HYPOTHESES GENERATED BY THE STUDY
Hypothesis
Selecting is a simple behavior.

Conclusion
Supported

All processes - regardless of domain
- can be modelled as variations on
simple behavior, event-driven
behavior, or continuous behavior.
(Osterweil's hypothesis)
Novice and experienced respondents
are distinct populations that load on
different factors.
*
Perceiving is a three-stage linear
process consisting of (1) constructing
a situational context, (2) assessing the
valence of the event, and (3)
attributing the cause of the event.

Supported

Temors with positive or negative
valence induce other temors to revise
their valence in the same direction.
The TTM will reveal a diverse range
of informant adoption states.
The process of evaluating a motive
differs from the process of evaluating
a technology.
A temor transitions to a state of active
interest when a technological
capability is discovered that relates to
a sensitive requirement.
Valence acquired prior to first use is
used to determine whether to proceed
to first use. It is discounted if it
conflicts with valence acquired after
first use.
The halo effect acts as a weighted
voting scheme in which sensitive and
important beliefs are accorded
proportionally greater weight.
Persons receiving help or information
from technovangelists are more likely
to be attribute these events to personal
rather than technological causes.
The instability of the TTM and other
pseudostage models is due in part to
the failure to distinguish between a
stage and a state.

Supported

Evidence
Sequence data and prior literature (Beach and
Mitchell, 1996; Potter and Beach, 1994).
Sequence data

Supported

Prior literature (Thompson, Hamilton and
Rust, 2005)

Supported

Prior literature (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman &
Miller, 1986; Taylor &Koivumaki, 1976;
Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974; Pettigrew,
1979; Miller, 1976; Schlenker & Miller, 1977;
Mullen &Riordan, 1988)
Prior literature (Montgomery and Svenson,
1983)

Not
Supported
Not tested

Not tested

Not tested

Not tested

Not tested

Not tested
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TTM classification results

9.4. Comparison to Rivals
This section compares the MTB framework with rival perspectives on
adoption. The purpose in making this comparison is to look for insights that may have
been overlooked in the analysis rather than to establish which framework is better.
Classification-centered frameworks were chosen because of their potential to shed
light on qualitative features of'* adoption and to identify potential pitfalls and blind
spots. Two rival frameworks were selected:
-

The Concerns-Based Adoption Model (CBAM, Hall et al., 1975), which
classifies respondents on the basis of their acceptance of a favored option;
and

-

The Transtheoretical Model (TTM, Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984;
Prochaska et al., 1992), which classifies respondents on the basis of their
discontinuance of an non-favored option.

Several prominent adoption frameworks were excluded from comparison
because their focus is on the prediction of variables that influence the rate of adoption
rather than classification of qualitative adoption stages. Specifically excluded are
CAVTs such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), the Theory
of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985), and the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis,
1989). During future research the MTB framework will be used as the basis for a
structured equation model of adoption; at that time a comparison will be made to these
rival CAVTs as part of quantitative hypothesis testing.
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9.4.1. The Concerns-Based Adoption Model
The CBAM is a framework that defines adoption in terms of technology use.
Primarily used in education to encourage the adoption of mandated programs, the
CBAM is used to profile typical concerns which arise at various stages of the adoption
process so that appropriate resources and interventions may be directed to potential
adopters. The CBAM defines seven stages of adoption:
0
1—1

II
III
IVa
IVb
V
VI

Nonuse
Orientation
Preparation
Mechanical use
Routine use
Refinement
Integration
Renewal

CBAM classification was performed on all informants as part of the telephone
prescreening interview. The purpose in making this classification was to ensure that
the theoretical sample included informants with a range of current adoption status. The
CBAM instruments are listed in Appendix B; classifications for the PP+ case are listed
in Table 5 on page 93, and classifications for the WB case are listed in Table 8 on
page 96.
Four of the 21 primary informants (19%) could not be staged by the CBAM
algorithm:
-

Informant #10 purchased the annual PP+ pass, but experienced buyer's
remorse and returned it within a week for a refund.
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-

Informant #5 experienced buyer's remorse after purchasing PP+ but he
waited too long before attempting to return it. He made sporadic use of
PP+ until it expired, then did not renew the pass for the following year.

-

Informant #4 used his PP+ pass less and less after he began riding his
bicycle to campus. At the end of the year he allowed the pass to expire and
did not renew it.

-

Informant #18 was an early Flexcar adopter. The way she used Flexcar
made it rather expensive, and after a period of extensive use she
unsubscribed. A couple of years later she was hired by PSU. After an
important person in her office subjected her to a certain amount of peer
pressure she re-subscribed to the service. However, during this second
subscription period she never actually used Flexcar, maintaining that she
had 'mislaid' her membership card.

None of these informants could be classified by the CBAM for the simple
reason that they had discontinued use. The CBAM invests technology with positive
value and conceives of adoption as a progression leading up to full use. It is designed
to help encourage adoption and makes no allowance for discontinuance; the CBAM
assumes that adoption is the final outcome. It exhibits what Rogers calls proinnovation bias, "the implication in diffusion research that an innovation should be
diffused and adopted by all members of a social system, that it should be diffused
more rapidly, and that the innovation should be neither re-invented nor rejected"
(2003, pg. 106).
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9.4.2. The Transtheoretical Model
The TTM is widely used to classify willingness to undertake healthier patterns
of behavior such as smoking cessation, dietary changes, exercise adoption, condom
use, drinking and driving, and the like. It defines four stages of adoption:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Precontemplation
Contemplation
Action
Maintenance

The TTM was administered to all informants prior to beginning the first
interview. The purpose in making the classification was to collect data which could
prove useful later, as hypotheses emerged from the MTB framework. Since it was not
known in advance what these hypotheses would be, the TTM data were collected and
reserved without computing their classification scores.3
After completing the bulk of the analysis for the PP+ case, it was hypothesized
that the TTM scores would show broad dispersion, since the CBAM had been used to
select informants who exhibited a range of adoption status (see memo M.69). This
hypothesis was rejected after tabulating the TTM scores: far from revealing a broad
range, all informants were classified in either the contemplation or action stages (see
Table 17.)

3

Classification scores were computed for the first two informants as a pilot test of the TTM instrument.
On the basis of these scores it was determined that two of the questions (Q27 and Q28) were doublebarrelled; the wording of these questions was changed for subsequent informants. These changes did
not affect the classification scores for the two pilot informants.
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TABLE 17. CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR THE TTM QUESTIONNAIRE

As an additional test I took the survey myself. Since I have not owned a car in
over five years I expected to be classified in the maintenance stage as a reflection of
an established car-free lifestyle.'* Instead, I was surprised to be classified in the action
stage, indicating that I was currently in the process of reducing car use. Clearly
something was amiss here: either the questionnaire is flawed, the TTM is invalid as a
classification model for transportation mode choice, or both.
The TTM was originally developed to measure smoking cessation, and it may
be that the willingness to stop addictive behavior is not a good analogy to reducing
automobile use. After all, cigarettes have no functional utility in the sense that cars do;
furthermore, quitting smoking is an all-or-nothing proposition, whereas reducing car
use is a continuum. These factors may partly account for the low discriminant validity
of the TTM instrument. Other possible factors may be gleaned from the published
TTM literature. Tucker (1999) was unable to stage a substantial proportion of
respondents (210 of 1155, or 18.2%) and questions the adequacy of the underlying
model and/or the staging measure. Rosen (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 47
TTM studies and found inconsistent sequencing across health care domains: in
smoking cessation, cognitive processes are used in earlier stages than behavioral
processes; in exercise adoption and diet change, cognitive and behavioral processes
increase together.
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The difficulty of applying the TTM outside the domain of smoking cessation
and applying the CBAM outside of the education domain suggest that the TADP is
inherently domain-specific. For example, certain domain-specific regularities were
observed in the evaluation profile for bicycle commuting (see memo M.9) as
summarized in Table 18.
TABLE 18. EVALUATION PROFILES FOR BIKE COMMUTING
Summer Bike Commutina
Evaluation State
1. Recognition
Dissatisfaction with alternatives;
identification of role models
2. Passive interest Early conversations with role models
3. Active interest Acquiring more specific information,
help, and bicycle; making plans
4. Initial use
Setting a date and first trial ride to work
5. Differentiation Discovering and solving problems
related to routes, bike equipment, and
hygiene
6. Dominance
Habitual use, occasional use, or
structuring/regret discontinuance

Winter Bike Commutinr
Dissatisfaction with alternatives;
identification of role models
Early conversations with role models
Acquiring more specific information,
help, and rain gear; making plans
Experiencing first hard rain
Discovering and solving problems
related to riding in cold, dark, and rain
Habitual use, occasional use, or
discontinuance

9.5. Generalizability
It is difficult to generalize the TTM and CBAM because they are bound up
with historically-situated and context-specific input variables and outcomes. The MTB
framework, by contrast, covers just a portion of the entire TADP. Referring to Figure
8 on page 27, the MTB framework is a CAPT that does not take inputs or outcomes
into account. The discovery that technologies and usage categories exhibit fractal
structure means that the MTB framework should be broadly applicable to settings
beyond transportation mode adoption, since fractal structures arise from uniform
generating processes. The mental processes described by the MTB framework are of
universal scope.
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From a computational standpoint, the MTB framework is completely general
since motives, beliefs, and technologies are modeled as abstract classes of objects.
However, before the GAM can be made operational it must be linked to contextspecific inputs and outcomes as shown in Figure 8 on page 27. A common software
engineering technique could be used to achieve this linkage. In commercial software it
is common to develop genera%>urpose systems that are customizable to contextspecific applications. For example, a company that makes voice mail systems cannot
anticipate all of the ways that its customers may wish to use these systems (e.g., a law
firm needs a different voice mail menu than a credit card company.) Since it is
impractical to hard-code every conceivable variation into the software, voice mail
systems are designed to use a script-based architecture: a simple interpretive language
is used to give customers the ability to customize their own voice mail menu by
constructing simple sentences of verbs (processes) that perform operations on nouns
(objects). Something similar is envisioned for the GAM. The GAM will be
implemented as a simple language of nouns (e.g. motives, technologies, capabilities,
and requirements) and verbs (evaluating, selecting, maintaining.) Anyone wishing to
model a specific adoption process (e.g., smoking cessation) will construct a script for
that process from these basic building blocks. From a computational standpoint, then,
the GAM is flexible enough to describe virtually any adoption process. A script
language interface would make the GAM compatible with popular agent architectures
such as the Belief-Desire-Intention framework (Bratman, Israel, & Pollack, 1988).
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This study's findings are only partly generalizable with respect to decision
type, since theoretical content was sampled from decisions involving conscious
resolution of tradeoffs (Svenson's Type III) as well as decisions involving the
construction of alternatives (Type IV). It is unclear whether the MTB framework is
applicable to unconscious decisions (Type I) or quick conscious decisions (Type II)
since these were not sampled. <The largely automatic nature of Type I/II decisions
poses an epistemological threat to the elicitation-based methods that were used to
develop the MTB framework. With a suitable choice of parameters, it is possible that
the MTB framework could be applied to Type I/II decisions, but more study is needed.
Since the study relied on theoretical rather than statistical sampling, its
findings are not generalizable with respect to populations and cannot be used to draw
inferences about factors that influence adoption rates or outcomes. This limitation is
part of the price for having a completely generic CAPT.
9.5.1. Discussion
Progression through the evaluation states was marked by certain regularities
such as identification of role models and the need to purchase equipment. It is all too
easy to jump to the conclusion that these regularities are evidence of stages rather than
states. The distinction is subtle but important. Stages are information processing
structures that flow from one task to the next in a certain necessary sequence (not
necessarily a linear sequence.) They are inherently unstable for measurement purposes
because they are not defined in terms of characteristic conditions or variables. But as
we concluded in Chapter 7, evaluation is characterized by states rather than stages.
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States are control structures that are defined in terms of a prevailing set of conditions.
They are not information processing structures and they imply nothing about
sequence. This paradox is analogous to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle:
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Weinstein, Rothman and Sutton (1998) allude to this paradox in their review of
staged theories of health behavior. They distinguish between continuum theories (e.g.,
the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behavior, and the Technology
Acceptance Model) and staged theories, which are distinguished between true staged
theories (e.g., the Precaution Adoption Process Model) and 'pseudostage' theories
(e.g., the TTM.) Weinstein and colleagues argue that four criteria distinguish a staged
theory from a pseudostage theory: 1) a classification system to define the stages; 2) an
ordering of the stages; 3) people in the same stage face common barriers; and 4)
people in different stages face different barriers. Because the TTM does not meet these
criteria, Weinstein and colleagues consider it to be a pseudostage model - a
framework that superimposes stages onto a continuum.
In the context of the present discussion, the second of Weinstein's criteria
clearly refers to stages (process flow), whereas the others refer to states (process
control.) It is hypothesized that one reason for the instability of the TTM and other
pseudostage models is because they do not adequately distinguish between a stage and
a state.
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSIONS
10.1. Overview
Despite an abundance of adoption studies, CAPT has been stagnant for
decades and seldom subjected to much critical examination or scrutiny. In
consequence, the DOI literature Is unstable - different studies identify different factors
as important. Without CAPT, DOI lacks a theoretical basis for resolving
inconsistencies across studies and guiding the refinement of CAVT. A second problem
is that DOI does not lend itself to controlled experimentation; for the past 40 years
diffusion forecasting has been dominated by aggregate approaches like the Bass model
that grossly simplify diffusion behavior and limit the value of DOI research to
practitioners.
Agent-based artificial market simulations show great promise to break this
impasse and usher in a new era in DOI research. Simulated consumer agents could
help identify new markets before they emerge and model aspects of diffusion
dynamics that are currently beyond reach. However, their development is hampered by
a shortage of CAPT that could help guide their construction.
Thus, both management problems - the instability of DOI research and the
inability to conduct controlled DOI experiments - can be traced to a common root
cause, the lack of CAPT. This research makes several important contributions toward
closing this gap in the literature.
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10.2. Theoretical Contributions
In reviewing the theoretical contributions of this study, it is helpful to revisit
Steinfeld and Fulk's (1990) discussion from Chapter 1 on the uses of theory:
-

To provide a framework for identifying empirical patterns;

-

To resolve inconsistencies across studies;

-

To generate hypotheses by which generalizable conclusions may be tested;

-

To provide perspective on larger issues;

-

To recommend directions for future research; and

-

To help integrate knowledge from related fields.

The MTB framework has advanced the state of knowledge in every respect.
10.2.1. Provide a Frameworkfor Identifying Empirical Patterns
The MTB framework conceives of adoption as a psychological and social
process by which beliefs about a tool change over time in response to certain events.
Three mental structures are involved in adoption: motives (inner mental reasons),
technologies (tools that pertain to motives) and beliefs (associations between motives
and/or technologies.)
Three conscious processes govern the behavior of these structures. "Selecting"
chooses a tool to satisfy an immediate need; it requires a certain degree of cognitive
flow or concentration. If selecting is interrupted, it must be restarted - although
subsequent passes need only recapitulate the process in a gross sense. "Evaluating"
constructs beliefs about a tool; it is event-driven and unfolds over a longer time
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horizon than selecting. Evaluating is the primary mechanism by which beliefs are
created and changed, although beliefs can also change through the unconscious halo
effect. "Maintaining" determines the functional status of a tool; it is also episodic and
is driven by empirical facts. Five unconscious auxiliary processes - "perceiving,"
"framing," "focusing," categorizing," and "acting" - govern motivation.
Capabilities and requirements are the pegs and sockets that connect the
structural elements. They are discovered during the evaluating process, when they are
combined with valence to construct new beliefs. During the selecting process these
beliefs are used to screen the technology options and choose a plan of action.
Capabilities and requirements can come or go depending on the current maintenance
state of a technology.
This study has made several unexpected discoveries about adoption. The first
is that the atomic unit of adoption is the temor, a belief that associates a technology
with a particular motive. On the most fundamental level, adoption is the process of
constructing and using temors. Beliefs that associate two motives are called momors;
it is hypothesized that momors are to learning what temors are to adoption. Temors
express 'how' beliefs, whereas momors get at 'why' beliefs.
Another non-intuitive insight is that adoption is driven by factors that are
important to novices, whereas discontinuance is driven by factors that are sensitive to
experienced users. First-hand use bifurcates technology users into two populations novice and experienced - because experience changes beliefs more deeply and richly
than hearsay.
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Sensitivity is distinct from importance: the former derives from short-term
plans, whereas the latter derives from long-term images. Sensitivity is also different
from habit: sensitivity is learning which stimuli to pay attention to, whereas habit
ignores stimuli by treating them as part of the background. Sensitivity may be
understood as a strategy for conserving focus. It looms large over the adoption process
because people tend to give greater weight to negative stimuli over positive ones,
short-term rewards and disincentives over long-term ones, and repeated incidents over
isolated occurrences. Users can become so sensitized to a recurring pattern of unmet
needs that they may reduce or discontinue their use of a technology in favor of its
rival. By lowering the psychological barriers to entry by rival technologies, sensitivity
is an important mechanism driving technological substitution.
The study also revealed that selecting and evaluating are complementary
ceteris paribus processes that operate in tandem. Selecting holds the motive constant
and varies the technologies; evaluating holds the technology constant and varies the
motives.
Finally, it was found that motives and technologies exhibit fractal structure in
the sense that they may be consolidated or differentiated into units that are recursively
self-similar. The composition operator for technologies is "bundling"; a technology
may be unbundled into a set of subtechnologies as long as at least one of them can
provide a capability of its own. Technologies that cannot be unbundled are called
primitives. The composition operator for motives is "consolidating" and the
decomposition operator is "differentiating"; desires are primitive motives that cannot
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be further refined. Inconsistencies or conflicts that inhibit the consolidating process
are resolved through the unconscious halo effect.
10.2.2. Resolve Inconsistencies Across Studies
The study helps solve the instability problem by identifying

seven

dichotomous adoption criteria:
Timing

Is there an immediate need?

Relevance

Is this particular technology relevant to the need?

Familiarity

Have I used this technology before?

Valence

Is this technology effective, ineffective, mixed, or unknown in
terms of meeting the need?

Opportunity

Can I get this technology?

Accessibility

Do I already have this technology?

Operability

Is this technology functional?

These criteria will be validated as part of a long-term research program to
assess the construct, discriminant, and predictive validity of the MTB framework in
relation to its rivals and increase confidence in the GAM. During the first study the
criteria will be used to develop a questionnaire to classify a respondent's adoption
status with respect to the GAM. A cross-sectional comparison will then be made to
identify 1) commonalities among people in the same states and 2) differences among
people in different states. Subsequent studies will sample larger populations to
validate the transition sequences of the GAM and identify factors that are predictive of
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state transitions. Later in the program the predictive power of the MTB framework
will be assessed with respect to rival theories by conducting experimental studies of
matched and unmatched interventions. By developing a better instrument to measure
adoption the MTB framework will help to alleviate the instability of DOI research.
10.2.3. Generate Hypotheses by Which Generalizable Conclusions May be Tested
Although the primary aim of this study was theory-building rather than
hypothesis testing, the MTB framework is sufficiently precise to generate testable
hypotheses (see Table 16 on Page 201.) The GAM has already been used to generate
theoretical propositions in relation to the data, and an explanatory mechanism for the
halo effect was able to account for experimental observations by Montgomery and
Svenson (1983). An important future test is whether (with a suitable choice of
parameters) the selecting, evaluating, and maintaining processes will be able to
accurately describe the behavior of Svenson Type I and II decisions. Confirmation of
this hypothesis would be of considerable interest, since it would elevate these
processes to the status of universal microlaws.
No research is perfect, and this study entails several limitations. The MTB
framework is a work in progress, and certain aspects are known to be in need of
further conceptual development. In particular, it is felt that the dominance structuring
and regret states of the evaluating process are not quite right yet. These states have a
'stagelike' character that is defined in terms of information processing rather than
status; the entry and exit criteria of these stages are not clearly enough defined. All of
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the transition relations of the evaluating process need to be tested by confirmatory
factor analysis. More research is needed to refine the framework.
10.2.4. Provide Perspective on Larger Issues and Knowledge Claims
Three findings have implications beyond the immediate objectives of the
study. The first pertains to the role of intuition in decision making; the second extends
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle to process philosophy; and the third provides
evidence in support of Osterweil's hypothesis.
10.2.4.1. Bounded Rationality and Intuition
According to the standard or 'Humean' theory of motivation, the primary
drivers of human behavior are the emotions. Willpower can arbitrate among
conflicting emotions, but it cannot directly oppose them; the will's role is to work out
the best means of achieving desires, not to formulate them. While we generally concur
with Hume's conclusions, this study found that means-ends reasoning is a closed
feedback loop rather than a linear chain. 'Ends' suggest a linear metaphor, and linear
thinking is a common pitfall in human reasoning (Sterman, 2000). As shown in Figure
60 on Page 176, the cycle of means-ends reasoning begins when a person desires to
bring about a more ideal state of affairs. Using bounded rationality, willpower then
formulates a set of plans for achieving these desires. If the attainment of these desires
reinforces that person's images of an ideal future, then new desires will arise through
unconscious intuition and the cycle will repeat.
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Success images can cause people to desire ever increasing amounts of goods,
money, power, fame, etc. In a sense, successful retailers like Ikea, Starbucks,
Abercrombie and Fitch, Crate and Barrel, and so forth are not selling goods or services
so much as they are selling images and experiences of an idealized lifestyle. They
advertise images of an ideal future as well as the inferred means of attaining those
images.
Of course, attaining one's desires is no guarantee that these images will come
to pass. These images may conflict with other components of self-image such as
principles of right and wrong (e.g., 'greenness'; maintaining a healthy diet and
lifestyle; spirituality; the virtue of leading a simple life, etc.) When images conflict
they will give rise to discordant, competing sets of desires that the will must arbitrate.
Thus, Simon's concept of bounded rationality is correct, but incomplete in that
it undervalues the role of unconscious images and intuition in decision making. The
will is important in two ways: in the short term, to arbitrate between conflicting
emotions; and in the long term, to influence and reshape the images of what we desire.
10.2.4.2. The Uncertainty Principle and Process Philosophy
In Chapter 2 it was noted that staged adoption models share several systematic
weaknesses such as overlapping stages, difficulty in clearly distinguishing between
stages, skipped and out-of-order stages, truncated search procedures, and weak
empirical support. Given that adoption has been the main dependent variable for a
considerable number of studies, the inability to clearly measure the stage of adoption
must be reckoned as a serious problem in DOI research.
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In Chapter 9 we traced the cause of these measurement problems to confusion
regarding the difference between a stage and a state. A stage is an information
processing structure that can describe the sequence of a process, but cannot be
accurately measured. A state is a control structure that can be accurately measured
(e.g. by defining entry and exit criteria), but cannot be used to specify sequence. The
error made by staged models life the CBAM and the TTM is in attempting to use the
same structure to both specify sequence and measure progress. Accurate measurement
of adoption - or any other process, for that matter - requires a combination of stages
and states.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that it is impossible to precisely
specify both the position and the momentum of a particle at the same time. The degree
of uncertainty can never be reduced below a certain theoretical limit. The uncertainty
principle was a major advance in physics and made a deep statement about the
structure of the universe: there is a fundamental limit to how accurately certain pairs
of variables can be measured simultaneously. Quite unexpectedly, this study finds that
the uncertainty principle - or something analogous to it - may also be inherent to the
relationship between information flow and control.
10.2.4.3. Osterweil's Hypothesis and Process Philosophy
Osterweil's hypothesis states that process is software, regardless of domain.
This study provides evidence in support of this hypothesis by demonstrating that
software principles also hold for psychological and social processes. This is not simply
a matter of using software to model mental processes; this study has used fundamental
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software engineering principles like simple and event-driven behavior to make nonobvious yet successful predictions about psychological and social phenomena. Prior to
this study there was little basis for supposing that software principles would be
applicable to psychological phenomena. By providing empirical evidence in support of
Osterweil's hypothesis, this study contributes to Whitehead's process philosophy and
makes a metaphysical statement about the relationship of software principles to all
kinds of process.

10.2.5. Recommend Directions for Future Research
As discussed in Chapter 3, artificial market simulations of calibrated consumer
agents could be used to forecast future market behavior, explore market dynamics,
facilitate management education and training, develop new public policies, analyze
massive market databases, game organizational strategies in volatile new markets, and
mine profiles of new products and services which do not yet exist, but which markets
are poised and ready to accept. We believe that agent-based artificial markets are
destined to play an important role in the future study of innovation dynamics.
An innovation is literally a "thing-for": it is the emergent intersection of a
technology ("thing") with a usage category ("for"). Of course, it is one thing to speak
of innovations as being emergent in a general sort of way, but quite another to
understand something about the regular rules or "microlaws" that generate emergent
structures (Langley, 1999). The fundamental microlaws of innovation are evaluating,
selecting, maintaining, and the auxiliary processes that govern motivation.
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Many systems have been proposed for classifying innovations and numerous
typologies have appeared in the literature (see Fagerberg, 2004 for a review.) We may
plot some of these by estimating the extent to which their underlying technologies and
user motivations are in equilibrium (Figure 65).
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Figure 65. Innovation Types

The novelty of an innovation stems from changes in its underlying usage
categories and technologies; the extent to which these are in equilibrium defines the
axes of a two-dimensional basin of attraction. A basin of attraction is a set of states
that end up at the same stable equilibrium point or attractor. A repellor is an unstable
equilibrium from which all nearby trajectories are forced. The basin of attraction for
innovations manifests itself as a gradient that converges toward stability over time (see
Figure 66). This is why so many innovations are of a sustaining or incremental nature.
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Figure 66. Basin of Attraction for Innovations

Innovations will always act in surprising ways because emergent behavior
cannot be anticipated simply through an inspection of their microlaws. To gain an
understanding of innovation dynamics we must embody these microlaws in simulated
consumer agents.
One of the great advantages of agent-based simulation is that it explicitly takes
the spatial dimension into account (see Section 3.1.3.) The spatial dimension need not
involve physical topography; it can be a pure abstraction, like a social network or
basin of attraction. Thus, it would be very useful to derive a gradient map or response
surface of Figure 66 from empirical data. Armed with such a map, an artificial market
simulation could be constructed in which agents representing innovations move and
interact in the basin of attraction to simulate the dynamics of high-technology markets
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and enable qualitative prediction of future market states. For example, the fractal
structure of usage categories suggests that consumer populations bifurcate into
asymmetric market segments along recurring fault lines (Abbott, 2001). By examining
historical market data, it should be possible to identify fault line candidates and
simulate the emergence of niche markets. These qualitative market predictions could
then be used to help guide organizational strategy.
At this point the basins of attraction for innovations can only be described in
general terms, but by analyzing historical data on the emergence of innovations it
should be possible to construct a gradient map or response surface of Figure 66.
Projects such as TRIZ and the Atlas of Technological Advance (van Wyk, 2007) could
be useful in this regard. Christensen's work on low-end and market-disrupting
innovations (Bower & Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor,
2003) and Downes and Mui's work on killer applications (Downes & Mui, 1998) also
hint at some of the underlying forces and properties that shape the basin of attraction
for innovations: How stable is the basin? Which factors determine how fast
innovations migrate and interact? How often do new innovations emerge, and from
what portion(s) of the basin? Are there characteristic paths that innovations follow
through the basin? Do the basins vary from industry to industry?
Thus, by explaining the microlaws of innovation, this study lays the foundation
for an entirely new approach to technology and market forecasting. However, basic
research is needed before a proof of concept demonstration may be conducted.
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10.2.6. Integrate Knowledge from Other Fields
A particular strength of this research is the deep insight it has afforded into the
nature of adoption. Past DOI research has emphasized the inputs and outputs of
adoption without examining the process itself (Eveland, 1979) and has largely ignored
decision psychology (Gatignon & Robertson, 1991; Kottonau et al., 2000). The MTB
framework is the first theory to explain the inner mental processes of adoption. It
presents a coherent, empirically grounded, and theoretically integrated framework for
adoption that breaks the stagnation of CAPT in a manner analogous to how cognitive
psychology broke free of the behaviorist paradigm during the 1960s.
In decision psychology, research on individual decision-making has been
dominated by experimental studies of subjects in controlled laboratory settings. These
studies have made many important and useful contributions. However, with the
notable exception of Beach and Mitchell's Image Theory (1996), there have been few
attempts to synthesize a unified theory of decision making. As a result, the decision
psychology literature contains a plethora of theories of limited scope that are
applicable to specific phenomena such as tradeoff heuristics, attribution, framing,
closure, option screening, dominance structuring, regret, and so forth. This study
makes a contribution by combining existing theory with original field research to
synthesize an integrated framework for decision making.
10.3. Methodological and Substantive Contributions
Historically, the social sciences have not fully appreciated the value of
software as an analytical tool in its own right (Meyer, 1997, pg. 148). Part of the
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problem is that simulation modeling has been viewed as a 'black box' in which
practically any desired result may be obtained simply by tweaking assumptions buried
deep in the model. This study makes a significant methodological contribution by
demonstrating how qualitative field research can be combined with agent-based
simulation modeling to construct consumer agents that are grounded in an unbroken
chain of empirical evidence. The* approach taken here could address many weaknesses
in the specification, calibration, analysis, publication, and replication of ABSS.
Axtell (2003) argues that a coevolution is currently taking place between social
science and software engineering, and that computer simulation is destined to become
a major method in the social sciences. This study demonstrates that software has an
analytical value that is entirely independent of its usefulness in providing operating
instructions to computers. In particular, it has shown how UML can be combined with
grounded theory and sequence analysis to improve the conceptual clarity of
inductively-derived theories, reveal hidden relationships, generate new questions for
data collection and analysis, and keep qualitative inquiry focused along productive
lines. By enabling grounded theories to be more easily rendered as executable
simulation models, this study facilitates the use of agent-based social simulation as a
venue for testing and eliminating weak social science theory.
Finally, this study makes a substantive contribution by developing a GAM that
is well-suited to guide the construction of simulated consumer agents. With the
addition of a suitable script-language interface (as described in Chapter 9) this model
could be customized to model any Svenson Type III/IV adoption decision. Planned
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future work will construct a companion questionnaire to the MTB framework and
thereby increase the substantive contribution of this research.
10.4. Concluding Remarks
When I first began working on what would eventually become the MTB
framework, I thought of adoption in fairly conventional terms: as a process, an event,
and/or a state of being. Having grappled with the adoption concept for the past seven
years, I have come to recognize that this phenomenon is deeper and more complex
than I originally suspected. My intellectual journey began with software engineering,
systems science, and technology management, led me through the social and
behavioral sciences, and finally extended into obscure corners of neuropsychology,
philosophy, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, animal behavior, and even
theology.
I read somewhere that a thesis topic should provide enough 'daylight' to
enable a significant contribution to be made, and enough 'heft' to sustain one's
interest during the long intellectual and emotional ordeal of completing a doctorate.
Adoption has certainly done that, and more besides. At its most basic level, the MTB
framework represents my poor attempt to understand how thought is constructed and
organized. I feel I have barely scratched the surface of this rich, profound, and
endlessly fascinating phenomenon.
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APPENDIX A. RECRUITING FLYERS

PSU Faculty & Staff

Bike Commuters

Win a $20 Gift Certificate ggp
from Powell's Books! \ jlWW

Win a $20 Gift Certificate
from Powell*s Books!

GomminerB^i&hnmkih^iJcf</

Commuter

I'm a PSU doctoral student studying how people make
commuting decisions My research wiil be used to
develop a computer model of the adoption process

Decision

Making

Study

I'm a PSU doctoral student studying how people make commuting decisions,
My research will be used to develop a computer model of the adoption
process

tf you,
* Are a member of the PSU faculty or staff,
• Are thinking of participating m PSU's Passport Plus transit program,
or began using Passport Pftis for the fitst time within the past year; and
• Have ownedoroperatedacarwithinthepast year,

tfymt:
Are thinking about riding your bike to work next winter,
Haven't previously ridden your bike to work during the winter, frnd
Don't work for PSU,

then I'd like to talk with you by phone for about 10 minutes to ask you a
few questions about your experiences with the Passport Plus program
These questions are npt expected to touch on any sensitive or -uncomfortable
topics, and your responses and personal data will be kept confidential.

.then I'd like to talk with you by phone for about 10 minutes to askyqu a
few questions about your bicycle commuting experiences. These flttesttons
are not expected to touch on any sensitive or uncomfortable topics;, and your
responses and personal data will ha kept confidential.

If you meet the above criteria and participate in aphoneintewew, you will fee
entered m z &&>mr\q fat a $20 gift certificate from
Poweli'sBootis!

if you meet the a.bove criteria and participate in a phone interview, you will he
entered in a drawing for a $26 gift certificate; from PowefPi Books?

Research Study: (503) 282-6822
bcapps@hevanet.com

Research Study: (503) 282-6822
bcapps@hevanet.com

Figure 67. Recruiting Fliers
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APPENDIX B. TELEPHONE PRESCREENING SCRIPTS
B.l. Prescreening Script - PP+ Case
Opening Statement,
I'd like to thank you for calling about my research study. I know you're very
busy and I appreciate your willingness to help me out with my research.
A little bit of background about this study: My name is Brent Zenobia, and I am a
Ph.D. candidate in Engineering and Technology Management at Portland State
University. I'm conducting a study on how people make decisions about adopting
new technologies. The main contribution of my study will be a computer model
of the adoption process for green technologies like bicycles, car sharing, and
mass transit.
I'd like to ask you a few questions about your daily commute that should take
about 20 minutes to complete. Do you have any questions or concerns at this
point?
Automobile Use.
Q1.

Okay, let's get started then. Have you owned or operated a car within the past
year?

If no, skip to closing statement B.
Contact Information.
Next I need to get your contact information. I won't disclose this data to anyone
else.
Q2.

What is your name?

Q3.

Are you a member of the PSU faculty or staff?

If no, skip to closing statement B.
Q4.

What is your telephone number?

Q5.

What is your mailing address?

Q6.

What is your e-mail address?

Personal Innovativeness.
Q7.

People have a wide range of attitudes when it comes to trying new technologies.
I'm sure you know some people who want to try new technologies as soon as they
come along, others who like to wait and see, and others who just aren't interested
in trying new technologies. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being very interested in
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trying new technologies and 1 being not at all interested in trying new
technologies, how would you rate your attitude toward trying new technologies?
CBAM Classification.
Q8.

Next, I'd like to ask you a few questions about how you get around town. I'm
going to use the term 'commute,' and by 'commute' I mean getting to work,
going to school, running errands, doing your shopping, picking up your kids, or
just otherwise going about your daily life. PSU offers a commuting package to its
faculty and staff called Passport Plus. This program consists of an all-zone
TriMet pass, free Flexcar usage during business hours, or reduced-rate campus
parking in any combination. Have you ever used Passport Plus as part of your
commute?

If no, skip to Q15.
Q9.

When did you first begin your participation in the Passport Plus program? Was it
more than a year ago, about a year, or less than a year?

If more than a year, skip to closing statement B.
Q10.

Do you use your pass only to commute to campus, or do you also use it to go to
off-campus places as well?

Q11.

a. On average, how often do you use your pass to obtain reduced-rate campus
parking? More than once a week, about once a week, or less than once a week?
b. On average, how often do you use your pass to ride TriMet? More than once a
week, about once a week, or less than once a week?
c. On average, how often do you use your pass to borrow a Flexcar? More than
once a week, about once a week, or less than once a week?

Q12.

Do you ever coordinate your TriMet or Flexcar use with other people, such as to
go shopping or attend sporting events?

Q13.

Have you ever encouraged other people to use TriMet, Flexcar, or Passport Plus?

Q14.

Are you looking for ways to get more mileage out of your Passport Plus pass?

Skip to closing statement A.
Q15.

Do you have any plans to participate in Passport Plus in the future?

If no, skip to Q17.
Q16.

Have you set a date when you plan to begin participating in the program?

Q17.

Are you at interested in learning more about Passport Plus?

If no, skip to closing statement B.
Ql 8.

Are you actively seeking information on the program, or are you monitoring
information that happens to come your way?

Closing Statement A.
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This concludes our telephone interview. I'll enter your name in the drawing for a
$20 gift certificate from Powell's Books.
Based on our conversation, you qualify for the next stage of my research study.
I'd like to meet with you in person to learn more about how you make
commuting decisions. Your participation in this next stage is completely
voluntary. If you'd like to participate, I'll enter your name into a pool. A couple
of weeks from now I'll draw some names from the pool at random for a face-toface discussion at a mutually convenient time and place. This discussion will take
about an hour and focus on how you make decisions about commuting. It's not
expected to touch on any topics which might be sensitive or uncomfortable for
you. If your name is drawn, I'll send you an information packet in the mail
containing a consent form and a short questionnaire to be completed before the
interview. As a thank-you for participating in an interview you'll receive a free
pedestrian safety light. Would you be willing to meet with me in person to
discuss how you make commuting decisions?
If no, skip to Closing Statement B.
Okay, I'll enter your name in the pool. If you're selected, you should hear from
me in a few weeks. In the meantime, if you have any questions or concerns about
this study you can reach me at this telephone number. Thank you for your time,
and goodbye.
Closing Statement B.
This concludes our telephone interview. Thank you for your time, and goodbye.

(249)

"Passive"
Orientation
"Active"
Orientation

Integration

Renewal
Campus only;
Infrequent TriMet
or Flexcar use

Mechanical
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Figure 68. CBAM Classification Instrument - PP+ Case

B.2. Prescreening Script - WB Case
Opening Statement.
I'd like to thank you for taking the time to participate in my research study. I
know you're very busy and I appreciate your willingness to help me with my
research.
A little bit of background about this study: My name is Brent Zenobia, and I am a
Ph.D. candidate in Engineering and Technology Management at Portland State
University. I'm conducting a study on how people make decisions about adopting
new technologies. The main contribution of my study will be a computer model
of the adoption process for green technologies like bicycles, car sharing, and
mass transit.
I'd like to ask you a few questions about bicycling commuting that should take
about 10 minutes to complete. Do you have any questions or concerns before we
begin?

(250)

Bicycle Use.
Q19.

Okay. I'd like to begin by asking you a few questions about how you get around
town. I'm going to use the term 'commute,' and by 'commute' I mean getting to
work, going to school, running errands, doing your shopping, picking up your
kids, or just otherwise going about your daily life. Do you use a bike as part of
your commute?

If no, skip to Q3.
Q20.

Do you ride year round, or only when the weather is good?

If year-round, skip to closinghtatement C.
Q21.

Are you thinking of trying to commute by bike during the upcoming winter?

If no, skip to closing statement C.
Contact Information.
Next I need to get your contact information. I won't disclose this data to anyone
else.
Q22.

What is your name?

Q23.

What is your telephone number?

Q24.

What is your mailing address?

Q25.

What is your e-mail address?

Q26.

Where are you employed?

IfPSU, skip to closing statement C.
Q27.

Approximately how many people work there? Is it more than 50 people, about 50
people, or less than 50 people?

Automobile Use.
Q28.

Have you owned or operated a car within the past year?

Personal Innovativeness.
Q29.

As you know, people have a wide range of attitudes when it comes to trying new
technologies. I'm sure you know some people who want to try new technologies
as soon as they come along, others who like to wait and see, and others who just
aren't interested in trying new technologies. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being
very interested in trying new technologies and 1 being not at all interested, how
would you rate your own attitude?

CBAM Classification.
Q30.

Now let's return to the topic of bicycles. Do you own a bike at present?

If no, skip to Q18.
Q31.

Do you use your bike only to get to work, or only for recreation, or both?

If recreation only, skip to Q19.
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Q32.

a. On average, about how often do you ride your bike to work when the weather
is good? More than once a week, about once a week, or less than once a week?
b. On average, about how often do you ride your bike to work when the weather
is coW. More than once a week, about once a week, or less than once a week?
c. On average, about how often do you ride your bike to work when the weather
is rainy? More than once a week, about once a week, or less than once a week?

Q33.

Have you ever participated in any bicycling community events like a race, Pedal
Palooza, a Critical Mass ride, or things of that nature?

Q34.

Have you ever encouraged other people to commute by bicycle?

Q35.

Do you plan to increase your bicycle use during the coming year?

Skip to closing statement A.
Q36.

Do you have plans to purchase a commuter bike?

If no, skip to Q20.
Q37.

Have you set a date when you intend to begin riding your bike to work?

Q38.

Are you interested in learning more about bike commuting?

If no, skip to closing statement B.
Q39.

Are you actively seeking information about bike commuting, or are you
monitoring information that happens to come your way?

Skip to closing statement B.
Closing Statement A.
Okay, I'll enter your name in the drawing for a $20 gift certificate from Powell's
Books.
Based on our conversation, you also qualify for the next phase of my research
study. Participation in this next phase would be entirely voluntary. What I would
like to do is to with you in person to gain a better understanding of how your
commuting decisions unfold over time. To do that, I'm looking for some
bicyclists who will let me talk to them over the winter so I can understand the
decision from their point of view. If you decide to participate, I would meet you
for two face-to-face discussions. The first time would be in either September or
October, and the second time would be in either December or January. Each
discussion would last about an hour and would take place at some mutually
agreeable time and place. These discussions would focus on how you make
decisions about bicycle commuting. They're not expected to touch on anything
which might be sensitive or uncomfortable for you. Participation would be
voluntary, and you may leave the study at any time. You're under no obligation
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to keep riding your bike all winter, and you can still participate in the study even
if you decide to stop riding your bike. As a thank-you for participating, you'll
receive a free pedestrian safety light with each interview. Are you willing to take
part in this phase of my study?
If no, skip to Closing Statement C.
Okay, you should hear from me in early autumn. Prior to our first interview I'll
send you an information packet containing a consent form and a short
questionnaire to be completed before the interview. Do you have any questions at
this point?
Okay, if any questions or concerns come up for you later on, you may reach me
at this telephone number or by e-mail. This concludes our telephone interview.
Thank you for your time. Goodbye.
Closing Statement B.
This concludes our telephone interview. I'll enter your name in the drawing for a
$20 gift certificate from Powell's Books. Thank you for your time. Goodbye.
Closing Statement C.
Okay, this concludes our telephone interview. Thank you for your time.
Goodbye.
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Figure 69. CBAM Classification Instrument - WB Case
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APPENDIX C. CRITICAL EVENT SHEET

My Earliest
Memory

The
Present
Figure 70. Critical Event Instrument
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APPENDIX D. INFORMED CONSENT FORM
This document is being provided to you to help you decide whether or not you
want to participate in Brent's research study. It explains what actions are needed from
you, as well as the risks and benefits of this research for you and your community.
Below are some general questions you might want to ask Brent before you make your
decision.
1. Who is Brent? What is his research study about?
Brent is a graduate student in Engineering and Technology Management at
Portland State University who is conducting this study as partial fulfillment of the
requirements for a Ph.D. degree; he is working under the supervision of his advisor,
Dr. Charles Weber. Brent is studying how people make decisions about adopting
innovations. The main contribution of his study will be a computer model of the
consumer adoption process for green technologies like bicycles, car sharing, and mass
transit.
2. Why was I selected to take part in this study?
Brent is interested in talking to adults who are currently considering, or have
recently considered, making changes in how they get around town. Brent is looking
for folks from all walks of life to help him understand how people make certain kinds
of decisions.
3. What will I have to do?
• You will be asked to participate in two interview sessions, each of which will
last around an hour. The second interview will take place about two months
after the first interview.
• A location will be identified that is convenient for you and accessible for
Brent.
• After asking you a few questions about your background, Brent will ask you
some questions about how you went about deciding to commute by bicycle this
winter.
• With your permission, Brent will audio record the interview. This recording
will only be used to help Brent transcribe the interview.
4. What are some risks of participating in this study?
This study poses minimal risk. Brent will not disclose any of your personal data to
anyone else. The interview is not expected to touch on topics which might be sensitive
or uncomfortable for you. If you don't want to go on, you may stop the interview or
leave the study at any time. You're under no obligation to continue riding your bike all
winter, and you can still participate in the study even if you decide to stop riding your
bike.
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5. What are you doing to protect me?
Brent won't tell anyone that you took part in this study. Your name and other
confidential information will be omitted from the interview transcripts. The audio
records will be kept on file for three years, the amount of time required by federal
regulations, and then destroyed. Only Brent will have access to these records.
6. What are the potential benefits of participating in this study?
You will receive a free blinking pedestrian safety light as a gift for participating.
You'll receive the light as soon as each interview starts, and it is yours to keep even if
you decide to stop the interview. If you would like to receive the results of this study
they will be mailed to you at no 6harge.
7. How can I contact you if I have any questions or concerns regarding this
study?
If you have any questions about this study, this form, or the interview, you can email Brent at bcapps@hevanet.com or telephone him at (503) 282-6822. You can also
contact the Chair of Human Subjects Committee at Portland State University about
your rights as a research participant.
8. How can I contact your advisor and your Graduate Studies Office?
Dr. Charles Weber
Department of Engineering and Technology Management
Portland State University
Post Office Box 751
Portland, Oregon 97207-0751
Phone:(503)725-8133
E-mail address: charles.weber@etm.pdx.edu
The Office of Graduate Studies
Cramer Hall, Room 117
1721 SW Broadway, Portland, Oregon 97201-0751
Phone: (503) 725-8410 / (800) 547-8887
Fax: (503) 725-3416
E-Mail address: grad@pdx.edu
Hours: 9:00 AM-5:00 PM
By signing below, I have read and understood the conditions under which I will participate in
this study. I give my consent to be a participant and receive a copy of this consent form.

Signature

Date

Thank you for taking the time to complete this informed consent.
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Best Regards,
Brent Zenobia
Department of Engineering and Technology Management
Portland State University
Post Office Box 751
Portland, OR. 97207-0751, USA
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APPENDIX E. INTERVIEW SCRIPTS
E. 1. Interview Script - PP+ Case
Collect the consent form

and TTM questionnaire; label the

questionnaire.
Opening Statement (5 minutes)
QO: I want to thank you for meeting me today. I know how busy you
are and I appreciate your willingness to help me out with my
research. As a thank-you for helping, I'd like to give you this
pedestrian safety light.
Give the safety light to the informant.
Any comments you make here today will be confidential. I won't
be including your name or any other identifying information in
my report. I want you to feel that you can speak freely.
While I have some specific questions that I need to ask, mainly
my job is to listen and ask you for clarification when I don't
understand something. Our time together is limited, so at times I
may need to move us along.
Start the voice recorders.
From our phone conversation, I gather that (you've decided / are
in the process of deciding whether) to use your Passport Plus pass
as a means for getting around town. Today I'd like you to help me
understand how your decision unfolded.

I'm

particularly

interested in hearing about the turning points in your decision,
and how these related to other problems or concerns that you
were experiencing in your life at the time.
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Grand Tour Question (10 minutes)
Ql: Let's begin by focusing on the 'big picture'. I have a card here
with an arrow across down the page. This arrow represents time,
from your earliest memory on this issue down to the present. I
invite you to spend a few moments looking back over your
decision as a whole to think about what were the most significant
happenings or memories that stand out in your mind. Then, when
you're ready, take this pencil and mark on the card the
approximate time when those memories occurred, and give them
labels that you find meaningful. This will help me to keep the
sequence of your recollections clear in my mind.
Give the informant the card and a pencil
Probe 1. What's your earliest memory on this subject? Please
mark and label it on your card.
Probe 2. So, after

, what's the next thing you remember?

Please mark and label it on your card.
Estimated number of critical events: 4-5 per respondent.
Mini-Grand Tour Question (10 minutes)
Q2: Okay, let's turn to the (first / next) memory you listed on your
card. Tell me more about that.
Probe 1. About how much time had passed since (the previous
event)!
Probe 2. How did

relate to other needs or concerns in your

life at this point?
Probe 3. What were some of the options that you were
considering at this point? What did you think about them?
Probe 4. Did you encounter any obstacles or distractions?
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Probe 5. Is there anything else you'd like to add before we move
on?
Repeat mini-grand tour question for each event.
Decision Outcomes (10 minutes)
Q3: That brings us up to the present. What is your overall opinion
about Passport Plus at this point?
Probe 1. When do you think you might ride TriMet? When would
you not use it?
Probe 2. When do you think you might use Flexcar? When would
you not use it?
Probe 3. When do you think you might use your car? When
would you not use it?
Closing (5 minutes)
Q4: In summing up, is there anything else you'd like to add?
Q5: Do you know of anyone else who might be interested in
participating in this study?
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E.2. Interview Script - WB Case (First Round)
Collect the consent form

and TTM questionnaire; label the

questionnaire.
Opening Statement (5 minutes)
QO: I want to thank you for meeting me today. I know how busy you
are and I appreciate your willingness to help me out with my
research. As a thank-you for helping, I'd like to give you this
pedestrian safety light.
Give the safety light to the informant
Any comments you make here today will be confidential. I won't
be including your name or any other identifying information in my
report. I want you to feel that you can speak freely.
While I have some specific questions that I need to ask, mainly my
job is to listen and ask you for clarification when I don't
understand something. Our time together is limited, so at times I
may need to move us along.
Start the voice recorders.
From our phone conversation, I gather that (you've decided / are in
the process of deciding whether) to use your bicycle as a means for
getting to work. Today I'd like you to help me understand how
your decision unfolded. I'm particularly interested in hearing about
the turning points in your decision, and how these related to other
problems or concerns that you were experiencing in your life at the
time.
Grand Tour Question (10 minutes)
Ql: Let's begin by focusing on the 'big picture'. I have a card here with
an arrow across down the page. This arrow represents time, from
your earliest memory on this issue down to the present. I invite you
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to spend a few moments looking back over your decision as a
whole to think about what were the most significant happenings or
memories that stand out in your mind. Then, when you're ready,
take this pencil and mark on the card the approximate time when
those memories occurred, and give them labels that you find
meaningful. This will help me to keep the sequence of your
recollections clear in my mind.
Give the informant the card and a pencil
Probe 1. What's your earliest memory on this topic? Please mark
and label it on your card.
Probe 2. So, after

, what's the next thing you remember?

Please mark and label it on your card.
Estimated number of critical events: 4-5 per respondent.
Mini-Grand Tour Question (5 minutes)
Q2: Okay, let's turn to the (first / next) memory you listed on your card.
Tell me more about that.
Repeat mini-grand tour question for each event.
Bike Challenges (20 minutes)
Q3: That brings us up to the present. What issues have you experienced
in terms of...?
Probe 1. .. .riding in traffic?
Probe 2. .. .health and hygiene?
Probe 3. ...the weather? [Did you procrastinate about getting rain
gear?]
Probe 4. .. .making the best use of your time?
Probe 5. .. .mechanical problems?
Probe 6. .. .other people's attitudes about biking?
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Probe 7. ...flexibility and integration into all the other areas of
your life?
Closing (5 minutes)
Q4: In summing up, is there anything else you'd like to add?
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E.3. Interview Script - WB Case (Second Round)
Opening Statement (5 minutes)
QO: I want to thank you for meeting me again. I know how busy you
are and I appreciate your willingness to help me out with my
research. As a thank-you for helping, I'd like to give you this
pedestrian safety light.
t

Give the safety light to the informant
As a reminder, any comments you make here today will be
confidential. I won't be including your name or any other
identifying information in my report. I want you to feel that you
can speak freely.
While I have some specific questions that I need to ask, mainly my
job is to listen and ask you for clarification when I don't
understand something. Our time together is limited, so at times I
may need to move us along.
Start the voice recorders.
I'd like to start out by reading you a recap of our last conversation.
Please me know whether it accurately summarizes your situation
from last Fall.
Read the case summary.
Grand Tour Question (10 minutes)
Ql: Okay, now let's catch up on your biking experiences since that
time.
Probe 1. Did you discover anything that surprised you? How did
you deal with it?
Selection (10 minutes)
Q2: How regularly did you ride your bike this past winter?
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Probe 1. On any given morning, how did you go about deciding
whether to ride?
Probe 2. How did you get around on days when you didn't ride?
Probe 3. Were there periods of time when you did not ride?
Probe 4. Did participation in this study influence your decision
whether to ride?
Specific Cycling Challeriges (20 minutes)
Q3: Next, I'd like to ask you a series of questions about specific biking
issues. Did you experience any challenges in terms of:
Probe 1.. .riding in the rain for the first time?
Probe 2.. .riding in the dark for the first time?
Probe 3.. .riding in the cold for the first time?
Probe 4...riding in the snow? [Alt: How did you get to work that
day?]
Probe 5.. .riding in traffic?
Probe 6.. .maintenance issues?
Probe 7.. .health and hygiene?
Probe 8... flexibility and integration into all the other areas of your
life?
Probe 9.. .making the best use of your time?
Probe 10.. .other people's attitudes about biking?
Probe 11. Did you encounter any other challenges that you had to
solve?
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Attitude Change (10 minutes)
Q4: In looking back, has your attitude about cycling evolved since last
Fall?
Probe 1. Has your attitude toward (cars, TriMet) evolved since last
Fall?
Closing (5 minutes)
Q4: In summing up, is there anything else you'd like to add?
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APPENDIX F. TTM CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT
Please indicate your response to the following questions, with a score of 1 indicating
strong disagreement and a score of 5 indicating strong agreement.
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
(1)

DISAGREE
(2)

NEITHER AGREE
NOR DISAGREE
(3)

AGREE
(4)

STRONGLY
AGREE
(5)

©

©

©

©

©

Ql.

,As far as I'm concerned, driving a car is not a problem that
needs changing.

©

©

©

©

©

Q2.

I think I might be ready to explore ways of driving a car less
often.

©

©

©

©

©

Q3.

It bothers me to drive so much, and I am doing something about
it.

©

©

©

©

©

Q4.

It might be worthwhile to find alternative ways of getting
around town.

©

©

©

©

©

Q5.

It doesn't make sense for me to get rid of my car. I'm not
causing a problem.

©

©

®

©

©

Q6.

I've already curtailed my driving, but I'm worried that I might
find myself suddenly needing a car. I'd like to explore what my
options are.

©

©

©

©

©

Q7.

I am finally working on driving less.

©

©

©

©

©

Q8.

I've been thinking I might want to explore other ways of getting
around town.

©

©

©

©

©

Q9.

I've been successful at reducing my driving, but I'm not sure I
can keep up the effort on my own.

©

©

©

©

©

Q10. At times it is difficult to avoid driving places, but I'm working
on it.

©

©

©

©

©

Q l l . Filling out this questionnaire is pretty much of a waste of time
for me because the problem doesn't have to do with me.

©

©

©

©

©

Q12. I'm hoping that by driving my car less I'll be doing something
to help the environment.

©

©

®

©

©

Q13. I guess I'm dependent on my car, but I don't see that as
something that really needs to change.

©
©

©
©

©
©

©
©

©
©

Q14. I am really working hard to reduce the extent of my driving.
Q15. Operating a car is expensive, and I really think I should work on
reducing my driving.
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©

©

®

©

©

Q16. I tried to reduce my driving, but I'm not following through as
well as I'd like. I'd like to find some realistic alternatives to
being forced to drive everywhere.

©

©

©

©

©

Q17. Even though I still use a car, I'm at least working on helping the
environment.

©

©

®

©

©

Q 1 8 . I thought once I had freed myself from my car that would be the
end of it, but sometimes I still find myself needing a car from
time to time.

©

©

©

©

©

Q19. I wish I had more ideas on how to avoid using a car so much.

©

©

©

©

©

Q20.) I have started driving my car less often, but I would like some
help.

©

©

®

©

©

Q21. Maybe there are options available for driving my car less often.

©

©

©

©

©

©

©

©

©

©

Q22. I may need a boost right now to help me maintain the
adjustments I've already made to my driving habits.
Q23. Cars may be part of a larger problem, but there's not much I can
do about it.

©

©

©

©

©

Q24. I hope that I can find some good options for driving less often.

©

©

©

©

©

©

©

®

©

©

Q25. Anyone can talk about driving less; I'm actually doing
something about it.
Q26. All this talk about the environment is boring. People are always
claiming the sky is falling.

©

©

®

©

©

Q27. I'm looking for options to avoid having to go back to driving as
much as I used to.

©

©

®

©

©

Q28. It is frustrating, but I feel I might have to go back to driving
more often.

©

©

®

©

©

Q29. Sure, I drive a car; but so does the next person. So what?

©

©

©

©

©

Q30. I am actively working on reducing my car use.

©
©

©
©

©
©

©

©
©

©

Q 3 1 . I would rather deal with my car and all its petty frustrations than
try and live without one.
Q32. After all I had done to try to reduce my car use, ever now and
again I still find myself needing to use one.
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APPENDIX G. INTERVIEW CHECKLIST
What to Bring
1. E-mail reminder
2.
Information sheet on informant
3.
Safety light
4.
DVR + manual + earphones
5.
Fresh AAA batteries
6.
Interview script
7.
Critical event sheets
8.
Contact summary sheet
9.
Two spare consent forms
10. One spare TTM questionnaire
11. Field book
12. Pens and pencils with erasers; pencil sharpener
13. Backup tape recorder with power pack and tape
14. Business cards
15. Room key or directions/map
Before
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

the Interview
Set up backup tape recorder
Microphone check of the DVR
Collect the consent form; give them a copy
Collect and label the TTM questionnaire
Give them your business card
Give them the safety light

After the Interview
1. Label TTM and Critical Event Sheets
2. Fill out Contact Summary Sheet
Post-Processing
1. DVR: Upload voice recording
2. Scanner: Scan Critical Event Sheet and Contact Summary Sheet
3. Excel: record TTM data, update contact notes, print updated
information sheet
4. Word: Create blank transcript file
5. Atlas-TI: attach transcript, crit. event sheet, and contact sheet;
create new family
6. Check all files into VSS
7. Run backups
8. File hardcopies

(270)

APPENDIX H. CONTACT SUMMARY SHEET

Informant:
Contact Date
Contact Type: Phone Visit

Today's Date
E-Mail

1. What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact?

2. Summarize the information you got (or failed to get) on each of the target
questions you had for this contact.
Question

Information

3. Anything else that struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating, or important in
this contact?

4. What new (or remaining) target questions do you have in considering the next
contact?
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APPENDIX I. UML PRIMER
1.1. Background
This brief introduction to the Unified Modeling Language (UML) is written for
social scientists. No prior programming knowledge is assumed.
UML is a visual language for drawing very precise pictures. While these
pictures are often used to generate computer code, UML is not a programming
language. It is a completely general notation which can be used to diagram any sort of
structural or behavioral relationship regardless of whether the intention is to write
computer software. For this reason, UML is beginning to find applications in areas
which have little to do with computers.
The roots of UML date back to the 1970s, when flow charts and other kinds of
diagrams began to be used to design computer software. By the late 1980s so many
idiosyncratic notations were in use that the software engineering community needed a
uniform standard for drawing precise pictures; UML was the result. The standard is
best understood as a collection of many different kinds of diagrams, each of which is
useful at conveying a particular perspective. For example, class diagrams are good at
conveying the static structure of a system, whereas activity diagrams (the modern
equivalent of flow charts) are good at conveying a dynamic flow of tasks.
The standard has been extremely successful and has undergone several
revisions since its initial 1997 release; a recent search at Amazon.com listed 4,755
technical and professional books with "UML" in the title. As UML has evolved it has
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become richer and vastly more complex. Fortunately, only a tiny fraction of it is
needed here.
1.2. The Object-Oriented Paradigm
UML packs a lot of information into a few lines and boxes, so it is important to
understand the abstract modeling principles which they represent. The goal of this
primer is to convey these modeling principles without leaning too heavily on software
engineering jargon. We will use Legos illustrate how UML diagram can be used to
document structural and behavioral relationships.
The UML is a standard for object-oriented modeling. An object is anything
that has identity, structure, and behavior; the Lego on my desk is an object. An object
need not be concrete - it can be entirely conceptual. My belief that it will not rain this
afternoon could be modeled as an object, as could 'rain', 'afternoon', 'weather', etc.
Objects, like words, are abstract representations of phenomena.
A class is a family of objects: Lego is a class, but any particular Lego is an
object. A class is an archetype or abstraction of essential properties, rather like one of
Plato's ideal forms. A class also describes the pattern by which objects of that class
are brought into existence or instantiated (bearing in mind that these are virtual
objects, not physical ones.) It follows that classes embody static structure as well as
dynamic behavior.
The UML draws a fundamental distinction between structure and behavior.
Structural diagrams are used to define the building blocks of a system (objects and
classes), whereas behavioral diagrams are used to show how these building blocks
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interact and change over time. In the next sections we will draw upon Lego examples
to introduce the five types of UML diagrams which are used in this thesis (see Figure
71).
UML Diagrams

I
Structural Diagrams

Behavioral Diagrams

I

7T
Object Diagrams

Class Diagrams

Use Case Diagrams

Statechart Diagrams

Activity Diagrams

Figure 71. Overview of the UML Diagrams Discussed in this Primer

1.3. Class Diagrams
In UML a class is shown as a box with a name:
Lego

Figure 72. UML Classes

The class shown in Figure 72 represents any kind of Lego. Suppose we wanted
to list things that were true of all Legos, such as what they are made of or what you
could do with them. Two optional compartments are provided for listing the attributes
and operations of a class:

.--"'

Lego
Color: {Red, White, Black, Yellow, Green, Blue}
Join ()
Unjoin ()

The top compartment always shows the class name.

The middle compartment always shows the class attributes.

"----....

The bottom compartment always shows the class operations.

Figure 73. U M L Class Compartments
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From Figure 73 we see that all Legos have a color attribute and two defined
operations, join and unjoin. These properties are automatically inherited by any
subclass which is derived from the Lego class. For instance, suppose we wanted to
define a particular subclass called a "six-brick" to describe Lego 2x3 bricks:
Lego
Color: {Red, White, piack, Yellow, Green, Blue}
Join ()
Unjoin ()

A

Six-Brick

ii-,.

Figure 74. UML Generalization Relationships

Figure 74 tells us that Six-Brick is a type of Lego. In UML a hollow arrow
indicates a generalization relationship, which in this case means that Lego is a
generalization of Six-Brick. A child subclass automatically inherits the properties of
its parent(s), so there is no need to repeat that color, join, and unjoin are defined for
Six-Brick; this is implied by the generalization relation. (In UML, the motto is "say it
once".)
Nevertheless, we know that there is something distinctive about a Six-Brick
above and beyond what Figure 74 is showing us. For instance, we know that a SixBrick can be joined to as few as zero and as many as six other Legos. This kind of
relationship is called an association, and it is indicated by a different kind of arrow:
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Lego

Multiplicity
1
0..*
1..*
0..n
n
(etc.)

A 0.6 ..

Meaning
Exactly one
Zero or more
One or more
Zero ton
Exactly n

Six-Brick

Figure 75. UML Associations and Multiplicity

The 'multiplicity' of the association is such that one Six-Brick can be joined to
as many as six other Legos. Notice how Figure 75 omits the attributes and operations
defined previously, and does not show the generalization arrow; in UML it is
considered good practice to show only the necessary details. This helps to avoid
overly complicated and cluttered diagrams. Also, it can be confusing to show both
generalization and association in the same diagram, so these relationships are usually
conveyed with separate diagrams.
You may have noticed a problem at this point. A Six-Brick can actually be
joined with as many as twelve other Legos - six with the male pegs and six with the
female sockets. Let's clear up this ambiguity:
Lego

A 0..6
Female

Six-Brick

Figure 76. UML Roles

Figure 76 makes it explicit that a Six-Brick can be joined to the female end of
as few as zero and as many as six other Legos. "Female" defines a role that one Lego
plays in relation to another (i.e., all Legos have sockets, but not every Lego has pegs.)
Labeling both ends of the association is unnecessary and would tend to clutter up the
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diagram, so following good UML practice we will dispense with the "male" role.
Roles are a bit like dummy variables in this sense.
The diagram is still ambiguous because we haven't specified the orientation of
the join. Two Six-Bricks can be mated exactly, or they can be offset in a number of
ways:

Figure 77. Some Legos

Orientation is not the sole property of either Lego. Instead, it is a property of
their joint association. We introduce a new type of class to characterize dyadic
relationships:
Lego

A\
Join-Orientation

0..6
Fem
1

Six-Brick

Figure 78. UML Association Class

In Figure 78 the dashed line indicates that Join-Orientation is an association
class, a special entity which preserves the properties of the association. A JoinOrientation exists only in relation to the two Legos that it connects; it has no
independent existence. Furthermore, if a Six-Brick were to be joined to more than one
Lego, like these...
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Figure 79. Some More Legos

...then each association would have its own Join-Orientation. A JoinOrientation relates one Six-Brick to one other Lego; the multiplicity of the association
indicates how many total instances of Join-Orientation are needed to characterize
those configurations.
1.4. Object Diagrams
An object is an instance of a class, and it is created and destroyed by certain
operations of that class. Object diagrams are similar to class diagrams except that the
names are written differently. Let's take a look at the following configuration of
Legos:

Figure 80. Even More Legos

If we wanted to diagram how these particular Legos were connected, we could
use an object diagram:
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Leao A: Six-Brick

: Join-Orientation

Female

Lego B: Six-Brick

Female
: Join-Orientation

Anonymous object of the specified class V

Lego C : Six-Brick

Proper name with specified class

Figure 81. UML Object Diagram

As you can see from Figure 81, there are a couple of different ways of naming
objects. Lego A, Lego B, and Lego C are the proper names of three objects of the SixBrick class. The two instances of Join-Orientation are not important enough for us to
give them names; they are anonymous objects. In this thesis, association classes will
generally be omitted from the object diagrams to simplify the diagrams and reduce
visual clutter:
Leao A : Six-Brick

Female
Leqo B : Six-Brick

Female

Figure 82. UML Object Diagram (Association Classes Omitted)

1.5. Use Cases
Now we turn our attention to describing how classes interact and change over
time. UML includes several types of diagrams which are useful for describing
behavior (Figure 71); the first type we shall discuss are Use Case diagrams, which are
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helpful for depicting collaboration among the actors and elements involved in some
behavioral scenario. Use cases are commonly used as a first step during objectoriented analysis.
It is not possible to illustrate behavior with normal Legos, which are
completely static: once assembled, ordinary Legos just sit there. However, Lego
makes a kit called a Tankbot' which is capable of manifesting behavior4 and is
commonly used to teach basic robotics concepts. It consists of a computer controller
and snap-on extensions that can grip objects and sense touch, light, and the rotation
angle (see Figure 83.)
.«,

ToadiSenser Bumper

Tankbot

isMfoi/Aitgte Sasof 1

•CI

1

Figure 83. Lego Tankbot and Extensions

4

While this Tankbot example has a 'mechanical' feel, this thesis will demonstrate that UML is capable
of describing psychological as well as mechanical processes.
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We will program our Tankbot to count how many black bands ring the inside
of a hollow cardboard tube (Figure 84.) The Tankbot will beep its horn each time it
passes over a band; when it reaches the far end of the tube it will halt and blink its
headlight as many times as there were bands in the tube.

Figure 84. Tankbot Band Counting Scenario

The use case diagram for this scenario is shown in Figure 85.
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Tankbot
Light Sensor

Read Light Level

A stick figure denotes an actor
(human or nonhuman) who
interacts with the system.

The outer box
indicates the
system boundary.

The inner box indicates
that the light sensor is
a subsystem of the
tankbot chassis.

Use cases are indicated
by ovals. These four use
cases describe operations
which are intrinsic to the
tankbot chassis.

Lego
Hobbyist

The hobbyist invokes the
Count Bands case by
pushing a button on top of
the tankbot (not shown)

A dashed arrow indicates
that Beep Horn "extends" or
adds detail to Count Bands.

Beep Horn

Figure 85. UML Use Case Notation

In Figure 85 an actor - the Lego Hobbyist - sets Count Bands into operation
by pushing a button. Several subsidiary use cases 'extend' or add detail to Count
Bands, four of which describe features which are intrinsic to the Tankbot chassis:
Move Wheels, Stop Wheels, Flash Headlight, and Beep Horn. The fifth case, Read
Light Level, is available whenever the light sensor subsystem is snapped onto the
Tankbot.

1.6. Statecharts
UML Statecharts are useful in describing stimulus/response or event-driven
behavior. The light sensor is capable of detecting whether the Tankbot is inside or
outside of the tube and whether it is positioned over a black band. Let us define two
light thresholds, the first indicating whether the Tankbot is inside the tube and the
second indicating whether it is over a black band. If a light level of 100 indicates
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maximum brightness and 0 indicates absolute darkness, then we might set the tube
detection threshold to 50 and the band detection threshold to 25. We could then
describe the relationship among these variables using the Statechart shown in Figure
86.
States can be
nested ad infinitum

These symbols indicate
the initial or default states

Inside Tube
Light Level >
Tube Detection Threshold
Outside Tube

<Light Level <=
Tube Detection Threshold

Light Level <=
Band Detection Threshold

-M

On Band

<r
Light Level >
Band Detection Threshold

>

Off Band

Figure 86. UML Statechart Notation

In some cases action will continue as long as the Tankbot remains in a
particular state, such inside the tube; at other times action will occur only when the
Tankbot changes from one state to another, such as when it enters the on-band state. It
should be noted that the variable which governs the tube state (Outside Tube vs. Inside
Tube) is separate and distinct from the variable which governs the band state (On
Band vs. Off Band), and that in this case the band state is undefined when we are
outside the tube.

1.7. Activity Diagrams
UML Activity Diagrams are useful in describing simple behavior in which a
system executes a set of tasks until completion or interruption by an external event.
Count Bands is a simple behavior which is described in detail by the activity diagram
in Figure 87.
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Count Bands

1
Band Count = 0

I

Move Wheels

&

Read Light
Level

• * < > -

Check
Tube State

i

£o

in [Outside Tube] T

in [Inside Tube]

1

Check
Band State

Stop Wheels

[Band Count = 0]

enters [On Band]

<8x—
[end]

[Band Count.t>0]A

Flash

]

Headlight

I

I

Decrement
Band Count

L

I

[else]

Increment
Band Count

I

Beep Horn

Tankbot

Light Sensor

Figure 87. UML Activity Diagram Notation

The Lego Hobbyist sets Count Bands in operation by positioning the Tankbot
at the entrance to the cardboard tube and pressing the button on top of the unit. The
Tankbot sets its Band Count variable to zero, begins moving its wheels, and enters a
loop. It then reads the light level and consults the statechart in Figure 86 to determine
whether it is still inside the tube. If it is, it checks to see if the band-state has changed
from Off Band to On Band, which would indicate that it has detected a new band to be
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signified by beeping its horn and add one to the Band Count. The Tankbot then loops
back to the top of Figure 87 via the label ® (labels are used to avoid cluttering the
diagram with crisscrossing lines.) When the Tankbot detects that it is outside of the
tube it halts. As long as its Band Count is greater than zero it flashes its light and
decreases its Band Count by one. When the Band Count reaches zero, the operation
terminates.
It may be seen by inspection that if the Lego Hobbyist activates Count Bands
without placing the Tankbot at the entrance to the cardboard tube, the 'bot will
immediately detect that it is outside the tube and terminate the operation without
beeping its horn or flashing its headlight.
1.8. Lollipop Notation
Finally, we return to class diagrams to introduce one last piece of UML
notation which will be very useful in our discussions. Suppose we wanted to express
that the Tankbot can connect to other kinds of things than the light sensor:

Light Sensor

Tankbot

>• Light Sensor

Tankbot

Figure 88. Separating the Tankbot from the Light Sensor

This way of drawing pictures does not seem very satisfactory. From looking at
the lower half of Figure 88 it isn't clear who does what, or what kinds of connections
are permissible. To solve this problem, UML provides something called "lollipop
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notation" which can be used to describe how the Tankbot interfaces with its optional
extensions:
Light Sensor

Touch Sensor
Tankbot

ho

Rotation
Sensor

Gripper

Figure 89. Tankbot and its Extensions in Lollipop Notation

Lollipop notation is useful anytime you want to describe how two modular
components interface. The Tankbot can do something even if none of its extensions
are attached, but the extensions can't operate unless they are attached to the Tankbot.
To show this, we say that the Tankbot provides an interface where the extensions can
attach, and the light sensor requires this interface before it can function (see Figure
90.)
Providing
End

/~\
\-J

Requiring
End

Figure 90. UML Lollipop Notation

Then, when the two ends are mated, they form a contract which specifies their
joint behavior.
contract

Tankbot

Light Sensor
Q j l_i<

Figure 91. UML Contract
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1.9. Additional Reading
A vast number of UML books have been published, only a handful of which
are really useful. The most common problems with UML books are a paucity of
realistic examples and a dry, abstract, inaccessible style. The works listed here avoid
both of these pitfalls. It should not be assumed that the most recent books are best.
Some of my favorite UML books are a little outdated now.
All of the following books assume a certain amount of programming expertise.
No one has yet written a UML book which is geared to the needs of nonprogrammers.
The best introductory book is UML 2 for Dummies (Chonoles & Schardt,
2003). This book is written by two highly experienced software engineering
professionals who explain UML concepts in a very clear, jargon-free way. They alert
the reader to a number of tricky conceptual pitfalls in UML. Best of all, they include
many useful examples. This book is not only a good introduction, it is one of the best
UML books at any level.
A good quick reference book is UML in a Nutshell (Alhir, 1998). This is an
older book which does not cover the UML 2.0 standard. Although a newer edition is
available from a different author, I prefer the older book; it is better written and far
more useful. This book is handy as a quick overview of the UML standard. It should
not be taken as an authoritative guide to UML 2.0 notation, but for the simpler sorts of
notations that are used in this thesis the older edition is perfectly adequate.
Real Time UML, 3 rd Edition (Douglass, 2004) is the best of the advanced
books. Although it is certainly not a work for beginners, it does an outstanding job of
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presenting UML concepts in a lucid and useful fashion and includes copious
examples. If you can only own one advanced UML text, this is the one to have.
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APPENDIX J. THE GROUNDED AGENT MODEL
This appendix summarizes the UML diagrams created for the study. The GAM
is a conceptual model, and should be considered preliminary until validated by
additional field research.
Selecting
uses beliefs

Motives,
representations of inner mental reasons

Technologies,
tools pertaining to motives

Beliefs,
judgements about cause and effect

Auxiliary Processes
(perceiving, categorizing,
focusing, framing, acting)
change motives

Maintaining
changes technologies

Evaluating
changes beliefs

Figure 92. The Motive-Technology-Belief (MTB) Framework

J.l. The Structural Specification
Belief

IT

MofiVe

A1 *
Requirement
Capability

1
Requirement

Desire

f t

Hsdonic Desire

Volitional Desire

Plan

O

^
0..*
Capability
Image

GAM Structural Specification
V1.0ofApril7,2008

0..*
Capability
Bundle
0..*
0..*
Requirement

Technology

Subtechnology
ogy/k

Figure 93. GAM Structural Specification, V1.0 of April 7,2008
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T\

J.2. The Behavioral Specification
SelSCting P r o c e s s

«precondition»

Prompting Motive : Motive

«postcondltlon» technology chosen

&

usage situation

Z=Z

Information
Event

Help
Event

Prompting
Motive

Get
Information

K®

Frame
Situational Needs
Decision Frame

t

0|

Action Check

3
T

[action required]

[status quo!

Reject Option

Recall Option

>

Short List
v

t

Recall
Optional Need

> | Optional Need Set

I Violation Check
[

Closure Check

„

[
Optional Need Set

-0-

[else]
[closure achieved]

|

©

[limit exceeded]

Closure Check
[else] \ y

[short listt<ii
< 1]

'JY
T

[short list > 1]

—o
[closure achieved]

[else]
Sensitize
Motive

T

Reframe
Situation

Make
Tradeoff

•r

Choose
Technology

V
Decision
Frame

Action Check

n¥u

[action initiated]J*J [else]

\^

Q—^
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Figure 94. The Need Selecting Process, V1.0 of April 7, 2008
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APPENDIX K. USE CASES
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Figure 97. Use Case Diagram for the Need-Driven Adoption Path
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APPENDIX L. INDEX CODES
In Atlas-ti, codes were primarily used to index certain passages in the code for
later retrieval. Index codes were not used extensively during analysis; memos were
much more important for this purpose. The grounded column refers to the number of
quotation links, and density refers to the number of network diagram links.
TABLE 19. INDEX CODES
Code
Grounded Density Definition
Candidate,
20
0 A candidate evaluation episode which the informant perceives as containing both
positive and negative aspects
evaluation mixed
Candidate,
21
0 A candidate evaluation episode which the informant perceives as largely negative in
character
evaluation
negative
Candidate,
32
0 A candidate evaluation episode which the informant perceives as largely positive in
character
evaluation
positive
Candidate,
25
0 Initial exposure to the technology candidate
exposure 1st
Candidate,
3
0 Exposure to the technology candidate is occurring less frequently than before
exposure
decreasing
Candidate,
12
0 Exposure to the technology candidate is occurring more frequently than before
exposure
increasing
Candidate,
15
0 Earliest expression of interest in the technology candidate
interest 1st
Candidate,
20
0 Making an effort to actively seek out information
interest active
Candidate,
5
0 The informant's interest in the technology candidate is decreasing (e.g., from active to
passive)
interest
decreasing
Candidate,
15
0 The informant's interest in the technology candidate is increasing (e.g., from passive to
active)
interest
increasing
Candidate,
5
0 The informant has lost interest in the technology candidate
interest lost
Candidate,
17
0 Wait-and-see mode — passively monitoring information that comes your way
interest passive
Candidate, need
7
1 A primary need or perk has been found for this candidate
found
Candidate, need
17
1 A potentially useful technology candidate has been identified, and a search is currently
seeking
underway to find some need (a solution chasing a problem to solve)
Candidate, use
29
0 First hands-on use of a technology candidate
1st
Candidate, use
26
0 Informant is willing to use the candidate, but is being prevented from doing so for some
reason
block
Candidate, use
block removed

7

0 Informant had been prevented from using a technology candidate, but the obstacle has
now been removed
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Code
Candidate, use
decreasing
Candidate, use
discontinued
Candidate, use
increasing
Candidate, use
learning
Car, biodiesel
Car, electric
Car, Hummer
Car, hybrid
Com, $$
Com,
accessibility

Grounded Density Definition
11
0 The informant's use of the technology is decreasing (e.g., from routine to situational)
9
12

0 The informant's use of the technology is increasing (e.g., from situational to routine)

19

3 The informant is learning how to use the technology

1
0
13
16

0
0
0
0

104
42

Com, availability

57

Com, ease of use

40

Com, familiarity

18

Com, fatigue

0 The informant has ceased to use the technology

5

Com, fear

22

Com, flexibility

36

Com, health

37

8
7

Com, hygiene
Com,
maintenance
Com, parking
Com, safety

37
65

Com, security

3

Biodiesel car
Electric car
Discussions involving Humvees
Hybrid? car

0 Affordability issues
1 Issues surrounding the physically accessibility of this technology. Accessibility differs
from availability, flexibility, and ease of use in that accessibility pertains to physical or
geographical considerations (e.g., handicapped access), whereas availability refers to
temporal considerations, flexibility refers to life integration issues, and ease of use
refers to the mental demands attending technology use.
1 Issues surrounding whether this technology is reliable and available on demand —
where and when you need it. This code also refers to reliability issues (e.g., will I get a
flat on my bike?) in the sense of being able to get where you want to go in a timely
fashion without unexpected delays. Availability differs from accessibility, flexibility,
and ease of use in that availability deals with temporal considerations (e.g., Does the
bus run at the time of day when you need it?) rather than geographical or physical
limitations, life integration issues, or mental demands attending use.
3 Issues surrounding whether the technology is easy to use in the sense of requiring much
mental effort to operate it. This code is limited to technology use, and thus differs from
flexibility (life integration issues), accessibility (physical effort or geographical
proximity), and availability (temporal proximity.) This code also differs from
familiarity in that something can be hard to use and yet still familiar.
4 Familiarity with the use of this technology. This code differs from ease of use in that
something can be hard to use, yet one may still be comfortable with its use ("It's a little
tricky, you have to jiggle the handle to get it to work.")
0 Physical or mental fatigue which influences the use of this technology ("I'm too tired to
ride my bike today", "I'm tired of dealing with the bus", etc.)
4 Fears associated with the use of this technology (e.g., dread of some specific bad
consequence like missing the last bus and being stranded in the middle of nowhere;
generalized fear of the unknown; more specific fears, like getting smacked by a car
while running to catch the bus or getting attacked while riding the bus late at night.) It
differs from stress as a matter of degree.
1 Issues surrounding the ability to easily integrate and reconcile the demands of using
this technology with the other demands of one's life. Flexibility differs from
accessibility, availability, and ease of use in that flexibility refers to life integration
issues rather than technology use (e.g., is carpooling going to interfere with my ability
to work late tonite?)
0 This code refers to physical health and wellness considerations attending the
commuting experience. This category would also include biking to work in order to get
some exercise. It differs from health image in that commuting health refers to
immediate physical experience (e.g., my shoulder hurts from riding my bike), whereas
health image refers more to one's future hopes and plans (e.g., I want to ride a bike so I
can lose some weight.)
0 Codes related to personal hygiene (e.g., needing to shower after a bike ride)
0 Codes related to bike maintenance
0 Parking hassles (e.g., around the PSU campus)
0 Codes related to personal safety which is personally experienced - as opposed to
hearsay.
0 This code pertains to the security of one's possessions (i.e., a bike) as opposed to one's
personal safety.
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('ode
Com, stress

Com, time
utilization

(.rounded Density Definition
54
1 Stress and anxiety issues surrounding the use of this technology. This code differs from
fear in degree; stress refers to hassles (e.g., being a minute late in returning the Flexcar)
as opposed to fear of dreadful consequences (e.g., putting one's safety at risk.)
1 Making the best use of one's time (e.g., figuring out how long it will take to get
96
somewhere; using the bus ride to relax or get some work done.)

Com, weather
Diffusion,
observability
Diffusion,
opinion leaders
Diffusion,
technology
cluster

38
15

0 Commuting codes related to weather conditions.
0 Codes related to observability as it pertains to technology diffusion

12

0 Codes related to opinion leadership as it pertains to technology diffusion

Image, arc
Image, cool
Image, diversity
Image, freedom

28
25

Image, fun

19

Image, green
Image, guilt

43
20

Image, health

16

Image,
nonconformity
Image, plan
Image, selfreliance
Image, shadow
projection
Image,
successful

14

Image, values
Image, violation
In vivo,
commuting
In vivo,
methodology
In vivo, selfimage
In vivo, TADP

9

8
1

17
12
8
23
21
29
115
1

0
0
0
0

The arc of one's life; image of an ideal future
Codes associated with coolness, hipness, or trendyness
Beliefs and attitudes pertaining to social diversity
Beliefs and attitudes pertaining to personal freedom, or the lack thereof. Can also
pertain to escapist fantasies

0 Codes related to fun, entertainment, and personal enjoyment - as #5 says, "I just enjoy
riding my bike...it just made me feel good about life."
0 Beliefs and attitudes about "greenness" or environmental consciousness
1 Feelings of guilt — perhaps stemming from violations of self-image
0 Beliefs and attitudes about health and wellness issues. It differs from Com, health in
that this category is focused more on motivational issues (why you exercise) rather than
physical and logistical issues (how you exercise.)
0 Codes association with rebellion, counterculture, individualism, or defiance
0 Plans or actions for fulfilling one's image of an ideal future
1 Codes associated with retaining self-confidence, personal independence, autonomy, and
control - or the lack thereof
0 This code refers to the projection of shadow characteristics onto an external group in
order to get rid of them from one's self ("Lance Armstrong wannabes")
0 Beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions about what it means to be successful (or
unsuccessful) in life
0 Principles of rightness/wrongness
2 An act or situation which violates one's ideal self-image
0 In vivo codes pertaining to aspects of the commuting experience
0

70

0 In vivo codes pertaining to self-image

19

0 In vivo codes related specifically to innovation adoption.

Limit, count
Limit, interrupt

6
5

Limit,
procrastination
Limit, timeout
Mode, bike
Mode, bus
Mode, car, IP
Mode, car,
friend's

19

Mode, car, pool

0 Codes related to interactivity and interdependence among distinct technologies.

12
141
110
83
10
13

0 A change which occurred because some maximum count was exceeded
0 A change which occurred because the process was interrupted by some exogenous
event
2 Codes related to dithering, dawdling, hemming and hawing, and generally avoiding
making a decision at all.
1 A change which occurred because some time limit was exceeded
0 Bicycle
0 Riding the bus
0 Single-passenger car, typically owner-operated
0 Traveling as a passenger in a car operated by a friend or family member; alternatively,
borrowing a friend's car
0 Car pooling
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Code
Mode, car, share
Mode, ferry
Mode, rail

Grounded Density Definition
0 Car sharing (e.g., Flexcar)
116
1
0 Taking the ferry (e.g., in San Francisco or Seattle)
0 Light rail (e.g., MAX), streetcar, or heavy rail (e.g., commuter train)
67
0
Mode, ski
3
0 Taking a cab
Mode, taxi
9
17
0 Walking
Mode, walk
0 The informant's first awareness of something being needed in a situation
Need, awareness
12
1st
0 A technology candidate has been found for a previously identified need
Need, candidate
11
found
Need, candidate
6
0 The informant is aware of a need, and is searching for a technology candidate which
satisfies that need (a problem chasing a solution)
seeking
4 A technology candidate is potentially useful, but sets up a conflict among the needs in
25
Need, conflict
the decision frame.
26
2 The informant is attempting to resolve a conflict among the needs in a decision frame.
Need, conflict
resolution
seeking
2 The informant has managed to resolve a conflict among the needs in a decision frame.
Need, conflict
18
resolved
4
0 The informant perceives the importance of this need to be decreasing.
Need,
importance
decreasing
0 The informant perceives the importance of this need to be increasing.
Need,
10
importance
increasing
1 A need has arisen which the informant derives no benefit from resolving — only the
Need,
7
avoidance of some penalty.
involuntary
4
1 Needs which have not yet been recognized or consciously acknowledged by the
Need, latent
decision maker.
44
0 A primary need is an important need, the criteria which determines the decision
Need, primary
outcome.
0 A technology candidate has been identified which simultaneously resolves all of the
8
Need, satisfied
needs in a solution frame.
A
perk is a secondary need. It differs from a primary need as a matter of degree; perks
34
0
Need, secondary
convey relatively minor advantages.
11
1 A previous search has failed to turn up any viable technology candidates for this need.
Need, unmet
2
1 A technology candidate has been identified for a previously unmet need
Need, unmet
resolved
16
0 Codes related to reduced rate parking on the PSU campus.
PSU, reduced
rate parking
0 Unconsciously anchoring estimates up or down from an original starting point
Psy, anchoring &
3
adjustment
2 Quotes relating to the positive or negative use of psychological commitment
5
Psy, behavioral
trap
0 Simultaneously holding two inconsistent and conflicting beliefs. Festinger proposed
Psy, cognitive
5
CD as a motivational theory, and argued that CD was triggered in part by public
dissonance
advocacy of a position.
Psy, conformity
Psy, discounting

3
6

0 Codes related to pressures to conform to social influence
2 The tendency to place greater value on rewards which are nearer in time, and discount
the value of rewards which are distant in time. See Conflict theory (Lewin 1951, Miller
1944); Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope 1998; Trope & Liberman 2000;
Sagristano, Trope and Liberman 2002); Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1981)
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('ode
Psy, dominance
structuring

Psy, framing

Grounded Density Detimtion
15
3 The practice of eliminating or neutralizing violations of dominance by means of editing
operations (de-emphasis, bolstering, cancellation, collapsing - and one might also add
learned helplessness to this list.) Svenson distinguishes differentiation and
consolidation from dominance structuring largely based on when it occurs predecision in the case of dominance structuring vs. postdecision in the case of
differentiation and consolidation — but it's not clear to me that this distinction is truly
meaningful.

14

3 Including a need within the decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and
contingencies associated with an episode of technology adoption or selection. Frames
are partly controlled by the formulation of a problem, and partly controlled by the
norms, habits, and characteristics of the decision maker.

Psy,regret

18

3 Codes associated with regret ("Oh damn, I just missed the bus!") A fair percentage of
pedestrian injuries or fatalities occur when they run across lanes of traffic while
attempting to catch the bus.

Psy, risk, dread
consequences
Psy, risk,
unknown
consequences
Psy, selective
exposure
Psy, selective
perception
Q, critical event
Q, followup
Q, puzzle
Q, surprise
Selection,
evoked
Selection, inept
Selection, inert
Soc, advocacy
Soc, communitybuilding

Soc, conflict
Soc, socializing
TriMet, annual
pass
TriMet, daily
fare
TriMet,
discounted
tickets
TriMet, Fareless
Square
TriMet, monthly
pass
TriMet, Park and
Ride

16

2 Perceived dread risk of future consequences. This category differs from unknown
consequences in that it involves visualizing and fixating on the worst possible thing that
could happen.

7

3 Perceived risk of unknown consequences. This category differs from dread risk in that

6

1

8

0

192
13
5
23
49
38
34
11
16

it doesn't involve visualization of any specific outcome. For example, not knowing how
long it will take to commute from A to B using an unfamiliar transit mode.
The tendency to attend to information which is consistent with one's existing beliefs
and attitudes ("I wouldn't have seen it if I hadn't believed it")
The tendency to interpret information in terms of existing attitudes and beliefs ("I won't
believe it.")
Label associated with critical event sheet
Followup question for subsequent interviewing

0
0
0 I was struck by the sense of'What's going on here?'
0 I found this unexpected and surprising
0 A preferred or routinely evoked option
0
0
0
0

An option which would never be chosen to address this need

44
38
42

A latent choice or backup option; may require "thinking outside the box"
Advocating use of a technology to another person
Deeper and more extensive socializing around technology use. Making plans for
socializing that alters plans for technology use; social factors for technology selection
override functional factors; constructing a shared identity (sense of "us") around
technology use
0 Codes related to conflict and attempts to resolve conflicts
1 Episodes of socializing with others while using the technology
0 TriMet's Passport program; also includes PSU's Passport Plus program

10

0 Normal TriMet fare; also includes day passes and bus tickets.

1

0

2

0

4

0 Monthly pass

8

0
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APPENDIX M. MEMOS
Memos were a primary instrument for grounded analysis; 160 memos were
produced during this study, classified

in six categories: ordinary memos,

commentaries, meeting minutes, methodology memos, modeling memos, and
theoretical memos.
Some memos are more important than others. Excluding minor glosses on the
transcripts, memos on the mechanics of Atlas-ti, and meeting minutes, 131 memos
were used for analysis; these are listed in Table 20. The grounded column refers to the
number of quotation links, and density refers to the number of network diagram links.
Memos instrumental to the analysis are included as full text; these are signified by
boldface.
TABLE 20. SUBSTANTIVE MEMOS
„,
11)

M.l
M.2
M.3

„
Page
h

302
303
303

M.4

303

M.5
M.6
M.7
M.8

306
306
307
307
308

M.9

M.10 310
M.ll 311
M.12 312

,,
Memo

Network
...
Diagram

#14and#18
Adoption as an equilibrium state
Adoption as puzzle-solving
Adoption vs. retention
"An inflationary aspect to the argument"
Anxiety disorder and the bus
Are dominance structuring and spin synonymous?

,,
. . .
.,
(.rounded Density
4
6
1
6
5
18
7
1
2
8
5
0
0
5

Autogenesis
Automobiles as addictions/attachments
Being a grownup
Being a kid
Being a professional
Bicycle adoption as a series of challenges

N.1,N.5,N.6,N.9,
N.10

Bike- and Transit-unfriendly communities
Bike commuting perceptions - novice vs.
experienced
Bike culture vs. mass transit (non)culture?
Bike routes as fishing holes
Bikes for commuting vs. bikes for recreation
"Bitten by the bug"
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N.1,N.9,N.10

12
1
4
12

...
Ivne
•"
Commentary
Theory
Theory
Theory
Memo
Commentary
Theory
Theory

3
1
2
11

10
6
5
22

Memo
Theory
Theory
Memo
Theory

6
6

7
14

Memo
Memo

0
5
13
2

4
10
28
8

Theory
Theory
Theory
Memo

,„
ID

„
Page

..
Memo

M.13 314
M.14 314
M.15 314

Blocked discontinuance

M.16 315

Changing your mind
Chopper Bikes
Clinchers
Coadoption?

M.17 316
M.18 318

Network
...
Diagram

Bus regret and bus karma
Buyer's remorse
Car sharing: how many cars?
CarShare
N.3,N.4,N.7
N.2

M.19 319
M.20 319

Collapsing decisions
,
Collective adoption and the origins of desire
Cross-town TriMet service
"...Cursing at God, saying 'Give me more!' Can you
give me more!'"

M.21 320

Deal-breakers
Dedicated bicycle facilities
Design-time vs. run-time and structured vs.
anarchic perspectives
Discounting
Does driving desensitize risk?

M.22 321
M.23 321

M.24 322
M.25 322
M.26 324

M.27 324

M.28 324
M.29 325
M.30 326
M.31 327
M.32 327
M.33 327

M.34 328

M.35 330
M.36 330

M.37 331

N.4, N.5
N.5.N.12
N.6,N.ll

6
7
9
4
1

5
2
0
2
1

12
11
4
2
5

Theory
Memo
Memo

5
10

14
11
3

Modeling
Memo
Modeling

S
1
4
4
7
6
6
4
7
2
15

Memo
Memo
Memo
Theory
Theory
Methodology
Theory

0

N.7

2
1
1
2
1
0
1
1
4

N.3

2
14

Flexcar stress
"Fixies"
"Follow your own damn bliss"
Forced adoption
From the inert set to the selection set
From the selection set to the inept set

5
10
0
N.1,N.9,N.12
9
N.8,N.9,N.10,N.12 4
N.8,N.9,N.10,N.12 13
From the selection set to the inert set
N.2,N.8,N.10,N.ll 2
Functional needs vs. self-image needs
Functional needs vs. social needs
2
N.8,N.10,N.ll
Gresham: car pool flexibility
3
Gresham: TriMet Passport program
1
Grounded Agent Modeling
0
Hybrids vs. public transit
1
Illusion of control
2
1
"I can't lose."
"I didn't have all my transportation issues sorted out"
3
"I discovered that I didn't really mind"
2
2
"I just acted on the options that I knew I had."
N.7
In between passive and active
3
Informant sampling
1
Intentionality
0
Interest "expiration date?"
1
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...
Ivpe
"'

2
3
5
4
1
4
1
4

N.11.N.12

Dominance structuring: Convenience vs Cost
E-mail as a memory supplement
Emic and Etic
Everyday Phenomenology
Exposure as an interrupt
Familiarity breeds contempt?
Fear of the unknown
Flexcar followup with #8

,,
. . ..
..
Grounded Density

9
8
11

7
16
2
15
7
16
7
13
5
1
2
1
7
4
5
10
5
5
1
4
4

Theory
Theory
Theory
Memo
Memo
Theory
Memo
Theory
Theory
Theory

Theory
Memo
Memo
Theory
Commentary
Memo
Memo
Theory
Theory
Theory
Theory
Theory
Memo
Memo
Modeling
Memo
Memo
Memo
Memo
Theory
Commentary
Commentary
Methodology
Theory
Memo

ID

Page

M.38 333
M.39 334
M.40 334

M.41 335
M.42 335
M.43 335
M.44 337
M.45
M.46
M.47
M.48
M.49
M.50

337
344
345
346
346
347

M.51 348
M.52 349
M.53 349
M.54 349
M.55 354

M.56 354
M.57 355

M.58 355

Network
...
Diagram

Memo
In vivo idioms
Irreversible decisions
Is regret the inverse of dominance structuring?
"It was almost like they had a curfew"
"It was heaven...and it was damned!"
"Jonny Appleseed"
Latent needs
Learning and unlearning

N.2,N.11,N.12

Making a virtue out of a necessity
Making the best use of your time
Microcommunities
Microcommunity spillover from bus to MAX
Modeling desires
Modeling mixed transit modes
Needs vs. advantages
"No brainer" decisions
Norm theory and framing
Not on the radar
Observability
One-upsmanship
Park and Ride
Paying your dues

N.3.N.6

N.ll
N.12

Perks
"Pretty ridiculous things"
Primary needs, perks, and clinchers
Primary/perk vs. functional/social dimensions
Procrastination
Prompting event
Recall time
Resistance to options
Returning the TriMet annual pass
Satisficing for a necessary evil
Selection process bias
Short hops and long hauls

Social loafing
Stretching and cocooning
Successful advocacy and opinion leadership
Technology-centered identity
Technology clusters: Atomic time
Technology clusters: Cell phone
Technology clusters: Web
Technology cults
Temors and Momors
The "Ah-ha!" experience
The framing, adoption, and selection processes

358
358
362
362
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M.l. Adoption as an equilibrium state
[07/06/06] Once decisions are collapsed and a new status quo emerges, decision makers seem
reluctant to revisit them. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) [cited in Baron pg. 291]
looked at health care plans and found that employees tend to stick with the status quo
each year, even though they might choose something else if they were choosing for the
first time. This might also explain why people tend to start the search process over
again from scratch when they learn that a previously screened alternative is not
available (Potter and Beach 1994).
This says something about why adoption is an equilibrium state. The Certainty Effect
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) and pseudocertainty (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichenstein
1982) suggest that people want to avoid spending extended periods of time in decision
making chores. They have several strategies for escaping the discomfort of decision
making, such as satisficing (Simon) or social loafing (Pious pg. 192-4). I suspect that
different people learn different strategies for cutting short the decision making process,
akin to how oyster catchers learn different strategies for opening oysters.
[10/09/06] In (26:30) I managed to catch #14 in an early stage of decision making:
B:
Have you ever thought about just getting rid of your car?
#14.

I'm not there yet...I'm not there yet. On the weekends I do things, and
some things at night, where I really feel like I'd be safer in a car. Meeting
friends for movies, or dinner, or something. Yeah.
She doesn't say "I thought of that, but decided not to." Nor does she state that she's
definitely planning to get rid of her car. Instead, she paints her mental state in terms
which suggest some kind of inner dialogue is taking place. It's as if some part of her
self was trying to work up the nerve to take some difficult path. She's currently in an
equilibrium state, and her words suggest she's not quite satisfied with the status quo,
but she doesn't quite have the necessary oomph or stimulus yet to support a change to
some other state.
This in interesting in light of the Mind and Brain book, which argues that we don't have
just one center in our brains which decides what to do - we have many. Our narrative
self maintains a running dialogue of why we do what we do - sort of the mind's PR
agent.
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M.2. Adoption as puzzle-solving
#3 really went the extra mile to try and make this work, juggling needs, reconciling
conflicting needs, trying to accommodate the innovation. There's a aspect of decision
making that's like trying to solve one of those puzzles that involves getting the bead to
roll around into the little hole. Stable equilibrium?
#5 also seems to have taken a decision as a kind of stable equilibrium: taking the train
would shorten the commute, the permit cost was reasonable, and he believed it would
encourage him not to drive (to take advantage of it.) Kind of a strategy for using the
potential for regret (if he didn't take advantage of the pass) as a way of ensuring that he
would keep at it. Of course, it didn't quite work out that way for him...
#8 liked my BB-in-the^hole metaphor for her dilemma in trying to figure out how she
was going to manage child care issues and reconcile that with bus use (23:45).
An alternative metaphor might be to think of decision making as akin to weaving or
knitting. We learn certain basic decision "stitches" or "knots" and reuse these over and
over again as circumstances arise (although this would tend to point back in the
direction of decision heuristics, which it seems to me has been a bit of a theoretical
dead-end.)
I heard this one again the other day ~ the idea that people learn and reuse particular
decision making strategies throughout their lives is beginning to gain currency in the
psychology literature. This reminds me of the oyster catcher birds learning particular
predation strategies from their parents.

M.3. Adoption vs. retention
[4/17/06]

In looking at #4's transcript, the thought occurs to me that the reasons for adoption may
be quite different from the reasons for retention. #4 adopted because it was fun,
because it was a social outlet, and because he harbored positive feelings about cycling
since he was a youth. He continued cycling because it was fun, yet he also began to
recognize that health considerations were a good reason to continue cycling. This
dynamic might be expressed in terms of dominance structuring — finding reasons to
bolster the earlier decision — but I don't think that quite captures what I'm seeing in this
transcript. What it looks more like is that he began to find legitimate advantages to
retaining the innovation which were not things he originally considered.

M.4. Autogenesis
[11/25/06] My entries today on run-time vs. design-time structure, the structured vs. anarchic
perspectives, and temes and memes is recalling to my mind the earlier work I did with
autogenesis during my dissertation proposal. Some relevant quotes:
"A great deal of research on self-organizing involves developing equations,
or other forms of rules, that can be used to graphically portray the
unfolding of emergent structure over time. To analyze the relationship
between structure and process, researchers have increasingly turned to the
computer as a tool for capturing synamic systems (Friedhoff, 1989).
Computer simulations make it possible to produce both direct and indirect
visual representations of self-organizing systems as they evolve over time
(Abraham & Shaw, 1987; Gleick, 1987; Lorenz, 1987)." (Drazin &
Sandelands, 1992, pg. 235)
"One of the consequences of force fitting process into variance theory is
the creation of language that gives the illusion of process when a process
has in fact not been described. It seems that the researcher who tried to
develop a process theory, but works within a variance framework, always
runs into a logical bind with the only escape being to use process-like
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achievement verbs, such as 'environmental selection' or 'strategic choice'.
These verbs become part of the metatheoretical background of an argument
for process but are never actually described or tested. Theories which use
words like these tell stories which sound process-like but which lack
genuine process content." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 245)
"Autogenesis is the idea that organization can be explained by observation
and categorization of the interactions of independent actors whose
behavior is governed by a system of recursively applied rules. Autogenesis
is pre-eminently a process-oriented perspective because it focuses on
explaining how organization emerges, rather than why it emerges (Mohr,
1982)." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 236)
The reference to recursion is particularly relevant in terms of the
collapsing/exploding/contextualizing operations I'm thinking of including in the
external interface as a way of communicating with my "ontology server".
"The autogenesis of social organization can be analyzed in terms of three
different types of structure:
(1) deep structure, which consists of rules that generate and
govern individual behavior and interactions,
(2) elemental structure, consisting of interactions among
individual actors, and
(3) observed structure, comprised of the categories and terms that
apply to the perceptions of social interaction as collectives by
observers."
Level
Deep Structure

Definition
Key Properties
Tacit rules that govern actors
Virtual and unobserved,
in their actions and interactions Generative - The
dynamic recursive
function that creates
elemental and observed
structures.
Elemental Structure States of actors, Interactions
Observed in time and
among actors.
space, consists of
micro-level structure
Observed Structure Social facts constituted by
Observed in time and
interactions among social actors, space, consists of
macro-level structure.
It's a little less clear at first how this maps onto the run-time vs. design-time distinction;
all three of these seem to correspond to instantiated run-time structures. The closest
thing to a static design-time structure would seem to be deep structure; perhaps
"design-time" is just a convenient reference point, a way of treating what is really a
dynamic process as a static process because unconstrained dynamism makes
explanation, understanding, and prediction impossible. Certainly elemental structure
would seem to correspond to ontological instantiations within agents (systems of
personal meaning), and observed structures would seem to correspond to innovations
and ideas (systems of shared meaning). Deep structure would then correspond to
psychological and neurological forces which give rise to elemental structures. Deep
structure may be dynamic, but any change in these structures would tend to take place
over many generations through evolutionary forces. In humans, second-order
emergence would tend to accelerate these processes and make it possible for deep
structure to be modified, at least within individuals, through mechanisms such as
learning and education. Here's the tie to organizational learning...
"[Deep structure] rules play a central role in the model because they
generate the observable patterns of interaction over time that make up the
organizing process. Dynamic processes can be summarized by generative
rules and these rules are an efficient description of that process (Goffman,
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1967; Chomsky, 1972; Gleick, 1987)." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg.
237)
"Different organizing processes are likely to be governed by different
rules... At the same time, there are likely to be certain rules which
generalize across situations, if only because human behavior is not
infinitely variable, but retains a distinctively human character across
situations." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 238)
"Researchers have little choice but to observe patterns of overt behavior
and work backward to infer rules that could have produced them - a
procedure that is bound to produce multiple and competing conceptions of
rules." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 238)
"There is a paradoxical aspect to rules. On one hand they are produced by
social action -ftheir institutional form being objectivated human activity.
On the other hand, they are experienced as something tangible and often
felt as constraints. This experienced quality gives rules their deep structural
character." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 239)
"[Elemental structure] is the kind of social structure with which we are
natively most familiar, which appeals most directly to our senses. Because
we are especially aware of individuals in our environment we tend to
regard social structure at this level as uniquely objective and concrete - and
more so than structure at the level of rules, or at the level of observed
structure." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 240)
"Observed structure includes entities such as groups, teams, coalitions,
business units, departments, and whole organizations. Observed structure
also includes various relations which may be postulated between entities such as causality, constraint, intention, or mimesis." (Drazin &
Sandelands, 1992, pg. 240)
/ particularly like how Drazin and Sandelands note that observed structure is not an
element of ontogenetic reasoning. That certainly tracks with the way I'm looking at
ideas and innovations, that they are not an element of reasoning in my theoretical
framework. Instead, they are emergent, run-time observed structures. Of course, the
name "observed structures" is problematic, since to my mind ideas and innovations
cannot be observed directly. (What can? Evidently only elemental structures can be
observed directly by us — yet perversely, elemental structures cannot be shared with
others.) The implication is that we can individually observe the world, but that our
ability to share these observations is inherently imperfect.)
"One implication of the role of the observer in the conception of structure
is that familiar terms, such as organization and environment (along with a
host of other terms), become more problematic. We see that they are not
immutable things, but partly artificial constructs invoked by the observer to
bring order and sense to a confusing world." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992,
pg. 241)
"Our understanding of organizations depends on our position as observers
of unfolding processes. Taking an autogenetic perspective encourages us to
look at different levels of structure and process and to discern connections
between them. By conceiving of organizational theory this way it is
possible to explore alternative ways of seeing and gain valuable insights
about the dynamics of organizing." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 242)
"Deep structure offers insights into elemental structure because elemental
structure is what one sees when rules operate. Similarly elemental structure
offers insights into rules because rules are redescriptions of elemental
structure at a deeper level. Elemental structure illuminates observed
structure because observed structure is what is discerned amidst the bustle
of elemental structure. Observed structure reflects back upon and
illuminates elemental structure when observed structures are analyzed into
constitutent elements." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 242-243)
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"By making alternative views of structure explicit, the autogenetic
perspective avoids the nettlesome problems of reductionism and reification
that plague organization theory." (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992, pg. 243)
[02/25/07] See today's entry in the "intentionality" memo.

M.5. Automobiles as addictions/attachments
[7/12/06]

This quote, along with other source materials ("My name is Randy, and I'm addicted to
oil" - Willamette Week, February 22, 2006; subscription form to Car Busters magazine)
is an interesting tie-in to the TTM questionnaire.
However, I am skeptical that the addiction metaphor applies to automobiles, as the
problems with the TTM survey tend to bring out. Most people are living in places
where it just isn't practical to stop using cars altogether, and indeed our technological
civilization could not sustain itself without them in some form. But it is an interesting
statement from the standpoint of identity construction.

[07/23/06] The process of reducing automobile use is indicative of a style of decision applicable to
lifestyle changes in keeping with Beech and Lipshitz (1996) - the image of the ideal
self, countered by powerful constraints imposed by past 'decisions' (either implicit or
explicit). Rather than sunk costs, automobiles serve as golden handcuffs. Technologies
(cars, in this case) ensnare as well as reward. It is in some sense akin to addiction, or to
the Buddhist concept of 'attachment' — but there are limits to the addition metaphor.
Cf. quote from Gigerenzer (2001 pg. 40): "Christian ideal of omniscience or Laplacian
superintelligence"
This class of decisions characteristically have a high degree of involvement, perhaps
extending to a new conception of the self as a result of having made a change in a
direction consistent with the higher conception of the self, and at the cost of
considerable personal sacrifice. This is a type of decision with deep philosophical,
psychological, and evolutionary roots.
[07/26/06] #10 uses the addiction metaphor too: "Cars as they exist now are almost like a cancer or
plague on our society...it's due to drug-like forces, people being addicted because of
sociological business forces." But then he goes on to ask the rhetorical question "But
what can you do about cancer on society?"
[07/27/06] Here it is again, in #4's observation that "...with the fixed gear there's sort of an anti-car
elements built into it, and also sort of a nonconformist element built in." Although he
goes on to say that this isn't the same as a green self-image; within his group of friends,
the environmental argument is taken as a kind of given. Green is different than
nonconformist.
[10/13/06] I think #18 may have been the only informant in PP+ who actually referenced peak
oil...and yet she's also probably the heaviest car user in the bunch. Maybe that's not a
coincidence — she could be working through some guilt issues (I notice she's also
Catholic, for what that's worth):
B:
So, would it be fair to say that your car is sort of a necessary evil? Would you go
that far?
#18: No. I don't think a car is necessary. I think a car is a luxury that I indulge in too
much, perhaps.
B:
And you continue using it because the alternatives have problems?
#18: I don't like them so much, but I still would say that I have resigned myself to
needing to [make greater use of them.] It's like...I've got to quit smoking. It's
the same thing, like 'I gotta.' And eventually I will.

M.6. Being a grownup
[5/15/06]

Malcolm Knowles discusses "The Learner's Self-Concept: Adults have a self-concept
of being responsible for their own decisions, their own lives. Once they have arrived at
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that self-concept, they develop a deep psychological need to be seen by others and
treated by others as being capable of self-direction. Most adults resent situations where
others are imposing their wills upon them..." from "Technology-based training and
adult learning theory", a paper submitted for Charles Weber's knowledge management
class in Winter 2006. There are three Knowles references in this paper, I'm not sure
which one it's referring to:
•

Knowles, M.S. "The Modern Practice of Adult Education: Andragogy versus
Pedagogy." New York: Association Press, 1970.
•
Knowles, M.S. "Andragogy in Action." San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984.
•
Knowles, Hold, Swanson: The Adult Learner (2005)
[07/19/06] Or, as #10 puts it here, "having a life as a normally functioning human being."

M.7. Being a kid
[07/18/06] Something that strikes me about #5, #10, and #4 is that they all trace the formation of
their bicycling identity to positive experiences as children. On one level this shouldn't
be surprising — that's when most people learn to ride bikes — but I think there's more to
it than just that. Learning to ride a bike is an important rite of passage for children.
Along with toilet training, telling time, and learning to use the telephone, learning to
ride a bike ranks among the most significant tool-related accomplishments of
childhood.
Learning to ride a bike is also important in a second sense: it opens up a wider world
for exploration and an important step away from dependency on one's parents for
transit needs. Once I'd learned to ride a bike I didn't have to be restricted to my own
neighborhood; I could wander and explore, and dream of getting on my bike and riding
away from home without stopping. It's a powerful association, and I doubt many people
ever forget owning their first bike.
When teenagers come of age to drive a car they may put away their bikes for a time,
but nobody is too old to ride a bike. If the infrastructure is available it can be a very
pleasant way to get around, which might explain why so many people could entertain
the idea of riding a bike more often if they only felt it were a viable option. The BTA
says that 60% of the population of Portland is not currently cycling, but is interested
(source: Bike Boulevards Campaign flyer; I think this figure comes from Mia Burk's
talk at the Bike Summit.)
Perhaps there's an opportunity here to take old bikes and refit them to be "checked out"
library-fashion for people who are thinking of buying, but want to be convinced that
biking is possible and safe before laying down the bucks...

M.8. Being a professional
[07/31/06] In (17:26) #4 touches on bikes and professionalism:
B: Were bicycles even on your radar at that point?
#4:
You know, I didn't consider it at the time. I'm not entirely sure why I didn't. I
guess maybe to a degree there's sort of a professionalism to using either a car
or a bus, that a bike doesn't necessarily immediately lend itself to that. It
doesn't make sense for me to say now, but maybe at the time that was more of
my thinking.
These comments are supported by (43:4):
"Some lawyers don't want to visit clients in a car like this, but I don't care,
because this idea has changed my life," said Polfliet, who uses
Greenwheels instead of owning a private car.
(This comment is from Amsterdam.)
And (57:1):
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"Cyclists used to be seen as blue collar workers who drive their bikes to
work to save bus fare. But today you see executives, government workers,
lawyers, students — everyone is riding."
(This comment is from Santiago, Chile — one of the most socially
conservative societies in South America. So much for the idea that biking
is the sole province of "blue" cultures.)

M.9. Bicycle adoption as a series of challenges
[04/20/06] From an April 20th e-mail to Dan Zalkow and Eben Saling:
Although I only began my field research in January and my findings are
still very tentative, one of the things I'm starting to hear from multiple
informants is that Flexcar may be more useful to bicycle commuters than
TriMet users. The reason has to do with the nature of how the bicycle
decision unfolds. Generally speaking, bicycle commuters seem to begin
gradually, using their bikes only to make limited trips in good weather.
There are a number of concerns that bike commuters harbor at this early
stage (safety, security, weather) and it takes them a little while to get a
handle on how to solve this series of challenges. A couple of factors seem
to be important in encouraging them to 'stretch' their bicycling commuting
practices 1) the availability of role models — near-peers who are visibly
successful as bicycle commuters. 2) the availability of dedicated support to
help surmount some of the practical barriers to bicycle commuting. This
includes striped bicycle lanes, but it also extends to things like shopping,
which is hard to do on a bike.
If I'm correct, then one promising strategy for increasing bicycle commuting to the PSU
campus would be to put together some sort of comprehensive package for beginning
bicycle commuters. For a nominal fee (say, $20-$40/year) this might include a Bike
There! map; access to a secure bicycle storage area somewhere on the PSU campus;
access to the shower facilities at Stott and a locker for street clothes; a list of dry
cleaners around the campus who could launder work clothes without the need to haul
them home; membership in the PSU Bicycle Coop, which has repair facilities; a free
training class in bicycle maintenance conducted by someone at the Coop; and an annual
Flexcar membership. I don't think it would be necessary for the university to pony up
the 4 hours of free Flexcar use for bicyclists, because their usage pattern would likely
be different and centered more on off-campus use. The goal here would be to
encourage people to ride their bikes everywhere, including the PSU campus. Providing
Flexcar would help alleviate the concern that bicyclists couldn't go shopping for
groceries, or might find themselves needing to get to some distant location quickly. /
believe the key to getting people to bike to campus is to encourage them to bike all over
the place, including the PSU campus (in management terms, "growing the market" for
bicycle commuting generally, which would naturally increase the number of people
riding bikes to the campus.)
[07/25/06] Summary offactors which have emerged so far in encouraging people to commute by
bike:
•
The availability of role models.
•
The availability of dedicated en-route or end-trip bicycle facilities (bike lanes
or boulevards; shower facilities)
•
A prior history of favorable bicycle use.
•
Currently experiencing some feelings of regret or conflict about one's
existing transportation mode. (Car, bus, etc.)
•
The ability to visualize an image of yourself biking to work, and what that
might feel like. (Getting some exercise, reducing pollution, saving money,
becoming part of something cool, having fun, feeling good about yourself.)
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"

Having a practical plan for getting there by bike (or at least the ability to try
bike commuting on a limited basis. Could a "bike library" help here by
reducing the cost of experimentation? Having the bike for a finite period of
time might help people get over the procrastination hump.)
It is a little less clear what role a prompting event would play. Perhaps the importance
of a prompting event at this stage is to get people to pay attention and overcome
selective exposure — forcing something onto the radar, as it were.
[07/26/06] Add to that list the additional factor of discovering that the actual challenges of bike
commuting aren't as bad as the anticipation of those difficulties, as #10 related in
(14:99).
[07/31/06] In (17:74) #4 discusses why he purchased PP+ at first instead of biking to PSU - the
first obstacle, he didn't have a "setup" (i.e., a commuter bike.)
[08/01/06] Here's another challenge* discussed by #4, from (17:81): r/ze ability to estimate how long
it will take to get from point A to point B, factoring in not only the time in the schedule
(if one exists) but also real-world experience: unplanned delays, walking time, locking
up the bike, etc. That requires a base of prior experience to work from. The absence of
such a base of experience leads to unknown risk.
[02/25/07] #36 says something interesting from (26:00-29:30):
Stubbornness [carried me through it], I suppose. I just kept saying to
myself, 'Why can't you figure this out?' I'm 51,1 really want exercise, and
I kept feeling 'I've got to figure this out!' All of these other things that I
kept trying to get an exercise routine, it just wasn't working. I don't
know...I guess I just said 'I can do this!' It was scary to me, you feel so
vulnerable on a bike as you know. There are a lot of unaware people;
they're not bad people, they're just clueless. 'Hello! I'm right here!' [...] /
was just keeping my fingers crossed.
She is in a situation where she knows there are problems with the status quo - she
doesn't know how to fix a flat — yet it doesn't seem like a realistic plan to learn how to
fix one, given that she doesn't carry the equipment with her or get enough practice to
remember how to do it when it occurs. Thus, she is trapped in an imperfect status quo
without any other plan than "keeping my fingers crossed."
[04/20/07] There's something kind of ironic when #22 says that people get kudos from their
coworkers for biking thru the winter. The implication is that people are impressed by
your willpower; and yet my research suggests that willpower is actually a weak
motivator for most people. Those people who continued biking thru the winter often
did so because there was some strong hedonic motivation at the back of their decision.
And yet, somehow, we don't find that quite as admirable as someone who continues
through sheer force of will...
[04/25/07] Summary of factors which have emerged thus far in determining whether people will
continue to commute by bike:
•
Road hazards, especially in the bike lanes.
•
Potholes
•
Wet leaves
•
Broken glass
•
Rain.
•

•

Variety of responses to rain gear; it's an open question whether it's
really worth it (a wash). It's a question of whether it's worth the
extra time to get wet inside the gear from sweat than getting wet
outside the gear from rain. This is related to temperature regulation.

Dark.
•

Seeing the road.

•

Being seen by cars.

•

Seasonal affective disorder — saps energy and willingness to ride
during December?
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•

Cold
•

Regulating body temperature — see rain. Very hard to keep a
consistent comfortable temperature.

•

•

•

Black ice and frost. Very dangerous — this is one of the showstoppers.
Wind and fog.
•

Dense fog is another very dangerous biking condition. Fortunately
we don't get valley fog much in Portland.

•

Wind is a royal pain, but it seems to be limited to certain times and
places. It seems to be more common down by the river.

Hygiene
•

•

•

I was surprised that more people didn't complain about the lack of
end-of-trip facilities like showers. People seem fairly capable of
adapting to this.
Time utilization
•

Time required to find your gear

•

Time required to put the gear on

•

Time required to pull the gear off

•

Time required to store the gear

•

Extra ~ the 'hassle factor' of putting gear on and taking it off
(booties too snug for your shoes, flaps that won't stay flapped,
getting overheated while waiting to walk out the door, etc.)

Maintenance
•

If you do it right, the bike needs regular cleaning, oiling the chain,
etc. because water and road grime are bad for a bike. However, a
lot of people simply ignored this issue.

•

Exception: brakes require more attention in winter. This can't be
ignored.

•

Maybe more flats due to more crap accumulating by the side of the
road.
Seasonal affective disorder is particularly important. According to my theory, affect
drives technology adoption and selection. Therefore, anything that suppresses affect is
likely to suppress adoption - and there is evidence in the winter bikes case that
seasonal affective disorder did indeed cause people not to bike in the darkest part of
December.

M.10. Bike commuting perceptions - novice vs. experienced
[07/12/06] Based on anecdotal experience, plus the discussion at the Bike Summit on June 12,
there seems to be a pretty sharp divide as to how commuting challenges are perceived
between novice and experienced riders. This is also borne out in the Oregonian article
from June 16 about bike boulevards.
[07/24/06] These differences in perception are hinting something important about changes in
personal value system and self-image that occurs as a result of adoption.
[08/01/06] The shift from novice to experienced biker may involve gestalts of its own, as #4
alludes to in (17:85). Perhaps these occur as the accumulation of experience causes the
informant to discard previous unknown risks (but what happens to dread risks? Are
these subject to discounting per Montgomery's dominance structuring theory?)
[08/09/06] Jason's first ride downtown points up that access to experienced adopters is an
important factor in overcoming barriers; so is safety in numbers.
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[08/23/06] I think this issue is also important by its relative absence from the public transit modes;
there doesn't seem to be a major difference in perception there. Ditto for Flexcar, and
indeed for the annual transit pass itself. Perhaps this speaks to the relatively more
complex nature of the bike commuting decision (Svenson's type 4 vs. type 3 or 2.)

M.l 1. Bike culture vs. mass transit (non)culture?
[07/06/06] Why does bicycling support such a rich subculture in Portland, while mass transit lacks
any distinctive cultural features? Where does Flexcar fit into this? (Flexcar seems to
share certain 'technology cult' features with TiVo)
[09/21/06] This topic is emerging as an excellent theme for cross-case comparison. After
interviewing half the ,bike cohort, I am struck by the differences in how people
approach bikes vs. mass transit, and in particular the bus. Many (but not all — the
exception being #36) of the bike informants have described their involvement with
bikes as stemming from deep self-image issues.
•
For #20, bikes are about rediscovering her own needs and getting back in
touch with her former interests after the graduation of her daughter.
•
For #25, bikes have awakened a new interest (hobby?), and he has immersed
himself in learning more about the mechanics and history of the bicycle.
•
For #21, bikes have been instrumental to her recovery from a serious,
dehabilitating ear tumor; they represent independence of mobility as well as a
comforting and nurturing tie to fond childhood memories.
•

For #27, bikes are part of his construction of a new life for himself after a
period of economic hardship. He has immersed himself into the online bike
community and formed a new, heightened awareness of bike issues. Whereas
his previous level of political consciousness was fairly low, he now sees
himself as part of a larger movement.

•

#36 provides a contrasting case. For her, the issue at age 51 is principally
finding the time in her day to get some exercise, and bikes are a means
toward that end. Economic considerations play little role. She is ambivalent
about continuing, and it is an open question as to whether she will continue to
ride as the days turn wet, cold, and dark.

By contrast, buses do not seem to spark much interest in the way of community
formation. This week I discussed this issue with Jason, pondering why people don't
seem to form strong social attachments on the bus. He said that many times he didn't
want to have conversations on the bus — he wanted "private time" to wake up, and
encouraging social bonds on the bus would be counterproductive as it would tend to
create unwanted social obligations which would be inescapable due to the restricted
nature of the bus (concentrating trips in time and space.) This really reminded me of
what #3 said about car pools, and the social tensions they created. From (5:162):
#3:
I did develop some sense of community with my carpool mates, but because
one person's always driving, you're not having quite as much interaction. And /
think because there's this inborn tension from relying on each other so much.
You get a little friction all the time.
Jason said that some people he observed on the bus just can't seem to shut up, and the
last thing he wanted to do was to fall prey to an "attention vampire."
Bikes would seem to offer the freedom to form communities and to choose social
connections, without requiring them or constraining them in undesirable ways. Buses
complicate the picture as they force social interaction, rather than permit it to freely
occur or not to occur, as desired. People in communities (American ones, at least) seem
to desire the freedom to come and go, to decide upon their own level of participation.
Bikes allow that; the bus does not. People may be reluctant to form microcommunities
on the bus because they run the risk of creating a social obligation that may be difficult
to escape from should the relationship turn undesirable. Bikes do not have that
problem.
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[06/01/07] See today's entry in "technology-centered identity".
[06/26/07] Today I met with Jeff Mapes, who is on leave from the Oregonian to write a book on
Portland's bicycling community. He made an interesting remark, saying that the bus is
sometimes called the 'loser cruiser' in Los Angeles, meaning that in places where the
bus service is known to be lousy, and you ride it anyway, they you are a loser —
because riding the bus is seen as an act of desperation. It becomes difficult to
construct a plausible justification for riding the bus on any other basis than desperation;
claiming that you're riding the bus out of concern for the environment just isn't
credible. On the other hand, the social stigma of using transit lessens as the quality of
service improves — thus, there's a vicious cycle in operation here.
Does this apply more generally? Are bikes accorded low status in certain locales where
the level of service is very low?
#23:

Even my friend? would think it was idiotic to ride your bike in West Virginia.
People on the road probably wouldn't give [a bike] any more thought than a
squirrel crossing the road. I get more of a sense that there may be some
socioeconomic or political statements by [cyclists] getting hit or harassed in
Portland than I ever would in West Virginia; it was just downright not safe.
People drove fast; they drove aggressively; we didn't have freeways, so it's all
winding country roads. People wouldn't even see you, any more than they
would see a squirrel or a possum. They didn't even have an interest in seeing
them. I don't think they were paying attention; I don't think it was a political
issue. [...] There was no encouragement and no bike community; literally,
nobody rode their bicycles. You just didn't. If you ever saw somebody riding
their bicycle, you knew they lost their license for DUI and that was the only
reason they were riding their bicycle!

and;
#10:

I had been riding a bike in Memphis and had things thrown at me. I'd been hit a
couple of times, and one of the times the person hit me with their rear-view
mirror, and then pulled over to the side of the road, and then proceeded once
I'd stood up -1 mean, it didn't toss me badly, but it, you know, shook me off
my bike. I stood up next to my bike, and they had stopped and pulled up, and as
soon as I stood up and started walking toward the truck, they sped off. And this
was on a highway road out in the middle of nowhere, near Memphis. [...] In
Memphis, people would swerve at you just because... it 'sjust Memphis.
They're just very hostile, and you're a target if you're on a bike, you know? It's
just a hostile environment. It's just.. .Memphis.

M.12. Bikes for commuting vs. bikes for recreation
[7/11/06]

Interesting that #5 says that recreational biking tends to facilitate social relationships,
but commuter biking does not. Perhaps there's something fundamentally different in the
needs which are met by these two modes of use, something which isn't captured in the
notion of "mode choice".

[7/12/06]

#5's statement about "I haven't typically met all that many people through [bicycle]
commuting, because it tends to be a sort of solitary activity" (11:109) stands in contrast
to the many friends he has met as a result of recreational riding (11:107). What is
different about bike commuting vs. bikes for recreation?
•
•

•

Recreation can be solitary, but its enjoyment is enhanced if done as part of a
group.
By contrast, commuting is easier to accomplish if done alone (cf. #3's
remarks about carpooling, and the tension that results from having to
coordinate one's commute with another person.)
Commuting trips tend to be more frequent and shorter(?) and proceed from
functional needs.
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•

Recreation trips tend to be less frequent, require planning, longer(?) and more
leisurely, and proceed from socio-aesthetic needs (i.e., having fun). Fun is its
own justification, although certainly exercise would apply in both cases.

•

Recreational riding partners may be hard to find, thus creating the need for
cycling clubs like the Portland Wheelmen. There seem to be few analogous
organizations for bike commuting, although organizations like the BTA
exists for lobbying purposes. This seems like a fundamentally different kind
of need - the BTA isn't primarily a social organization, even though social
contacts do occur as a byproduct of its activities. By contrast, the Wheelmen
is primarily a social organization.

Somehow this seems important to the question of the kinds of communities which are
formed. Recreational biking facilitates social cliques, but does not necessarily facilitate
an identity centered on bicycling. Commuter biking, by contrast, does not facilitate
social cliques ~ the interactions are too brief ~ but does facilitate the formation of a
technology-centered identity. That identity, in turn, stimulates social organization for
the purpose of protecting and expanding the welfare of all group members (e.g.,
through lobbying.)
Thus, two contrasting examples of how a technology can bring about social
organization. And perhaps this has something important to say about why recreational
riders don't automatically become commuter riders and vice versa. The underlying
needs are different. The primary needs addressed by commuter biking are functional;
the primary needs met by recreational riding are social.
There may also be secondary factors involved, since not everyone wants to self-identify
with bikes-as-a-lifestyle, even if they may be sympathetic to those goals (cf. Abbott's
"The Chaos of Disciplines") Bike-centered identity projects an image to outsiders (cf.
the
[07/24/06] I think this also relates to the category of "bike commuting as a series of challenges".
Recreational riding often occurs within the context of organized group activities; there
is often a cadre of experienced riders around so that many problems have already been
anticipated and solved in advance. Commuting, by contrast, is by and large a solitary
activity. The bike commuter must encounter each issue as it arises and develop a
solution (either home-grown or by asking others). Over time this either thwarts further
progress ~ if the problem is intractable — or else the commuter finally works out
solutions to all the major problems. In this latter case / hypothesize that this series of
challenges acts as an initiation or rite of passage, leading to changes in personal selfimage and values, and cementing the technology's place in one's life in a totally
different way than recreational riding. ("Paying Your Dues")
[07/26/06] As #10 demonstrates (14:107) this mental hurdle works both directions: he uses his
bike to commute, but not to ride recreationally.
[08/01/06] This whole passage by #4 at quote (17:79) is very illuminating.
[10/09/06] In (26:30) and then again in (26:37), it seems clear that recreational and commuter
biking is tapping a very different set of needs. #14's commuter biking, if she did it,
would be primarily functional in nature. By contrast, her recreational biking is
primarily social - so she can ride around at Sauvie's Island with friends. Even her trips
to the Farmer's Market seem motivated primarily for the enjoyment rather than the need
to transport vegetables to/from the market; it simply provides a nice excuse for a bike
trip. She details her thought process about commuter biking in (26:37).
[06/22/07] It seems to me that this is getting at some kind of category error. This has only become
clear after talking to #36, who does not view her bicycle as a thing-for-transportation.
To her, the bike is a thing-for-exercise; and similarly the recreational cyclists which #5
refers to view their bike as a think-for-sport. Thus, a conversation between a bike
commuter and a sport biker may lead to frustration because they don't view these
categories in the same way.
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M.13. Blocked discontinuance
[3/14/06]

I suppose blocking can occur any time the consumer decides to take action! I knew
implementation could be blocked, and that adoption could be forced, but the idea that
rejection could be blocked...but of course it makes sense, especially given the kind of
heavy-penalty-for-discontinuance
contracts that are being written these
days...interesting tie here to Krackhardt's work in using network analysis to determine
power relationships among monopolists and monopsonists.

M.14. Bus regret and bus karma
[07/25/06] I can relate to what #1Q says here in (14:44). Bus regret is that feeling of'Damn! I just
missed the bus!' It is the opposite of bus karma, the feeling of satisfaction that comes
from arriving at the bus stop just at the moment when the bus is pulling up so that you
don't even have to run to catch it, and don't have to spend any time waiting for the bus
either. As a bus rider I am conscious that bus remorse begins to build as I approach a
bus stop at a blind corner when I can't see if the bus is close. It continues to build to a
maximum when I'm close enough that if I run, I could catch it; but if I continue to walk,
I'm going to miss it. It is caused by the suspense over whether I'm going to be there just
in time, or whether I'm just going to miss it by a hair. When I arrive at the bus stop I
can finally see how close the bus is; if I've just caught it, then I say to myself 'I've got
good bus karma today!' and feel good. Otherwise I settle in to wait for the bus.
Bus regret stems from approach-avoidance conflict, which occurs when we approach
(in space or time) an event which we associate with mixed feelings of reward and
punishment (catching or missing the bus.) The opposition of bus regret and bus karma
tends to confirm that some sort of inverse relationship exists between regret and
dominance structuring.
Oddly enough, / don't think bus regret is really about time utilization. It's akin to
beating the train across a railroad crossing, or a car just squeaking past a yellow light. It
doesn't matter than much in most cases whether you arrive at your destination a minute
or two earlier, especially if it occurs at some considerable personal risk. Time just
doesn't enter into the decision frame; it's purely a matter of whether the decision
outcome falls into the domain of gains or losses. Thus I don't think time utilization
really has that much to do with it, or at best it's a percentage difference like
psychological accounting. Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) predicts
this.

M.15. Buyer's remorse
[07/24/06] #10 says that he felt a mild amount of buyer's remorse after learning that he would be
paying for two unused months on his transit pass. This buyer's remorse seems to have
undercut his ability to feel good about his purchase (i.e., undermined his attempt to
construct a dominance structure -- confirming that regret and dominance structuring
seems to be opposing forces.) This corresponds to Schein's 'disconfirming the status
quo', which (together with the availability of substitutes and the construction of a plan
to turn the substitute into a viable option) led to the reversal of #10's decision and to see
a refund on his pass.
Perhaps if there is no regret associated with an adoption decision, it is harder to
reverse. This sounds similar to the 'happy end effect', the tendency to place greater
emphasis on more recent positive effects than more distant negative ones. The Psy 510
notes go on to state that the positive value of an outcome can linger long after the cost
has been forgotten, supporting the idea that the ability to construct a dominance
structure tends to 'freeze' a decision and make it harder to reverse. Festinger's work on
cognitive dissonance suggests that if this dominance structure is publicly articulated by
the decision maker (e.g., by construction of a technology-centered identity and
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formation of social links through membership in various affinity groups) then reversal
will become even more difficult and adoption will further solidify.
Significantly, this is immaterial to whether all the original needs were being met.
Regret effectively involves the addition of new needs to the decision frame. Had TriMet
simply said the cost was X, and there been no discussion of whether the pass was
prorated for the two months missed, #10 might not have framed the decision outcome
in the domain of losses, and thus would have remained steadfast in his decision
(perhaps even constructing a dominance structure in terms of enjoying riding the train,
getting to read, etc.)
The fact that #10 had to hand them a check on the spot probably accentuated the
buyer's remorse and threw it into sharper relief. (14:80)
[07/25/06] In quote (14:92) it appears that #10's buyer's remorse intensified after he had the
successful bike commuting experience on the second or third day of his job. As soon as
biking became a real option to him, his internal conflict and feelings of regret
intensified. This is very interesting. It suggests that regret over an evoked option plus
the existence of a viable substitute is a powerful motivating force, and possibly the only
thing standing in the way at that point is some sort of use block for the substitute. I
suppose part of the reason why his feelings of regret became so powerful is that he
already intimated that money was very important to him, and that wasting money
("paying 23 bucks a month for a pass I'm not even going to use") was the source of this
conflict.

M.16. Changing your mind
[7/10/06]

Here #5 says there were two (actually three) important factors to his decision not to
continue using the annual TriMet pass:
•
Dissatisfaction with the status quo ("some little disillusionment with the
train", principally regarding time utilization)
•
Availability of a more attractive substitute ("bike commuting")
•
A feasible means for getting there ("my success with bike commuting")
#5 emphasizes the latter as being more important than mere dissatisfaction with the
train. After all, it is possible to commute by MAX, so the status quo does work; it just
isn't optimal. Of course, this reminds me of Schein's typology of factors important to
change. But it also raises questions about just what the "status quo" is. Is it a previously
collapsed (solved) decision? And perhaps the hesitancy to revisit it is due to the trouble
(read: cognitive effort involved) in reopening it? And the possible feelings of regret it
might bring to the surface?
[07/11/06] #5 says he changed his mind within a very short space of time here. Sounds like a
framing issue.
[07/19/06] #10 also changed his mind within a very short space of time ~ a period of about five
days. Regret, the availability of a viable alternative, and the reversibility of the
decision all seem to have played a crucial role. But based on the experience of #5, it's
not clear that reversibility played as important a role as the other two factors, if only
because #10 simply would not have renewed his pass the following year. Later on, it
clearly emerges that "my success with bike commuting" also played an important role
for him as well — thus, his experience in changing his mind closely parallels #5's, in
that all three factors were involved:
•
•
•

Regret about the status quo (the pass was expensive)
Availability of a more attractive substitute (bike commuting)
A feasibility means of getting there (successful bike commuting during that
first 5-day period)
[07/21/06] This same pattern was confirmed again in today's decision to cancel a Flexcar
reservation in favor of taking a taxi to the vet. Once again regret, the availability of a
viable alternative, and the reversibility were key factors.
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M.17. Clinchers
[07/05/06] From the Wikipedia entry on killer applications, retrieved July 5, 2006 from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Killer_application:
A killer application (commonly shortened to killer app) is a computer program
that is so useful or desirable that people will buy a particular piece of computer
hardware, gaming console, and/or an operating system simply to run that
program. See the killer game entry for video-game related killer apps.
History
The first example of a killer application is generally agreed to be the VisiCalc
spreadsheet on the Apple II platform. The machine was purchased in the
thousands by finance workers (in particular, bond traders) on the strength of this
one program. The next example is another spreadsheet, Lotus 1-2-3. Sales of
IBM's PC had been slow until 1-2-3 was released, but only months later it
became the best-selling computer. A killer app can provide an important niche
market for a non-mainstream platform. Aldus PageMaker and Adobe PostScript
gave the graphic design and desktop publishing niche to the Apple Macintosh in
the late 1980s, a niche it retains to this day despite the fact that PCs running
Windows have been capable of running versions of the same applications since
the early 1990s.
There have been a number of new uses of the term. For instance the usefulness of
e-mail drew many people to use the Internet, while the Mosaic web browser is
generally credited with the initial rapid popularity of the World Wide Web. The
term has also been applied to computer and video games that cause consumers to
buy a particular video game console or gaming hardware to play them; two
related examples of this are Halo and Halo 2, which turned the Xbox console into
a commercial success that it would not have been otherwise. Likewise, the 1993
adventure game Myst compelled many PC users to add CD-ROM drives to their
computers, as the game was not available on floppy disk. See killer game for
more information.
Developers of new platforms now tend to put a lot of effort into discovering or
creating the next killer "app" for their technology, in the hope that it will be the
breakthrough needed to get the technology adopted. This has led to the
burgeoning list of features on, for example, mobile telephones, such as text
messaging, digital cameras, etc., though many maintain that the killer app for
telephone technology is, and always has been, live peer-to-peer voice
transmission.
Computer experts sometimes use the phrase with reference to other technologies
to explain its significance to laypersons. In this context a killer application refers
to a certain usage of that technology that makes the technology popular and
successful. This usage of the term is especially prevalent when the technology
existed before but did not take off before the introduction of the killer
application. Examples for this:
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technology
killer application
the telephone (microphone and earphone) talking to distant beloved ones
via a telephone exchange
the steam engine
railway transport (although its
factory use was of prior
significance)
rubber
the pneumatic tire, or raincoats
the gasoline engine
the automobile (though
motorboat "one-lunger"
engines were the first
widespread sales)
Internet

e-mail

There is also a fairly well-known book by Larry Downes and Chunka Mui on this
topic: Unleashing The Killer App
From "Unleashing the Killer App", retrieved July 6, 2006 from
http://www.wspromotion.com/newslettervoll 51 .html:
Unleashing the Killer App
Larry Downes & Chunka Mui define a "killer application" as "a new good or
service that establishes an entirely new category and, by being first, dominates it,
returning several hundred percent on the initial investment." As they explain in
Unleashing the Killer App (published by Harvard Business School Press), the
primary forces at work in spawning today's "killer apps" are both technological
and economic in nature. "The technology we are concerned with is the
transformation of information into digital form, where it can be manipulated by
computers and transmitted by networks." Digital strategies are needed to achieve
market dominance.
The co-authors divide their book into three parts: Digital Strategy, Designing the
Killer App, and Unleashing the Killer App. In Part I, there is a brief discussion of
one "killer app" in the Middle Ages, the stirrup, which added mounted cavalry to
the battle equation. The "lowly stirrup" played a singular role in rearranging the
political, social, and economic structure of medieval Europe.
In The Lever of Riches, Joel Mokyr identifies countless other "killer apps"
throughout history such as paved streets and sewerage disposal; the lever,
wedge, and screw; the heavy plow and three-field system; the weight-driven
mechanical clock; spectacles; the printing press; the steam engine; the
telegraph; the bicycle; ...each of which also had a truly profound impact.
To repeat, Larry Downes & Chunka Mui concern themselves with the technology
of transforming information into digital form. Thus in Part I, they examine the
"killer app", explain what they call "the new economics", and then shift their
attention to the nature of a digital strategy. They dully acknowledge the
disruptive power of "killer apps" which can suddenly destroy the equilibrium of
what appeared to be stable systems of commerce and government. For them,
business change now originates with digital technology; more specifically, with
"killer apps." Strategies are needed to manage (to the extent possible) their
impact to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. These strategies must
accommodate three new forces: digitization, globalization, and deregulation. The
"dirty little secret" to which Gary Hamel has referred is that the strategy industry
"doesn't have any theory of strategy creation." The success of any digital strategy
may well be the result of what Hamel calls "lucky foresight." Downes & Mui
seem to agree with Hamel while offering, in Part II, what they refer to as "a few
rules of thumb." They suggest three stages of "killer app" design and carefully
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explain each. They identify 12 specific principles on which to base the design
process. In Part III, they shift their attention to "Unleashing the Killer App" and
correctly stress the importance of communication, one which "speaks with the
language of ideas, scenarios, options, and what-ifs."
In Chapter 7, the reader's attention is directed to two major corporations,
McDonald's and VEBA AG, which illustrate digital strategy in practice. These
are, in effect, mini-case studies. It is important to point out, however, that
effective digital strategies are not the sole province of major corporations such as
these. A "killer app" can quickly increase or reduce the size of any company.
Consider the fact that a single dry goods store in Kemmerer (Wyoming) can
become the J.C. Penney Company which, in turn, now struggles (with mixed
results) to compete successfully with a company whose own history can be
traced back to the Walton 5&10 in Bentonville (Arkansas). Downes & Mui assert
that "Developing digital strategy...requires components of both problem-pull and
technology-push...operating together in a well-functioning organization [in
which] the process becomes not only circular but indistinguishable...in a
pragmatic, indeed opportunistic, response to the new digital environment."
In the final chapter of Unleashing the Killer App, Downes & Mui suggest that
cyberspace "is fueled by free computing power and free bandwidth...and free
software." Consequently, "the social conditions that resulted are raw, and the
nature of the business climate, by necessity, less developed." As with The
Golden Rule dry goods store (in 1902) and then the Walton 5&10 (in 1950),
today's companies must seek out new areas of opportunity and start doing
business there. "Those who make the transformation by developing a digital
strategy are choosing to engage the frontier on its own terms, just as their
counterparts from Europe did in settling the New World."
Larry Downes & Chunka Mui have outlined the process of digital strategy,
explained the twelve design principles, and described the experiences of
organizations that are transforming themselves so that they can unleash "killer
apps." Which companies will conquer the "frontier", whatever and wherever it
may be? Which companies will not? In the Digital Marketplace, we won't have to
wait very long for the answers. Probably in what seems to be about five minutes.
I hope this helps in your future marketing decisions.
[07/28/06] Of course, it's perfectly possible to adopt without a killer application of any kind.
Compare with #4's decision to take up bike commuting: there were plenty of
alternatives available, and bikes in no way constituted a killer application that none of
the others could address. However, they were a better fit with his ideal image of
himself. {Does this make a difference in affective vs. functional adoption?)
[08/09/06] What #4 says here in (17:126) is interesting in terms of substitution. "I think Flexcar
would work better for me if I didn't own a vehicle. I think Flexcar has too high
marginal costs for me. Owning a vehicle and then having Flexcar negates really the
value of Flexcar aside from, 'I got somewhere by bike or bus, now I need a vehicle.' So
I don't use it as much any more. Does Flexcar have a killer application only when car
ownership is not an option?
[11/10/06] I think "clincher" gets closer to the sense that I'm trying to convey here than "killer
application", a metaphor I've always found way too violent for my tastes. Retitled this
memo from its original title, "killer applications"
[12/29/06] See today's entry for "successful advocacy and opinion leadership". Clinchers help
generate buzz.

M.18. Coadoption?
[03/01/06] This seems to be a case of coadoption, the adoption of two technologies which
complement each other and offset each other's weaknesses vis-a-vis a substitute (e.g.,
replacing single passenger car with the combination of car pooling and rail, or car
sharing and rail.)
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I've never run into that before in the literature...but informant #5 referred to the
phenomenon as "multi-mode" transportation.
[07/19/06] Coadoption strikes me as an important conflict resolution strategy (e.g., workaround
for a use block or other conflict.)
[07/31/06] In (17:75) #4 discusses having all of his transportation needs pretty well covered —
walking or bikes on the Reed campus, and taking the bus those times he had occasion
to go into town. Living in the village-like campus atmosphere, he was pretty well selfcontained. (Unlike, say, CMU where you have to go for quite a walk just to get to the
grocery store.) It was a combination of technologies to solve particular needs rather
than one technology which did it all.

M.19. Collapsing decisions
[03/01/06] Here is an example of collapsing the commuting decision into a general category —
'how bad is the commute?' — rather than considering each need individually. Is it
cognitively simpler to reach decisions in this way? (cf. political polling with their 'on
the right track' questions). Related to Janis and Mann's conflict theory, with its
cancellation and collapsing mechanisms?
[07/06/06] Perhaps the ease or difficulty of decisions is a function of whether they can be easily
collapsed into 'good for me' or 'bad' for me' categories. Perhaps it's too cognitively
expensive for people to leave decisions unresolved (cf. the Certainty Effect from
Tversky and Kahneman (1981); Zeckhauser's Russian Roulette experiment, discussed
in Pious pg. 99).
[07/11/06] #5 provides an example here of how the individual needs collapse into one general
category, 'it seemed like a good idea at the time.' I think there's something important
about our psychology lurking in this deceptively common expression. It tracks with
political science, where pollsters ask 'do you think the country is on the right track?'
[07/13/06] When searching for something else in my PSY 510 lecture notes I noticed that
collapsing is explicitly included as part of Montgomery's dominance structuring theory
(along with bolstering, cancellation, and deemphasis.) It was both a confirmation and a
'duh!' moment, as I should have remembered that a long time ago. I keep coming back
to dominance structuring as a crucial mechanism in how conflicts are reconciled during
the collapsing process.
[12/20/06] I ran across another reference to this behavior in Miller's classic 1956 paper, "The
Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two" (pg. 16)
"[T]he span of absolute judgment and the span of immediate memory impose
severe limitations on the amount of information we are able to receive, process,
and remember. By organizing the stimulus input simultaneously into several
dimensions and successively into a sequence of chunks, we manage to break (or
at least stretch) this informational bottleneck."
[06/25/07] There's an interesting moment in the decision process that is extremely familiar, yet
seldom remarked on: the sense conveyed by linguistic cues like "Now then..." or
"Having said that..." It's a conversational marker to indicate that the speaker is moving
on from the previous subject or is extending the argument in some way; but it also
signifies something important in the cognitive process, the moment when the topic is
collapsed.

M.20. Collective adoption and the origins of desire
[05/16/07] At IAMOT 2007. The foundation of collective adoption is individual adoption. In the
case of organizations, is is the decision to maintain one's allegiance to the group
through continued employment or membership. Habit plays a part here. Once
allegiance becomes habitual it is no longer reflected upon; subsequent decisions are
then bound by this first, primary decision to adopt the group. Thus does "adoption"
enter into other meanings here, as to "adopt" a child into a family. With time and the
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deepening of habits of mind, it becomes literally unthinkable to entertain the notion of
rejection simply because of the profound personal mental, social, and functional
disruption which would ensue.
This harkens back to autogenesis, and the distinction between teleological and
teleonomical intent. The individual experiences endogenous, teleological intent; as the
ties binding the collective group become stronger, its teleonomical intent becomes
teleological as well, passing through an intermediary chaotic phase of "quasiteleological" intent ("I just can't help myself!")
Can any system possess a teleological goal without reference to a meta-level system?
The balance of nature (Darwin, adaptation through natural selection) would seem to
require reference to a meta-level purpose; otherwise balancing feedback could not
arise. The very absence of a goal in evolution seems to imply that it must be present at
a higher level; otherwise the feedback would be self-reinforcing rather than balancing.
In any case, desire would seem to arise from the interaction between micro-level
neurological processes and the macro-level sense of "self. Evolution has caused the
individual cells of our body to adapt to their environment in order to survive; over time
this constraint has solidified to the point where the individual cells can no longer
survive as independent agents, but only as part of the collective whole. In this way, the
collective has acquired a unity of action which emerged after a chaotic period akin to
the kinds of collectives which we call human social organizations.
Adoption is part of the mechanism by which individuals become collective structures,
and over time synthesize into individual actors themselves.
[07/31/07] See Zimmer (2007) — discusses applications of Martin Nowak's game theory work to
evolution. Nowak argues that evolution consists of three processes: cooperation,
mutation, and selection. By cooperation he discusses phenomena like sterile worker
bees caring for eggs in the hive, and how this form of cooperation came about (another
example would be cells in the body, which cooperate even to the point of dying on
command.)

M.21. Deal-Breakers
[07/19/06] #10 refers to a "deal-breaker" here — is that the opposite of a "killer application"? An
unmet need so important that it overrules all other favorable need-tech pairings?
In modeling terms, this might correspond to a technology which is in the selection set
for one need, but the inept set for another need. Thus, there is a difference between a
killer application and a primary need, or between a deal-breaker and a primary
need. The killer application/deal-breaker refers to the teme — the need-tech
association. The primary need is only one part of the killer application/dealbreaker. The same thing goes for perks and drawbacks.
And what happens when a deal-breaker is placed in opposition to a killer application?
Do you get involuntary adoption or rejection in that case? (e.g., having to agree to an
onerous contract just because otherwise there is no way to obtain some key advantage.)
This is how monopolies are built...perhaps Krackhardt's studies of network power
configurations could shed some insight on how this conflict is resolved.
[08/23/06] In reading #8's comments here in (23:32) that a use block is a kind of deal-killer — a
condition that precludes using a technology, no matter how attractive it is or how much
you'd like to adopt it. It simply overrides all other considerations - and on that basis
perhaps it's not a complete opposite to a killer application, since a killer app doesn't
necessary override all other considerations.
[10/09/06] #14 provides a further example in (26:39) - she is unable to bike to work because of all
the stuff she would need to transport. In (26:42) it's pretty clear why #14 doesn't use her
bike to commute: this candidate is dominated by other options. She's already getting
exercise at the health club; she's not driving that much to begin with; there's no real cost
advantage, since she's still going to be paying for the TriMet pass; she's going to be
encumbered with too many things to carry on the bike. "Well, right now, for me this
isn't going to work." However, she did give it serious consideration, and for me what
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makes it interesting is that she really tried to resolve the conflict between these needs,
but ultimately she encountered a use block that she was unable to resolve.

M.22. Design-time vs. run-time and structured vs. anarchic perspectives
[10/24/06] I've been thinking about the event-state diagrams I'm producing, and how these are
pretty good at capturing some of the real-life context behind decision making.
Nevertheless, they necessarily oversimplify that context. This seems unavoidable; even
the most microcoded grounded theory or ethnographic approach is going to have to
oversimplify some context. Real life is just too rich — and I would argue, irreducably
complex in the sense that it is inexorably bound up with history. It is not only
emergent, it is also contingent (Heidegger had some remarks on this subject — see
Collins and Selina pg. ^-8, 79, 82-83. See also Heidegger's response to Sartre in Thody
and Reed pg. 59-61; also Appignanesi and Zarate pg. 124-125.)
Just as the dynamic trajectory of a chaotic system is its own shortest description, so too
is life experience contingent on its history (and exactly when does that history begin?)
There is no more economical representation of life context than the life experience
itself— which is inherently subjective.
I began thinking about why this may be, and it hit me that this really goes to the heart
of the quite necessary tension between the structured vs. anarchic perspectives, and
between Levi Strauss' analytic and synthetic poles. These aren't really endpoints of a
continuum after all (I always had a little trouble with Mintzberg and Langley here)
because they're tapping two different dimensions. One dimension is structural and deals
with patterns and generating processes; it is fundamentally static and atemporal. The
other dimension is temporal and deals with history, origins, and contingency; but
cannot look at structure because a life lived is its own shortest description; life
experience is irreducably complex. The structured perspective discounts history; the
anarchic perspective discounts generating processes.
This really goes to the heart of what I'm trying to express with the design-time vs. runtime distinction in computer science. A design-time description is static; it describes
generating processes, but instantiation does not occur at design time. An object can
only be instantiated at run-time, and in the act it acquires a history: its construction, its
thread of execution, its destruction. Run-time structures are inherently emergent and
contingent upon this history; agent-based modeling is inherently probabilistic (and
different from deterministic equation-based modeling) because it is impossible to
completely specify the state space of such a system.
[11/25/06] Perhaps the distinction I'm drawing between run-time and design-time structures
parallels the distinction between phenotypes (the emergent physical appearance of an
organism) and genotypes (the underlying biochemical processes which give rise to a
phenotype). This occurred to me after reading the Wikipedia article on memes (see
today's entry in Temes and Memes); but I'm not an expert on evolutionary biology, so I
need to be careful in drawing such analogies.

M.23. Discounting
[07/21/06] This is surprising and puzzling: why did I discount the free Flexcar credit in order to
pay cash for the taxi ride? See notes on discounting in Psy 510; in reference to
'comping the house' see the Weber-Fechner law, which states that the psychological
impact of something dwindles the more of it you have.

[07/26/06] Seems like in (14:105) that discounting is an important part of #10's unconscious
mental strategy for constructing a frame which allows him to operate in the domain of
gains, no matter what the outcome is. If a negative outcome occurs, then he can
discount the importance of those needs which would ordinarily lead him to operate in
the domain of losses. This is part of the de-emphasis process which Montgomery
describes.
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M.24. E-mail as a memory supplement
The ability to keep e-mail around ("hoarding" e-mail) is an interesting and
comparitively recent cognitive strategy. Given the increased pace at which information
bombards us - and our limited ability to respond to just a fraction of all that info -- email serves as a kind of supplemental personal memory. We no longer need to retain
the details of the info; we just need a few snippets of detail which we can use to search
for the entire record. It's rather like how we use vague associations (sound, taste, etc.)
to locate past memories. From an evolutionary standpoint this would be a much more
efficient strategy than maintaining a voluminous memory of details.
But what, then, do we use the freed-up capacity for? Perhaps Levi-Strauss' pole
between the analytical and the synthetic comes into play here; by surrendering detail,
we gain the ability to make generalizations and recognize broad patterns.
Perhaps we free up that capacity because there is an ongoing cost associated with
keeping problems open-ended ~ in which case this phenomena may be related to
collapsing decisions. Keeping the e-mail around means that collapsing need not mean
burning bridges behind us; in principle we can always go back and root through our old
e-mail to try and find that piece of information that didn't seem important at the time,
but now might hold the key to solving some current problem. Thus, e-mail facilitates
collapsing? (The alternative perhaps being a metaphorical "mental pile" of sticky notes,
colored index cards, etc.)

M.25. Emic and Etic
[11/10/06] Ever since I interviewed #25 for the winter bikes case (on September 14) it's dawned on
me that adoption is similar in certain respects to religious belief. About ten years ago,
when I was working on a book exploring the relationship between religion and
prejudice, I read Batson, Shoenrade & Ventis's book Religion and the Individual: A
Social-Psychological Perspective (1993). One thing that's always stuck with me about
this book was its unpacking of religious belief into three dimensions: religion as means,
religion as end, and religion as quest. This really resonates with me in this study, and I
notice today that it's been right in front of my nose since the very beginning of the
analysis: functional, social, and self-image needs correspond very closely to religion as
means, religion as end, and religion as quest respectively.
At the same time, there is a second way of looking at the needs which drive adoption in
terms of clinchers, perks, drawbacks and show-stoppers.
[11/29/06] I was reading the Martino (1993) book on technology forecasting today, and I was
struck by the distinction he draws between technological and functional issues: the
former are focused on the attributes of a technology, whereas the latter pertain to user
needs. He says it's important to maintain this distinction, and I fully agree. That started
me thinking about Linstone's three perspectives — technical, organizational, and
personal — and how this set differs from the three I have arrived at. It isn't just that the
names are different; it's that the technical-organizational-personal perspectives are
"etic" whereas the functional-social-personal perspectives are "emic". "Emic" is an
ethnographic (more specifically, anthropological) term which refers to things that
make a difference to an insider, whereas "etic" refers to things that make a difference
from an outsider's view. Agar (2005) argues that the emic perspective is particularly
important in agent-based modeling, to model things which make a real difference in the
world being described. As he sees it, some "artificial societies" are more artificial than
others:
"...[A]n emic model results in a different sensitivity to program details and
what they mean, because program details have a phenomological analogue
in the world of real-life agents...it raises issues about the translation of
ethnographic analysis into computational form. [...] Emic models sharpen
the question of what an agent-based model should include to serve practical
goals."
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Agar goes on to say that while the "emic" and "etic" terms are useful at a general level,
"a closer look reveals many conceptual potholes...the distinction between emic and etic
isn't as straightforward as it seems."
"If you're going to model what human agents do in some corner of the
world, you can adopt theoretical frameworks that lay out dozens or even
hundreds of variables that might make a difference. Or you can explore
that corner of the world and listen and learn, from the point of view of
living breathing agents, what it is that actually makes a difference from
their point of view. But a major qualification is necessary here, one that is
well known by ethnographers but important to foreground for readers who
have no such background. "Emic" never means "everyone told me that this
is exactly the problem and this is how to solve it and they are all exactly
right." Emic" means a difference that makes a difference in those agents'
world, even ifkhey are not aware of it. Emic goes beyond the consciousness
of any individual agent, including any individual ethnographic agent. [...]
The important part of "emic" is that you, the outsider/modeler, learn some
key differences from them, the living agents. The significance of those key
difference may well not have been known, to the outsider, before the
research. Possibily the outsider knew of them, but he/she didn't really
understand how they played the roles that they did."
"But then modeling the difference means you need a computational
translation. [...] Is there any sane way to tell a computer what these
propositions mean? Consider the "etic" at this point. In the case of risk and
the impact of experience, there are, in fact, etic research traditions that
focus on exactly those concepts, namely diffusion of innovation and
prospect theory. Etic they may be, but in this case they intersect with emic
differences and let us model them. Notice several things:
1. Selection of etic/theory was directed by an important emic difference
rather than being selected a priori.
2. The etic research tradition had an elaborate pedigree with numerous
studies in different context and geographical areas.
3. So elaborate was the etic tradition, and so robust were its key results,
that one can argue that it plausibly represents universal aspects of
the human situation.
"Ethnography can be defined as making sense of human differences in
terms of human similarities. The differences — the emic ~ are always in the
foreground, since they are the primary focus of any ethnographic study.
But similarities ~ the etic — are featured as well, at least enough to connect
the differences in the agents' world with the audience's way of
understanding how the world works. Differences are the problem;
similarities are the solution. Similarities are where the etic helps out."
"This is a version of "emic/etic" that makes sense for ethnographic research
and for modeling its results...With development of an ethnography/agentbased modeling tradition, we might notice that particular theories are
repeatedly useful and appreciate how those recurrently useful theories work
together. We might begin to build an etic structure, a theory hybrid, backed
by relevance to many different cases. We might, in short, move towards
something previously available to the wise and the insane ~ an actual
theory of how the social world works that helps explain across many kinds
of differences, a theory shaped by robust emic relevance rather than
proclaimed universality (often false) and predictive power (that often
doesn't work)."
"If nothing else, "emic" reminds us that models of the human world have to
have clear connections with what the humans who live there are actually
thinking and doing."
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M.26. Exposure as an interrupt
[03/16/06] Here #1 says that she was prompted to take another look at Flexcar because I
mentioned it in the telephone prescreening (BTW, I didn't suggest that she look into it,
I asked how often she had used it.) This suggests that interrupts don't just function as a
break in the decision process, but can also function as external events which punctuate
the background. It's kind of an "inside out" way of looking at interrupts from that which
I'd previously thought of.

M.27. Flexcar stress
[03/01/06] Could the regret associated with 30 minute vs. 15 minute charges actually be
discouraging the frequency of Flexcar use? (Sounds like a good candidate for a social
simulation!)
There are two sources of anxiety #3 alludes to here: paying extra (presumably a minor
issue, since PSU is footing the bill) and the potential of inconveniencing someone
else. The latter source is likely to be an important source of low-level stress associated
with Flexcar use, since every time you use it there is the potential for an innocent
mistake to turn into a highly disruptive and socially embarassing episode. This bears
watching in future interviews with Flexcar users.
[03/31/06] Based on #4's interview, it appears that the cost of underestimating the time block is
very significant indeed! The Flexcar user may be required to pay for a taxi trip if
someone was supposed to follow them, and I don't think PSU covers it! Flexcar may
have made the cost of making a mistake too punitive.
[07/21/06] As I discuss in my Flexcar journal, Flexcar users are caught on the horns of a dilemma
— between regret, if they overreserve the car and pay for unused time — and dread risk,
if they underreserve the car and get fined for late return and cab fare. Flexcar is asking
too much by expecting that its customers can accurately forecast factors which are
beyond their control which may influence rental time. In response, institutional
customers tend to overreserve these cars because the cost of the service is borne by
employers like PSU. But over time this may drive away customers who are not
affiliated with such institutions (or at least discourage their participation), and might
lead institutional users to discontinue a service which they view as a 'perk' or at best a
way of essentially purchasing subsidized parking spaces (see interview with Dan
Zalkow).
[10/09/06] In (26:32), #14 supports the idea that Flexcar stress might result more from concern
about inconveniencing the next person than fear of financial penalties. But she also
mentioned that concern about unforseen delays — e.g., someone parked in the Flexcar
space when you try to return it ~ is a source of stress as well. #14 confirms the
tendency to overschedule Flexcar to avoid the return penalties.

M.28. Forced Adoption
[11/30/06] It seems remarkable to me that I've managed to get all the way through the PP+ case
without writing a memo on forced adoption — although in fact there's a huge one that's
been sitting right in front of my nose the whole time: being forced to use a car.
I woke up just now thinking about being forced to upgrade computer software. I might
have been thinking of my subscription to Norton Internet Security, which I had to
renew a couple of days ago (and Symantec manages to always make it a royal hassle to
give them my money.) This practice of forcing the consumer to constantly upgrade just
to maintain the status quo, where you can't simply continue to use what you've already
got ~ tying the innovation to "network externalities" as Brian Arthur says (he was cited
in the Linstone 1999 article I just read on complexity science and forecasting). There's
something deeply troubling about this, and it finally came to me just now:
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What would happen if everybody did this?
Of course, it seems like we're getting closer to that point every day, as companies figure
out that forcing people to adopt is a great way of enhancing their own revenue stream.
But as more and more companies do so, consumers are being treated as a
nonsustainable resource -- almost like they're being 'clear cut' by rapacious companies
who are only out for their own bottom line, and to hell with the long term consequences
for society. It's a classic commons dilemma.
•
As consumers are hit with more and more unreasoning, unarguable demands
for upgrades, they are going to have less and less disposable income. It is
simply not sustainable over the long run.
•

As society gets hit with the sheer waste of all these disposable, useless,
obsolete software products, what is going to be the long-term consequence of
this sheer waste? (Software waste is invisible; hardware waste winds up in
the landfill. How many computers are actually being recycled? How much of
the Earth's limited resources is just winding up in the landfill?)

•

As computing becomes ubiquitous, what is the technological consequence of
having to support ever-increasing demands for upgrades? What happens if
your toaster stops working because it's software can't communicate with the
house anymore? As absurd as it sounds (given the simplicity of a electromechanical toaster sans software) this is a real possibility if we keep sticking
software everywhere, simply because marketers are under pressure to
constantly add new features to encourage sales. (Think of Powerpoint)
Featuritis has longer-term consequences than just making life more difficult and
frustrating for individuals. It is part of a complex web that forces consumers to
upgrade, and when it is widely enough practices will have serious implications for
society.

M.29. From the inert set to the selection set
[07/24/06] Here #10 gives a very nice description of how he began to entertain a candidate he once
would have dismissed out of hand ('Yeah, right!'). A number of elements are present
here.
•

A prior history with bicycles that was favorable. In this case that's his
experience in Eugene, and it's interesting that he clung to this favorable view
of bikes despite his very negative experiences in Memphis.
•
Positive role models.
•
An obtainable vision of how the substitute might be worked into one's life.
•
Regret about purchasing the transit pass.
I particularly think the "I took the emotional leap of just doing it" stands out. "Giving it
a whirl" is an interesting phenomena in its own right...a way of cutting short the
analysis paralysis. Fortunately bicycles are fairly easy to try on a limited basis —
provided that you own a bike!
[08/01/06] See the "ah ha!" experience for more insight on this phenomena. #4 has several
interesting things to say about this in quote (17:84).
[08/08/06] #4's statement in (17:114) would tend to confirm some aspects of what I described
above — how he got back into cycling after a hiatus of several years:
•
Prior history.
•
Positive role models.
However, there are important differences in how #4 and #5/#10 approach adoption.
#10 frames the issues in largely functional terms: he is very analytical and wants to find
the most cost-effective way to get to work without having to pay $8 a day for parking,
or pay for two months on the TriMet pass that he saw no benefit for. #5, while of a
more athletic bent than either #10 or #4, is also coming at bicycle commuting largely
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from a functional standpoint (any socializing and identity construction he would do
would tend to be associated with recreational cycling, not commuter cycling.)
#4, on the other hand, frames the issues from the outset in largely social and aesthetic
terms: "I think we definitely differentiate ourselves. We would not be cyclists that
would wear [racing] jerseys [laughs] so we're in that category of not taking cycling
seriously in terms of athleticism, but more of a larger...I don't know, it's more of an
identity issue than it's sort of an athleticism issue. We get around biking, instead of for
health, but because that's what you have to do, that's sort of the way to go." He bikes
because it is an aspect of belonging to a community, rather than the other way around.
This parallels childhood experiences where all your friends were riding bikes, and if
you wanted to keep up with them you had to ride, too. Riding cements the social bond
and one's sense of belonging. There is an egalitatian aspect to (noncompetitive)
recreational biking, where everybody has a bike, everybody belongs, everyone is equal.
(Compare to the Slug Velo ride, where no one is left behind.)
So maybe regret is a factor here after all: the desire to avoid the powerful feelings of
regret that may result from watching everyone else in your social circle ride off and
leave you behind., .regret is incommensurable, so "the desire to avoid feelings of regret"
is a wide-open statement that has to be understood in a specific context. For #10 it was
regret about purchasing the transit pass; here it's regret about being left out of one's
social circle.
It's also important to point out that adoption which is framed in social and aesthetic
terms tends to involve recreational biking first, then (perhaps) commuter biking after
that once riding is firmly established: "Hey, maybe I could ride my bike to work!" The
biking identity leads the informant to search for additional potential applications.
[08/09/06] #4's in vivo quote in (17:121) tends to reinforce this conclusion that the desire to avoid
feelings of regret is a powerful social motivator:
B:
So talk to me about this period from October to April. I mean, I would
think the idea of pitching...if I were going to pitch something to my friends,
saying 'You ought to commute by bike!' I wouldn't pick October to start
making the pitch.
#4:

Well, yeah, I think it was because it was the end of the summer. It's like
the zenith, October is still nice. Yeah, we were still hanging out.../ think
part of it, too, that friend of mine that summer, we -were doing a lot of stuff
together, and he was going to get to where we were going by bike
regardless. So there's sort of an inclusion - if I got on a bike then we '11
both go over the same way, versus me bumming a ride from somebody, or
hopping on a bus. It just wasn't going to match up with what we're trying
to do together.

[08/24/06] In her early stages of considering Flexcar, #8 makes some remarks that track with
aspects of what I observed earlier with #10: an obtainable vision of how the technology
might fit into your life:
#8:

Because the kids, it's on separate days, so two times a month we do this
back-and-forth, back-and-forth. Whereas I could walk over to behind the
Urban Center and hop on a...get a Flexcar and drive out, and come back.
That would be really nice to do, because I can 't really take the bus home
back in the middle of the day, #12 -1 mean, that would be an extra hour, at
least.

Although, from (23:63), it's clear that #8's ideal vision of how Flexcar would work isn't
going to jive with the reality of the service.

M.30. From the selection set to the inept set
[07/19/06] #10 and #5 give examples of moving from the selection set to the inept set — rejection.
It seems to me that one of the major differences between value-centered adoption and
the construction of a technology-centered identity is that in the former case rejection is

(326)

just a matter of changing your mind. But in the latter case rejection a traumatic
experience that jeopardizes the identity which has been constructed, risking some
disruption of the personality! In that case, the safer course of action may be to just
move the technology to the inert set rather than the inept set; one 'grows away from'
using it rather than repudiating it, and jeopardizing one's identity and interpersonal
relationships.

M.31. From the selection set to the inert set
[07/19/06] The gist of what #10 is saying here is that he doesn't want to get rid of his car, he just
wants to be selective in how and when he uses it. This also seems to track with what
#1, #3, and #5 are saying — they don't view cars as an addition which must be stopped
cold turkey, but rather as a resource to be managed intelligently and selectively.
But is this rejection? It doesn't seem to match any concept of rejection which is
discussed in the literature (e.g., Eveland 1977?, Rogers 2003).
[07/27/06] #4 says that he stopped using his bicycle for a while when he first moved to Portland ~
but he didn't reject it, he just discontinued using it for a while. This I think points up the
fallacy of equating disuse with rejection. He just temporarily moved that option from
the selection set to the inert set (or perhaps the inept set, since he didn't own a
commuting bike at that point?) There's something important here that points up the
distinction between attitude toward a technology and actual use of that technology; one
can have one without the other. See discussion of the KAP gap from Rogers (2003).
I'm beginning to suspect that there's something amiss in this selection set-inert setinept set business from the marketing literature. It's kind of a blunt toolfor getting at
some subtle nuances of technology adoption...
In (17:45) #4 makes it clearer that the reason he stopped using his bike in Portland was
that 1) he didn't leave the Reed campus very often, and 2) he didn't have a commuter
bike. Thus, he had no need of commuter biking.

M.32. Functional needs vs. self-image needs
#3 notes here that the biggest factor in her decision was the wear and tear of
commuting. The environmental impact was in there, but it wasn't the driving force.
In (26:30), #14 gives a good example of a primary need which is not a functional need:
she bought a bike for recreational purposes, so that she could ride with her friends for
fun. Fun is inherently nonfunctional; it is an emotional need and an end unto itself. In
this case, the social bonds which are strengthened during the bike ride are also
nonfunctional, in that they are not being used (in this instance) to achieve any sort of
functional purpose. While it is true that friendship ties can be employed to serve
functional purposes (cf. #18) the deeper truth is that we seek human companionship for
its own sake; it is a core emotional need. Its functional uses follow from friendship. It is
generally frowned upon to seek out relationships for the sole purpose of achieving
functional ends. No one like to feel like they are being used rather than sought out for
their own sake.
[06/22/07] See today's entry in functional needs vs. social needs.

M.33. Functional needs vs. social needs
[03/02/06] It looks like the functional needs are the driving force here, then once they're met there
are additional opportunities to satisfy social needs. This also suggests that social
consolidation may be a signifier of later adoption stages.
[03/15/06] It's interesting to compare the functional vs. socioaesthetic dimension with Maslow's
heirarchy of needs, which places functional needs (food, shelter, safety) at the base of
the pyramid, whereas social needs (self-actualization) are placed closer to the pinnacle.
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[07/10/06] Perhaps the dominance structuring and diff/con phenomena occur because of the desire
to collapse as many open subproblems as possible, thus obtaining the smallest local
minimum in cognitive cost?
[10/09/06] See today's entry for functional needs vs. self-image needs.
[06/22/07] Yesterday I attended a Cycling Brown Bag event on Why People Don't Bike, and Linda
Ginenthal presented findings from a recent survey conducted by the City of Portland.
She expressed some frustration when people would just reply "I don't know" when they
were asked point blank why they didn't ride more. She sorted these into two sets of
reasons, objective and subjective.
When she said that, a light popped on and I suddenly had the language to describe
something that I've been struggling with for some time — why do people tend to offer
functional narratives as defenses rather than social or personal ones? The answer
comes from attribution theory. Objective attributions are easier to defend because
circumstances or situations are not easily altered; other people would presumably do
the same things in similar situations or circumstances, so an individual cannot be
blamed for making an incorrect decision. Subjective attributions are harder to defend
because they involve personal actors who could presumably choose to act differently,
and therefore the person could be blamed for making an incorrect decision. This
implies that attribution theory is related to regret and dominance structuring.
Dominance structuring is the after-the-fact search for objective attributions to bolster
decisions which can only be defended on subjective grounds. Regret occurs when a set
of objective attributions cannot be found to defend and justify an incorrect decision.
The distinction between good vs. bad decisions (referring to the process) and correct
vs. incorrect decisions (referring to the outcome) also relates to this distinction
between objective and subjective attributions. In classical decision theory, a good
decision making process seeks to minimize the influence of subjective personal intuition
and maximize objective information about circumstances and situations. A desired
decision outcome cannot invariably be related to good decision making, nor can an
undesired final result be traced to bad decision making (Baird 1989, pg. 14). However,
if a good process is followed then the outcome (either good or bad) can be defended
more easily because it can be attributed to objective rather than subjective factors.

M.34. Grounded Agent Modeling
[08/19/06] I guess what seems to me kind of a radical notion is that you can use software to do
more than just program computers. You can also use it as an aid in thinking, to express
ideas - well, ideas of a certain kind, anyway. Software can be used as a language of
theory, to help express ideas more clearly, and as a way of testing whether those ideas
actually make sense and are self-consistent; to explore their hidden implications, and to
see how one idea fits or meshes with another idea in a way that might allow them to be
used in combination.
It seems to me that's what Meyer is driving at here: "Over the years many articles and
talks have claimed to examine how software engineers could benefit from studying
philosophy, general systems theory, 'cognitive science', psychology. But to a
practicing software developer the results are disappointing. If we exclude from the
discussion the generally applicable laws of rational investigation, which enlightened
minds have known for centuries (at least since Descartes) and which of course apply to
software science as to anything else, it sometimes seems that experts in the disciplines
mentioned may have more to learn from experts in software than the reverse...the
profession [of software engineering] has not fully realized the epistemological
implications of its own work. Eventually someone will come and explain what lessons
the experience of software construction holds for the intellectual world at large. No
doubt abstract data types will figure prominently in the list." (Meyer, 1997, pg. 148)
[10/28/06] Two different but complimentary approaches to analysis were used to construct the
structural and behavioral models.
The Structural Model
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The structural model was constructed using a grounded approach to coding and
analysis. During open coding a provisional set of codes was identifyed and used to tag
important personal, social, and functional issues along with other relevant factors such
as commuting needs and process boundaries. This initial set of codes was revised and
expanded somewhat during the analysis process, but stabilized fairly early on. These
codes was used to index certain segments of the transcripts for later analysis. Memos
were used in conjunction with coding; CAQDAS was used to establish an evidence trail
and record the emergence of themes over time.
During axial coding a set of network diagrams were deveoped to identify interactions
between categories and identify the properties and dimensions of the categories. The
categories which emerged during this process included:
Self-image and transportation: to the wider context of transportation decisions and how
these relate to the maintenance of self-image: life arc, plans, violations, conflict, etc.
Themes of personal identity and meaning are central to this category, such as what it
means to be a kid, a grownup, or a professional.
Development of an initial interest. This category explores the interplay of attention and
intention. Important properties include the 'ah ha' or eureka experience; how an issue
comes to be 'on the radar'; how one becomes 'bitten by the bug'; how perceptions and
interest shifts as new experience is gained; and the nature of the events which prompt
these experiences.
Exploring possible uses for an innovation, an axis whose dimensions span the range
from killer applications, through perks, to a wash, to a drawback and finally to a showstopper.
Getting over the procrastination hump, a category which explores the origins and nature
of the procrastination phenomenon in its various forms, and its relation to the
technology adoption process.
Thwarted intentions deals with the flip side of procrastination: what happens when
choice is involuntarily constrained (e.g., forced adoption; blocked adoption; blocked
rejection.) Technology clusters and network externalities are the major properties of
this category.
Collapsing the decision is about balancing the pros and cons of a set of options to arrive
at a final, summary judgement (collapsing). This category likens adoption to a kind of
puzzle to be solved.
Getting comfortable with the idea examines the process of gaining experience and
becoming comfortable with one's mastery over the innovation.
Constructing a narrative focuses on the psychological need to construct a story of 'why'
one's decisions unfold as they do. Self-image forms the hub of this rather dense
category, whose properties include regret, buyer's remorse, irreversable decisions,
behavioral traps, 'patting yourself on the back' (aka dominance structuring),
discounting, bolstering, making a virtue out of a necessity, maintaining the illusion of
control, and framing.
The central category of the case is adoption. Three major axes of adoption are
identified: adoption as means, which addresses the functional or utilitarian aspects of
technology; adoption as end, which examines the construction of social communities
and cultures around certain technologies such as bicycles; and adoption as quest, which
explores changes in self-image and personal growth which may be symbolically
expressed by the adoption of certain technologies.
A progressive literature search was undertaken in parallel with axial coding. New
sources of literature examined, including transportation mode modeling, the philosophy
of desire, memetics, and neuropsychology.
As analysis progressed the major structural aspects of the adoption process began to
emerge. The basic structural framework is derived from the Humean model of desire
formation, together with some of its modern refinements.
The External Specification
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A paradigm or set of assumptions for adoption was developed for the theory, and was
further refined using contract-driven analysis.
The Behavioral Specification
Event-state analysis was used to construct the behavioral specification. Once the
transcripts has been completed and grounded analysis was near completion for the case,
each transcript was reviewed and a list compiled of important events, conditions, and
needs.
Each entry in the list was identified by time of occurance, a brief description of the
event, type of event (functional, social, or personal), and the source paragraph in the
transcript.
Once a list had been compliled for the entire transcript, the events were sorted in
chronological order.
Similar/duplicate entries were merged, taking care to preserve their sources in the
transcript.
Once the final event list had been compiled, an event-state diagram was constructed as
a summary of the decision process.
Member checks: each informant was mailed a copy of their own event-state diagram,
asked to review and make corrections, and return the diagram to the researcher with a
self-addressed stamped envelope.
When all the diagrams had been reviewed and member checked, composite sequence
analysis was used to identify common behavioral sequences and construct the
behavioral specification.

M.35. "I discovered that I didn't really mind"
[7/10/06]

This seems important. #5 originally believed that riding his bike in the dark would be a
deciding factor in his decision, based on his anticipation of what it would be like. But
then, after he actually tried it, he decided that it wasn't that bad after all. His dread of
future consequences was discounted when he actually experienced it, and this shifted
his decision in an important way, changing its outcome and increasing his regret for the
course of action he had originally chosen. This this led to his trying to get a refund on
the TriMet pass.

I wonder if it matters that this happened during a period when #5 was experiencing
conflict with his ability to get his transportation needs down pat? Perhaps this ongoing
conflict interfered with his ability to "collapse" this decision into a settle routine?
[07/26/06] Similarly, #10 discovers in (14:99) that riding in the rain isn't as bad as he anticipated it
would be. "Leaning into it" seems to be a way ofreframing the issues in the domain of
gains rather than losses.

M.36. "I just acted on the options that I knew I had"
[08/17/06] #6's comments here in (20:29) are revealing. During a hurried application of the
selection process there was little time to consider alternatives, and no time to consider
adoption of a new option (cf. Janis & Mann's conflict theory of decision making.) It
was only later, when thinking over the incident in his mind, that it occured to #6 that
maybe Flexcar might have been an option. But with the crisis passed, and (apparently)
little chance of it happening again, he never really seriously considered signing up for it
— even though it was free.

This is not quite regret, but it's close. If he had thought of an option that interfered with
his ability to construct a dominance structure that he did the right thing, then it is quite
possible that feelings of regret could have come over him. For example, if the incident
had turned out badly, and he subsequently discovered that he could have had a free cab
ride courtesy of Parking and Transportation, then he might have very much regretted
his decision to risk not calling a cab. On the other hand, as it did turn out he didn't need
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the cab; so if he'd called the cab and paid for it himself, he might have felt regret at
spending cab fare so frivolously. So much of decision making involves forecasting an
uncertain future...
[10/09/06] Regarding #14's statement in (26:23), I suppose there are two ways that needs and
candidates get matched up. Having a candidate in hand, and searching for a need - this
feels like an experimental process. On the other hand, having a need and suddenly
realizing there is a candidate which could meet that need — this feels like a "eureka"
moment, a sudden recognition.
This is interesting in light of my recent reading of the Mind and Brain book.
Recognition is an important brain function, and when it's impaired due to damage the
results are odd and dehabilitating. In the title story of The Man Who Mistook His Wife
for a Hat, Oliver Sacks describes loss of recognition as a syndrome of the right brain
which impairs cognitive judgement, while leaving intact the ability to form cognitive
hypotheses (pg. 19.) This seems to suggest that recognition is involved in reality-testing
in some way.
Insight and judgement seem to be a function of the right brain. Perhaps this is why
techniques like brainstorming work by opening up the creative possibilities before
exercising the critical faculties?
I'm not sure yet how this applies to decision making, but it seems related somehow.

M.37. Intentionality
[02/25/07] Something occurred to me this morning as I was reading this passage in LeShan (2002),
"The Psychology of War":
It is important to note at this point that a "nation" does not exist except in
the minds, and on the maps, of human beings ~ those of its own citizens
and those of the citizens of other "nations." To say "A nation responds..."
or "France struck back at the invader" makes for good poetry, but is
semantic nonsense. Human beings, usually living in a specific geographical
area, and regarding themselves as citizens of a political entity, may act
together in a military manner; but there is no meaning in saying that a
"nation" takes military action. People often (perhaps typically) act as if
their nation is a biological organism, with a will of its own, but it is
individuals who act, not nations. Not being clear on this point (and most
writers on war have not been) is bound to lead to confusion, (pg. 34)
Yes, that's true; and yet, each of these individuals is in turn comprised of trillions of
cells. From whence does the will arise? And under what conditions do individual
agents become so constrained in their freedom of action that they effectively cease to
act as individuals, and in so doing transfer the property of will to the next higher
organizational unit? When does heterarchy become hierarchy? When does
teleonomical or inferred intent turn into teleological or endogenous intent?
Checkland (1988) describes two types of intentionality: explicit goal-directed
teleological purpose, and implicit, apparent goal-directed teleonomical purpose. The
existance of a goal in a balancing feedback loop represents a kind of "decision": "The
automatic generator may be thought of as a receptor of information about engine speed
which 'takes a decision' - completely preprogrammed in the case of the automatic
governor - and feeds back 'an instruction' to the valve." (Checkland 1988, pg. 88)
Intention is a crucial mechanism for providing feedback from the macro (emergent)
level to the micro (immergent) level. Reinforcing feedback requires no exogenous
mechanism, but balancing feedback does; the existance of a goal cannot be accounted
for purely in terms of the system elements, but must be provided exogenously. And
where does this goal come from if it does not arise as "part o f the system? There are
some deeper truths here about whether any system can possess a teleological goal
without reference to a meta-level system, and thus whether overall balance can be
achieved without reference to a meta-level system. Does the balance of nature require
reference to a meta-level consciousness? Cf. the discussion of the Ugly Duckling
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Theorem in Ilachinski (2004, pg. 67), which was in turn proposed by Watanabe (1985):
"A system, whether it is designed to solve a specific 'problem' or evolve in a more
open-ended fashion, must decide by itself, and for itself, which parts are more or less
important (i.e., have greater or lesser value) than others." Extended to the system as a
whole (i.e., the entire cosmos) this seems to imply that if purpose exists in any part of
the cosmos, then intentionality must suffuse the fabric of the cosmos itself; for
otherwise it would always be possible to repartition and locate the origin of purpose in
some other part.
Checkland distinguishes between 'purposive', whose meaning is the neutral serving-apurpose, and 'purposeful', whose meaning refers to conscious intent-based action.
Teleology is behavior that fufills a conscious, goal-directed purpose. Teleonomy is
behavior which can be described as if it had Milled a purpose, i.e., when the goal is
only apparent to an observer, but not explicitly conscious to an actor. (Checkland,
1988, pg. 75) I think there are a lot of problems with the way that Checkland
conceptualizes these as being completely distinct; a human can have a teleological
purpose but an animal can't, it can only have an apparent teleonomical purpose. There
must be a chaotic transition zone between the two - a kind of quasi-teleological
purpose in which an actor is compelled to adopt an explicit purpose in order to retain
membership as part of a larger, emergent structure, (cf. Janis's Groupthink
hypothesis.)
This seems to make sense within the context of the decision theory I'm developing, (cf.
Hume; Schein; Gellatly and Zarate pg. 144; William James)
1. At the deepest level, human beings are motivated by desires, especially
hedonic desires. Volitional desires are weak motivators and difficult to
sustain for any length of time.
2. Humans also require three conditions to be met before they will take
action:
a. Disconfirmation of the status quo.
b. Vision of a better state of affairs.
c. A plan for getting from the status quo to this desired future state.
3. If these conditions are not met, freedom of action will be constrained and
people will acquiese to the status quo.
The important point here is not that people "can't" take action; it is that they "won't"
take action, at least not sustained action. In the absense of these preconditions any
action would be motivated by volitional desires, which cannot be sustained over the
long run. They are inhibited from any other possibility; they "just can't help
themselves." Thus, these conditions provide the generating pattern by which (for
humans, at least) the teleological purpose of individuals gives way to a quasiteleological state within which the freedom of action of human actors is so constrained
as to no longer exist in any practical sense. The most striking example of this is war: in
wartime an army, and to a lesser extent a nation, can also be said to actually have
quasi-teleological rather than teleonomical purpose, for as long as the individual
actors are so constrained in their freedom of action that no other choice remains
open to them. And if the individual actor's freedom of action is ever permanently lost,
in the sense that the actor can no longer survive outside of that web of constraints, then
the transition process will be complete: the capacity for teleological purpose will have
graduated to the next meta-level, and the process begins again. So are cells in turn
comprised of their own individual components (e.g., mitachondria; and even further,
DNA) which long ago yielded up their independence and freedom of action.
"We" arose from our cells banding together in common defense...and just as the ant
colony or the beehive acts as a superorganism, so too we may ultimately merge into
human hives. Assuming we survive that long...
See also the memos on Temes and Memes; Autogenesis; Deal-breakers.
[05/02/07] See today's entry in the Procrastination memo. It looks like there are actually four
conditions which must be met: (Schein; Gellatly and Zarate pg. 144; William James)
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a. Disconfirm the status quo.
b. Develop a vision of a better state of affairs.
c. Develop a plan for getting from the status quo to this desired future state.
d. Having sufficient emotional desire to carry through with the plan.
This fourth item is distinct from the three articulated by Schein etc. The first three are
cognitive. The fourth is affective; and without it nothing will happen. (Of course, you
could also argue that it's related to disconfirming the status quo - said disconfirmation
has to activate the emotions somehow. So is it really so different?)

M.38. In vivo idioms
[03/08/07] Since I haven't had much luck finding a dictionary of idioms that specifically calls out
decision making idioms and colloquisms, I've decided to begin my own.
The catch
The rub
The kicker
A deal breaker
A show stopper
The fly in the ointment
Paying the piper
The long pole in the tent
Awash
A two-fer
To sweeten the deal
A perk
A bonus
The clincher
A killer application
A throwaway decision
To seal the deal
To close the deal
No choice
No brainer
Keeping my fingers crossed
Buyer's remorse
Taking a wooden nickel
Sleep on it (#33)
Just do it (#10)
Play it by ear (#33)
Toy with the idea (#33)
[04/20/07]
On a kick (#25)
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M.39. Is regret the inverse of dominance structuring?
[07/19/06] In thinking about what #10 says here, I'm struck by how regret seems in many ways to
be the inverse of dominance structuring. Regret is kicking yourself over a decision that
didn't go your way, based on factors that you don't fully control; dominance structuring
is patting yourself on the back about a decision that did go your way, based on factors
that you don't fully control.
I think the desire to avoid regret is a powerful motivator. People pay a lot more
attention to negative information than positive information (I think this is from Rosen's
Anatomy of Buzz, but for the life of me I can't find it now, even though I've combed
through that book very carefully. Could it be from Cialdini's The Psychology of
Influence? Or some other book I was reading at the time?)
[07/21/06] Is there a feedback loop between framing, regret, and dominance structuring? Framing
causes regret; regret is uncomfortable. Dominance structuring, on the other hand,
relieves anxiety and helps the decision maker feel better about the outcome. It is
analogous to spin (see Deetz) in that DS neutralizes violations of dominance in an
outcome, whereas spin emphasizes the positive aspects of an outcome. On thinking
about it, they're more than just analogous — DS and spin are closely related, and may in
fact be two aspects of the same phenomena. Spin is a framing technique — and by
extension, so is dominance structuring. So DS can be seen as a technique for refraining
to reduce or offset the discomfort of regret and erect a psychological defense.
[07/24/06] For a review article discussing "negativity bias" (people paying more attention to
negative information) see Kanouse, D. E. & Hanson, L. R. (1972), cited in Kottonau
(2000). Kottonau also cites an interesting article on "status quo bias" in Samuelson, W.
& Zeckhauser, R. (1988).
[07/26/06] #10 finesses this issue (in 14:99) by "leaning into" the problem of riding in the rain,
turning it into a liberating rite of passage. In (14:103) he has used dominance
structuring to work out a way of framing the issues so that no matter what the outcome
is, he has a dominant outcome and therefore doesn't have to experience regret.
Regret, by definition, occurs when people compare the quality of their decisions to
what might have happened if they'd made a different choice (Pious, 1993, pg. 101-102;
Dunning and Parpal, 1989). Dominant options are equal or superior to their alternatives
over all need present in the decision frame. So, if a choice dominates all of its
alternatives, there is no possibility of regretting the outcome; by definition you've made
the best choice, no matter what happens.
See also Reason-based Choice (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky, 1993).
[07/28/06] #4 provides another example of reframing a disadvantage into a challenge in (17:59).
"Well, there's sort of a challenge to it. 'How many groceries can I get home on the bike?
What time can I haul into work?" This same theme appears again in (17:62).

M.40. "It was almost like they had a curfew"
[07/18/06] #10 has a great in-vivo quote here: "It was almost like they had a curfew or something,
you know - like they weren't an adult, a mature human being who could do whatever
they wanted."
I think he puts his finger squarely on self-image issues surrounding bus transit that are
hard to articulate, but definitely present. Being dependent on the bus to get around can
be a rather like when your parents had to ferry you around town when you weren 't old
enough to drive — and for many people there may be painful subconscious feelings
about that awkward adolescent period when the other kids teased you about still being
dependent on Mommy to get around.
When the bus service is too restricted, there's more at stake than simple accessibility
and availability. It strikes at the heart of what it means to be an independently
functioning and self-confident adult.
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M.41. Latent Needs
[08/17/06] Since the association between needs and technologies is one-way in the direction of
technologies, this business of casting about to try and find some use for a technology
requires a target need. There could be a modeling use for a "latent" need, as a kind of
unanchored, unspecified "stub" need which will later be displaced by a real need - if
any.

M.42. Learning and unlearning
[05/15/07] At IAMOT 2007. Very interesting information in a talk by Roland Rust on feature
fatigue (see Thompsoni, Hamilton and Rust, 2005). They conducted an experiment in
which consumers were presented with a choice of two video players (visual basic
mockups) and ask them to choose which they preferred: the simple versionl, or the
complex one.
•
Both experts and nonexperts responded similarly, with no significant
differences detected. (This would seem to correspond to the 'etic' dimension,
with superior knowledge and theories but no actual insider experience.)
•
However, there was a significant difference observed between experienced
and nonexperienced users. The inexperienced users — expert and nonexpert
alike — tended to prefer the feature rich version. However, the experienced
users strongly preferred the simpler version. Shifts were observed in the
weights accorded to usability and capability.
[05/16/07] At IAMOT 2007. How, and under what circumstances, do people unlearn? If, as
Heraclitas said, you can never step in the same river twice, then how is unlearning
possible (except for amnesiacs)? The implication is that, once temors and momors are
formed, they can never be broken — only their state can change. There is no
destructor, but they can be set aside or 'bracketed' in a process akin to 'putting your
religion in your back pocket' - making a conscious effort to exclude it from the
decision frame.

M.43. Making the best use of your time
[07/19/06] It seems to be a consistent theme that the ability to make good use of the time spent on
public transportation has a lot to do with whether people mind the fact that the bus (or
MAX) takes longer.
•
#1 likes taking the bus, because she can use the time to people-watch, grade
papers, prepare her lesson plans, or take a nap.
•
#3 prefers taking MAX to driving, even though it takes longer, because she'd
rather be reading than driving.
•
#5 doesn't like taking the bus because the commute is either too short to make
use of (Sunset to Goose Hollow) or else it's a milk run (MAX thru the
Beaverton corridor.)
•
#10 likes taking the bus because it gives him the opportunity to read.
[07/31/06] In (17:76) #4 points up an altogether unexpected aspect to time utilization on the bus:
there's a professional image issue lurking here. "Professionals read things on the
bus/train."
[08/16/06] Here it is again in (20:23):
#6:
For driving to work, it's too expensive.
B:
To take your car?
#6:
Oh yeah. I mean, the economic consideration is... well, / don't know if I'd
say even now that it's a primary motivation, because I don 't like driving in.
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I just enjoy reading on the...I'm so used to that. I like that time that I take
the MAX.
Significantly, time utilization doesn't seem to be a factor in whether people are willing
to try public transportation, but whether they are willing to continue to use it. This
points up the idea that adoption and rejection really are two different cognitive
processes.
[08/17/06] Later, in (20:34):
B:
How do you like to use your time when you're riding public transportation?
#6:
Reading or sleeping. [Laughs]
B:
Reading or sleeping?
#6:
Yeah, unfortunately I burn the candle at both ends, often. I'm very often
dozing. Or I read partly, to say the Hollywood stop, and then use the rest of
the time for dc/zing or just relaxing.
B:
Is that something that you do because you 've got to find some way to pass
the time, or is it something you look forward to?
#6:
/ look forward to it. Sometimes I won't do anything, I'll just sit and
observe, just as an exercise. I'm an inveterate reader. I may read too much.
So sometimes I just put it away and watch the passing landscape. But
there's not a need to, not usually. Not on MAX. The bus, sometimes is
tedious.
[08/23/06] I'm beginning to think that the reason why this time utilization thing is important is
because it ties into the Humean theory of motivation — using one emotional desire to
balance out a deficit in another area; just as riding a bike can be justified by the
exercise you get, and the time it saves from having to otherwise make time to exercise.
This could be a potential predictor variable in whether people will continue (as opposed
to discontinue.) How will this translate in the bike commuting case? I'd say that's going
to depend on their original motivation for commuting. I suspect if it's just to save
money, that may not be enough. (Why?) I would hypothesize that sticking with bike
commuting during the cold and dark will require some other emotional motivation to be
brought into play. I think this remark by #8 is particularly telling: (23:35)
B:

When you look at the time you spend on bus travel, do you see it as being
purely a necessity? Or is it something that you found ways to look forward
to?

#8:

I find ways to look forward to it. You get occasionally, different people on
the bus. But it's worth it - it is a quiet time. Once you have kids, or just a
busy life in general, it is a time when I can just kind of [relax]. That's 20
minutes of my day, or half an hour, so an hour probably total (unless you
get on a really crowded bus where you're standing up, and you're packed
in.) But generally I do look forward to it.
Of course, her response is conditioned by the fact that I specifically asked her if she
"found" ways to look forward to it, so I need to be careful to watch how my own
language can shape the responses I get. I wish I had drilled further down into how these
informants discovered ways of utilizing their time, but I think it's a little late for that
with this case.

In (26:18) #14 describes MAX as personal "relaxation time" or "me time" which she
contrasts with time spent driving the car. She can read, or listen to music or books on
tape, or converse with fellow riders with whom she's struck up an acquaintence. The
MAX ride takes her a little longer, but she prefers it because the quality of her time is
better balanced with the "quantity" of time she has invested.
#18 has some interesting things to say on this score in (32:43):
#18:

I'm really twittery...like, anxiety ridden. My bus journey has been kind of
caught up with me trying to be more of a quiet person, trying to be more
okay with not a lot going on, being more okay with that. And that butts
right up against being on the bus along with nothing to do. So, every time I
choose to be on the bus I'm choosing to actively deal with that thing that
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bothers me. So of course I'm not going to take it a ton, but it's not just the
bus. It's the bus and what you do on the bus. I think for a lot of people it's
like... it could feel like that is wasted time, or they feel like it bothers them
and they don 't know why. I think I'm one of those people.
And:
#18:

B:
#18:
B:

#18:

It really bothers me, that time between when the bus is supposed to be there
and it actually gets there. I'm like, 'Lets go! [claps hands] We've got
things to do! I've got to get to work! I need to do some filing!' And I start
running through all this crap I have to do.
So this makes you even more anxious?
Yeah, because I need to start doing something so I can stop humming, you
know?
:
So, it sounds like - if I can paraphrase - one of the reasons why you end up
driving your car down here is because you feel like you have more control
over the timing of it?
Yeah.

M.44. Microcommunities
[03/02/06] Summarizing some of the factors that here seem to be important to the formation of
"microcommunities" form on rail or bus:
•
Trip duration
•
Number of stops?
•
Bus/train frequency
•
Compartment size
•
Number of compartments and relative ease of movement between
compartments
•
Concentration of passengers at embarkation points
•
Regularity of use (regular time each day, vs. occasional use)
•
Lack of mutual interdependency (cf. carpool)
See today's entry in "bikes for commuting vs. bikes for recreation."
#5's experiences track with what #10 says in (14:108). #10's bicycle adoption is purely
functional. It is consistent with his self-image, but image drives the adoption rather than
the converse.
#6's experiences (20:39) track with everything I've seen so far: he has met and struck
up conversations with people on the bus, but that hasn't extended to the formation of
friendship ties, nor did it influence his decision to take the bus or even which bus to
take. These social connections are too weak and fleeting to exert a significant constraint
on the selection process, let alone adoption.
Ditto with #14 (26:20). She struck up acquaintences with other women on the MAX,
and sometimes chats with them, but has not moved on to form significant relationships
with any of them.
In (32:54) #18 gives a reminder of another important factor: the degree of homophily
with the other riders ("the level of sketchyness" in her words.)

M.45. Modeling desires
[08/11/06] I think Irvine's taxonomy of desire (2006, pg. 60) which is in turn based on Hume's A
Treatise of Human Nature (1739) provides a solid foundation for the inheritance model
of needs and desires. While I will need to alter a few names from those found in
Irvine's taxonomy for the purpose of object-oriented analysis, I will try to coin as few
neologisms as possible.
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A Motive is a conscious or unconscious drive which influences a person to act in a
certain way. It is modeled as abstract base class and must have a unique name.
The two inheritors of the Motive base class are Desire and Need. A Need is a motive
which is wanted for the sake of something else (i.e., it can be recursively decomposed
into other motives.) A Desire is a motive which is pursued for its own sake (i.e., it is a
primitive or terminal motive which cannot be further decomposed in terms of other
motives.)
There are two types of desires: Hedonic and Volitional. Hedonic desires are emotional
(affective) motives to experience good feelings or avoid bad feelings. Volitional desires
are intellectual (cognitive) motives which arise from the will, 'just because'. Volitional
desires are considered relatively poor motivators and it is hypothesized that they do not
provide sufficient motivation for technology adoption. Hedonic desires, on the other
hand, exert a very powerful influence on the adoption process. Even though it is
hypothesized that volitional desires cannot motivate technology adoption, they will be
represented in the model until such time that this hypothesis can be validated.
Needs are cognitive in nature, and come in two types: Functional and Image.
Functional needs represent purely practical motives. Self-image needs pertain to social
motives.
Instantiations of the Technology class must be identifiable by a unique name.
The Teme class models the directed association from motives to Technology instances
which pertain to those motives. The valence of a teme characterizes whether the
association is positive, mixed, or negative. The teme class will occupy a prominent role
in the behavioral specification, since the formation of temes is the principal activity of
the adoption process.
Teme

Structural Specification
VO.lof Aug. 11, 2006

+Valence: ValenceType

«enumeration> >
ValenceType

Hi

Motive

Technology

+Name: String

Need

^3

+Type: NeedType
<<enumeration>>
NeedType
+Functional
+Image

+Name: Strilg

Desire
+Type: DesireType
<<enumeration>>
DesireType
4+tedonic
+Volitfc>nal

[08/15/06] I've gotten hold of Schroeder (2004), and after some struggles I've decided to try to
adopt their nomenclature as closely as possible since some of these terms are already in
use in the philosophy of mind literature. I don't necessarily like them, but on the whole
I think it's better to try and follow their lead rather than make up new names which
might lead to confusion.
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Tone

Structural Specification
V0.2of Aug. 15, 2006

+Valence: TemeValenceType

«enumeratkjn»
TemeValenceType
+PoStrve
+Mixed
+Negative

Technology
+Name: String

21

+Name: String

^

Instrumental Desire
+Type: InstrumentalDesireType

<<enumerationA
InstnimentalDesireType
+Functional
+Self Image

Terminal Desire
+Type: TerminalDesireType

«enumeration>>
TerminalDesireType
+Hedonic
+Vc*fonal

[08/18/06] Okay, I've been looking at this new nomenclature for a couple of days, and it's just too
wordy to be workable. I've gotten hold of Frankfurt (1988) and discovered that this
nomenclature isn't as standard as I had assumed. I've decided to go back to my original
scheme based on Motive as the base class; after thinking carefully about it, I believe
that 'Motive' actually is the right word that captures the essence of what I'm trying to
get at here.
It has also occured to me that I need an association class which governs the links in a
motive chain, and that not all links should be of the "I need X because I need Y" type.
It is just as important to represent "Z will prevent me from accomplishing Y" type. For
the time being I'll call that association a Meme, although I'll probably get some
pushback on that. At the moment I think it is the correct term, however. In my scheme,
a Meme is an association which acts as the "glue" or causalative link which holds
aggregations of motives together. Like temes, memes have a valence. Due to
hierarchical decomposition, it is possible for high-level motives (the classical,
Dawkins-style view of memes) to be decomposed (one might say 'deconstructed' except
that this invites confusion with object-oriented software term 'destructor') into
constituent submotives. So far, the only difference between a Meme and a Teme is that
the former describes associations between motives, and the latter describes associations
between motives and technologies. However, I expect more differences to emerge as I
proceed.
It is important to stress that a Meme does not describe a causal relationship between
motives A -> B. Rather, a Meme describes a causalation relationship which has been
inferred to exist between motives A -> B. Furthermore, this is a directional association;
it may or may not be the case that there is also an association between B -> A. (Can a
Technology ever be the source of a causalative association??? I suppose people do
blame television for a lot of social ills...)
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+State: ValenceState

<<enumeration>>
ValenceState

+State: ValenceState

+Positive
+Mixed
+Negative

"1/0..
Motive

Technology

+Name: String

+Name: String

Need

Desire

+Purpose: NeedPurpose

<<enumeratton»
NeedPurpose

+Purpose: Dea'rePurpose

<<enumeration>>
DesirePurpose
+Hedont
+VoRtional

+Functionat
•Self Image

Structural Specification
V0.3 of Aug. 18, 2006

[08/20/06] Perhaps that should be "attributional link" rather than "causalational link". Causalation
is a subset of attribution theory.
[11/01/06] Modified the NeedPurpose enumeration to reflect three dimensions of adoption, rather
than the earlier two. Changed need type from enumerations to booleans. A 'mixed'
valence on a teme or meme is a strong indication that the motive needs to be unpacked
or decomposed to determine the nature of the conflict.

+Valence: ValenceState

+Valence: ValenceState

< <enumeratfc>n >>
ValenceState
+Positfve
+Mlxed
+Negatrve

" 1 / o..;
Technology
+Name: String

+Name: String

Need
-HsFunctional: Boolean
-HsSocial: Boolean
-HsPersonal: Boolean

+Type: DesireType

< <enumeration> >
DesireType
+Hedonic
+Voltional

Structural Specification
V0.4 of Nov. 1, 2006

[11/18/06] The recursive nature of motive chains is suggested by in vivo expressions such as
'getting to the bottom of an issue. What is the nature of such a 'bottom'? Is it a
configuration of motives that is sufficient and requires no further decomposition?
[01/13/07] Added a link to make it explicit that needs can be decomposed in terms of other
motives. Added a link from technology to need to make the optional need connection
explicit.
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Ontofogfcal Structure Package
V 0 . 5 o f January 13, 2007

L

<<enumeratbn>>
ValenceState
+Positive
+Mixed
+Negative

Meme

Teme

+Valence: ValenceState

-f-Valence: ValenceState

\

1

0..*

Motive

<<I >

+Name: String

i..*

\

\

Technology

o..»

l

+Name: String

1

l
Need

Desire
+Type: DesireType

-risFunctional: Boolean
-HsSocial: Boolean
-HsPersonal: Boolean

<=
0..*

OptionalNeed

< enumeration >>
DesireType
+Hedonic
+VoHbnal

[03/14/07] I've been reading 'Why' by Charles Tilly. It seems to me his approach is complementary
to my own, although our terminology is slightly different. A conceptual map of reasons
might include:
JTCT
*\^000**+<Cr^
j
Narratives
\ ^ ^ *
y A ^ a f t e r Tiily 2 0 0 6 ) / ^ ^

,T'

"*CT

Conventions ~~^>

Stories

'^>

Codes

~~^>

^^C^Technical Accounts^)
Reasons

f

Outward dialogue

S.

Inner mental states

j<
jfC
T*(
Motives
^^
\(after Irvine 2 0 0 6 ) ^ ^

Needs

")

j r C T Hedonic J j )

alitional^J)

It's a kind of inheritance diagram. Reasons are explanations of why we do what we do.
There are two kinds of reasons. Motives are inward-directed reasons which represent
inner mental states. Narratives are outward-directed representations of an event or a
series of events (Tilly 2006, pg. 64; Abbott 2002, pg. 12). Narratives repair and
maintain important social relationships. To the extent that narratives become
internalized, they also serve to maintain and repair self-image. The audience for
internalized narratives is the narrative self, the continual dialogue we maintain with
ourselves and which is vital to our ability to be-in-the-world (Sacks, 1970).
Narratives are outside the scope of my theoretical framework, but it is still important to
understand them because all evidence of inner states (motives) is expressed or filtered
in terms of conventions, stories, codes and technical accounts (per Tilly 2006.) Inner
states cannot be measured directly (Tilly 2006, pg. x-xi) Thus, narratives have
epistemological relevance, just as motives have ontological relevance, (narratives are
meant to include condemnations as well.)
This crops up in explanations of why people don't like to ride the bus. An informant
who wishes to avoid riding a "smelly bus" full of "sketchy people" is employing a
narrative euphemism to avoid articulating inner motives (e.g., avoiding association with
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marginalized outgroups; fear of violence; etc.) Such avoidance may occur due to social
reasons (e.g., fear of censure from others) or for personal reasons (fear of self-censure,
dissonance and internal conflict.) Cognitive dissonance works by employing 'strategic
ambiguity' — avoiding matching up narratives with motives. "It works better if you
don't think too much about it." Too much introspection can jeopardize one's ability to
act in the world.
As one marketer told me, consumers will not tell you the "real reasons" (i.e., motives)
why they do what they do. Several interviewing guides recommend avoiding direct
'why' questions for this reason — it puts people on the spot, narratives are not
necessarily offered for the purpose of concealing motives, either from others or from
themselves. In most cases people genuinely do not understand their own motives.
Neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology suggest that the narrative self is not the
only concept of "self we have, nor is it located in a single place in the brain, nor does
the narrative self always have the final word on why we do what we do. In fact the
narrative self seems to function more like a narrative generator — an internal apologist,
if you will. In any case the narrative self — our inner dialogue or voice — does not
"think" in terms of motives. It thinks in terms of narratives. Motives are a more holistic
expression of why we do what we do, and take into account not just the narrative self
but the other levels of self-image as well.
Narratives are not simply public motives. They are structured differently. Every single
person in the winter bikes case commented on the issues list that a) it was a thorough
synopsis of their case, and b) they'd ever heard it put quite that way before, stripped of
stories/conventions/codes/technical accounts and simply presented as a pure
chronology. People just don't think in those terms.
[04/15/07] Minor nomenclature change to expunge the "meme" baggage. See today's entry in the
Temes and Momors memo.
<<enumeration>>
ValenceState

Ontobgcal Structure Package ^
V0.6ofAprill5, 2007

+Positive
+Mixed
•miegatwe
Momor

Terror

+Valence: ValenceState

+Valence: ValenceState

N 0..*

i
Motive

<<t

+Name: String

1

1

\

Need

Desire
+Type: DeslreType

=>

1..*

\

Technology

o..»

1

+Name: String

-HsFunctfonal: Boolean
-HsSocial: Boolean
-HsPersonal: Boolean
0..*

<<enumeratbn>>
DeslreType
+Hedon!c
+Volitbnal

[06/28/07] Changed the ValenceState enumeration to reflect the latest state of the behavioral
analysis. Added some attributes to the classes to reflect the event definitions from the
behavioral analysis.
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«enumeratlon»
ValenceState

+Valence: ValenceState

+Valence: ValenceState

-Hatent
+Positive
+Mixed
-ttJegative

•ji o..»
Motive

Technology
+Name: String
-tOptionalNeed: Temor[0..*]

+Name: String
-tOptbn: Temor[0..*]
+MotiveChain: Momor[0..*]

Ontotogcal Structure Package
V0.7 ofJune 28, 2007

[07/02/07] Added methods to update the class attributes. Clarified that an optional need is not a
temor, because it has no valence. NOTE: see the "Latent Needs" memo of 8/17/06!
<<enumeratton>>
ValenceState

+Valence: ValenceState

+NUII
•Hatent
+Postive
+Mixed
+Negative

4-SetValenceO
-tGetValenceO

\1>0..»
Technology

Motive
+Name: String
40ption: Ternor[0..*]
+MotiveChain: Momor[0..*]
+SetContext()
+GetContextO
+SetOption()
+GetOptfc>n()

+Name: String
+OptionalNeed: Need[0..*]
+SetNeed()
-K3etNeed()

+OptionalNeed

<<enumeration>>
DesireType
+Hedonic
^-Volitional

An optional need
Is not a temor. K
has no valence.

/
Desire
+Type: DesireType

•HJnpackO
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Ontobgical Structure Package
V0.8ofJuly2, 2007

[08/22/07] Reworked valence enumeration to reflect results of behavioral analysis. I decided to
suppress the operations portion of the class diagram because it seemed to add clutter
without clarity; this is a conceptual rather than an operational model.

\lf Q..«
Motive
+Name: String
+Opt'on: TsmoitO..*]
+MotlveChain: Momor[0..*]

Technology
+Name: String
+OptbnalNeed: Need[0..*]

+OpttanalNeed

«enumeration>>
DesireType
+Hedonic
+Volitional

An optional need
is not a temor. It
has no valence.
Desire
+Type: DesireType

Ontobg'cal Structure Package ^
V0.9of August 22, 2007

[09/17/07] Added a virtual base class to make it more explicit that temors and momors types of
belief.

Technology

Motive
+Name: String
-fOptton: Temor[0..*]
+MotiveChain: MomortO..*]

+Name: String
+OptbnalNeed: Need[0..

+OptiortalNeed

<<enumeration»
DesireType
-HHedonic
+Voltional

An optional need
is not a temor. It
has no valence.
Desire
+Type: DesireType

Ontotogtal Structure Package L
V0.10 of September 17, 2007

M.46. Modeling mixed transit modes
[7/10/06]

Mode mixing seems to be a common theme, as here when #5 indicates that he wanted
to take his bike on the MAX. It's a strategy for solving conflicts among individual
transportation modes. But does the resulting adoption or rejection apply to the
constituent modes, or to the mixed-mode solution at the aggregate level?
It seems clear to me that adoption needs to be modeled as a multilevel, hierarchial
phenomena. At the top level is the basic question: 'Do I have a solution to this need?'
And that solution may be an aggregate of solutions to individual subproblems. This
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suggests something about how to develop the structural model, that the top level
structure (or category, in qualitative terms) is an object with subparts (subdecisions.)
I have several modeling questions and design choices to resolve here. Should I model
the main object as an aggregation of smaller decisions (subparts have independent
existence) or a composition of smaller decisions (subparts do not have independent
existence)? Are decisions always one or the other? I can envision some decisions which
present rather specific problems to be solved, and the solutions to those problems do
not carry over, as with the problem of figuring how to deal with the rain when you're
commuting by bike. This suggests composition. On the other hand, some decision
problems present subproblems that may be useful in other situations, as with the
problem of getting to doctor's appointments etc. when you're commuting by bus (-->
Flexcar.) This suggests aggregation. Perhaps all subproblems should be modeled as
aggregations, it's just that the solution to some subproblems are more generalizable
than others.
Another issue pertains to the question of knowing when to explode and collapse a
decision into its constituent subdecisions. Unlike rational decision theory, which does
not consider the cost of mental resources associated with this, / believe that there is a
cognitive cost associated with exploding a decision into its constituent parts and
keeping that decision process open pending a solution. This resource cost ceases when
the decision collapses, explaining why people are uncomfortable with ambiguity; it
might also explain why procrastination occurs. Procrastination is a form of collapsing;
it reduces the ongoing mental cost of the decision, since you know what needs to be
done, but it's a quasi-stable state. It does not reduce the cost to zero, and it requires an
additional cost before it may be reduced to zero, but for the moment it is stable — a
local minimum. Somehow the model must be able to take the cost of cognition into
account.
I also detect some concurrency going on within the behavioral view. Collapsing the
main state is contingent on collapsing all of the substates (collapsing does not
necessarily involve finding an acceptable solution; it may also include finding a
workaround which is less than satisfactory.)
[07/13/06] With respect to collapsing, take another look at Montgomery's dominance structuring
paper. It explicitly discusses collapsing along with deemphasis, cancellation, and
bolstering as mechanisms for resolving the needs conflict and condensing it into a
single category.
[10/13/06] In looking at #14's comments in (26:47) it seems likely that trip chaining is the
'orthogonal counterpart' to mixed transportation modes. Just as one can combine several
different modes to make a single trip, one can also combine several trips into one with a
single transportation mode.

M.47. Needs vs. advantages
[07/17/06] This diagram addressing the survey question "Why do you bike to school?" is
misleading. Based on the interviews with my informants, the top justifications given
here — such as "biking is fun", "reduced air pollution" — describe some of the
advantages of cycling, but they seem to emphasize the perks rather than the primary
needs which really drove the decision. I think this is something of major importance:
the advantages of cycling are not the same thing as the primary need which drove the
decision. The primary needs reported by most of my informants, such as "saves
money", "parking is costly", "parking is hard to find" are not rated at the top of the list
and are in some cases rated rather low. Note also the overlap between "saves money"
and "parking is costly" (of course, cars are expensive in ways other than parking fees.)
By comparison, look at the reasons given in the 2004 survey of faculty and staff: "saves
money" and "parking is costly" are right at the top of the list.
A couple of possibilities here. 1) This survey is dominated by student respondents and
thus reflects a different set of needs, issues, and priorities than faculty/staff. 2) The
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respondents could be giving answers which reflect dominance structuring and identity
formation rather than decision making. 3) My informants are not representative.
These data hint that we should be careful in attributing too much causal explanation to
factors simply because they are more commonly reported in a survey. These factors
may be more commonly reported because they are popular, justifiable, defensible,
salient, or available rather than causal. It is widely understood in consumer
psychology that you may not be able to get at the underlying causal justification
through surveys.
Needs are different from advantages. A advantage may not be needed (a perk). A need
may not be a desire (e.g., vitamins - although this changes the perspective from "What
I need" to "What you need"). Could a need be considered a disadvantage, such as
addictive behavior?

M.48. "No brainer" decisions
[03/01/06] #3 remarks that central location made for an easier decision. What makes a decision
'hard' or 'easy'? Are easy decisions those whose conflicts are more readily reconciled
(i.e., it is possible to structure a dominant outcome?) Does this imply something about
the nature of the decision making process?
[07/24/06] #10 discusses this in terms of making a spot decision about whether to continue with
his previously decided plan to purchase the monthly pass in terms of new, unfavorable
information. He said that at the time it wasn't obviously bad on its face — it wasn't a
deal-breaker, in other words — and this made it more difficult to make a decision.
Seems like this is related to dominance; a dominant decision is a no-brainer decision.
[10/09/06] #14 also relates a quick decision process in (26:16). She was already dissatisfied with
the current state of affairs. From 26:17:
#14: Driving the Banfield was an awful mess all the time, and I would see the MAX
trains going by, so when the Flexpass came up I thought 'I'm just going to do
it.' Some people said to me 'Don't you want to try it first?' 'No, I'm just going
to do it...just doit!'
This seems to behave like a guard condition. The 'just do it' remark is also interesting
and echoes #10's quote from (14:81) and (14:117).
In grounded theory terms, "no brainer" decisions seem to stake out one end of a
dimension, with the opposite end being "difficult" decisions and procrastination
marking the middle. Or perhaps "no brainer" stands in opposition to procrastination?
Maybe there is more than one dimension present here: the degree of thought required
(no brainer vs. difficult) and the degree of emotional motivation present (no brainer vs.
procrastination).
[11/10/06] Switching terminology from "killer application" to "clincher" from this point forward
in the analysis.
[01/03/07] Jason mentioned another interesting variation on this, the "throwaway decision" -- a
decision made so quickly and so casually that it isn't given serious consideration. It can
be thought of as a variant on a "no brainer" decision, except with little explicit
consideration.

M.49. Norm theory and framing
[11/20/06] There's something here I didn't catch the first time through coding, and it was only when
I was putting together the decision diagram that I noticed it: #17 didn't say anything
about the cost of the motor pool when I first asked him how satisfied he was. This issue
entered the decision frame only after I mentioned that Flexcar was essentially free for
trips during the work day.
I can't shake the feeling that there's something fundamentally important in this. When
asked which factors were important to his decision about a single technology option
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taken in isolation (in this case Flexcar), #17 replied that he didn't think they were
accessible to his location. But when faced with a comparison between two choices, new
issues entered the decision frame. This suggests certain similarities to norm theory
(Kahneman and Miller). We judge things in comparison to what we consider to be
normal. Thus, needs can enter the decision frame based on comparisons to selection
substitutes.
This occured to me as I was walking home with my groceries, thinking to myself that
when I was really in a hurry and needed to be sure of getting somewhere on time, my
bike is a better bet than the bus (which can experience long, unpredictable delays.) But
before I began riding my bike, that wasn't something that I normally disliked about the
bus. It was only when a realistic alternative to the status quo became available that new
issues entered my decision frame.
This also calls to mind Schein's three conditions for change: disconfirming the status
quo, having a better option available, and a realistic plan for implementing that option.
These conditions are linked on a deeper level than I previously suspected. It is precisely
the availability of a substitute that causes new needs to be admitted to the decision
frame which tend to disconfirm the status quo. There's a possible mechanism at work
here which explains why Schein's formula holds true in so many situations.

M.50. Not on the radar
[04/17/06] This whole passage at 11:102 about bicycles not being 'on the radar' is interesting in
terms of what it says about the framing process. It suggests something about the
importance of imitation to framing — structural equivalence, or functional equivalence,
etc. If you see yourself as a professional, you frame your transportation choices
accordingly. If others commute by car, or MAX, or bus, then those are your options.
But if one has a positive view of bicycles from childhood, perhaps it only takes one or
two examples of near-peers using them to commute before you think they may be a
serious option for yourself...
Most significantly, #4 refers to this as "a threshold you break." This suggests that
framing can be a revelation, a sudden insight, a discontinuous change, a gestalt — like
the opening chords to Beethoven's 5th. The 'ah ha!' feeling.
[7/7/06]

[7/10/06]
[7/11/06]

It also seems to hint at something about the difference between a value-centered
adoption and the construction of a technology-centered identity, but I'm not quite sure
yet what it might be.
This business of adopting the norms of near-peers reminds me of Norm Theory
(Kahneman and Miller). Each stimulus recruits its own alternatives.
This is interesting; #5 confirms what #4 was saying, and even uses the same in vivo
phrase "not on the radar" to describe it. Even more significant, #5 says it's highly
resistant to advocacy: "I've had no success in convincing them it's rational or getting
them to change their minds."

[07/24/06] This tracks for #10 too, in quote 14:85:
B:
Had it occurred to you?
#10:

It had occurred to me as like a...it had somewhat occurred to me, but I
hadn't actually done it. I had never biked from where I lived to downtown.
And all of my past biking experiences were much more leisure-oriented,
except for Eugene.

So it appears that an important part of recognizing bicycles as a legitimate candidate for
commuting is to be able to visualize yourself in that situation...a combination of the
vision and 'having a plan for getting there' part of Schein's formula. Part of the
'threshold you break' is just being able to visualize yourself in that situation — which in
the case of bikes, I hypothesize involves dread risk (fear of getting clobbered by cars.)
[08/17/06] In (20:43) #6 gives a different example of something being 'not on the radar' (i.e., a
latent need.) In the course of discussing his excitement over purchasing a new car, he
says:
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B:
#6:

You don't use either [car] to commute down to campus?
Uh, I will, probably, from time to time, as I did last week. And one time
this week, depending on if I have to get down here to some appointment.
Like yesterday, I had a dental appointment. So the bus line...the bus that I
take gets me here a little later than the 8 o'clock that I'm supposed to be
here, but we're pretty liberal about that. So it's work. But if I have to be
here, like for an 8 o'clock appointment, then I'll Park and Ride. So I could
forsee my doing that in future, from time to time, to use the old egg-beater
and drive to Gateway station and park, and take the train. It might be a
coming thing.

Even though we discussed Flexcar earlier in the interview, it never occurs to #6 that
Flexcar might be a better option for getting to a dental appointment (assuming that
appointment is downtcjwn, which may be a big assumption.) But certainly Flexcar is
not on his radar, despite the fact that this application is one of the ones Flexcar has been
pushing the hardest. I guess #6 can't visualize using Flexcar for that purpose...he only
began thinking about it in the context of an emergency ride home, and perhaps that's
the only association he's formed for it (an option which was briefly considered at one
time, but ultimately discarded.) However, in (20:45) #6 seems to imply that when he
has an appointment he's only talking about driving to the Park and Ride — so maybe the
appointment he's trying to catch is out past Gateway. Unfortunately, I didn't ask him
about that...
[06/22/07] See today's entry in bikes for commuting vs. bikes for recreation.

M.51. Perks
[03/01/06] For #3, Flexcar wasn't the driving consideration in the decision to purchase PP+; TriMet
access was. Flexcar is a "perk." But what is a perk?
# 1 says that the initial reason she bought the annual pass was the cost savings; yet over
time this was restructured such that convenience was the main advantage.
Perhaps today's perk is tomorrow's killer application?
# 1 adds that Flexcar was a perk for her as well. Like #3, she had already decided to
purchase the annual pass. Flexcar is one of the perks; thus, it seems that a perk really
isn't a need in the strict sense; by definition, a perk is an advantage that you don't really
"need". An unneeded need, as it were. But over time one can really come to depend on
unnecessary comforts...cell phones spring to mind.
[04/18/06] During the April 18 conversation with Eban Saling this issue came up again — that PSU
didn't intend for Flexcar to be a "perk" or a "fringe benefit" but has a specific objective
(reducing competition for parking spaces.)
[08/08/06] I think #4 gives an important clue in (17:34) as to what a perk is, and what its function
is in the adoption process. In discussing the real-time tracking system offered by
TriMet, it's clear that his adoption of the bus wasn't predicated on the availability of this
perk. However, the inability to control the timing of his trips thru TriMet and the
associated uncertainty caused discomfort which is linked to bus regret. The tracking
system helps alleviate that uncertainty and reduce the potential for bus regret. In turn,
this improves the ability to construct a dominance structure around bus adoption. Thus,
the value of this perk is to cement adoption, rather than trigger it. Perks are needs
which pertain to dominance structuring. Killer applications, on the other hand, are
needs which pertain to the formation of initial interest and a decision to proceed with
the adoption. Perks influence the quality of adoption and may prevent substitution.
Killer applications influence whether the adoption occurs in the first place.
[08/24/06] See today's entry in the Procrastination memo for a very important and unexpected
connection between perks and procrastination. I think this explains why perks may
influence the quality of adoption, but can't by themselves drive the adoption process.
[11/10/06] I'm switching from "killer application" to "clincher" from this point forward in the
analysis.
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M.52. Primary needs, perks, and clinchers
[3/15/06]

A primary need is an important application. It is the basis on which the decision
outcome is rendered. It is hypothesized that people will always have a reason for
making the decisions they do (cf. reason-based choice) but that they may not always be
consciously aware of what these reasons are (tacit or latent needs, vs. explicit or
consciously acknowledged needs.)
A perk is a secondary need which conveys some relatively minor advantage. It is
hypothesized that a perk can never form the basis for the decision outcome.
Alternatively, decisions based solely on perks are relatively weakly held and easily
reversed.
There are two primary psychological uses for perks. First, a perk can be used as a
public justification of a decision outcome if the primary need would encur socially
disapproval, and thus requires concealment. Thus, a perk may serve as a device for
concealing one's true motives in reaching a decision. Because functional needs may be
easier to justify than social needs, it is further hypothesized that perks may tend to be
functional in nature, and that functional perks are often used to conceal primary social
needs or protect them from social attack.
Second, a perk can be used to help construct a dominance structure -- the "patting
yourself on the back" feeling, which is one way of bolstering the ego. It is hypothesized
that perks will tend to be discovered during the differentiation and consolidation phase,
after the primary need has been identified and the decision has been made to use the
candidate. A perk may be used in this manner to reinforce and bolster a decision; after a
committment has been made to a candidate it is hypothesized that the importance of
perks will be inflated in comparison to their importance before the point of
committment.

A "killer application" is the primary need which can only be satisfied by a unique
technology candidate. Identification of a killer application sets up a dominance
condition favoring the candidate to the exclusion of all rival substitutes.
[11/10/06] I'm replacing the term "killer application" with "clincher" from this point forward
throughout the analysis, but I'll leave intact those places I've referred to it in the past as
part of the history of how I got to this point. Retitled this memo from the old title,
"Primary needs, perks, and killer applications"

M.53. Primary/perk vs. functional/social dimensions
[03/15/06] The primary/perk dimension overlaps with functional/social dimension to a certain
extent. I hypothesize that the causal relationship is from functional/social -> to
primary/perk, in other words the type of need — functional or social — helps determine
whether a need is primary or a perk. But how, exactly, does this work? Under most
circumstances it seems like functional needs are in the drivers seat (primary) whereas
social needs are often seen as perks (e.g., socializing).
But not always...

M.54. Procrastination
[5/19/06]

I think there's more to procrastination than economic considerations. They're partly
responsible, but I think even more to the point is the simple strategy of avoiding
unnecessary mental effort. Many times problems take care of themselves after a while,
or somebody else solves them for us, or they don't seem as important after all.
Procrastination can be seen as a decision making strategy: we intend to do something,
we just never get around to it. Thus, image issues are mollified (we meant to...) But
what cuts short procrastination? When do we decide it's time for action? Probably
when there's some sort of deadline involved — here is a clear-cut case in which a
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timeout or count becomes an important factor in the decision making process (e.g.,
"Sale ends Friday!") I also sense there's an important connection here to perks and
'killer applications' — if the relative advantage is based on 'perks' then one might
expect people will endlessly procrastinate due to the mental effort associated with trial
use. On the other hand, a killer application together with a time limit should cut short
procrastination and lead to an immediate trial use.
Something else that's interesting, too, is the parallel to shopping I alluded to in the
interview with #8.1 can window shop for hours without buying something; then when I
finally find that one thing I really want, once I lay out the money it becomes much
easier to buy other things, which perhaps I don't need as much. It's like wandering
around at Powell's, browsing through interesting books, maybe taking them into the
coffee shop, but ultimately returning them to the reshelf not because I didn't want them,
but rather because I didn't want to bother with standing in line to pay for them. 'I'll buy
them next trip' I would say to myself, and sometimes I would and sometimes I
wouldn't. Once again, procrastination in action. As a followup I need to find some
references to this in the consumer psychology literature to this phenomena — I don't
know what they call it, but I intend to find out. I'll hit the PSU library today after the
dog and pony show.
[08/01/06] From my bicycle journal:
It also occured to me that I'm procrastinating about making preparations for
riding in the rain and the cold. I don't know why this is the case. Last weekend
when we made the rounds at the bike shops I had the opportunity to price out
some bike clothing, but I didn't want to spend any money...things are a little
thin during the summer, and Adam's illness has tapped our funds. Nevertheless,
there's something I can't quite put my finger on regarding the procrastination. I
know what I want to do, and am fully resolved to do it, and yet I don't do it
even when I've got the opportunity. It reminds me of what Jason told me about
his grandfather's driving habits ~ he would get stuck in traffic and they wait,
and they wait, until it was almost too late — then he would lurch violently
forward, as if he was trapped by indecision until last-minute panic forced him
to take action. Jason said that was something his dad used to rant about
regarding Jason's grandfather (who was nearly blind and still driving.) I don't
know if this was just a pithy rant or if there's really some kind of physiological
basis to it, but it's interesting that procrastination seems to require some kind of
external event to force action; self-imposed timeouts or counts don't seem to
work as well (maybe this is why I've seen so little evidence of them in the
transcripts??] This is like the risk mitigation practices they teach in project
management, that you should have some clearly defined criteria to put
mitigation plans in effect and then regularly monitor whether those conditions
have been met. Pious (1993, pg. 242) discusses a variety of behavioral traps in
Ch. 21. Procrastination seems to fall within the purvue of what are called time
delay traps — momentary gratification (not expending the effort on thinking)
clashes with long-term consequences (failure to take action.) Behavioral traps
can also be used constructively. From Pious (1993, pg. 252): "For example,
recovering alcoholics, ex-smokers, and dieters often 'screw their courage to the
sticking place' by intentionally trapping themselves in healthful patterns of
living. When entrapment is desired, decision makers should:
•

Avoid information about the costs of entrapment.

•

Refrain from setting limits or evaluation the costs of continuing.

•
Make a public declaration of commitment.
•
Compete with people who are striving toward the same goal."
[See also Brockner and Rubin (1985), cited in Pious.] What I think is
interesting about this is that these guidelines suggest something about the
causal mechanisms for procrastination. Just what that might be isn't clear to me
yet, but the fact that my informants don't seem to be using time limits or counts
to limit their decision process is probably saying something significant about
the psychology of decision making.
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[08/17/06] #6 touches on these issues in (20:30). Even though Flexcar is free, "I haven't looked
into it...probably just being lazy about it, because it does sound like a good deal." He
goes on to say "What was running through my mind, and what runs through my mind
now, is that it's something that might be available to look into, but I'm not strongly
motivated right now, for different personal reasons. I'm getting along pretty well. [...]
[M]y needs perception for Flexcar has not expanded, in other words."
Based on the reading I've been doing over the past few days to develop the Structural
Specification (Hume 1740; Irvine 2006; Schroeder 2004; Frankfurt 1988) I'm
beginning to suspect that a lot of procrastination occurs because the emotions aren't
engaged. It isn't just happening out of mental lazyness; people simply have a hard time
developing any sort of motivation when the emotions aren't engaged, no matter how
good the idea may sound on paper. This would explain why time limits seem to be
involved, but not counts — unless the adoption involved counting down to zero or some
other absolute reference point. Relative counts are unlikely to provide the same degree
of motivation.
#6 considered Flexcar only because he did experience that a sudden emotional need to
get home in a hurry, and once the crisis had passed (with little chance of recurring in
the future) his interest in Flexcar waned and disappeared. He cites an analogy in
((20:30): "It's like people who live in Oregon who may never have been to Mount
Hood because it's so close. Mount Rainer, which I have not been...although I've been
halfway across the world, but I've never been to. ..it's sort of like: it's there, I know it's
there, so I don't feel the urgency." So where does the urgency come from for people
who are visiting Oregon? From the fact that they have limited time on their vacation for
sightseeing. Without the time limit, the emotional feeling of urgency dissapates, and so
does the motivation.
Which brings up the interesting point, raised by #10 in (14:117) and (14:88): the way
he cut short the procrastination was to just do it, to make a leap and give it a try. And
where does THAT come from? Is there an emotional need lurking even here? Perhaps
it's because uncertainty generates its own emotional distress, and thereby provides
motivation for doing something, ANYTHING, just to not have to experience the
discomfort of uncertainty anymore?
There's another interesting quote from #6 in (20:63):
#6:
The Flexcar, that could be...and the thought about it economically,
probably makes sense. But I don't... as I said before, I'm a little lazy about
it. I guess I have the sense, 'Well, that's a pretty good deal, I can look into
it'
Once again, here we have an instance where something makes sense intellectually, but
because it doesn't engage the emotions there's no motivation to proceed. How long can
procrastination last? Indefinitely, I would say...there's no obvious limitation on passive
interest, at least until the Flexcar service folds or there is some other kind of prompting
event that increases the emotional stakes.
The comment in (20:63) about "that little [Honda] Element out there; it might be fun to
drive" is interesting and matches up with #l's evaluation of Flexcar (8:96): "It might be
something fun to do just to drive another car sometime, just for kicks." It is as if both
informants are saying: / might be willing to try it if there were some chance for me to
get something out of it emotionally. But in both cases they're kind of grasping for
straws in terms of a motivation, and they seem to be aware of it.
Maybe this is why the 'disconfirm the status quo' part of Schein's formulation is so
critical. The disconfirmation raises the emotional stakes by heightening people's sense
of alarm (about their own job security.)
[08/23/06] Oh ho, maybe there's something the Humean theory of motivation overlooks here.
Perhaps one of the ways of overcoming procrastination is (initially) the sheer exercise
of willpower to get past the status quo bias of doing nothing. Then, once the emotional
interest develops in the task, it becomes self-sustaining. If that's the case, then
volitional desires could actually plan an important role, if only to provide that extra getoff-your-duff impetus.
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[08/24/06] In (23:66) #8 seems to suggest that part of the reason why she's procrastinating about
Flexcar is that it's a perk rather than a killer application:
B:
And now what is your thinking about it?
#8:
Well, now there's not really...any of the reasons kind of keeping
me...well, helping me procrastinate, which is cost, and thinking that I don't
really need it that much, are sort of waived. Because, I mean, there are a
few times when I think it would be convenient to have it.
"Would be convenient" is kind of a weak need, particularly since it provides only an
occasional convenience and comes at some cost in terms of learning (and stress, but
that comes later.) I hadn't suspected until now that there might be a connection between
perks and procrastination, but it makes total sense from the standpoint of Humean
motivation: a perk is a need which does not by itself provide a strong enough emotional
motivation to ensure taction. Thus, if a technology can only offer a perk as an
advantage, people will procrastinate because they lack enough emotional motivation to
adopt.
[08/28/06] In (23:69) #8 says,
#8:

I think in this case, the inconvenience that we've been experiencing, and
the cost along, is enough to jolt me out of my slumbering state here in terms
of 'Oh, it's not that big a deal'
And yet, based on her e-mail communication to me from last Thursday, she is still
wavering. Evidently inconvenience and cost alone are NOT enough to jolt someone out
of procrastination?
Then again, in (23:71), #8 describes it as a hump: "Once you get past that hump, then
it's usually quite easy."
See today's memo entry for Timers and Counts for important notes about modeling
procrastination as a guard condition.
[08/28/06] Another interesting exchange with #8 in (23:74):
B:
Yeah, I'm reminded of when I go to the mall, and it's like... I can walk
around the shopping mall for a couple of hours and not spend any money.
#8:
Yeah.
B:
You know? And once I've finally actually parted with some money at a
shop, it becomes easier for me to spend money at that point.
#8:
Right. Exactly.
B:
I'm wondering if...is that a familiar feeling?
#8:
I would say so, in this case.
B:
And do you think that's kind of relevant here?
#8:
Yeah, I would say so. And, seeing now that the shirt is not as expensive as
you thought it was, maybe it's on sale now, and so you get it.
Perhaps Cialdini's book will have something to say about this...
[10/09/06] See today's entry for "no brainer" decisions. One thing that's interesting about no
brainer decisions is how action is taken immediately — "just do it", as #10 and #14
describe it. Precisely the opposite of what happens with procrastination - and different
from rejection, too. With rejection at least a decision is taken not to take any action.
With procrastination a decision is taken to act, and yet that decision is not acted upon.
It's like deciding to decide to act, rather than actually acting. It's like Dick Fairley's
remark about "planning to plan" or that cartoon about the "planning sessions".
[10/13/06] In (32:57) #18 describes a negotiating process to increase emotional incentives to
overcome procrastination:
#18: I think in general a lot of times when you're procrastinating, you're
procrastinating because you don't want to, but you know you should. So,
while I know I should, since I don't really enjoy it, it's kind of like...'You
should eat your peas.' And I don't friggin' want no peas. So part of it is
like, 'Well, here's cheese sauce!' ... 'Well, here's exciting music to listen
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to while you have peas and cheese sauce!' You know, trying to put those
things together, like literally trying to find in my downstairs, a CD player.
Trying to put some stuff together, put it on reserve, to get books on tape.
Trying to get used to making my coffee early in the morning so I can drink
it on the way. Putting all these things in place.
[02/25/07] #36 also touches on overcoming procrastination in (33:00-34:00) and provides an
important disconflrming case:
#36: I think for me it was like facing a fear, because I was really afraid to do
this. Just saying, 'Come on! You can do it!' and being willing to deal with
whatever was going to happen - hopefully I wasn't going to be dead by the
end of the day - but whatever was going to be an obstacle, I could figure
out. I am the one leaving at 6:30 in the morning to get going, by myself. /
just did it.
This "just do it" or "making the leap" phenomena seems to be an important way of
getting out of the metastable state of an unsatisfactory status quo. It's not necessarily
the case that people procrastinate because their emotions aren 't engaged, because
clearly for #36 her emotions were engaged — they just were in conflict. She had
emotional needs to get exercise, which were in conflict with her fear of riding. That is
the nature of the "hump" she had to get over. Hume and Irvine talk about this — how
reason works by playing off one emotion against another and thereby achieve better
outcomes. Both #18 and #36 provide examples of this dynamic.
[05/02/07] I've been thinking about the different forms that procrastination can take.
•
Fully intending to do something, andjust never quite getting around to doing
it (being lazy, or trapped by inertia — the status quo is not sufficiently bad)
•
Not being very enthusiastic about doing something inevitable, and dragging
your heels hoping the problem will go away on its own (failure to articulate a
vision)
•

Hesitation, indecisiveness, and vacillation in deciding a proper course of
action (failure to articulate apian)
•
Being bored with something, and engaging in distractions (playing games of
Risk; spending lots of time on formatting) which are more interesting than
the real work (failure to enact apian)
It is important to engage the emotions as a way of breaking out of this pattern of
vacillation. Otherwise, the rational response of "Why I should do this" is
counterbalanced by equally rational responses for "Why I should not do this." This is
deeply connected to the utility property (clincher, perk, wash, drawback, and showstopper) ~ the need to find a strong enough motivation to ensure action of one sort or
another. In rereading this memo, I'm struck by #8's comment above: "maybe it's on sale
now" which echoes what Arthur and Donna told me about running a bakery: have a
sale of one sort of another going on all the time. Why? It gives people that extra added
incentive to act now, as opposed to any other time. A clincher doesn't have to provide
sufficient motivation all by itself. It only has to be sufficient reason to act now, as
opposed to any other time.
See also today's entry in the Intentionality memo.
[06/26/07] After I met with Jeff Mapes today I finally managed to come up with a typology for
procrastination.
•
Denial is inordinate preoccupation with side-issues as a subconscious
strategy for avoiding unpleasant truths. (Tolstoy's story about the soldiers)
Janis and Mann 1977?
•
Vacillation is an inability to achieve closure on a decision. The emotions are
essential to terminating the decision process.
•
Foot dragging is a strategy to delay action in the hope that the need for
action will disappear on its own. Strictly speaking foot dragging is not denial,
for it is a conscious strategy; nor is it vacillation, for the needed action is
usually clear, if unpleasant or undesirable.
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"

True procrastination occurs when a commitment is made to a course of
action, and that course of action is seen as the correct and necessary thing to
do, but the decision maker simply never quite gets around to doing it. It
remains on the to-do list for days, weeks, months, years. The decision maker
is insufficiently motivated to carry out the intended course of action. What is
lacking in this case is sufficient emotional reward for action or punishment
for inaction.

M.55. Prompting Event
[05/08/06] This seems like an example of a "prompting event" or something that forces action
(e.g., our automobile accident in 2002 that totalled our car and forced us to start taking
TriMet.) Otherwise It's* easy to keep procrastinating by keeping it on the 'to do' list
week after week, until finally it drops off from lack of interest. This seems like it might
be a particularly important factor in Flexcar adoption, where signing up for the service
isn't the same thing as trying it for the first time!
[07/24/06] It's interesting that in quote (14:88) that #10 did not procrastinate in his decision to try
riding his bike to work "I took the emotional leap of just doing it...I just did it." The
prompting event in this case may have been the regret associated with buying the pass
('perhaps it's not too late to return it?') together with the fact that he was already having
to expend mental energy on learning the routines of a new job. It's interesting that he
states "Ijust didn't want to think about it, didn't want to deal with it in my own mind."
See research on habit-breaking, cited in Kottonau, Burse, & Pahl-Wostl (2000). This
article gives a nice review of literature touching on my topic and is well worth
rereading.
[10/09/06] #14 gives an interesting discussion in (26:41) — she had several of the prerequisites set
up for a bike commuting trial: dissatisfaction with her car; limited recreational use of
her bike; exposure to biking role models; prompting event. And yet...
B:
Had it ever crossed your mind before then that, in addition to using your
bike for recreational purposes, you might actually be able to use it for
commuting?
#14: Not seriously. We have two people who are faculty in my department who
...one of them, they just recently bought a car, because his wife was saying
'We've got to buy a car.' But they only commuted by bike, everywhere.
The other one has a car, but does commute in by bike. They both live
closer in than I do. And so, I thought...even though they were around and
doing it, / never really seriously thought about it until I saw the 'Bike to
Work for a week '
...she is unable to give it serious consideration because the amount of stuff she must
carry. It's a "deal-breaker" which overrides her desire to explore the possibility.

M.56. Selection Process Bias
[7/12/06]

I met Timo Forsberg at the Bike Summit and then again last night at the Sweet Summer
Cycle event (his cell phone number is listed on the handout, 503.806.3415). However, I
must disagree with the statement he makes here that the point of change is the decision
you make in the morning; rather, it's the decision which unfolds more gradually during
the days and weeks leading up to that first morning you decide to try riding your bike to
work. Adoption is different than selection.
It seems curious to me, but as an outsider to the urban transit world, the conversations
I've had so far with people with an urban transportation background seem to suggest a
certain strange blind spot about innovation adoption (e.g., the meeting I had with
Jennifer Dill, where she immediately recognized my description of selection as being
their prevailing view.) There seems to be a pervasive sense of now-ness in their
thinking, as suggested by the TriMet ridership survey I took earlier in the year. Perhaps
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shaped by their way of thinking about transportation issues, transit agencies seem to
place all of their emphasis on the selection process, and little to none on the adoption
process. It is reminiscent of the divide between the behaviorists, who are interested
only in the external manifestations of the psyche, and the cognitivists, who are willing
to dive into the 'black box'. Transit agencies don't care what people are thinking, they
care what people are doing: it's a purely prescriptive way of looking at the world, and
it's bound up with the research methods they use. (This is a familiar issue from Rogers;
source bias strongly influences the kinds of questions which are asked, and
consequently which methods are used; over time these become the dominant methods,
because they aren't trained to use anything else.)
[07/17/06] Adoption is the process of adding another option to the evoked, inert, or inept set.
Selection is the process of choosing an option from one of those sets. It seems to me
that this has important modeling implications.
The evoked, inert, and inept sets are properties of needs.
When a primary need is generated for which there are no evoked options, it provides
the impetus for an adoption search to try and identify technology candidates. What
happens when there are no inert candidates, either? Does this define a killer
application — a candidate which is the only viable solution to a primary need?
The teme is the association which is created in response to a lack of technology
candidates. Temes have states and behavior, reflecting the evolution of experience
toward the need-technology association. Somehow, when the teme achieves an
equilibrium state with respect to a solution candidate, it triggers some sort of state
change in that need. Perhaps adoption occurs when all subneeds in a need have viable
evoked candidates, or else their relative priority is updated to demote them from
primary needs to perks?

M.57. Sleep on it
[03/10/07] In writing up the issues list for #33 I was struck by something he said ~ when
describing his process for big ticket decisions he said he likes to sleep on it What
happens when we "sleep on it"? It seems like a way of dealing with conflict — just the
opposite of a "no brainer" — something that not only requires thought, but unconscious
processing of thought. Things come to us in our dreams, we turn over the day's events
and get in touch with deeper parts of ourselves that are hard to access when the daytime
narrative self is dominant. It's a time to adjust, to reflect on our goals, to make sure it's
what we really want. It's also a way of buying time for additional information to come
our way. Many times I've found that by waiting, by putting off an immediate decision,
sometimes the problem will solve itself. It's both a strategy for minimizing regret and a
way of structuring a dominant choice. It seems different from procrastination somehow.
Sleeping on it is not an indefinite putting-off; it puts the decision off for a specific,
limited period and allows a cooling off so that rash decisions are not made solely on the
basis of the emotions. Sleeping on it is one technique the rational mind uses to hold the
emotions in check and prevent us from simply reacting to the excitement of the
moment.

M.58. Stretching and Cocooning
[02/23/07] In reviewing the issues list for #26 and #21 it occurred to me that there's another
property here that I've missed up until now ~ mood. This property gets at emotional
energy, focus, openness, opportunity cost - the cost of cognition. As I'm fond of
saying, thinking is hard work and people will avoid it if they can. It takes energy to
follow up on new opportunities, and it's evident from #26, #21, and #18 that people
who are in a period of recovery from physical or emotional trauma are focused on
maintaining their comfort zone. Their focus and energies were directed inward.
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By contrast, several others in the study mentioned wanting to stretch or move beyond
their comfort zone, specifically #10, #14, #20, #23, and #25. This was associated with a
period of personal growth and renewal, of energies directed outward.
I've never seen explicit consideration of emotional mood in previous discussions of
adoption, but the influence of positive and negative affect has been studied in the
context of decision psychology (although not extensively.) See Isen, A.M., Positive
affect and decision making, in W.M. Goldstein & R.M. Hogarth (eds.), Research on
Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.
509-536. This may also be related to the certainty effect (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981) as well as loss aversion. See also Pious pg. 99-100 for discussion of Zelkhauser's
"Russian Roulette" example, as well as Slovic, "The Perception of Risk" pg. 413-429
on the bookshelf; there are also some more Isen references in the back of the Slovic
book. There also seem to be strong ties here to framing as well as self-image (e.g.,
reconnecting with childhood) which brings image theory into it as well.
This property seems to be about emotional mood — but what is mood? What exactly is
being conferred here? It is cognitive or affective? Certainly it seems strongly tied to the
emotions and framing, and operating in the domains of gains/losses (from Prospect
Theory). Some attributes of this property (or is it a category?) include "circling your
wagons", having "too many irons in the fire", having "too many balls in the air",
"withdrawing from the world", "pulling in and taking care of yourself, "having a lot
on your mind"; the antipode of this property includes attributes such as "moving
beyond one's comfort zone", having a "stretch goal", "reaching out" or "engaging"
with the world, etc.
There are structural implications here in the size of the decision frame, and the
willingness to unpack the frame. Unpacking requires emotional and mental energy; it
does not come for free.

M.59. Successful advocacy and opinion leadership
[03/01/06] In a way, #3 put herself out on a limb here. She'd never actually used Flexcar herself,
so by offering it as a solution to the group's problem she was putting herself at
something of a social risk if things didn't work out and they were late to the work
meeting — particularly since she'd only been working for PSU for two months at that
point. As it happens, things not only worked out for the best, but the positive reaction
of her coworkers to the Flexcar innovation transferred to her to some extent.
Somewhere in here there's a social gambit involved in offering new information about
innovations, which if successful may help to improve the informant's position in the
social network (i.e., this is part of how opinion leadership gets built.)
[08/08/06] #4 also puts himself in an advocate's position, but here (17:103) there's less social risk
involved: he's doing it for himself. The benefit is functional rather than social.
[12/29/06] Rosen (2000) has some interesting things to say in Chapter 11 about why people pass
along word-of-mouth information. WOM is new, relevant, and exciting. Telling new
information is rewarding; a feeling of importance rubs off. Having 'inside information'
implies that you are well-connected (i.e., a high-status individual). WOM travels much
faster when you give them a hero; people like to feel good about heroes. Humor also
helps. Articulating what's so special is much of what underlies buzz (i.e., clinchers)

M.60. Technology-centered identity
[07/05/06] I think technology can play an important role in the formation of social identities (e.g.,
the Open Source movement, Linux, bicycles, skateboards, etc.) but the question is:
under what circumstances does this occur? How is bicycle adoption different than, say,
coffee maker adoption? It can't simply be facilitating social interaction, because coffee
makers (arguably) do that. No, it seems like identity construction happens when
technology serves as the glue which binds together the various threads of one's life
(arcs). One constructs meaning from the adoption of technology by using it as a lens

(356)

which brings into focus previously important threads or arcs, and giving them
expression; the act of finding these connections is intense, pleasurable, and deeply
exciting - we feel a powerful need to tell others, to evangelize, to encourage them to
form the same connections. Thus does a bicycle take on greater significance than a
mere means of transportation. Walking is a means of transportation, but I haven't yet
hears of a "walking summit".
[07/11/06] #5 alludes to a technology-centered identity here, which he describes as "bikes-as-alifestyle".
[07/26/06] I hypothesize that part of the construction of such an identity involves rite-of-passage
events like the one #10 relates in (14:99) about riding in the rain. On the other hand, in
a later passage #10 says that his adoption of bicycling is purely function...so perhaps
rite-of-passage is necessary but not sufficient to construct a technology-centered
identity? Or perhaps nqt even necessary...?
[07/27/06] Certainly in #4's case (17:47) there was no discernable rite of passage (unless perhaps it
was riding out-of-control downhill with no brakes!) He seems to have developed an
affinity for recreational bike use based on the socializing within his group of friends at
Reed, and his later use of bikes for commuting seems to have been a natural extension
of his earlier recreational riding.
[08/08/06] There's a nice in-vivo quote from #4 in (17:114):
#4:
Yeah, I think we definitely differentiate ourselves. We would not be
cyclists that would wear [racing] jerseys [laughs] so we're in that category
of not taking cycling seriously in terms of athleticism, but more of a
larger...I don't know, it's more of an identity issue than it's sort of an
athleticism issue. We get around biking, instead of for health, but because
that's what you have to do, that's sort of the way to go.
[09/19/06] During the interview with #25,1 was struck by the fact that this informant is motivated
primarily by internal factors such as the challenge, getting exercise, and learning rather
than external factors. He seems interested in the mechanical details of biking to a far
greater degree than me — and yet he also describes his biking experience as being
primarily functional rather than identity-centered. / see interesting analogies between
functional vs. identity-centered adoption and the three dimesions of religious belief per
Bateson — intrinsic, extrinsic, and seeker. Perhaps functional and identity-centered
adoption are independent dimensions rather than mutually exclusive states; but
devising a test of that would be better done using survey research and factor analysis.
For the Winter Bikes case, it raises the possibility of a hypothesis: informants who rate
low on an identity-centered adoption scale would be less likely to perserve all winter?
But I suppose informants who were biking because of cost issues (high on the
functional scale) might also be likely to continue...
[06/01/07] In looking at the experiences of some of the Winter Bikes informants (esp. #23 and
#27) it is clear that biking culture (or transit-friendly culture, generally) played a role in
their decision to move to Portland in the first place. This is an aspect of bicycling
adoption that can't be explained solely in terms of biking infrastructure: the behavior of
drivers, the atmosphere of bike-tolerance, the supportive attitudes of city government —
these all play a role in the growth of biking and indeed make it possible for the political
will and funding to be found for biking infrastructure. Thus, there are complex
feedback loops operating here, and the physical infrastructure is only part of the
equation. One of the strengths of agent-based simulation is that it makes it possible to
integrate elements from the physical and social environment in a single model. This
would be a good point to stress in the paper I'm proposing for bridging the gap between
traffic field research and multi-agent simulation. What cultural elements make Portland
(etc.) hospitable for biking and transit, and how do these translate into increased
funding and public support for alternative transportation modes? This argues for
explicit consideration of personal and social psychological factors in multi-agent
transportation modeling.
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M.61. Technology cults
[03/02/06] Could this "microcommunity" phenomena be connected in some way to the formation
of "technology cults" like TiVo or the free software movement?
Could perhaps be an indication of the quality of adoption? Perhaps this phenomena
occurs when a particular pattern of needs falls into place with a satisfactory technology
candidate? Could technology be acting like the "floating bit of trash" which provides
the initial impetus to the formation of a microcommunity of like-minded individuals
("cult")?
[07/27/06] Certainly "chopper" bikes seem to have provided an opportunity for shared recreational
outlets among #4's circle of friends at Reed (17:47)

/

M.62. Temors and Momors
[08/19/06] Doing a bit of reading about memetics, to see if my use of this term is way off base.
Evidently, it's not ~ largely because there is no accepted definition of what a meme is.
People have spent quite a bit of time arguing about definitions, in fact (Hales and
Marsden, 2002; Edmonds 2002). Wilkins (1998) traces the development of this term
and points out that it's been applied to quite a number of things; it parallels 60 years of
arguments about what a gene is, until DNA was mapped. There's a nice quote in
Wilkins: "A theoretical term is usually generated to denote a causal nexus in the model
the theory describes. On at least one recent account (Suppe 1989, van Fraassen 1980) a
scientific theory is an attempt to either isolate or idealize a system — usually a physical
system — in such a was that its dynamics can be reduced to a manageable number of
variables (each of which is usually represented by a theoretical term) related by a
mathematical description, so taht the model generates a restricted number of likely
outcome states." That certainly tracks with what I'm trying to do here.
The whole thrust of my theory of adoption is that 'innovations' do not have ontological
status, but are instead emergent, dynamic patterns of how needs are associated with
technologies. That's very close to what Dawkins was talking about in The Selfish Gene
— according to Wilkins, Dawkins only mentioned memes in passing — and entirely
tracks with the idea that innovations are 'run time' structures in computer science
parliance. However, I do not think it is helpful to say that innovations are memes; to do
so would be to repeat the mistake of thinking of innovations, and memes, as objects
rather than relations or associations between objects (here 'objects' is being used in the
CS sense of the term.) Thus, there is nothing 'solid' about a meme; if you want to get at
what is distinctive about an innovation, you have to look at the social or psychological
forces that tend to keep it glued together. Thus, I think it is entirely appropriate to use
the terms meme and teme to describe those forces which hold together (or force apart)
emergent patterns of motives.
Thus, one of the problems with the term 'meme' is that it has been reified, much as
'innovation' has been. Memes, innovations, and temes are not structured objects; they
are a emergent set of relationships brought about by underlying forces, and which
manifest themselves only at run-time when they are instantiated. From Wilkins pg. 6:
"Dawkins' original introduction of the term 'meme' in The Selfish Gene mentioned in
passing statches of tunes, crazes and fads, but the paradigmatic example he gave, no
doubt due to his personal experience of it, was a scientific notion passed from scientist
to scientist. [...] Typically, scientific ideas are either evocative metaphors, like de
Candolle's 'struggle for existence' that inspired Darwin, or more or less formal models.
It is the latter that concerns us here, for when metaphors reach the end of their
evocation, they must be turned into formal models anyway in order to be tested against
quantifiable phenomena. A formal model like Boltzmann's thermodynamic entropy is a
far cry from Heraclitus' notion of flux, and it does a great deal more conceptual work.
The significance of Dawkins1 example is that one can, to a relative degree of exactness,
determine whether and how far a part of whole of a model has spread to another
scientist or textbook, or whatever one takes to be the cultural equivalent of the
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phenotype ~ for reasons I hope become clear, I shall refer to this as the phemotype, and
the total distribution of coadapted memetically constituted traits within a lineage the
phemorph of that lineage. The neologisms are strained, barbarous and ugly, but I hope
they will add some clarity to what is being discussed. In short, scientific examples can
be quantified both in terms of their frequency in a lineage of scientists, and their
relative rates of increase or decrease. This susceptibility to analysis is essential for
modelling change in terms of natural selection and evolution in general."
Others have made this point as well. Dawkins' view of memes as replicators has been
disputed by David Hull, who argued that interaction and not replication was the essence
of evolution; this has been called the Hull-Dawkins Distinction. "Hull's general view of
evolution is of a cycle of replicators coding for interactive traits, which through their
interactive success acquire (or fail to acquire) the resources needed for further
reproduction." (Wilkins 1998, pg. 7)
Wilkins seems to anticipate the point I'm making here. "The view I am advocating here
is neither individualist, nor holist, but a view known as 'emergentism' (Nagel 1961): the
doctrine that the properties of a collective whole arise from the relationships between
the properties of the components. Simply understanding the componential properties,
without understanding the connections between them does not enable us to model the
higher level thing they comprise." (pg. 10)
As Wilkins defines it (pg. 13), "A meme is the least unit of sociocultural information
relative to a selection process that has favorable or unfavorable selection bias that
exceeds its endogenous tendency to change." The 'favorable or unfavorable' part really
seems to anticipate the valence of the teme/meme association. It hasn't occured to me
until reading Wilkins just now, but of course this meme/teme valence is going to
inevitably lead to some kind of selection bias among networks of motives.
Wilkins mentions that one model of memes is epidemological in nature (e.g.,
Goodenough and Dawkins 1994; Lynch 1996; Dennett 1995: 364-368). He likens
memes to a kind of "mind virus". What surprises me is that they seem to be applying
the epidemiological metaphor apparently without any knowledge of the diffusion of
innovations literature!
He raises the interesting point that memes, unlike biological evolution, doesn't make
you more fit; they simply propagate, that's all (cf. Groupthink.)
[08/29/06] It seems to me that the central philosophical question I am addressing, the one which
gets to the heart of my inquiry, is: How is thought organized? What is its logical
structure? What is the nature of the connections linking one thought to another? (glue,
links, chains, logic) How does thought behave, and how does this behavior give rise to
organized structure?
Questions such as What is consciousness? What is the mind? What is intentionality?
What is volition? How are the brain and the mind linked? etc. are related, but tangential
to the question I seek to explore. Questions such as What is a meme? miss the point in
some sense, I think, because they reify the emergent run-time structures of collective
thought rather than seeking to understand the underlying organizing processes; or else,
they attempt to impose an inappropriate genetic metaphor onto the processes of
thought, rather than seeking to understand it in its own terms.
[11/25/06] From the Wikipedia entry on memes, retrieved today:
One important criticism of meme theory hinges on the following question:
"If memes are the solution, what is the problem?"
Critics in this vein point to a dearth of useful applications of meme theory in its two
decades of existence. Beyond highly general explanations of highly complex
phenomena (especially religion), meme theory has yet to produce, according to critics,
a solid case-study of a concrete phenomenon that has gained acceptance among either
scientists or social scientists. Rather, they contend, all memetic studies have done is
translate conventional social thinking into "meme language" - without adding new
explanatory value.
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This criticism continues by asserting that no reason exists for differentiating or
discerning the word "meme" from the word "idea" or from the phrase "pattern of
thought".
In response to these criticisms, a memeticist might characterize the intitial question as
misleading (the word "explanation" or "descriptor" might seem more apt than
"solution"). The creation of the term "meme" - as opposed to "idea" or "pattern of
thought" - allows for specific description and application of the meme as a
phenomenon. Additionally, using a new term such as "meme" allows one to avoid
semantic baggage associated with well-known terms such as "idea"; and conveys a
(mistaken) connotation of novelty.
This cirticism seems to underscore the point I'm trying to make here, that "innovation"
is to "idea" what "feme" is to "meme". If the term "meme" is not simply to be a
synonym for "idea", then there must be some way of clearly distinguishing between the
two — and to my way of thinking, "meme" should stand for the organizing process
which gives rise to an idea. An idea is an emergent, run-time structure; a meme is the
design-time process which gives rise to an idea (the 'glue' which holds an idea
together). In this way of approaching it, innovations and ideas are conceptually
analogous, and differ only in certain aspects of their underlying generating processes.
Innovations require the application of tools whereas ideas do not. Nevertheless,
innovations can have a significant ideational component (what Betz calls the schema of
a technology) as well as a technology component (which Betz calls the morphology of
a technology.)
The question becomes: is there really a clear distinction between and idea and an
innovation? An idea is an innovation which does not require a physical technology; but
what does it mean to say that an idea "requires" something? Is this simply a distinction
without a difference? I'm still puzzling that one out.
[11/25/06] Here's another interesting quote that brings another part of Hume's Treatise of Human
Nature into the fray:
...memeticists have started to see memes not as atomic but as complex interactors in an
environment of other memes and physical entities, a development pre-figured perhaps
in the theory of the association of ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
[citation needed]. However, such a response would require memetics to prove it had
some value to add to such complexity in order to prevent it falling into the same disuse
as the theory of association of ideas.
[...from the entry on association of ideas:]
The theory of the association of ideas is the name of a theory first propounded by
Aristotle (De mem. et rem., 2), where he identified three contexts in which ideas might
be associated.
The three contexts are:
•
Similarity
•
Contrast
•
Contiguity in time or space
Perhaps its most influential classical development was by David Hume in his A
Treatise of Human Nature Part I section IV, and later in An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding 111:19. His three contexts are:
•
Contiguity in space or time
•
Resemblance
•
Cause and Effect
Hume's theory of causation suggests that the third type might collapse into the first, in
that one of his criteria for causal relationships is "constant conjunction" (see e.g. A
Treatise of Human Nature Part III section XTV-XV).
[11/25/06] The Wikipedia entry goes on to list some important criticisms of memetics:
"
Lack of philosophical appeal. Reducing "memes" into their underlying
constituents will invariably mean the loss of important properties and
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richness of context. Another criticism is that memetics seems to reintroduce
or reinforce Cartesian dualism (in this case, gene/meme as an analogy to
body/mind.) My response to this point is covered in the discussion between
the structured and anarchic perspectives, which I see as essentially the same
argument (see today's entry in the "Design-time vs. run-time and the
structured vs. anarchic perspectives".)
•

•

•

•

Explaning, or renaming? Memetics has yet to make any useful predictions or
lead to any useful applications. As yet there seem to be no reason for
distinguishing the term "meme" from the word "idea" or the phrase "pattern
of thought". I have covered this point above: by defining a "meme" more
narrowly as an interaction rather than an object of some sort, a meme
(design-time structure) can be clearly distinguished from an idea (run-time
structure).
Lack of rigor. Memetics does not adequately distinguish between genotypes
and phenotypes. This point is covered above: clearly distinguishing between
design-time and run-time structures helps establish a clear conceptual
difference. Phenotypes are analogous to run-time structures (emergent
structures); genotypes are analogous to design-time structures (generating
processes.)
Analogy with viruses. Some critics have argued that memetics intermittently
applies an analogy with viruses. I think this point can be addressed by noting
the similarity of epidemiology and the diffusion of innovations, as well as the
distinction between a teme and a meme.
Accusations of pseudo-science. There exists no imaginable event which
memetics cannot explain; therefore memetics is a tautology. To address this it
is important to establish the boundaries of the theory ~ when it applies, and
when it does not. "According to some critics, memetics has joined
extraterrestrial, exo or xenobiology as a science devoted to a subject matter
whose very existence remains in dispute!" (Blute 2005)

[03/09/07] To avoid unnecessary confusion and controversy, I think it's probably better to propose
a name other than "meme" to denote the relationship between two needs. In keeping
with my nomenclature I've decided to call it a "mome" (for MO-Motive rElation) while
"teme" continues to stand for TEchnology-Motive rElation). I can then use meme to
refer exclusively to the emergent structure, analogous to an innovation. A mome is to a
meme what an teme is to an innovation, or a genotype is to a phenotype (although I'm
not quite sure if the last analogy holds; I don't know enough about phenotypes and
genotypes to be sure.)
The distinction between design-time and run-time structures reminds me a bit of Plato.
A design-time structure is an archetype; it is akin to one of Plato's ideal forms. A runtime structure has been instantiated.
[04/15/07] I've decided to throw in the towel on "meme". It's just too loaded down with baggage. I
think one major problem here is that memes have inappropriately combined two
different levels of analysis: interaction and replication. I'm interested applying the
interactive aspects of the meme construct without getting dragged into the controversies
about its replicative aspects, which I do not asubscribe to.
I also noticed today that the Journal of Memetics ceased publication in 2005 due to lack
of quality submissions. Edmonds (2005) writes an obituary for the concept. In certain
respects I'd say good riddance ~ I think memetics has become too idealogical and
associated with the agenda of fundamentalist atheists like Dawkins and Blackmore. The
meme concept is just too tainted by its origins in evolutionary biology and its ongoing
war with organized religion. Interestingly, Gatherer (2005) argues that reapproaching
memetics from the standpoint of object-oriented analysis could help to rescue memetics
from its 'malaise'.
That's not to say that the meme idea didn't have certain virtues ~ it joins catastrophe
theory and other failed systems concepts in that respect. It may return someday in a
new guise.
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So anyway, to eliminate any suggestion of a tie to memetics, I've decided to rename
temes to temors (TEchnology-MOtive Relation) and momes to momors (MOtiveMOtive Relation).

M.63. The 'Ah-ha!' Experience
[7/7/06]

Over and over again I find myself returning to the theme of gestalt psychology and
sudden flashes of insight; sudden and unexpected connections; solutions that occur to
you in a flash; events, discontinuous change, punctuated equilibrium, etc.

[7/10/06]

The "ah-ha!" phenomenon could be a sign that there is a change in a metastable state,
settling into a new "ground level".
[07/31/06] See Benson (1999, pgr 98) for a tie to insight learning theory (Kohler) and gestalt
psychology.
*
[08/01/06] #4 lends some interesting insight on this phenomena in quote (17:84). It seems like
these insights aren't quite so sudden as they first appear — preceding the sudden
realization is a slow period of gaining experience with the technology (thereby
mitigating the potential for unknown risks and dread risks), observing role models,
becoming discontent with one or more aspects of the current option. The insight only
comes once the state of the system is primed and ready for it (cf. Schein's conditions for
change, and Goldspink's discussion of the sensitivity of a system to external shocks; see
also self-organized criticality and catastrophe theory). See the memo entitled "From the
inert set to the selection set".
[10/13/06] It appears that emotions are necessary to the 'ah ha' insight. Support for this idea
comes from Damasio's work with hyperrational patients (cited in Irvine, pg. 113-115)
who seem unable to terminate the analysis process for even simple decisions like
scheduling the next doctor's appointment. It makes sense, really, because the sentiment
of "just do it!" is inherently nonrational. It also reminds me of Penrose's argument in
The Emperor's New Mind that cognition is inherently noncomputational: computers
lack the capacity to step outside of an argument and recognize when it's unsolvable (the
halting problem.) This seems like a very important fact worth restating: the famous
"haltingproblem" in computer science occurs because computers lack emotions, which
are essential to terminate the analytical component of decision making. Pure
computational analysis cannot terminate. The halting problem of computer science is
familiar to us by another name: "analysis paralysis."

M.64. The framing, adoption, and selection processes
[03/02/06] I think technology use may be understood in terms of three distinct, but interrelated
processes.
Framing refers to the process of identifying which needs are relevant to achieving
some intention, goal, or mission. (The actual formation of intention is way beyond the
scope of this theory.) It is not assumed that this process is rational or planned; rather, it
is assumed that framing is principally an associative activity, based on the history of
past decision outcomes. (See Antonie letter's presentation on fuzzy cognitive mapping - lots of potential for modeling the framing process here.) In the decision psychology
literature no one has yet proposed a comprehensive theory of framing (cf., Beach and
Lipshitz 1996.) I believe the reason for this is that framing is an inherently run-time
phenomena which is steeped in history (cf., Heidegger's 1949 Letter critique of Sartre,
discussed in Introducing Existentialism pg. 110 ff.) In discussing the design-time
structural and behavioral aspects of the framing process, one must be careful not to
assume that the whole process has been described. It is history-dependent; the run-time
aspects are crucial. (Thus, it cannot be fully described even in principle, but it can be
simulated.)
The needs which are identified by the framing process constitute the framing set. To
avoid having to consider needs individually — a cognitively expensive task ~ the

(362)

framing set can be collapsed or reframed into a single need which is composed of
many subordinate needs. "I need to go grocery shopping" entails a whole constellation
of subordinate needs, some of which have prior solutions, which are assumed in order
to avoid the cognitive cost associated with having to redecide them every time
(learning). It is possible to unpack a need into its constituent subordinate needs, but
this process requires deliberate thought as framing is a largely unconscious process.
Adoption refers to the process of forming associations between needs and technologies
which relate to those needs. There are three potential outcomes: a technology can be
evoked (brought to mind through positive memories) on the basis of the needs in the
framing set; it can be inept (brought to mind through negative memories) and hense
avoided in this situation; or it can lie inert — judged potentially useful on the basis of
older memories, but not a frequent choice and hense not as easily recalled during the
act of technology selection. Adoption is the process of forming evoked (useful), inert
(potentially useful), afod inept (contraindicated) associations between needs and
technologies.
Selection is the process of choosing a technology to solve a need presently at hand on
the basis of prior associations.
[11/20/06] See today's "norm theory and framing" memo for an interesting insight on the framing
process.

M.65. The incommensurability of regret
[07/25/06] There seems to be a certain incommensurability to regret. Regret is a feeling of conflict
over the outcome of a decision, but that conflict stems from factors which are particular
to the decision; thus, it is difficult to compare regret in one situation to regret in
another, since the underlying factors are often different.
As #10 says here (14:93) 'I just missed the bus' triggers feelings of social guilt due to
being late to work. Not so purchasing the annual pass; in that case, the regret seems to
stem more from squandering money unnecessarily. Thus, the underlying causes of the
regret are different. So regret is useful mainly as a way of generalizing feelings of
internal conflict over the outcome of a decision, but it is important to unpack that regret
before it can shed light on just why the regret is occurring.
[02/23/07] Maybe regret is incommersurable because it's a general process rather than an "object"
to be reified. Maybe regret occurs as we shift from the domain of gains into the domain
of losses? (See Prospect Theory)

M.66. The Morning Debate
[05/17/07] At IAMOT 2007. During the composite sequence analysis for Winter Bikes I keep
coming across examples of 'the daily debate' — informants who (due to circumstances
or personal decision making style) elected to make transit mode decisions on a day-byday basis, vs. those who preferred to surrender to habit (collapsing the decision).
There's a nice in vivo quote from #33: "I'm a different person before I've had my
morning coffee and make decisions on a different basis." See hen (1997) affect and
decision making (PSY 510 notes).
Habitual: #20, 21, 26, 27, 36
Daily debate: #22, 23, 25, 31 (see F13:15), 33, 41
Regardless of whether they were able to collapse the decision into a habit or not, the
continuance/discontinuance rate doesn't seem to be significantly different between the
two groups. A bigger sample would be needed.
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M.67. "This idea has changed my life"
[03/20/06] A bit of hyperbole, perhaps, but there's a lot of stuff lurking in this quote. I wish I knew
what the person quoted in this article meant by lawyers not wanting to visit clients in a
car like this (presumably a violation of the image that successful people drive big,
expensive cars) as well as what she meant by "this idea has changed my life."
[07/10/06] Alternatively, perhaps a life-changing experience results when adoption of a
technology triggers the collapse of self-image problems occuring in another, unrelated
part of one's life. The technology then becomes the key which unlocks the door to other
ways of constructing meaning from the world. I would not expect this phenomena to
happen in all cases of adoption — only those situations where the state of the cognitive
system is in a "high-cost" mode, i.e., the individual is expending a lot of mental cycles
dealing with stress, anxiety, uncertainty, etc. and finding the technology (or other key
idea) triggers a collapse in these other problems so that a solution manifests itself, thus
relieving the individual from the burden of having to continue to expend mental
resources on these personal problems. This need not be a complete collapse; but it
should be enough to result in a significant savings in cognition. Thus, there would be a
difference between "value-centered" adoption and "identity-constructing" adoption.
[07/24/06] In (14:87) #10 also discusses a period of change in his life (starting a new job) and that
this served as a catalyst for taking the leap and biking to work. This ties in with
Lewin's unfreezing and attitudes of psychological openness to new possibilities, but
this type of change seems different and contrasts to "this idea has changed my life" as
cited above. In that article the informant is reflecting back over all the changes that the
technology has brought about; it's retrospective as opposed to the immersive kind of
change that #10 discusses; #10 was in the moment, not reflecting on a moment that had
passed.
[10/09/06] In (26:27) #14 contextualizes her decision to begin riding MAX and using Flexcar as
part of a broader theme of using less consumable resources like gas, and simplifying
her life. This was triggered by a move from a larger house to a condo and the
subsequent downsizing of her possessions. She did not say what prompted the move —
and I didn't ask her — but one guess would be that after 29 years working at PSU (see
26:18) #14 is planning for her retirement, and this life-change has prompted her to
reevaluate priorities she had previously accepted without a lot of critical reflection. She
mentioned exercising more, and buying a bicycle which she is using for recreational
purposes. This parallels what I recently heard in the first round of Winter Bikes
informants (esp. #20 and #23) who became empty-nesters and entered a period of
reevalation of who they are now, and got back in touch with bicycles as a way of
reconnecting with something that had been important to them at an earlier stage of
their lives.
[10/13/06] See the 9/21/06 entry in the "bike culture vs. mass transit (non)culture" memo.
[11/07/06] In coding the issues list for #10 I am struck by this quote in (14:87): (edited for clarity)
#10: In the back of my mind it was like 'You could bike that. You can definitely bike
that.' But I had this emotional... like, you know... Ijust didn 't want to think
about it, didn't want to deal with it in my own mind. There's the whole, 'Is it
going to be safe? It's going to be cold, it's going to be wet. Is your bike good
enough? You 're going to get hit by a car.' And then, just like the second day I
worked here, I was in this moment of change in my life, I was starting a new
job. And Ijust put on my bike clothes, andlbiked to work. Ijust did it.
This "experimental moment" strikes me as one of the salient features of the personal
dimension on adoption, at least as far as bikes are concerned. Rationally there are all
kinds of arguments that can be made against biking, especially all-weather biking. But
he set aside those concerns, and in no small measure because an experimental moment
was taking place in his life; it is a moment when habits are interrupted. As JMS says in
The Deconstruction of Falling Stars, "Salah -- pause and consider." (I'm not sure how
the Hebrew word is spelled.) This "emotional leap" seems to set the personal dimension
on adoption apart from the social or functional dimensions.
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M.68. Timeouts vs. Counts
[5/19/06]

Timeouts seem more potent than counts, and I am finding more examples of timeouts
in my interviews. Perhaps that is because timeouts tend to be 'hard' and associated with
absolute dates ("Sale ends Friday!") whereas counts tend to be more relative, at least
when they're self-imposed. For example, I may begin shopping for a car by deciding
that I want to look at at least three models, but once I'm in the showroom it's easy to
lose this resolve (why three? It's entirely arbitrary.) Of course, there are also examples
of externally-imposed counts that are absolute ("Limit one per customer!") but
somehow I'm having trouble visualizing examples of how a count would influence the
decision making process in the same way as a timeout.
Unless a count influences the transition path sequence (e.g., count < 1, count = 1, count
> 1 forcing three different paths) whereas a timeout tends to influence the occurence of
triggering events ("Sale ends Friday! Act now!")
An interrupt can serve as a limit, too. "I've been meaning to do something about that,
and this event just reminded me that I need to fish or cut bait."
This reminds me of something Donna said about running a bakery: always have
something on sale. This gives people a reason to come in, as opposed to procrastinating
by continually thinking about coming in but never actually bothering to do it. A sale is
a reason to come in today, and not to wait for something better to come along. It's about
playing on one's fears of loss or regret!

[08/17/06] See today's entry in the procrastination memo for some important thoughts about
timeouts and counts.
[08/24/06] In (23:68) #8 discusses setting various arbitrary timeouts as a strategy for overcoming
procrastination (Feb., then May, then Aug) ~ and blows right through them. The
problem is that if the intellect sets these deadlines arbitrarily, then it can violate them
just as arbitrarily. This is predicted by Irvine's theory of motivation. "My intellect will
have a hard time justifying the terminal desires it forms...my intellect will be unable to
come up with anything more profound...than a feeble, 'I just wanted to.' Indeed, my
intellect could just as easily have formed the opposite desire...and it knows it. For this
reason, nonhedonic terminal desires tend to be pale, insubstantial things." (Irvine,
2006, pg. 71)
[08/28/06] Another interesting exchange with #8 here in (23:73):
B:
...what's the difference - what in your mind was different - that said 'Okay, now
is the time to do it'?
#8: I'd say two things. The cost of...two cost issues, sort of. The gas price is going
up, and learning that Flexcar, maybe it's worth the (when I thought it was) $25.
But that's not...when gas is $1.50, or $1.40, it's not that big a deal. When it's
$3.09, it's kind of a different deal. The $25, then... it pays for itself quite quickly.
And then, the other thing is the convenience. I mean, we don't have to do this
anymore, then we don't have to worry about...if [my husband] has something
going on that day, he won't have to worry about this. I will go do it, I will take
care of it. So it's taking on the responsibility.
And yet, based on her e-mail of Aug. 24, #8 has not yet taken action to sign up for a
service which is essentially free. Perhaps in part this is because there are no hard,
externally-imposed deadlines; neither the gradually rising gas prices (a count) nor her
self-deadline of August to sign up for the service (a timeout) proved to be sufficient.
Just as her intellect self-imposed a limit, it could just as easily rationalize its way out of
cancelling it if the emotional commitment wasn't there ~ thus counts and timeouts are
only as powerful as the underlying emotional motivation. This suggests that there may
be a cancellation mechanism which operates if the timer expires without finding a killer
application. Procrastination is not a state so much as a recurrent pattern of
timer/count expirations and reschedulings: procrastination is a guard condition.
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M.69. TTM: The Hummer and the Bicycle
[08/17/06] Last night I went ahead and computed the TTM scores for the Passport Plus informants.
I had hypothesized that, if I sampled across the full range of CBAM scores, then I
could expect to see a similarly uniform distribution of TTM scores. That was not the
case. There was a "central tendency" (in a loose sense, since the TTM produces ordinal
data) toward the contemplation and action stages. No informants were found in the
precontemplation or maintenance stages, suggesting that something else is going on
here. The CBAM appears to be tapping something different than the TTM, lending
support for the notion that adoption and rejection are not flip sides of the same coin.
My best guess at this point would be that the TTM is tapping an axis of sentiment about
car culture, from precontemplation at one extreme (exemplified by Hummers,
'conservation is a private virtue', 'global warming is a hoax1, 'we're not running out of
oil') to maintenance at the other (exemplified by bikes for commuting, Car Busters
magazine, Peak Oil). If this were true, then administering the TTM questionnaire to a
group of Hummer owners and attendees at a Peak Oil potluck would tend to produce
opposite classifications. I might expect the informants in my bike cohort (at least the
ones who no longer own cars) to score high on the maintenance scale.
It's tempting to use the Hummer and the Bicycle as symbols of these opposite extremes,
but the bike in particular is an imperfect symbol. Commuter biking might be a good
symbol of environmentalism, but recreational biking is not; one might well imagine a
4WD Hummer toting a mountain bike on the back bumper. In fact #4 alludes to this
contradiction in (17:133). Certainly many people who consider themselves part of a
larger 'bicycle community' have environmentalist sentiments and may tend to view the
bicycle as a symbolic identity of sorts — but that picture is complicated by the
knowledge that there are many types of cyclists. These indicate many cultural fault
lines operating within the 'bike' subcommunity a la Abbott's The Chaos of Disciplines.
But the Passport Plus informants fell in between these opposite extremes — all of them
within the contemplation category ('Cars are a problem for the environment, and I'm
probably contributing to it, but what can you do?') or the action category ('It's not a
perfect solution, but at least I'm trying.') In retrospect this makes sense. Many of these
informants own cars, and in any case buses and Flexcars are gasoline powered vehicles
themselves. Mass transit allows its adherents to plausibly maintain that they have
reduced their carbon emissions, but obviously they have not eliminated them entirely.
And yet, this dimension seems different from a technology cult somehow. It seems to
pertain more to the self-image arc which precedes adoption, and thus applies more to a
functional aspect. Or maybe what I'm seeing is that Passport Plus just lends itself more
to functional adoption (and hense does not lend itself to the formation of affinity groups
and subcultures) whereas Bicycles lend themselves more to affinity adoption and
subcultures? If that's the case I would expect to see informants in the Winter Bikes case
scoring more in the action and maintenance categories than the PP+ informants.

M.70. Using behavioral traps to overcome procrastination
[07/24/06] On reading this passage from #10,
"The idea is that it motivates me to get on my bike, and it definitely motivates me
not to drive my car." (14:76)
...I was struck by something I had also read from #5's interview:
"And I thought, 'If I have that, that will encourage me not to want to drive.'"
(11:85)
There's an aspect in which deliberately burning one's bridges can act as a motivator to
stick with something. This is a deliberate strategy to use the irreversability of the
decision and regret as a positive motivating force to overcome discounting and ensure
continued application of will. This is saying something very important about needs,
how the perception of needs is plastic and changes with time. Long-term needs that
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require the application of willpower, like exercising for health, tend to get
overwhelmed by short-term desires which promise immediate gratification, like being
lazy, sitting around watching TV, and eating ice cream. Commiting to an irreversable
course of action can be a positive boon because it harnesses regret to keep up the
motivation. The influence on decision making is through the framing process in some
way.
[07/26/06] This is echoed in #10's decision to return the PP+ pass (14:102) because not having the
pass meant that in good weather "there's no excuse not to bike." Presumably if he had
the pass he'd be feeling like he's wasting money on it if he doesn't use it, therefore it
becomes an excuse to avoid biking (and thus the unpleasant prospect of exercising.)
[07/27/06] #4 gets at this too, in (17:42): "I feel like if I have the Passport it will be easier for me to
roll out of bed and go 'Ah, I'll just get on the bus today.' This is something to followup
on with the bike cohort: do they have a TriMet pass? And what impact does that have
on their resolution to keep riding their bikes?
[08/01/06] See also the discussion of behavioral traps in Pious (1993).
[08/11/06] Irvine (2006) discusses this issue on pg. 75ff. "...although the intellect cannot command
the emotions to commit to one of its projects, it might be able to trick them into
committing." Perhaps as a way ofgetting past procrastination?
[10/13/06] See #18's comment in (32:37):
#18: And I pay $5 a day! I don't have a parking pass. I've been paying $5 a day since
October. I don't do it every day, sometimes I take the bus. But I keep paying $5 a
day because I don't want to get a parking pass, because I'm working towards
going on the bus every day.
She bought the transit pass to serve as a behavioral trap which would encourage her to
ride the bus every day, but it didn't provide sufficient motivation for her to overcome
her aversion to the bus (plus the fact that she's not a very organized person — one might
fairly conclude that her 'disorganization' is really a subconscious effort to sabotage her
own efforts to ride the bus.) She's been caught in a behavioral trap of her own devising.

M.71. Value-centered adoption
[03/28/06] #3 took the job based in part on her ability to utilize the technology — thus the desire to
adopt the technology constitutes an important force in her life.
[05/25/06] This seems to have been a factor for at least a couple of other informants (#10).
[07/10/06] ...and #5 as well, with his decision to purchase a house based in part on the commute.
[07/12/06] This is not the same thing as construction of a technology-centered identity. Here her
technology adoption is value-centered; a technology is chosen which comports with her
self-image and values. By contrast, a technology-centered identity actually seems to
have the power to reshape the values themselves. "I wanted to be able to use mass
transit, so I chose the PSU job" is somehow different from "I see myself as part of the
bicycling movement." But how? Perhaps in value-centered adoption, the self-image
comes first, leading the individual to adopt the technology; whereas in construction of a
technology-centered social identity, the adoption of the technology comes first,
followed by positive changes in the individual's social structure (networks) triggering
changes in self-image and personal values?

M.72. Wilsonville: Forced Rejection
[2/28/06] #3 wanted to make greater use of the technology (public transportation, Passport) but not
always able to use it herself ~ particularly when she was working in Wilsonville. She
was thwarted by availability issues. She was forced to reject public transportation,
despite having a favorable attitude and wanting to adopt. Instead, she had to rely on
driving her car.
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APPENDIX N. NETWORK DIAGRAMS
In Atlas-ti network diagrams are the principal vehicle for axial coding, each
category having its own diagram. These diagrams are used to establish linkages among
the properties and dimensions of each category.
N. I. Developing an Interest
This category pertains to the development of initial interest. Commuter biking
and recreational biking are often described as different worlds: "a threshold you
break". Why is this? How are bicycles seen as solutions to such disjoint sets of needs?
This category seems to be saying something fundamental about the nature of
innovation: Why do certain types of innovation regularly originate with people on
society's margins?

Bicycle adaption as a series of challenges

Figure 100. Network Diagram for "Developing an Interest"
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N.2. Exploring the Possibilities
This category is about exploring the need for an innovation: discovering
whether it would be something really useful (a clincher), or just nice to have (a perk).

' I t was heaven., .and it was damned!"

Dominance structuring: Convenience vs
cost

Deal-breakers

N
"No brainer" decisions
Clinchers
| | | N e e d , primary™ j

tt

Psy, dominance structuring™ |

^

Functional needs vs. social needs

1

Primary needs, perks, and clinchers

/

Needs

vs<

advantages

' Functional needs vs. self-irrage needs
\$% Need, secondary™ |

Prirrary/perkvs. functjonal/social

Normtheory and frarring

Trying to take advantage of a perk

N^

"I didnt have all iry transportation
j s s u e s XTte/i
o u t -,

^ /

t Candidate, need seeking'

Not on the radar
|

\

|$|Need, latent" I

J

Figure 101. Network Diagram for "Exploring the Possibilities"
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Learning and unlearning

N.3. Getting Over the Procrastination Hump
This category is about balancing the value of adoption against the time and
effort required to make a decision. This process manifests itself through status quo
bias, social loafing, reticence to act, and similar psychological mechanisms. Why do
something rather than nothing? Is there an easier way?
M | Corn stress" | . ,

is part of

\tj

C°m fear~"|

rritigates
|^|Com,farriIarity~|'

Social loafing

| f j Unit, count^j
Changing your rrind

[ffr Unit, interrupt^

Step on I

Figure 102. Network Diagram for "Getting Over the Procrastination Hump"
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N.4. Thwarted Intentions
This category is about what happens when needs are thwarted: involuntary use,
blocked use, involuntary discontinuance, and blocked discontinuance.

Gresham: car pool flexibility

Wilsonville: car pool flexibility

Figure 103. Network Diagram for "Thwarted Intentions"
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N.5. Collapsing the Decision
This category is about balancing the pros and cons of a set of options to arrive
at a final, summary judgement (collapsing).

Bike routes as fishing holes

Bicycle adoptbn as a series of challenges

Adoptbn as an equilibrium state

Coadopttan?

E-mail as a rrerrory supplement

"1 discovered that I didnt really rrind"

Collapsing decisions

Figure 104. Network Diagram for "Collapsing the Decision"
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N.6. Becoming a Habit
This category is about gaining experience, obtaining mastery, and becoming
comfortable with use of an innovation - in other words, the process of habit formation.
$ | Corn tirre utilization"-1 ^

is part of

t S Candidate, use fearning~|

Using behavioral traps to overcorre
procrastination

Collective adoptbn and the origins of

gjfij

Making the best use of your tirre

Adoptbn vs. retention ^ ^

adop(fon as a

^

rf

chai|enges

/

\

Adoption as puzzle-solving

/

\
Bike routes as fishing holes

Sleep on It

"Hie Morning Debate

Figure 105. Network Diagram for "Becoming a Habit"
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N.7. Constructing a Narrative
This category is about the process of constructing stories o f why' our decisions
unfold as they do.

Using behavioral traps to overcome
procrastination

Is regret the inverse of dominance
structuring?

Making a virtue out of a necessity

Are dorrinance structuring and spin
synonymous?

Dorrinance structuring: Convenience vs
Cost

1 ^ Psy, discounting^ |

"1 cant lose."

Adoption vs. retention

Figure 106. Network Diagram for "Constructing a Narrative"

N.8. Adoption as Means
This category relates to the functional dimension of technology adoption.

Automobiles as addccicns/attachrrents

T I » The Humrer and the Bicycle

From the selection set to the Inept set
From the selection set to the Inert set

Value-centered adoption

1
Functional needs vs. self-image needs
Functional needs vs. sodal needs

Figure 107. Network Diagram for "Adoption as Means"
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N.9. Adoption as End
This category relates to the social dimension of technology adoption.

Primary/perk vs. functional/social
dlrrensions

'Pretty ridiculous things"

'An inflationary aspect to the argurrent"

Mlcrocortminlties
Functional needs vs. social needs

Fromthe inert set to the selection set

\ffc Image, arc~|
Bicycle adoption as a series of challenges
TTM: The Hurrrrer and the Bicycle

Figure 108. Network Diagram for "Adoption as End"
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N.10. Adoption as Quest
This category relates to the personal dimension of technology adoption.
> | $ | Image, successful~|
Stretching and cocooning

1 ^ Irrage, values~|

Being a professional

Being a kid

IQlrB^fan-l

Everyday PtenorJology
Buyer's remorse

Fromthe selection set to the inept set

Functional needs vs. self-image needs
"This Idea has changed rry llfe"\

..Cursing at God, saying 'Gve m ^
morel' Can you give me morel"'
\

Bicycle adoption as a series of challenges
Functbnal needs vs. social needs

Fromthe setectbn set to the Inert set

Bikes for corrrruting vs. bikes for
.recreation

Bike commuting perceptions - novice vs.
experienced

TTM: The Humrrer and the Bicycle

^
•->rajS Irrage, arc~!

Autorrobiles as addictions/attachments

Figure 109. Network Diagram for "Adoption as Quest"
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N. 11. The Structural Model
This diagram links memos pertaining to the structural aspects of the GAM.

Collective adoption and the origins of
desire

Design-tirre vs. run-tirre and structured
vs. anarchic perspectives

Functional needs vs. self-image needs

Intentbnality

Stretching and cocooning

Folbwup items in the final case report
Deal-breakers

Figure 110. Network Diagram for "The Structural Model"
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N.12. The Behavioral Model
This diagram links memos pertaining to the behavioral aspects of the GAM.

Exposure as an interrupt

\
Learning and unlearning

Interest "expiration date?"

From the selection set to the Inert set
Fromthe selection set to the inept set

F r a m t h e inert s e t t 0 t h e setectk)rl

**

Design-time vs. run-tirre and structured
vs. anarchic perspectives

Grounded Agent Modeling

Figure 111. Network Diagram for "The Behavioral Model"
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APPENDIX O. SEQUENCE DATA

TABLE 21. EVALUATION PROCESS CODES
Tag
1ST

Code
First application

Description
First use of an option to address a situational need (note: not
necessarily the first use of the option.)
ATT Attribute event cause Judging the cause of an event within the present situational context
Removing a contingency between a need and an option (i.e., its
CON Consolidation
suitability no longer depends on another motive.)
Determining
the needs of the present situational context.
CXT Evaluate event context
A nuanced association between a need and an option (i.e., its
DIF
Differentiation
suitability now depends on another motive.)
Judging
a technology option to be a good solution to a situational
DOM Dominance structuring
need.
EVTE Evaluation event
Evaluating a situational need and/or a technology option on the basis
of new information.
IGN Ignore option
Ignoring the event which prompted the evaluation.
INT Interest
Expressing interest in a potential solution to a situational need.
NEV Negative evangelism Discouraging others from using an option.
NOP No operation
Discard the token without taking action (internal code).
PEV Positive evangelism
Encouraging others to use an option.
TRY Trial use
A technology option is judged sufficiently promising that its use is
warranted, given the right circumstances.
UON Update optional need A change has occurred among the needs which must be satisfied for
an option to be viable.
USN Update situational
A change has occurred among the situational needs.
needs
VAL Access event valence Assessing the value of an event to the current situation.
VIO Violation
A technology option is judged to be a mismatch to a situational need.
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TABLE 22. MAINTENANCE PROCESS CODES
Description

BLK
Use block
BLKR Use block
removed
BUY Purchase
equipment
JUNK Dispose
EVTM Maintenance
event
EXP
Expiration
FIX
Repair
SELL Sell
SUB
Subscribe
UNS
Unsubscribe

An external block is thwarting further action.
Removal of the external block which was thwarting action.
An equipment purchase is required to use the technology.
Dispose of a technology (junk it.)
Action is required over and above what is normally involved in evaluating
or using the technology.
Subscription expires.
Equipment repair is required to use the technology.
Sale of equipment required to use the technology.
A subscription (or renewal) is required to use the technology.
Unsubscription is required to discontinue using the technology.
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TABLE 23. SELECTION PROCESS CODES
Description
Actually carrying out the selected course of action.
Action initiated
Assess optional need Determining additional needs which must be satisfied for the option to
be considered as a viable solution.
A prompting motive is judged in immediate need of action.
AR
Action required
Sufficient time and effort have been expended on this topic, and it is
CLO
Closure timeout
time for a decision.
exceeded
An intention is formed to use a technology option.
CMT Commit to option
A motfve prompts the need for technology use.
EVTS Selection event
Determining which needs are relevant to the present situation.
FSN
Frame situational
needs
MO
More than one option may be used to satisfy the needs of the situation.
Multiple options
MT
Make tradeoff
Trading off needs when no single option presents a dominant
advantage in the situation.
No
options were found which will satisfy the situational needs.
NO
No options
00
One option
Exactly one solution option was found which satisfied the needs of the
situation.
Consciously or unconsciously delaying implementation of a decision.
PRO
Procrastination
QUIT Abandon motive
A prompting motive is judged in immediate need of action but there is
a lack of options. The prompting motive is abandoned.
QUITX Can't abandon motive A prompting motive is judged in immediate need of action but there is
a lack of options. The prompting motive cannot be abandoned.
QUO Status quo
A prompting motive is judged not in immediate need of action.
RCL
Recall option
Mental recall of an option which may be useful in the current
situation.
RSN
Refraining the current situation in such a way as to simplify the
Reframe situational
needs
decision task.
SCO
Screen option
An option is evaluated to determine whether it satisfied the needs of
the present situation.
SEN
Sensitive motive
A prompting motive exists for which there are no good solutions.
ACT
AON

TABLE 24. INTERRUPT GROUP CODES
SH

Seek help

SI

Seek information

Description
Seeking personal assistance (as opposed to information) from an
experienced party.
Seeking information other than personal assistance from one or more
sources.
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TABLE 25. EVALUATION PROCESS SEQUENCES
1

PP+

1/3

Interested in Flexcar

EVTE CXT VAL ATT DON INT S I TRY

3

PP+

3/2

Interested in Flexcar

EVTE CXT VAL ATT DON INT TRY

6

PP+

3/2

Evaluating first Flexcar use

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST DOM

7

3/2
4/2
5/1
6/3
6/3

Regular Flexcar use
Regular Flexcar use
Interested in Flexcar
Flirts with Flexcar
The moment passes

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

9
10
13
14

PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+

15
16

PP+
PP+
PP+

18
21
22
25

PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+

Friend signs up for Flexcar,
Flexcar promo
Vacillates about Flexcar
New Flexcar information
Evaluating first Flexcar use

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON IGN

17

8/2
8/2
8/4
8/5
8/5
14/2
14/2

27
28

PP+
PP+

29

Interested in Flexcar
Evaluating first Flexcar use

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (coping in an emergency)
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON IGN
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON TRY S I
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST DOM PEV
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT S I TRY
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON PEV

PP+

14/3 Evangelizes about Flexcar
17/3 Initial Flexcar evaluation
17/3 New Flexcar information

31

PP+

18/2 Disenchanted with Flexcar

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON USN (getting a new apartment)

34
35
36
39
40
41
42

WB
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+

44

PP+

23/4
4/1
4/2
4/3
4/3
5/1
5/1
5/2

45

PP+

48

PP+

49
50

Flirts with Flexcar
Biking at Reed
First "fixie" ride
Evaluating first trip to campus
Evaluating summer biking
Early commuter biking history
Considers biking to PSU

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON IGN
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT IGN
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON PEV
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM PEV
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY

Fall - evaluating bike commuting
10/1 Memphis: hit by car

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST DOM PEV

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM

PP+
PP+

10/1 Eugene: evaluating bike
commuting
10/1 Eugene: hit by car
10/1 Eugene: stops biking

51

PP+

10/2 Forest Park: too dangerous to bike EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON VIO

53
55
59
60

PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+

10/3
14/2
17/2
18/4

PSU: the rainstorm
Recreational biking with friends
Evaluates biking to park-and-ride
Bike evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN ("it's just Memphis")

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (breaks ankle)

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN ("I don't think bikes should be on the

road."]
64

WB

20/2 Missouri: child born

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (child born)

65

WB

20/3 Empty nest

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (taking stock of life)

66
70
71

WB
WB
WB

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY

73

WB

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON VIO

75
76

WB
WB

20/3 Flirts with bike commuting
20/4 Evaluating summer biking
20/4 Decides to try winter biking
20/4 Evaluating winter bike
commuting
21/1 PDX: evaluating bike commuting
21/2 Diagnosis and recovery

77

WB

21/3 Mom's 3-speed to the rescue

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F CON VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (life-threatening illness)
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80

WB

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON SH 1ST DOM

21/4 Evaluating summer bike
commuting

81
85

WB
WB

21/4 Decides to try winter biking
21/5 Evaluating winter bike

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON DOM

commuting

87
89

WB
WB

91
93

WB
WB

94

WB

96

WB

98

WB

99

WB

22/2 Recreational biking

EVTE CXT VAL ATT DON VIO

22/3
22/4 Summer biking evaluation
22/5 Fall biking evaluation
22/6 New job

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY SH 1ST DOM

22/6 Winter bike evaluation
23/2 Biking in West Virginia
23/2 Empty nest

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON VIO

Ride to Work week

EVTE CXT VAL ATT DON DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F
EVTE CXT VAL ATT DSN (changes jobs)

"*

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (taking stock of life)

102 WB

23/3 PDX: Summer biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST D I F CON DOM

105 WB

23/3 Winter biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

109 WB

25/2 PDX: Evaluates bike commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST VIO

110 WB

25/3 Wife graduates

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (longstanding financial problems ease)

111 WB

25/3 PDX: Second try, bike

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F CON DOM

commuting

112 WB
115 WB
116 WB

25/3 PDX: Commits to winter biking
25/4 Winter bike evaluation
26/2 Coworker diagnosed

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

117 WB
118 WB

26/2 Recreational biking with friend
26/3 Sees 'An Inconvenient Truth'

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM PEV

120 WB
122 WB

26/3
26/4 Winter biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON PEV

123 WB

26/4 Hit by car

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN ("I became a statistic")

125 WB

27/2 Decides to try bike commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY

127 WB
128 WB

27/3 Summer biking evaluation
27/4 Commits to winter bike

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON S I

130 WB
136 WB
137 WB
138 WB
139 WB

27/5
27/5
31/4
31/4
31/5
33/1

Summer biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (midlife crisis - health)

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (environmental epiphany)
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON PEV

1ST DOM PEV

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

commuting

132 WB

Hit by car

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

Fall bike evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT OON CON VIO

Summer bike evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM

Decides to bike through winter

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

Winter biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON DOM

Experiments with bike
commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY

141 WB

33/1 Gives up on bike commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN ("it's just this particular bike")

142 WB
145 WB

33/3 Second try on bike commuting
33/4 Fall biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY

149 WB

33/6 Summer biking evaluation
33/7 Decides to bike through winter

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DOM

150 WB
154 WB
155 WB
157 WB
159 WB
160 WB
161 WB
163 WB

33/8
36/2
36/2
36/3
36/3
36/4
41/3

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (unprepared for winter commute)

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

Fall biking evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON VIO

Thinks about biking to work

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT S I TRY

Bumpy start

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON 1ST

Summer bike commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

DIF

Uncertain about continuing

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

Fall bike commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON VIO

Experiments with bike
commuting

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
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164 WB

41/3 Job ends

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (job ends)

165 WB
166 WB

41/4 Decides to try winter biking
41/4 Job changes

EVTE CXT VAL ATT DON S I

168
170
172
174
175
178
184

41/5
1/2
3/2
4/2
4/3
5/1
8/2

Occasional biking to work
Evaluates PP+
Evaluates PP+
Evaluates PP+
Decreasing PP+ use
Evaluates PP+
Evaluates PP+
10/3 Evaluates PP+
14/1 Evaluates PP+

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

WB
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
186 PP+
189 PP+
191 PP+
193 PP+
195 PP+
196 PP+
199 PP+
201 PP+
203 PP+
205 PP+
206 PP+
207 PP+
208
209
210
211

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (gets job in Milwaukee)
DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST

VIO

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
i

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST

VIO

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM

17/2 Evaluates PP+
18/3 Evaluates PP+

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST

DIF

1/1
1/1
3/1
3/1
3/2
4/2
4/2
4/3

Car hassles
Bus evaluation
Gresham: car pool
Wilsonville: car dissatisfaction
MAX evaluation
Car evaluation
Bus evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

PP+
PP+
PP+

5/1
5/2
6/1

Decreasing bus use
Car evaluation
MAX evaluation
Car evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST VIO

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DOM

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST D I F CON VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

PP+

6/2

MAX evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DOM

212 PP+
214 PP+

6/2
6/3

Bus evaluation
Family emergency

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

218 PP+
219 PP+

8/2
8/3

Bus evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DOM

Unresolved transit conflict

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (stress on Dad)

220 PP+

8/4

Cold night with the kids

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (stress on kids)

221 PP+
224 PP+
225 PP+

10/1 Experiments with bus commuting
10/2 Car evaluation
10/2 Stranded in Forest Park

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM

228 PP+
229 PP+
232 PP+

14/1 Tired of driving
14/1 Experiments with MAX
17/1 Car evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DIF CON VIO

233 PP+
234 PP+

17/1 MAX evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

17/2 Job transfer

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (job transfers downtown)

236 PP+

18/1 The joys of bus #154

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (hates the #154)

239 PP+

18/2 Car evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN ("crappy car")

241 PP+
243 PP+
245 WB
249 WB

18/3
18/4
20/5
21/2

Bus evaluation
Car evaluation
Car evaluation
Diagnosed with tumor

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DIF CON VIO

252 WB
256 WB

22/3
23/3
25/1
26/1
27/1

Bus evaluation
Bus evaluation
Bus evaluation
Car evaluation
Michigan: 'loser cruiser'

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F CON VIO

258 WB
260 WB
261 WB

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON VIO

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (family emergency)

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DIF
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN ("it was heaven. ..and it was hell!")
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DIF
DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON DIF
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST
EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (dizzy spells)

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F CON VIO
EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON VIO

(384)

VIO

262

WB

27/6

Car pools with brother

EVTE CXT VAL ATT DON INT TRY 1ST

263

WB

27/6

Schedule change

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (brother's schedule changes)

DIF

264

WB

27/6

Stops car pooling

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON CON V I 0

268

WB

31/3

M A X evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST DOM D I F

269

WB

31/5

Car evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F CON VIO

272

WB

33/2

Shuttle bus evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST VIO

275

WB

33/2

Motorcycle evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST

277

WB

33/3

Car evaluation

EVTE CXT VAL ATT USN (lemon car)

279

WB

33/5

Evaluates MAX+shuttle

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST VIO

282

WB

41/1

Evaluates bus

283

WB

41/5

Car evaluation

DIF

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON INT TRY 1ST VIO NEV
>

EVTE CXT VAL ATT UON D I F

TABLE 26. SELECTION PROCESS SEQUENCES
5

PP+

3/2

First Flexcar use

EVTS FSN AR RCL (Friend's car) AON SCO RCL (Walk) AON
SCO RCL (Flexcar) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (Flexcar)

20

PP+

8/5

First Flexcar use

EVTS FSN AR RCL (Dad's taxi) AON SCO RCL (Flexcar) AON
SCO C L O MO MT CMT A C T (Flexcar)

24

PP+

14/2

First Flexcar use

EVTS FSN AR RCL (Flexcar) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT
(Flexcar)

26

PP+

14/3

Searching for additional Flexcar
applications

EVTS FSN AR RCL (Flexcar) AON S I

38

PP+

4/3

First bike commute to campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

43

PP+

5/1

Fall - commuting to PSU campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL
(bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT
(bike)

47

PP+

10/1

Eugene: bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bike)

52

PP+

10/3

PSU: tries bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

56

PP+

14/3

Flirts with bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (car)

58

PP+

17/2

Tries biking to park-and-ride

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

61

WB

20/1

Commuting to OHSU

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bike)

62

WB

20/2

Missouri: bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

63

WB

20/2

Missouri; schedule changes

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (car)

67

WB

20/3

Procrastinates about bike
commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT PRO QUO

69

WB

20/3

Begins bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL
(MAX) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (bike+MAX)

72

WB

20/4

Winter bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL
(car) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (bike+MAX)

74

WB

21/1

PDX: early bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

79

WB

21/3

Tries bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bike)

83

WB

21/4

Habitual bike use

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bike)

(385)

SCO CLO NO SEN QUIT

84

WB

21/4 Winter bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (MAX) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (bike + MAX)

90

WB

22/4 Habitual bike use

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bike)

95

WB

22/6 Free parking

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car pool) AON SCO
CLO MO MT CMT ACT (car pool)

97

WB

23/2 Commuting in West Virginia

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (walk) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (car)

101 WB

23/3 PDX: Summer biking

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

104 WB

23/3 The morning debate

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

106 WB

23/3 Daughter begins school

f

108 WB

25/2 PDX: Experiments with bike
commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (bike+bus)

113 WB

25/4 The morning debate

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

119 WB

26/3 Summer bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO

124 WB

26/4 Recovering from accident

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO CLO NO SEN QOITX RSN
CLO OO CMT ACT (car)

129 WB

27/5 Fall bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bike)

133 WB

31/1 Commuting in Seattle

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (walk) AON SCO RCL
(car) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (bus)

134 WB

31/2 Commuting in NYC

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (transit) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

135 WB

31/4 The morning debate

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car pool) AON SCO

CLO MO MT CMT ACT (car pool)

OO CMT ACT (bike)

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL

(car) AON s c o CLO MO MT CMT ACT (bike)
144 WB

33/4 Fall bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (car)

148 WB

33/6 Summer bike commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

152 WB

33/7 The morning debate

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bike)

156 WB

36/2 Experiments with bike
commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL(bus)AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT SH ACT (bike)

158 WB

36/3 Procrastinates about bike
commuting

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT PRO QUO

162 WB

41/2 Commuting to Vancouver

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (car)

167 WB

41/5 The morning debate

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bike) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (car)

180 PP+
194 PP+

5/2
1/1

Tries to find PP+ applications
Adjunct at PSU and PCC

EVTS FSN QUO

197 PP+

1/1

Consulting in downtown PDX

198 PP+

3/1

Commuting to Gresham

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bus)
EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (car)
EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL

(car pool) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (equal split)
200 PP+

3/1

Commuting to Wilsonville

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO RCL
(car pool) SON SCO CLO NO SEN QOITX RSN CLO OO CMT
ACT (car)

(386)

202 PP+

ID

Case DD
3/2

Selection Episode
Commuting to campus

Selection Sequence

204 PP+

4/2

Commuting to campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (bus)

213 PP+

6/2

Commuting to campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (MAX)

215 PP+

6/3

Emergency trip

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO CLO NO SEN QOITX
RSN CLO OO CMT ACT (MAX)

216 PP+

8/1

Living in Sylvan

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (Dad's taxi) AON SCO
CLO OO CMT ACT (Dad's taxi)

217 PP+

8/2

Living in Tigard

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (Dad's taxi) AON SCO
CLO MO MT CMT ACT (split)

222 PP+

10/2 Living in Forest Park

226 PP+

10/2 Living in North Portland

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO RCL
(bike) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (MAX)

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (MAX+bus)

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bike) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL
(car) AON SCO CLO NO SEN QUITX RSN CLO OO CMT ACT

(car)

227 PP+

14/1 Driving to campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (car)

230 PP+

14/1 Commuting to campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (MAX)

231 PP+

17/1 Commuting Beaverton to PDX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (MAX) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (split)

235 PP+

18/1 Living in West Linn

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (walk) AON SCO RCL
(car) AON SCO CLO NO SEN QDITX RSN AR RCL (taxi) AON

240 PP+

18/3 Living in Sellwood

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bus)

242 PP+

18/4 Commuting to campus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL
(taxi) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (car)

244 WB

20/5 Snow day

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO CLO NO SEN QOITX RSN
AR RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (bus)

246 WB

21/1 Commuting SE PDX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (car)

247 WB

21/2 Commuting SE-downtown PDX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bus)

250 WB

21/2 You can't get there from here

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (walk) AON SCO CLO
NO SEN QDITX RSN CLO OO CMT ACT (bus+walk)

251 WB

22/2 Commuting downtown PDX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (walk) AON SCO RCL
(car) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (split)

253 WB

23/1 Living in Virginia

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (car)

257 WB

25/1 Commuting Sellwood to
downtown

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
OO CMT ACT (bus)

259 WB

26/1 Commuting Forest Grove

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL
(bike) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (bus)

266 WB

27/7 Commuting Beaverton to PDX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (car)

267 WB

31/3 Living in PDX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL
(MAX) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (MAX)

271

33/2

EVTS FSN AR RCL (bus) AON SCO RCL (car) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bus)

SCO RCL (friend's car) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT (taxi)

WB

273 WB

Experiments with shuttle bus

33/2 Experiments with motorcycle

EVTS FSN AR RCL (motorcycle) AON SCO CLO OO CMT ACT

(motorcycle)
278 WB

33/5 Experiments with MAX

EVTS FSN AR RCL (MAX) AON SCO RCL (shuttle) AON SCO
RCL (car) AON SCO CLO MO MT CMT ACT (MAX+shuttle)

(387)

280 WB

36/1 Commutes SE to downtown

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (car+bus)

281 WB

41/1 Experiments with bus

EVTS FSN AR RCL (car) AON SCO RCL (bus) AON SCO CLO
MO MT CMT ACT (bus)

TABLE 27. MAINTENANCE PROCESS SEQUENCES
2
4
8
11
12
19
23
30

PP+

32
33
37

PP+
PP+
PP+

46

PP+

54
57
68

PP+
PP+
WB

78
82
86
88
92
100
103

WB
WB
WB
WB

PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+

WB
WB
WB
107 WB
114 WB
121 WB
126 WB
131 WB
140 WB
143 WB
146 WB
147 WB
151 WB
153 WB
169 PP+
171 PP+
173

1/3
3/2
4/2
5/2
5/2
8/5
14/2
18/2

Subscribes to Flexcar
Subscribes to Flexcar
>
Subscribes to Flexcar
Subscribes to Flexcar
Flexcar membership expires
Subscribes to Flexcar
Subscribes to Flexcar
Subscribes to Flexcar
Unsubscribes to Flexcar
Resubscribes to Flexcar

EVTM SDB
EVTM SUB
EVTM SDB
EVTM SUB
EVTM EXP
EVTM SUB
EVTM SUB
EVTM SUB

18/2
18/4
4/3 Buys "fixie" commuter bike
10/1 Eugene: buys bike

EVTM UNS

14/2 Buys bicycle
17/2 Purchases bikes
20/3 Gets bike refurbished
21/3 Buys hub gear bike
21/4 Buys winter biking gear
21/5 Buys air horn
22/2 Buys bike
22/4 Buys rain gear
23/3 Buys bike
23/3 PDX: Buys rain gear
25/2 Buys fixie
25/4 Buys biking gear
26/3 Buys winter bike gear
27/2 Purchases bike
27/5 Buys series of gloves

EVTM BUY

33/1
33/4
33/6
33/6
33/7
33/8
1/2
3/2

EVTM BUY BLK

PP+

4/2

176 PP+
177 PP+

4/3
5/1

179 PP+
181 PP+
182 PP+

5/2
5/2
6/2

Buys bike
Buys another bike
Buys biking gear
Gets bike serviced
Buys rain gear
Needs gloves
Purchases PP+
Purchases PP+
Purchases PP+
Lets PP+ expire
Purchases PP+
Tries to return PP+
Lets PP+ expire
Purchases PP+

EVTM SUB
EVTM BUY
EVTM BOY

EVTM BUY
EVTM F I X BLK S I

BLKR

EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY BLK BLKR
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY BLK BLKR BLK BLKR BLK BLKR
EVTM BUY
EVTM BUY S I
EVTM BUY S I BLK

EVTM BUY S I
EVTM BUY
EVTM F I X
EVTM BUY PRO BUY
EVTM BUY BLK BLKR BLK
EVTM SUB
EVTM SUB
EVTM SUB
EVTM EXP
EVTM SUB
EVTM UNS BLK
EVTM EXP
EVTM SUB

(388)

183
185
187
188
190
192
223

PP+
PP+
PP+
PP+

8/2
10/3
10/3
14/1

PP+
PP+
PP+

17/2 Purchases PP+
18/3 Purchases PP+
10/2 Buys car

EVTM SUB

237
238
248
254

PP+
PP+
WB
WB

18/2
18/2
21/2
23/1

Buys car

EVTM BUY

Car dies
Car dies
Bought 4WD

EVTM F I X JUNK

255 WB
265 WB
270 WB
274 WB
276 WB

EVTM SUB

Purchases PP+
Purchases PP+
Returns PP+ for refund
Purchases PP+

EVTM SOB
EVTM HNS
EVTM SUB

EVTM SUB
EVTM BUY

EVTM F I X BLK

,

EVTM BOY

23/1 Sold 4WD
27/6 Buys car
31/5 Unable to sell car
33/2 Sells car

EVTM SELL

33/2 Buys car

EVTM BOY

EVTM BUY
EVTM SELL BLK
EVTM SELL

(389)

APPENDIX P. DECISION DIAGRAMS
A decision diagram (DD) is a visual display of interactions among streams of
issues as a series of decisions unfold over time (Langley, 1999). Its purpose is to
depict the time order of events in context, thus making it possible to convert nominal
data into ordinal data in preparation for sequence coding. The 32 primary informant
interviews yielded a total of 90 pages of DDs: 31 pages from the PP+ case and 59
pages from the WB case. This section lists all of the DDs produced for this study. The
notation used in these DDs is described in Figure 24 on Page 104.
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1/1

Childhood

Late 90s?

Sept 2001

Commuting between home, campus, downtown, mother
Increasing bus use; buys monthly pass
Utilizes shuttle bus to commute between campuses
Tries to reduce use of personal vehicle (trip chaining)
Occasional walking

Working full time in downtown PDX

2003

a.

HI

at

z
oCO

<

-J

CO

<
o
o

u_

o
z

1/2

2003

Tired of
driving

Commute tradeoff

Commuting ranges over broad area of city
Increasing use of personal vehicle
Infrequent bus use; switches to tickets

Consulting part time in downtown PDX

Sept 2005

Oct 2005

Commuting between home, campus, mother
Increasing bus use
Periodic use of personal vehicle to visit mother

Nov 2005

a.

HI

tc

V)

<
z
o

1/3

Dec 2005

Jan 2006

Commute tradeoff

:K:MSK*£satfS83£^s^M?^%<8Kmm5;©^>'ftmMsfem!«?

Full-time
PSU faculty

Passive application search
Flexcar
Reduced rate campus parking

Feb 2006

Becomes Flexcar member
Forms tentative plan for initial trial
use within next couple of months

May 2006

Si:S®m:^W8SKmW»»s*H»BKS:*ffi

No application found;
search currently inactive

Jan 2000

m
a.

(0

o

<
o
o

Z3

z

IO

!<-»
Commute tradeoff

(-)

Flexibility
conflicts with
first car pool
mate

(+)

Nov 2001

I

Unproductive I
Back I
use of time I problems!

T'-> t»->

(-)

Flexibility
conflicts
with car
pool mates

Commuting between Hillsboro and Wilsonviile
Driving personal auto 75% of trips
Car pooling 25% of trips

Commuting between Hillsboro and Gresham
Driving personal auto 33% of trips
Riding MAX 33% of trips (monthly pass)
Car pooling 33% of trips

m

Looked at using
Flexcar as a vanpool
service for Wilsonviile

Jan 2005

Guilt about
driving

Working as transportation coordinator in Wilsonviile

Looked at converting employer
from monthly passes
to TriMet Passport program

Working as transportation coordinator in Gresham

Job interview;
found out about ]
monthly pass.

3/1

z
o

<

3/2

Jan 2005 -

Mar 2005

•*\flW\J^

" V
Concerned about
Concerned
cost of campus about parking
parking permit
hassles

Apr 2005

Commuting between
Hillsboro and PSU
• Mostly MAX + bus
• Rare use of personal

(-)

Regular Flexcar use
During the workday for errands
But limited to essential trips due to the
ongoing stress of scheduling the cars

•

Feb 2006

—

ON

Q.

O
(0

o
o

<

3

o
z

h-

o

<
z

4/1

Childhood

Adolescence

Bikes mean freedom

Living in Alaska
Biking in summer
Skiing in winter

Bike Identity

Bikes are fun

i(±)

1998

• (++)

Social biking with Reed friends
Borrowing bikes
Bike building; minibikes; "fixies"

Bikes are cool

~YV

Living near Reed campus
Walk to campus
Bus to metro Portland (fare)
Scooter
Limited biking around campus
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-
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*

•
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2001

2003

October
2003

h--->

c©

a:
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CO
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z
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4/3

April
2004

Bike Identity

Social biking with
Reed friends

Reliability

A

L

Personal
Satisfaction

August
2004

PP+ tradeoff

December
2004

Stressful

2006

Flexcar tradeoff

Expensive

PSU extends
Flexcar benefit
to bikers

(+)

Availability
when needed

Bike tradeoff

Commuting SE Portland to PSU Campus
Biking to campus
Trimet backup in bad weather, illness (fare)
Decreasing Flexcar use

l
Cost
( Effectiveness

<•"";

'H

Buys
new car

Decreasing
bus use

A

Safety

Secondary Biking Benefits

Exercise

Time Utilization

Explores alternative
bike routes

Comfort/
Hygiene

Bike tradeoff

Commuting SE Portland to PSU Campus
Bikes to campus
Trimet backup (PP+)
Somewhat increased Flexcar use

1980s

20 year prior history of
commuter biking

1970s-

5/1

1990s

Living & teaching
in Beaverton
Bikes to campus

Full-time OGI
faculty

Aug 2004

_jyv^

Commuting between
Beaverton and PSU
1 s t option: ride bike

Full-time PSU
faculty

•-•

MAX
+
bus

Bike

KSMSKS8KMSS3BS2M

Sept 2004

mnM-mm&mi%m*mtmmmmmm;vmmm

SS«SSSS*SSS>^K::K

Commuting between
Beaverton and PSU
• ~" 1 s t option: ride bike
• 2 nd option: MAX+bus

a.

zO
to
a.
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Oct 2004

^tusmf^mmmnnssf^wxi-^s

CO

<
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O

Cycling time now
comparable to
car+MAX+bus

Nov 2004

Biking reduces need for gym time

E

Bike tradeoff

3*^y«SSS:*

Uses bike commute
time to connect with
doctoral students

Buyer's remorse over PP+

TriMet tradeoff

>!%h**nA*xm<w

MAX is slow
and makes too
many stops

in bike route

Incremental
improvements

Passive search
for Flexcar applications

Establishes work
schedule to avoid
rush hour traffic

Applies

MAX + bus

Bike

CIO /

• Dec 2004

ismxmm&Mfmvmim

Passive
search
for new PP+
applications

Decreasing use of
MAX+bus

Situational use of
personal auto

Mostly bike

Commuting between
Beaverton and PSU

Sept 2005

Commuting between
Beaverton and PSU
Mostly bike
Situational use of
personal auto

<
z
o

6/1

1950s

1960s

Attends PSU
Rides to campus
with friend
Bus
Personal vehicle

yv^

Late
1970s

Living in SF Bay Area
•
BART
Park and Ride

1991

Expensive

kff

Car tradeoff

Traffic
hassles

Parking
hassles

i(-L

Parking shortage
at Gateway TC

Commuting NE PDX/Gresham to PSU
MAX/bus (monthly pass)
Occasional Park and Ride
Rare use of personal vehicle

6/2

Bus is slow

MAX is faster
than the bus

Time Utilization

MAX tradeoff

Early
2000's

Commuting NE PDX/Gresham to PSU
•
MAX/bus (PP+)
Occasional Park and Ride
Rare use of personal vehicle
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Q-
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6/3

>

c

Early Fall
2005

Car tradeoff

' -(-)
•

\

High mileage on
existing car

November
2005

April
2006

May
2006

(Wfr)
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2002

August
2002

- - - •

2003

Living in Tigard
Single car family of four
Mornings: Mom takes bus to PSU campus
Afternoons: Dad picks up Mom from campus
Sat night: Dad moonlights at Lloyd Center

Living in Tigard
Single car family of four
Mornings: Mom takes bus to PSU campus
Afternoons: Dad picks up Mom from campus
Wed & Sat nights: Dad moonlights

8/3

Summer
2005

Fall
2005

Living in Tigard
Single car family of four
Mornings: Mom takes bus to PSU campus
Mon lunchtime: Dad picks up Mom from campus, drives to
art class in Tigard; drives her back to campus two hours later
Mon, Tue, Thur afternoons: Dad picks up Mom from campus
Wed, Fri afternoons: Dad drops off kids with Mom; they bus home
Wed, Fri & Sat nights: Dad moonlights at Lloyd Center

Stress on
Dad

Environmental
impact of cars

Environmental
impact of cars

Winter
2006

Unresolved transit conflict

Occasional use
of Grandpa or
babysitter to
help manage
transit conflict

Single car tradeoff

Money is
tight

(-)

1

Dramatically
higher
gas prices

(-)

1

Money
is tight

Second car tradeoff

Time
utilization

Convenience

8/4

January
2006

February
2006

April
2006

Living in Tigard
Single car family of four
Mom takes bus to/from PSU campus
Mon lunchtime: Dad picks up Mom at campus, drives to art
class in Tigard; drives her back to campus two hours later
• Wed, Fri & Sat nights: Dad moonlights at Lloyd Center

8/5

Early May
2006

Late May
2006

Actively seeks
Flexcar information

August
2006

Sept.
2006

Nov.
2006

Living in Tigard
Single car family of four
Mom takes busto/fromPSU campus
Occasional Flexcar use

10/1

- Early Adulthood

Grew up in Memphis
100% reliant on car

Living in Eugene
Bikes to work

1995

-jyi/[/*

-IQQS

Hit by,
car
while
biking

f Breaks ankle A
V snowboardi ng\J

Stops
biking ^ > 4 ,

First 1
bus 1
ride 1

Living in Eugene
Bus to work

1999

Uses
bos time
to read

LU
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CO
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2000-

2001

2004

10/3

Oct 31
2005

Nov1
2005

Living in Portland (commuting to PSU)
MAX (Passport Plus)

Nov 2
2005

Nov 3
2005

Nov 4
2005

2006

Living in Portland (commuting to PSU)
Bikes to work in good weather
Rides MAX in bad weather (using
discounted tickets)
Situational car use
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14/1

1977
1986

October
2000

Occasional recreational MAX use

14/2

2003

2004

Parking Hassles

I (-) Car tradeoff

Commuting Gresham to PSU
• Car to Park & Ride
MAX to downtown
Bus to campus
Situational car use

Convenient

Occasional
stress

Flexcar tradeoff

Saves
money

Commuting Gresham to PSU
Car to Park & Ride
MAX to downtown
Bus to campus
Occasional Flexcar for work errands
Minimal car use with trip chaining

Available
on campus

14/3

May
2004

Commuting Gresham to PSU
Car to Park& Ride
MAX to downtown
Bus to campus
Occasional Flexcar for work errands
Minimal car use with trip chaining

2005

Searches for additional
Flexcar applications
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— 1950s

17/1

1980s?

Living in Europe
Trains

1994

\

Car tradeoff

Expensive
j

on
•(-)

Time
utilization

Clients dispersed
throughout PDX
metro area

Commuting Beaverton to PSU
Personal vehicle

TiiMet tradeoff

Accessability

i(+)

1998

(+)

Availability

(+)

Commuting within Beaverton
Personal vehicle
Situational MAX use for
downtown trips (fare)
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Io
z=3
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2004

July
2005

U2L

Economical

*

MAX cheaper
than driving

Parking is
expensive

K+) +(-) H+)

MAX tradeoff

September
2005

Low-impact
recreational biking

Safety of bike
commuting

Parking shortage
at Sunset TC

Winter 2005-2006

Crowded

Uses time to read
and play Scrabble

Long trip from other
Beaverton Park & Rides

Short trip from
Sunset TC Park & Ride

Time Utilization

Comfortable with trains

(+)

(-)

MAX slower
than driving

Time
Utilization

Car tradeoff

Purchases PP+

Commuting Beaverton to PSU
Regular MAX/bus use (PP+)
Park and Ride at Sunset TC
Regular car use with trip chaining (balancing car trips to clients with MAX trips downtown)
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May
2006

August
2006
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18/1

'

Childhood
1980s

Likes being
driven (security) J

Bus tradeoff

iw

Rides bus with
grandma

^

Living in Sellwood
Bus to high school

Early
1990s

Large family

Craves privacy

—T

(±

Limited
privacy

Living in West Linn
No bus service
No walking
No car
Dependent on others for
transportation needs
•
Cabs

Bumpy,
nauseating
ride
Bus tradeoff

Long,
roundabout
route

Living in West Linn
Limited bus service
No walking
No car
Dependent on others for
transportation needs
Cabs

Limited bus
availability
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18/2
u

1996

Car tradeoff

1997

Commuting West Linn to Lake Oswego
No bus service
No walking
•
Dependent on others for
transportation needs
Increase use of cabs
Telecommute to 2 nd job

Early
2000s

Large cash
deposit

Flexcar tradeoff

Flexcar is
expensive

I
Cancels
Flexcar

Needs deposit for
new apartment

Commuting West Linn to Lake Oswego
No bus service
No walking
Dependent on others for
transportation needs
Heavy use of Flexcar
Telecommute to 2 nd job

18/3
Living in Sellwood
Direct bus service (#19)

Early
2000s

-f^\)A

Fall
2005

-yv]/*

Commuting SE Portland to PSU
Bus to campus
Occasional cab

CO
DC
LU
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o

18/4

Fall
2005?

\

Freedom
and escape
J

Parking is
expensive

Car tradeoff

Regret
over PP+

Commuting SE Portland to PSU
Increasing use of sister's car with reduced rate parking
Decreasing use of bus
Occasional cab

2006

Relies on #14
to be de facto
Flexcar
member for
office

Prior history
Competes
with social
with cabs
network
and Flexcar
Flexcar tradeoff

"Can't find*
Flexcar
membership
card

Aversion
to exercise
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20/2

1986

1988

Bike identity

1989

Child born

—rTT

Child care

Bike tradeoff

Living in Miissouri
Habitual car use

Time utilization

(-)

Side trips
during day

Living in Miissouri
Regular biking (year-round)

2002

Child care

Exercise

Running + gym

Time
Utilization

Car tradeoff

Commuting SE to NW PDX
Habitual car (30 min)

Traffic
Stress

Pollution

(-) Car tradeoff

Car
tradeoff

Bike
identity

May
2006

{

j(++)

Empty
nest

V

(")

Procrastinates

Commuting
gear

Forms tentative
plan to begin in July

Bike concerns

Downtown
traffic

Thinks about bike
commuting

[
Child ^ \
Vgraduates^/
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June
2006

Refurbishes
bike at CCC

July
2006

f (++)

Commuting

(++) Bike concerns

Downtown
traffic

Aug
2006

Commuting SE to NW PDX
Regular bike + MAX (40 min)
Situational car wl trip chaining

CO
DC
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July
2006
Aug
2006

Commuting SE to NW PDX
Regular bike + MAX (40 min)
Situational car w/trip chaining

20/4

Sept
2006

Winter commuting SE to NW PDX
Regular bike + MAX (40 min)
Situational car w/ trip chaining

Nov
2006
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20/5

Jan
2007

Presence
required

(-)
Experienced
snow driver

Snow day issues

Has
chains

Has pass

Other
drivers?

Bus tradeoff

Some
familiarity

Winter commuting SE to NW PDX
Exclusive car use
First bus commute on snow day (1 hour)

vBus

tradeoff,

Time
utilization

(-)

Feb
2007

Winter commuting SE to NW PDX
•
Exclusive car use

21/1

1980s

Raised in
Michigan

1990s

College
Frequent biking
in good weather

f
\

Summer
1996

Moves to
Portland

A
J

Commuting SE PDX
Frequent biking
in good weather
Situational car use

1998

Series of jobs
scattered
around PDX

2000

Commuting SE PDX
Biking trails off and stops
Exclusive car use
No bus use

21/2
Commuting SE - downtown PDX
Frequent bus use
Situational car use

Commuting SE - downtown PDX
Habitual bus use
Stops driving car
Walks to stores
Rides in friend's cars

Commuting SE - downtown PDX
Minimizing bus use
Walking

4^

21/3

Mar
2006

Apr
2006

Commuting SE - downtown PDX
•
Habitual bike use
Situational MAX + bike
Sporadic bus use

a.

CO
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Apr
2006

Medications

Commuting SE - downtown PDX
Habitual bike use
Situational MAX + bike
Sporadic bus use

Summer
2006

Aug
2006

Winter commute SE - downtown PDX
Habitual bike use
Situational MAX + bike/bus + bike

Sept
2006

21/5

Oct
2006

Winter commute SE - downtown PDX
Habitual bike use
Situational MAX + bike/bus + bike

Dec
2006

Jan
2007

Snow day: Jan 16 2007
Rides bike first day
Sick second day
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1960s

Obsessed
with bikes

(+)

(-)
Bike identity

"Bikes are
for kids"

Mid-1970s

(+)

Socializes
with cyclists

College
Regular bike use

1980

1981

Early 1990s
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1996

College - lives near PSU
Walks to campus

2000

New job

Recreational
biking

(")

Waterfront
crowded

Traffic
hassles

Bike tradeoff

Unpleasant
social
encounters

Driving tradeoff

Hills and
traffic

Expensive

Commuting downtown PDX
Bus + walking

Owns series of
bikes

(-)

Poorly fitted
bikes

Parking
hassles

Summer
2005

4^

4^

22/3

Summer
2005

Commuting downtown PDX
Walking + bus

Spring
2006

Commuting NE - downtown PDX
Walking + bus (w/ transfer)

May
2006

Commuting NE - downtown PDX
Habitual bike use
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Summer
2006

Sept
2006
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22/5

Oct
2006

Tight
finances

*+)

Economical

Limited
cargo

Time
utilization

Nov
2006

J i o u s e / ' G a s prices ""
ease down

Sold 2nd

Fun

Safety

to. fcl

Dark

k^ i=L

Bike tradeoff

temperature

k±Body to

Cold

Rain

Maintenance

Kudos from
coworkers

w

Personal
accomplishment

mmmmw
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22/6

Nov
2006

Car tradeoff

i(±L
Parking
hassle

MfL
Parking
expense

—-fm

Car pool
w/ partner

Dec
2007

Christmas shopping
and socializing

Dark

TT-) t(-)

a.

Energy
level

Bike tradeoff

Jan
2007

a.

Physical
limitations

Series of
knee injuries

Winter commuting NE - downtown PDX
No biking
Regular car pool

ED
ta.

Illness

Time
utilization

Winter commuting NE - downtown PDX
Sporadic bike use
Increasing car pool

Fuo

Feb
2007

Longer
days

+(++)J

Bike t r a d e o f f A

IA.+.M

r

Commuting NE - downtown
Situational bike use
Regular car pool

00

CL

(0
111

o

Z

<

3

o
Io
z

23/1

+

)

Childhood

Being-inNature

' r(

Solo bike
rides

Fun

Exercise

Bike identity
Libera!
politics

Driving concerns

Night vision

1990s

Recreational biking
(150 mi/wk)

Safety

Living in Virginia
Habitual car use (20 miles)

Maintenance
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23/3
Exploring Portland
Regular bike use
Situational transit use (w/ fare)

Commuting N - NW PDX
Habitual bike use (10 mi/45 min)
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23/4

No clear cost
advantage

,( >

1 +

Sell car?

Summer
2006

Flexcar tradeoff

Accessability

Availability

L

1

)C

\

*•>

Sept
2006

Bike identity

"One less car" I I "Being tough

No pets

1

Decides not
to subscribe

Safety

»

Oct
2006

/

F H
Maintenance
Bike tradeoff

<-) •>(-)

Dark

Road hazards
(leaves, standing water)

Winter commuting N - NW PDX
Habitual bike use (10 mi/45 min)
Situational transit use (monthly pass)
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23/5

Nov
2006

Winter commuting N - NW PDX: "Morning Debate'
Regular bike use (10 mi/45 min)
Occasional car use
Situational transit use (monthly pass)

Dec
2006

Jan
2007

Feb
2007

Snow

Winter commuting N - NW PDX: "Morning Debate"
Regular bike use (10 mi/45 min)
Car pool with daughter (Fridays)
Situational transit use (monthly pass)
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2004

Commuting Sellwood to downtown PDX
Habitual bus use (15 min)
Recreational car use

Fall 2004

(w*)

PERSONAL

o

s=

25/3

Spring
2006

Bike "kick

Personal
Challenge

Aug
2006

Exercise

Sept
2006

Winter commuting: Sellwood to downtown PDX
Regular biking (45 min)
Situational bus use
Recreational car use

Oct
2006

Winter commuting: Sellwood to downtown PDX
(the "daily debate")
Daily decision: bike (45 min) or bus (15 min)
Recreational car use

25/4
fl/%

#^

Jan
2007

Feb
2007

Winter commuting Sellwood to downtown
•
Bike and bus: roughly equal usage
Recreational car use
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26/1

1960s

Family history
of cancer

1985

1986

Recreational
biking (20 mi/wk)

Biking prevalent
in Germany

1991

Time
Utilization

Owns many
bikes

Car tradeoff

Expensive

Commuting Forest Grove - Tigard
Decreasing car use
Increasing rollerblade + bus use
Situational bike use

2004

Commuting Aloha - Tigard
Regular car use
Occasional bike use
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Summer
2004

I

Personal
Growth

2006

Group biking events

n
Personal
Health
Bike identity

Personal
Discipline

(+)

Steep hills

Commuting West Hills- Tigard
Decreasing car use
Increasing bike use

Community
Involvement

Summer
2005

Friendly
competition

Recreational biking

Lunch rides with
coworker

Personal health

Family history
of cancer

JsL

Commuting Aloha - Tigard
Regular oar use
Occasional bike use

-

26/3
Commuting West Hills - Tigard
Habitual biking (15 miles, 1 hr)
Situational car use
Winter commuting West Hills - Tigard
Habitual biking (15 miles, 1 hr)
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26/4

Oct
2006

Rain

Cold

(-) H-)
Temperature
Regulation

Bike tradeoff

Personal
Discipline

(-)+(-) , k+)k+)
Time
Utilization

(+)

Maintenance

Winter commuting West Hills - Tigard
Habitual biking (15 miles, 1 hr)

Safety

a

Dark

Afraid
to ride

Dec
2006

Struck by car

(
I
\

m

I
J

Risk I
averse j
Bike tradeoff

Injured
wrist

v

.(-)

Car tradeoff

Environmental
guilt

Feelings
of regret

Winter commuting West Hills - Tigard
Unable to bike
Habitual car use
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26/5

Jan
2007

Winter commuting West Hills - Tigard
Very limited biking
Habitual car use

Feb
2007

Exercise

Bike identity

Personal
Satisfaction

Fun

Environmental
Friendliness

Winter commuting West Hills - Tigard
Gradually increasing bike use
Gradually decreasing car use
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Living in
Michigan

— 1990s

27/1

Unavailable

Low
Status

Bus image

Unreliable

i

2005

Unpleasant
social
encounters

Hard times
prompt
reappraisal

(")

Car tradeoff

Gas = Terrorism
,

Nov
2005

Brother
lives in
PDX

Moves to PDX

Gains
weight

Job
search

Unemployed in PDX
No car; limited mobility
Rides with family
Walking
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27/2

Mar
2006

Gains
weight

—r(+)

Exercise

Expensive

Bike tradeoff

Time
Utilization

Car tradeoff

Gas = Terror

Brother's
friends are bike
commuters

Personal
growth

Environmental
guilt

Seeks info
from internet

Apr
2006

Previous bike
shop experience

Brand finalists
Specialized
Binachi

Cost

Accessability

Selects bike shop

Brand tradeoff.

Quality

Shop tradeoff

Availability

Domestic
make

Time utilization

Buys bike
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Apr
2006

Exercise

W)

Safety

i±

Seeks online
information

(+)

Falls

Commuting SW PDX - NW PDX
Exclusive bike use (8 mi)
Situational car with brother

K)

+

Self-Confidence

Brother works
downtown

Refines routes

K+)

Time
Utilization

Bike tradeoff

£1

t).

Online
activism

t(")

Flexibility

Learns maint
skills

Reliability

Flats

£=L

Summer
2006

k)
Bike/car,
Bike/ped
conflict
Bike identity

Gas = Terror

Environmental
awareness
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27/4

Summer
2006

Commuting Beaverton - NW PDX
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APPENDIX Q. ORIGINAL FRAMEWORK AND GAM
This appendix is provided for historical purposes to describe the original
theoretical framework and GAM prototype, four years prior to the beginning of this
study. The GAM prototype in Figure 112 was developed and intentionally set aside
long before the study began, consistent with good software engineering practice
(Brooks, 1975). It reappeared quite unexpectedly at a much later date in modified form
as the state diagram of the evaluation process (see Figure 55).

Figure 112. Original GAM Prototype

In its original form, the theoretical framework consisted of the following
guiding propositions. Many of these were modified or eliminated from the final
version of the theoretical framework.
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TF-1. A need is a state of being in which something is wanted or required.
TF-la. Needs come in two forms: desires and beliefs,
i. Desires pertain to functional purposes,
ii. Beliefs pertain to cultural and/or aesthetic assumptions.
TF-lb. Needs may be either latent, active, unmet, or satisfied.
i. A latent need is one which has not been consciously
acknowledged by the decision maker.
ii. An active need has been consciously acknowledged, and a
search and evaluation is currently in progress to find one or
more technologies which satisfy that need.
iii. An unmet need has been consciously acknowledged, but a
prior search and evaluation has failed to identify any
technologies which satisfy that need.
iv. A satisfied need has been consciously acknowledged, and a
prior search and evaluation has identified at least one
technology which satisfies that need.
TF-lc. Three factors are necessary and sufficient to uniquely classify
the state of any need:
i. Whether the need has been consciously acknowledged,
ii. Whether an acceptable solution has been found.
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iii. Whether a search and evaluation process is currently taking
place.
2. A technology is a tool for extracting power from nature.
3. During the framing process (FP), the decision maker determines
which needs are relevant to a decision episode.
TF-3a. The output of the framing process is a set of needs known as the
decision frame.
4. During the technology adoption decision process (TADP), the
decision maker forms an unconflicted association between a need and a
technology which relates to that need.
TF-4a. The output of the TADP is a dyadic association is known as a
teme.
TF-4b. Temes may be either evoked, inert, or inept.
i. Evoked temes are preferred need-technology pairs.
ii. Inert temes are backup need-technology pairs.
iii. Inept temes are unacceptable need-technology pairs.
TF-4c. Membership in the evoked, inert, and inept sets are determined
by the set of needs which are included in the decision frame.
5. During a technology selection decision process (TSDP), the decision
maker chooses a technology on the basis of existing temes.
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TF-5a. The selection set consists of all technologies which are
members of the evoked set, but are not members of the inept
set.
TF-5b. The TSDP cannot terminate until the selection set contains
exactly one member.
TF-5c. If the selection set contains less than one member, the decision
maker will supplement the selection set with technologies
drawn at random from the inert set.
TF-5d. If the selection set contains more than one member, the decision
maker will supplement the decision frame with randomly
chosen "outlier" or low-priority needs. Since this increases the
size of the inept set, it effectively reduces the size of the
selection set.
TF-6. An innovation is an emergent network of evoked temes associating
one or more needs with one or more technologies. Innovations are not
immutable 'things'; they are emergent macroscopic structures. Few
definite statements can be made about them except that they are
perceived and named by decentralized observers, and are generated by
certain processes. These processes can be discovered and modeled in
explanatory process theories which, when coded and installed in
computer simulations, will generate running instances of these
emergent structures.
(484)

APPENDIX R. THEORY-BUILDING
Case studies can be used to develop and test process theory frameworks, and
this is the focus of Kathleen Eisenhardt's methodological approach (1989). Eisenhardt
synthesizes and extends the frameworks of Yin (2003), Miles and Huberman (1994)
and Strauss and Corbin (1998) to address the task of building process theory. She
proposes an eight step framework:
1. Early Conceptualization
2. Case Selection
3. Instrumentation
4. Data Collection
5. Data Analysis
6. Hypothesis Generation
7. Comparison to Literature
8. Theoretical Saturation
Each of these steps will be discussed in turn.
R. 1. Early Conceptualization
The initial step is to define a conceptual framework and design the research
questions. These activities occur concurrently and iteratively (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles
& Huberman, 1994, pg. 22, 25). Eisenhardt stresses that the research questions and
conceptual framework should be regarded as tentative at this stage; their purpose is to
help provide focus to inquiry. The elements of the framework are not guaranteed a
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place in the final theory, and the research questions may shift during the research
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003, pg. 120-122). Eisenhardt also emphasizes that
theory building research should begin as much as possible without defining firm
hypotheses to test or preconceived theoretical propositions. Obviously, there are
tradeoffs involved here. The general idea is to begin with an initial framework to help
provide focus, but also remain o*pen to the possibility of revising the framework so as
to limit the potential for bias and 'assumption drag'.
R.2. Case Selection
When designing a case study, two important decisions are whether to
investigate one or multiple cases, and whether to employ one or multiple units of
analysis (Yin, 2003). In resolving these decisions it is essential to develop an
operational definition of the case.
Single case studies may be employed when the research investigates a critical
case, as with Allison's (1971) study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Single cases are also
appropriate for situations which exhibit unique or extreme features, when the case is
believed to be particularly revealing, or to illustrate a typical or longitudinal case
(Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Yin, 2003).
Both Yin and Eisenhardt argue that multiple case designs are generally more
robust and should be employed whenever possible. Since each case represents a
substantial time investment, considerable care must be exercised in selecting the cases.
Yin (pg. 47) emphasizes the importance of replication logic, a quasi-experimental
approach in which cases are selected because they predict similar or contrasting
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results. This sampling strategy requires stating the conditions under which a particular
phenomenon is expected to be found, as well as the conditions under which it is not.
There is no consensus on the minimum number of cases required. Guidelines
range from "no more than four" (Creswell, 1998, pg. 63) to "four to ten" (Eisenhardt,
1989). Yin argues that the number of cases should be determined by the replication
logic rather than in an arbitrary manner. It is important to select cases which will
extend the theoretical framework and sharpen external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Another important decision in designing a case study is whether to employ a
single or multiple units of analysis. Yin (pg. 42-46) refers to a single unit of analysis
as a 'holistic design'; it is useful when no naturally occuring subunits exist in the case.
The entire episode is described holistically. Multiple units of analysis ('embedded
designs') may be employed whenever distinct subthemes exist, either within or across
the cases.
R.3. Instrumentation
One of the defining characteristics of case study research is its reliance on
multiple sources of data {data triangulation.) These may include interviews,
documents, archival records, direct and participant observation, and physical artifacts.
The exact mix should be determined by the case study protocol. The protocol for each
case typically includes an overview section, a description of the data collection
procedures (i.e., types of data to be collected, access strategies, schedules, sampling
procedures, screening procedures), the questions to be asked of the respondents and
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about the case itself, and a tentative outline of the case study report (Yin, pg. 67-77,
86).
Interviews are a typical part of data collection. Interviews may be loosely
structured when the goal is exploration of a poorly understood area (e.g., to generate
items for a survey instrument), to avoid biasing data collection, or to include rich
context (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pg. 35; Easterby-Smith et al, 2002, pg. 87-88).
More structured interviews are appropriate when the researcher already knows a lot
about the topic and wishes to avoid gathering extraneous data, to develop an initial
theoretical framework, or to confirm the validity or elicit knowledge about known
items (Johnson & Weller, 2002, pg. 494).
R.4. Data Collection
In multi-case research data collection and analysis are iterative and
overlapping (Eisenhardt, 1989, pg. 538; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). A case
is selected; data are collected within that case; within-case analysis takes place; the
case report is written; then the process repeats until theoretical saturation occurs, when
new insights stop emerging from the data because the bulk of relevant content has
already been sampled. Then cross-case analysis takes place and the final case report is
written.
Process research approaches the issue of sampling in a different manner than
variance research. The goal of variance research often involves drawing statistically
valid inferences about populations. By contrast, process research seeks to sample cases
and informants in a way that advances the development of explanatory theory. Since
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process research needs to sample content rather than populations, it replies on
purposeful (or theoretical) sampling rather than statistical sampling. This has
important consequences; process research is generalizable with respect to theoretical
propositions rather than populations (Yin, 2003, pg. 10).
Several authors describe strategies for purposeful sampling in qualitative
research (e.g., Patton, 1990; Kuiel, 1992; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Creswell, 1998).
Miles and Huberman's summary of these methods is shown in Table 28.
TABLE 28. STRATEGIES FOR PURPOSEFUL SAMPLING (MILES AND HUBERMAN, 1994)
Type of Samplin

Purpose

Maximum variation
Homogeneous
Critical case

Documents diverse variations and identifies important common patterns
Focuses, reduces, simplifies, facilitates group interviewing
Permits logical generalization and maximum application of information
to other cases
Finding examples of a theoretical construct and thereby elaborate and
examine it
Elaborating initial analysis, seeking exceptions, looking for variation

Theory-based
Confirming and
disconfirming cases
Snowball or chain
Extreme or deviant case
Typical case
Intensity
Politically important cases
Random purposeful
Stratified purposeful
Criterion
Opportunistic
Combination or mixed
Convenience

Identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know
what cases are information-rich
Learning from highly unusual manifestations of the phenomenon of
interest
Highlights what is normal or average
Information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon intensely, but not
extremely
Attracts desired attention or avoids attracting undesired attention
Adds credibility to sample when potential purposeful sample is too
large
Illustrates subgroups; facilitates comparisons
All cases that meet some criterion; useful for quality assurance
Following new leads; taking advantage of the unexpected
Triangulation, flexibility, meets multiple interests and needs
Saves time, money, and effort, but at the expense of information and
credibility

Different units are used for cross-case and within-case sampling. The units of
cross-case sampling are cases, which are selected to maximize the potential to
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contribute to the developing framework. Yin's replication logic is a quasiexperimental approach which operates at the level of cross-case sampling. The units of
within-case sampling are typically individuals, who are selected on the basis of their
ability to contribute to the understanding of the case.
R.5. Transcription and Coding
Transcription has received comparitively less attention than other aspects of
data collection (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pg. 56, 89; Poland, 2002). Poland identifies
several methodological and ethical issues which lurk in the transcription process, such
as superficial coding, decontextualization, missing inflection, and diminished social
presence. He gives some practical guidance on tape recording and notating transcripts,
while Miles and Huberman feature an extensive discussion of coding, marginal notes,
and memoing issues (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pg. 55-76).
Coding is an analytical tool which can be pursued in varying degrees. For
example, template analysis (Crabtree & Miller, 1992; King, 1998) is an a priori
approach to coding themes. It is conceptual similar to theory building, except that its
scope is more narrowly defined. During template analysis the researcher produces a
hierarchical list of initial codes for themes which are expected to be encountered
during data analysis. King warns that these initial templates should not be regarded as
sacrosanct; rather, they should considered to be tentative and refined as data collection
and analysis proceed. Unfortunately, he also notes that relatively little practical
guidance is available for conducting template analysis (King, pg. 133).
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R.6. Data Management
Case studies produce a large volume of data, which poses data management
problems. It can be difficult to ensure that all the planned data have been collected for
each case and that no data are missing; Miles and Huberman (pg. 80-81) propose a
simple mechanism called a data accounting sheet to help remedy this problem.
i

Several different examples of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis
software (CAQDAS) are available to help manage data collection and analysis.
Review articles about CAQDAS products (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pg. 311-317;
Easterby-Smith et al, 2002, pg. 127-129; Seale, 2002; Yin, 2003, pg. 110) together
with materials obtained from the web suggest that the software applications best-suited
to the needs of this project are Atlas-ti (http://www.atlasti.de) and NUD*IST
(http://www.qsr.com.au).

These

(http://www.QualisResearch.com)

two

products,

together

with

Ethnograph

dominate the CAQDAS market. Atlas-ti is

especially geared toward the development of grounded theory. NUD*IST, on the other
hand, contains a number of features which may be used to generate the matrices and
causal networks which are central to Miles and Huberman's style of analysis.
R.7. Data Analysis
Data analysis - particularly cross-case analysis - is the least developed aspect
of the case study method (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003, pg. 109). Fortunately, Miles
and Huberman (1994) is a classic sourcebook for case studies which emphasize
innovation adoption; numerous examples of TADP research are scattered throughout
the text.
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Miles and Huberman advocate constructing analytical matrices from coded,
context-bound case data. Matrices are useful for comparing two dimensions of the data
to explore and describe cases and conduct variable-oriented analysis and theory
building. Their basic approach is very flexible, and may be applied to diverse types of
data pertaining to critical incidents, roles, concepts, and so forth.
R.8. Hypothesis Generation
An important step in establishing the internal validity of a case study and the
construct validity of an emerging theoretical framework is to generate and test
predictive hypotheses. Miles and Huberman outline some general strategies for
generating hypotheses: (pg. 172-177)
•

In case-oriented analysis one case is analyzed in depth, then successive
cases are used to confirm whether the initial conclusions hold. Miles
and Huberman cite Yin's replication logic as an example of this
approach.

•

Variable-oriented analysis looks for predictor variables which cut
across cases.

•

Hybrid analysis mixes the case-oriented and variable oriented
approaches.

When the goal is to develop explanatory process theory Miles and Huberman
recommend identifying variables which may be used to predict outcomes. This
approach is akin to what Yin calls pattern matching (Yin, 2003, pg. 116-118).
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Predictor variables, in the context of this study, could correspond to the dichotomous
classification factors which identify the TADP state of survey respondents. At least
two types of hypotheses could be generated for these variables:
•

Hypotheses predicting which classification variable values would
trigger automaton state changes.
i

•

Hypotheses predicting which classification variable values would
coexist with other values.

Quasi-experimental test cases could be set up using Yin's replication logic.
Hypothesis testing would be judgmental in nature, since these data do not lend
themselves to statistical inference (Eisenhardt, 1989). These predictions could be
compared to rival classifications obtained from the Concerns-Based Adoption Model
(CBAM, Hall et al., 1975) or the Transtheoretical Model (TTM, Prochaska &
DiClemente, 1984; Prochaska et al, 1992).
R.9. Comparison to Literature
When building theory from case study research, Eisenhart stresses that it is
important to compare the emerging theoretical framework with the existant literature.
This requirement stems in part from the limited sample sizes in case study research
and from the need to break the analysis out of limited ways of viewing the data.
Highlighting similarities and differences with the literature can help to raise the
theoretical level, improve the generalizability of the findings, and strengthen the
internal validity of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989).
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R.10. Theoretical Saturation
Data collection and analysis conclude when theoretical saturation is achieved.
At this point, collecting additional data results in only marginal improvement because
the most relevant phenomena have already been recorded and analyzed. Pragmatic
considerations also factor into theoretical saturation, such as limited time and money
for continuing the research. At this stage the final case report is written up and the
study concluded.
R. 11. Evaluation Standards
Quantitative evaluation criteria such as internal and external validity,
generalizability, and reliability entail certain assumptions that are inconsistent with the
philosophies of science which underpin qualitative research. Many efforts have been
made to reconcile these differences, either by redefining or reconceptualizing
quantitative standards within a qualitative context (e.g., LeCompte & Goetz, 1982), by
proposing entirely new alternative standards for evaluating qualitative research (e.g.,
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stewart, 1998; Arnould & Epp, 2006), or by dismissing such
debates as semantic distractions (Wolcott, 1994). Regardless of the particular names
which are used, it is clear that different criteria are needed to evaluate qualitative
research. This section examines some of the qualitative alternatives which have been
proposed for internal and external validity, generalizability, and reliability.
In quantitative research, internal validity gets at the question of whether an
instrument measures what it purports to measure. Such a criteria presupposes that a
single correct view of reality exists, an assumption at odds with the social
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constructivist foundations of qualitative research. Credibility (whether interpretations
are adequate or believable) and veracity (truthfulness of depiction) are proposed
alternatives to internal validity which avoid making this assumption (Lincoln & Guba,
1985; Stewart, 1998; Arnould & Epp, 2006). A variety of techniques are available to
strengthen credibility, such as prolonged engagement and persistent observation;
triangulation of methods and ^different classes of informants; informant member
checks; and face validity. Veracity may be enhanced by linking findings to context;
employing multiple methods of data collection; and searching for disconfirming cases.
In quantitative research, generalizability refers to the extent to which findings
are applicable to other populations. However, qualitative research does not sample
populations - it samples theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003, pg. 10). Maxwell (1996,
pg. 96-98) argues that it is important to distinguish between internal and external
generalizability when assessing the applicability of qualitative research. Internal
generalizability refers to the applicability of the conclusions within die immediate
substantive setting or group under study, and external generalizability refers to the
applicability of the conclusions beyond that context. Maxwell considers internal
generalizability much the more important of the two, with external generalizability
viewed as either a minor concern or counterproductive to the aims of the study. In
cases where generalizability is not seen as appropriate standard, two proposed
alternatives are perspicacity (the ability to convey new understanding and insight into
the data) and transferability (the extent to which these insights can be employed in
other contexts) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stewart, 1998; Arnould & Epp, 2006).
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Methods for strengthening these include actively identifying boundary conditions to
explain where and why an interpretation fails, and theoretical sampling to ensure a
diversity of sites, settings, events, and classes of informants.
In quantitative research, reliability refers to the likelihood that similar findings
would be reached by other researchers. However, qualitative research investigates
social phenomena which are innerently context-bound, dynamic, and not replicable;
thus, alternative standards are needed. Dependability is proposed as the ability to
construct an interpretation that excludes sources of instability other than those which
are intrinsic to the phenomenon itself (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stewart, 1998; Arnould
& Epp, 2006). There are several methods for strengthening dependability, such as
employing longitudinal data collection; using multiple data collection methods with
the same informants; using multiperson teams; asking informants and knowledgeable
authorities to verify findings with the intention of reducing bias; and describing the
context of the findings in sufficient detail that they could potentially be discontinued
by a follow-up study.
Conflrmability refers

to the ability to reconstruct the

researcher's

interpretations by examining data trails and other records of the research process
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stewart, 1998; Arnould & Epp, 2006). Techniques for
strengthening confirmability include disciplinary triangulation; qualitative and
quantitative data triangulation; personalized journal writing; and using an outside
auditor to examine the correspondence between the data and the report.
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Integrity refers to the extent to which interpretations are unimpaired by
informant lies, evasions, misinformation, or misrepresentation. Techniques for
improving integrity include prolonged engagement; development of rapport and trust
between researchers and informants; triangulation; good interviewing technique;
ensuring informant confidentiality; and personalized journal writing (Lincoln & Guba,
1985; Stewart, 1998; Arnould &*Epp, 2006).
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APPENDIX S. FOLK UTILITY
As solutions settle into habits, we easily fall into a pattern of categorizing or
pigeonholing our reasons for using or rejecting technologies. We speak of showstoppers, contenders, longshots, drawbacks, or perks, but seldom do we reflect on
precisely what these terms mean or what they might imply about the decision making
process. Yet shorthand expressions such as these can reveal hidden insights into the
sense-making aspects of adoption. Since philosophers refer to commonsense systems
of meaning as folk theories, it is useful to refer to these informal expressions by the
collective term folk utility. By conducting a microanalysis of these folk utility
expressions and restating them in formal, operational terms, we can gain new insight
into the nature of technological innovation. We will turn our attention to two groups
of idiomatic, adoption-related expressions: beliefs about technologies, and beliefs
about motives.

S.l. Technological Pigeonholes
Selecting, evaluating, and maintaining revolve around seven criteria:
-

Is this option relevant to my needs? {Relevance)

-

Have I previously used this option to meet my needs? {Familiarity)

-

Is this option worthwhile, counterproductive, mixed, or of unknown
worth in terms of meeting my needs? {Valence)

-

Can I obtain this option? {Obtainability)

-

Do I already have this option? {Accessibility)
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-

Does this option function? (Operability)

-

Is my need in the present or the future? (Timing)

It is revealing to look at valid combinations of these criteria (see Table 29.)
These combinations are not independent, but cluster naturally into pigeonholes such
as 'longshots', 'nonstarters', and 'contenders'. Since these categories refer to options
rather than motives, it is useful to refer to them as 'technological pigeonholes.'
TABLE 29. TECHNOLOGICAL PIGEONHOLES (TABULAR VIEW)
Relevance
X

Obtainability
X
*

Timing
X
^

Accessibility
X
'

Operability
X
-

Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant

Unobtainable
Unobtainable
Obtainable
Obtainable

*
*

Inaccessible
Accessible
Inaccessible
Accessible

*
Inoperable
*

Relevant
Relevant
Relevant

Unobtainable
Obtainable
Obtainable

Accessible
*

Operable
*

Accessible

Operable

Relevant
Relevant
Relevant

Unobtainable
Obtainable
Obtainable

Future
Present

Accessible
*

Operable
*

Accessible

Relevant
Relevant
Relevant

Obtainable
Obtainable
*

Future
Future
*

Inaccessible
Accessible
Accessible

Operable
*

Relevant
Relevant
Relevant

Obtainable
Obtainable
*

Future
Future
*

Inaccessible
Accessible
Accessible

Relevant
Relevant

Obtainable
Obtainable
*

Future
Future
*

Inaccessible
Accessible

Irivk'Miiil

Relevant

Present
Present
*
Future
Present
*

Accessible

Inoperable

Inoperable
Operable
*
Inoperable
Operable
*

Familiarity
Familiar
*
*
*
*
*

Valence
Unknowij

Pigeonhole
(invalid)

X

Nonsequitur

*
*
*
*

Moot
Moot
Moot
Moot

Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar

Negative
Negative
Negative

Nonstarter
Nonstarter
Nonstarter

Familiar
Familiar
Familiar

Negative
Negative
Negative

Reject
Reject
Reject

Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
*
*
*

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Longshot
Longshot
Longshot

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Mixed Bag
Mixed Bag
Mixed Bag

*

Positive
Positive

Possibility
Possibility

Positive

Contender

Inoperable
Operable

*
*

X = undefined value; * = any value

Truth tables are difficult to read since they do not take the order of evaluation
into account. But if we evaluate these conditions one at a time and define 'ready to
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use' as the combination of (accessible + operable), then we can redraw Table 29 as a
hierarchy:
ready to use
positive
valence

->

Contender

•>

Possibility

-*•

Mixed Bag

-*•

Longshot

->

Reject

-*•

Nonstarter

•+•

Moot

not ready to use, but needed in future and obtainable

mixed
valence
else
unknown
valence

relevant

familiar
negative
valence
unfamiliar

Technological
Pigeonhole

not ready to use, and needed immediately or unobtainable

•

Nonsequitur

Figure 113. Technological Pigeonholes (Hierarchical View)

Even if these informal names are culture- and language-specific, the resulting
pigeonholes do seem to be expressing something essential about human decision
making:
-

A nonsequitur is an option which is irrelevant to the need at hand. For
example, a garden hose is no help in terms of getting to work.

-

An option which is moot is currently inaccessible and/or inoperable, and
is excluded from consideration because it is (1) needed immediately, or
(2) needed in future but unobtainable. If you needed to leave for work
right away, a bicycle would be moot if you did not own one (present need
+ inaccessible) or if it had a flat (present need + inoperable.) Even if you
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didn't need to go to work until later in the week a bicycle would still be
moot if your town had no bike shop to repair the flat (future need +
inoperable + unobtainable.)
-

A nonstarter is an option which has been dismissed prior to initial use
because of negative valence. For example, someone might decide not to
attend a play after reading an unfavorable review in the newspaper.

-

A reject is an option which has been dismissed after initial use due to
negative valence. For example, a computer user might conclude that
Windows Vista is no longer worth the trouble it causes, and decides to
switch to Macintosh.

-

A longshot is an unfamiliar option of unknown value. For example,
several informants knew of Flexcar, but held no opinion of the service
and had knew very little about it except that it existed.

-

A mixed bag is an option with both positive and negative aspects. For
example, informant #4 used Flexcar for many years and developed a
nuanced view of it which was neither wholly favorable nor unfavorable.

-

A possibility is a option under consideration for future use which is
relevant, obtainable, and has positive valence - but which is inaccessible
or inoperable at the present time. Informant #8 formed an early intention
to use Flexcar as a solution to her family's transportation crunch, but
delayed signing up for the service for several months because she did not
perceive an immediate need.
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-

A contender is an option which is relevant, accessible, operable, and has
positive valence. As long as the option is ready to use, it does not matter
whether it is obtainable. One of my favorite computer games is the
Windows 3.1 version of Risk. It still works, but should I ever lose it I
might find it difficult if not impossible to replace.

Maintenance plays an important role in determining whether an option is
viable. Basic viability is determined by relevance, obtainability, accessibility,
operability, and timing. By contrast, valence and familiarity tend to be used to
resolve tradeoffs during the choice stage, after viability has been established (Figure
114.)
Familiarity

Positive or
Unknown
Valence

Unfamiliar

Familiar

Longshot

Possibility (future)
Contender (present)

Mixed

Negative

Mixed Bag

Nonstarter

Reject

Figure 114. Resolving Tradeoffs: Familiarity and Valence

S.2. Motivational Pigeonholes
A second set of pigeonholes refers to the reasons behind a decision, whether
pro or con. Five 'motivational pigeonholes' emerged from the grounded analysis:
clinchers, perks, washes, drawbacks, and show-stoppers. A microanalysis of these
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reasons revealed that they originate in the capabilities and requirements of each
option. They can be distinguished by four criteria:
-

Does the reason refer to a capability or a requirement? (Polarity)

-

If the reason refers to a capability, it is useful at solving a requirement? If
it is a requirement, is it solved by a matching capability? (Reciprocity)

-

If it is a capability which solves a requirement, is that requirement
germane to the decision frame, or is it extraneous? (Topicality)

-

If it is a capability which solves a germane requirement, are there other
options which offer similar capabilities, or is the capability unique to this
option? (Exclusivity)

The truth table for these criteria is shown in Table 30.
TABLE 30. MOTIVATIONAL PIGEONHOLES (TABULAR VIEW)
Polarity
Requirement
Requirement
Capability
Capability
Capability
Capability

Reciprocity
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Matched
Matched

Topicality
X
\
X
LxlianeoiK
Germane
Germane

Exclusivity
\
X
X
\
Common
Unique

Pigeonhole
Show-Stopper
Drawback
Dunsel
Perk
Wash
Clincher

X = undefined value

On the basis of this analysis a previously unsuspected sixth pigeonhole was
identified, the dunsel. Figure 115 expresses the truth table as a hierarchy:
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unique
germane

Clincher

Wash

useful

extraneous

capability

Perk
not useful

Dunsel

Motivational
Pigeonhole
solved

Drawback

requirement
unsolved

Show-Stopper

Figure 115. Motivational Pigeonholes (Hierarchical View)

S.2.1. Show-Stoppers
A show-stopper is an optional requirement with no satisfactory solution. It is
a factor beyond the user's control which cannot be 'spun' or reframed; there is
simply no getting around it. A show-stopper is a decisive reason against selecting an
option:
"I could ride my bike to the Park and Ride and leave my bike. They
have those covered things that are locked; so I could leave the bike
there. But it's my backpack. People tease me that I have enough stuff
in there to.. .1 could go for a week and not ever have to.. .1 mean, I've
got saline solution for my contacts; I've got my CD player; and my
lunch, usually. And you know...snacks and various things. So, it's a
day pack backpack. I put this in it. [#14 indicates a large purse] I feel
safer if my purse is inside the zipped backpack. Umbrella, you know,
everything. And then, plus with my workout bag, that has my workout
clothes and my shoes and stuff in it, I thought 'How can I do that on
my bike?' I really can't." [#14]
A show-stopper has negative utility and always manifests itself as an absence
of something needed.
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Technology
(no matching
capability)

Requirement

Figure 116. Show-Stoppers

S.2.2. Drawbacks
A drawback is an optional requirement with a satisfactory workaround.
Technology
Capability
(workaround)

-o>-

Requirement

Figure 117. Drawbacks

After biking to work a person might need to shower and change clothes. If
there are shower and locker facilities at work, then a workaround exists and the
reason would be seen as a drawback. But if no such facilities exist and no other
workaround can be found, then the reason would be seen as a show-stopper.
A drawback has negative utility, but it is generally not grounds for excluding
an option unless a rival offers a superior solution, or the option imposes too many
drawbacks, or if a workaround fails to materialize. Drawbacks are risky, of course,
since they can devolve into show-stoppers, but users are forgiving up to a point.
Beach and Strom (1989) found that tolerance for drawbacks runs out at around four
violations.
Drawbacks can change into show-stoppers (and vice versa) as a result of the
maintenance process; for example, a printer may run out of ink, rendering it
inoperable. When an option stops providing certain capabilities, any bundled
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technologies which depend on these capabilities may also become inoperable (see
Figure 118).

Maintenance events
cause capabilities
to vanish and reappear..

. causing drawbacks in bundled
technologies to change into
show-stoppers or back again

Figure 118. Bundles and Maintenance Events

S.2.3. Dunsels
•
A dunsel• 5 is
a capability so useless it cannot even be regarded a perk.

Technology
(no matching
requirement)

f")

Requirement

Figure 119. Dunsels

During the late 1980s, the ISDN digital telephone service became
disparagingly known as "innovation subscribers don't need." Some informants came
to regard Flexcar's capabilities as dunsels:
"I was a [Flexcar] member, because I got this free membership. And I
never actually used it. I signed up for it: 'This is great! I don't have a
car at work, and I need a car to go somewhere.' And there's like 10 of
them within a block of this building. But I've never used it. It turns
out that when you're here you don't need a car for any place you want
to go. It's all within walking distance, or you can easily just hop on
the bus, or I've got my bike. So if I want to go somewhere, and I
don't want to do it on the bike or the bus, it's because, you know, I
need to get home with some big piece of furniture. And then, of
course, I need to take it all the way home, not here. So the Flexcar
doesn't help a whole lot. I signed up for it right away when I got my
1

The term 'dunsel' wasfirstcoined in an episodefromthe original 1960s Star Trek television series.
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transit pass, because it was free. If there was one within walking
distance of my house I would sell my car, I think. But there isn't."
[#5]
A dunsel can become a drawback if an option includes are too many of them,
or if they begin to interfere with the other capabilities of the option - a condition
known variously as 'feature creep', 'feature fatigue', or 'featuritis' (Thompson et al.,
2005). The notorious animated paperclip from Microsoft Office 97 is a classic
example of a dunsel that backfired: not only did the paperclip serve no useful
purpose, it created an annoying distraction. Thus, a dunsel is a capability with
negative utility.
S.2.4. Perks
A perk is useful, but not in a way that is germane to the decision frame.
Decision Frame

Technology

Requirement
(extraneous to the
decision frame)

<o-

Capability

Figure 120. Perks

A perk is an excess capability, a side benefit which provides a mildly positive
utility. Several informants described the 'green' benefits of public transit and bike
commuting as something of a perk:
"I don't ride to do good. Doing good is a side benefit; it's a perk.
That's not what motivates me to get up and get on my bike every day.
I get on it because I enjoy it. I like getting exercise every day; I like
the way I feel. I just enjoy being out there, riding. It's something I've
enjoyed doing all my life." [#22]
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S.2.5. Washes
A wash does something which is useful and germane, but not unique; other
options provide similar capabilities. There is a paradoxical aspect to washes. They
are undeniably useful, and should have positive utility if considered in absolute
terms. For example, the ability of a cell phone to place a call is still beneficial, even
if all other cell phone provide that same capability. However, washes are not helpful
in resolving tradeoffs among options, so they cancel each other out and drop out of
consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Montgomery, 1983). They are so taken
for granted that they may be seen to provide no utility. They become a desensitized
part of the background, and even mentioning their existence may risk a dismissive
response.
Decision Frame
Requirement

Technology A

KoH

Capability

Technology A and B provide substantially similar capabilities.
Decision Frame
Requirement

Technology B
( £ )

Capability

Figure 121. Washes

When selling bike commuting to his friends informant #4 considered its
'green' benefits to be a wash.
"If everybody's using the same argument then it doesn't really carry a
lot of value. [Laughs] If everybody's sort of beating on the
environmental drum, one more guy beating on the drum is not going
to make a huge difference. The environmental aspect is there, though
it's not one I think about a whole lot. I think that argument is taken
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care of well by others in the community who speak more eloquently
towards that than I will, and I don't sell that argument well within my
group of friends. I think of the fun aspect when I'm selling [bike
commuting] to friends, and there's definitely sort of an identity thing
built into it." [#4]
S.2.6. Clinchers
A clincher is a capability which is useful, germane, and unique. Uniqueness
.»

is defined as a level of performance that no rival can match, either because they lack
the capability or because their capability is of inferior quality. Differences in
performance are always judged with respect to the situation; it is futile to offer
capability in excess of the requirements. For example, a car offers greater range than
a bicycle, but this additional range is immaterial if the situation only involves a trip
of a few blocks.
Decision Frame

Technology A

Requirement

( (f~)

Capability

Technology A provides a meaningfully greater
level of capability than Technology B...
Decision Frame

Technology B
Capability

Requirement

..whereas in Technology C the capability is entirely absent.
Decision Frame

Requirement

Figure 122. Clinchers

Due to their uniqueness, clinchers loom large. A clincher is a tie-breaker:
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"[On campus] parking, the math doesn't make sense. You look at,
what, 70 bucks a month for staff to have a parking pass here? I
thought 'Well, I can give myself a thousand dollar raise by just taking
a bus.'" [#4]
Although a clincher is a decisive reason for choosing an option, it may not be
openly revealed - especially if the clincher might expose the consumer to guilt,
shame, embarassment, criticism, retaliation, disapproval, financial loss, or other
adverse consequences. An ulterior motive is a clincher concealed behind a, pretext a motive which is presented as a socially acceptable public front. Typically a pretext
is a legitimate motive, but not a genuine clincher; it is only espoused to be a clincher.
Often a pretext is simply an exaggerated wash, perk, or dunsel. Usually framing is
used in conjunction with a pretext to make rivals appear more unattractive by
limiting the alternatives to a single rival with known show-stoppers, or one whose
drawbacks can be easily misrepresented as show-stoppers. This process may or may
not take place on a conscious level: we can deceive ourselves. Depending on the
extent to which we have unpacked our own motives, we may reach a decision in
denial of the actual hedonic desires which are motivating the clincher. We learn early
in life that the preferred reasons for decisions are not always the real reasons.
Knowing that deception is possible, we develop 'theories of mind' to guess at
clinchers, for we know these can reveal a lot about a person.
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